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In this thesis, I contribute to the emergent English-language scholarship on little-
known 20th century German-Austrian philosopher Günther Anders (1902-1992), 
whose work is unique for its critical focus on technology. Anders studied under 
Husserl and Heidegger and was Hannah Arendt’s first husband. He also knew 
members of the Frankfurt School such as Marcuse and Adorno. However, he gained 
little notoriety during most of his life and has been described as an outsider of 
philosophy. In 1936, Anders fled Europe for the United States to escape Nazi 
persecution owing to his Jewish heritage. He returned to Vienna in the 1950s and 
dedicated the second half of his life to the struggle against nuclear weapons and the 
Vietnam War. In this thesis I argue that, despite often being associated with 
Heidegger, Anders’ experience of the Second World War led him to undergo an 
epistemological break. He turned away from Heidegger and towards Marx. Anders 
can therefore be viewed as a humanist-Marxist. His work updates Marx’s view of 
domination, alienation and ideology, applying it to the question of industrial warfare, 
nuclear annihilation and post-war consumer technologies. I show how aspects of 
contemporary digital societies illustrate Anders’ critical theory of technology. I 
choose two case studies: military drones and dating apps. I show that Anders’ theory 
can help us understand how these technologies are involved in modern forms of 
domination, alienation and ideology. I do this by using critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) to evaluate the written and spoken accounts of military drone operators. I 
moreover conduct 18 semi-structured interviews with dating app users, which I 
equally analyse using CDA. According to Anders, modern technologies allowed 
humans to act absent-mindedly without identifying with the consequences of these 
actions. This meant that terrible atrocities could be committed without the 
accompanying moral feelings of empathy and regret. I show how military drone 
operators and dating app users equally convey the sense of a conflicted 
identification with their own actions. However, I derive the concept of technological 
splitting to update Anders’ concept of Promethean shame. With technological 
splitting affects are not absent but expressed in a raw, overtly direct fashion. They 
can consequently be compartmentalised and split off from operators' and users' 
sense of self. 
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Dialectical relation: dynamic relation between two or more separate but mutually 
influencing categories. Examples: essence and existence; ideal and real; subject and object; 
freedom and necessity; ought and is; unity and separation; inner and outer; Eros and 
Thanatos. In Hegel’s philosophy, the tension arising from the interaction between these 
elements can be resolved by moving towards more general, all-encompassing concepts. 
Thus ‘reason overgrasps [i.e. reaches over and into] reality’ (Maybee 2009, 7). When applied 
to humans, this conception results in a view of ‘society as a complex of complexes’ (Fuchs 
2016b, 54). Society then forms a ‘totality consisting of overgrasping moments’ (Fuchs 
2016b, 54). 
Affordances: functionalities, intended modes of use and possibilities of use embedded 
within software and hardware design. This term seeks to find a middle ground between 
technological determinism and social constructivism. Users of technology are influenced 
and conditioned by software and hardware design. However, they remain situated agents 
able to discover new functions and ‘domesticate’ (Sørensen in Berker et al. 2005, 44) 
appliances. 
Techno-optimism/euphoria: the belief that technological progress automatically yields 
social progress. This leads individuals to over-estimate the emancipatory potential of new 
technologies, overlooking their negative effects. Techno-optimism/euphoria is connected to 
an optimistic hope that new technologies are the key to providing solutions to current and 
future problems. It consequently excludes social factors. 
Lad culture: male group behaviour characterised by ‘misogynist banter, objectification of 
women and pressure around quantities and particular forms of sexual interaction and 
activity’ (Phipps and Young in Lewis, Marine and Kenney 2018, 58). See also Nichols (2018) 
for the more complex concept of ‘laddism’. 
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Hook-ups: transient sexual encounters that are often direct and feature minimal 






ICTs: information communication technologies 
SNSs: social networking sites 
CDA: critical discourse analysis 
UAVs: unmanned aerial vehicles, a.k.a military drones 
PR: public relations; marketing 
15 
1. General Introduction 
 
1.1 The guiding research questions of this thesis 
The main research question of this thesis is: How does Günther Anders’ critical theory of 
technology help us analyse contemporary digital societies. To answer this, I first respond to 
the following sub-questions RQ.A: How can Günther Anders’ theory of technology be 
interpreted as a humanist-Marxist theory of domination, alienation and ideology? Chapters 
2 and 3 provide a foundation for responding to this question. I then look at RQ.B: How does 
Günther Anders’ theory help us analyse the way in which modern day examples of digital 
media are involved in the reproduction of domination, alienation and ideology?  
To respond to RQ.B, I select two case studies: military drones and dating apps. For the 
military drone case study, in the sphere of domination, I ask RQ1.1: What is the impact of 
the operation of military drones from a distance on operators’ psychological and emotional 
willingness to kill humans? In the sphere of alienation, I ask RQ1.2: What is the impact of 
military drone operator’s work on their personal lives, their feelings of shame and guilt, and 
their mental health? In the sphere of ideology, I ask RQ1.3: In what respects do military 
drone operators believe or not believe in the ideology of ‘surgical strikes’? 
For the dating app case study, in the sphere of domination, I ask RQ2.1: How does the 
design and structure of dating apps influence user behaviour and how does the knowledge 
or the lack of knowledge about the circumstance that all communication and activity on 
dating apps is recorded and can be shared with companies and the police impact the 
everyday behaviour of users? In the sphere of alienation, I ask RQ2.2: How does the use of 
dating apps impact users’ feeling of connectedness and isolation, their identity, their feeling 
of happiness and sadness and their perception of beauty standards? In the sphere of 
ideology, I ask RQ2.3: In what respects do users believe in or do not believe in the ability of 
dating app algorithms to create a “perfect match” of individuals? 
In answering these questions, this thesis aims to contribute to the emergent English-
language scholarship on Günther Anders (see Müller 2019, 2017, 2015; Müller and Anders 
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2016; Schwarz 2019; Beinsteiner 2019; Nosthoff and Maschewski 2019; Babich 2019, 2013; 
Dawsey 2019, 2017, 2012). In particular, I wish to develop an understanding of the parallels 
between Anders’ work and Marxian theory, showing how Anders can be used to update and 
apply the latter to the digital societies. 
 
1.2 Who was Günther Anders? 
Günther Anders was born Günther Stern in Breslau in 1902. Breslau was the largest city in 
the historical region of Silesia, which was governed by Prussia after 1742. The city is now 
called Wrocław and is situated in modern-day Poland. Anders died in Vienna in 1992, after 
becoming an Austrian citizen and spending most of the second half of his life there. Anders 
came from an intellectual family. His mother and father, Clara and William Stern, were early 
founders of the field developmental psychology (Driers 2018). Anders was also the first 
cousin of famous cultural critic Walter Benjamin. Despite presently enjoying little notoriety 
outside of Germany, Anders was involved in prominent intellectual circles of the 20th 
century. He went to university in Freiburg where he studied under the direction of Edmond 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger (Anders [1980] 1992, 430). He later moved to Marburg where 
he continued his studies and became friends with Hans Jonas. Anders would go on to marry 
Hannah Arendt in 1929, who also attended the same universities. He would later separate 
from her in 1936.  
Anders’ connection to German intellectual circles continued when, in 1929, he gave a 
conference on behalf of the Kant-Gesellschaft [Kant Society] in Frankfurt. The latter was 
attended by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Karl Mannheim and Paul Tillich (Anders 
[1980] 1992, 430). In 1930, Anders attempted to habilitate in philosophy under the direction 
of Paul Tillich in Frankfurt. This would have involved writing a thesis, the acceptance of 
which would have then allowed Anders to qualify as a teacher within the university of 
Frankfurt am Maim. He would have joined the Institute of Social Research, a centre for 
social theory with a strong Marxian influence that grouped together prominent figures such 
as Adorno and Horkheimer. However, his dissertation on the topic of philosophy of music 
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was rejected by Adorno (Anders [1980] 1992, 430). In his biography of Anders, Liessmann 
argues that this was due to ‘Anders’ supposed proximity with Heidegger’ (Liessmann 2002, 
139-140, computer generated translation). He further states that this ‘meant that the 
project could not be realised, which led to the subconscious resentment between Adorno 
and Anders that dominated their relationship for decades’ (Liessmann 2002, 140, computer 
generated translation).  
Anders nevertheless stayed in contact with members of the Frankfurt school including 
Adorno throughout his life. However, he also retained a critical perspective on their work. 
Hence Liessmann states:  
In American exile, Anders probably had contact with Horkheimer and Adorno; for a 
time he lived in Herbert Marcuse's house in Santa Monica; he also wrote a few 
articles for the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, mainly reviews. Anders took part in 
discussions at the Institute for Social Research, and in 1942 he also presented theses 
on a theory of needs there, without, however, belonging to the narrower core of 
exiled social researchers. His relationship with Horkheimer and especially with 
Adorno remained cold. Even after their return from emigration, their relationship 
remained extremely tense. On the one hand, Anders could not forgive Adorno for 
refusing an active commitment against nuclear annihilation, and Anders did not wish 
to be mentioned in the same breath as Adorno (Ketzereien, p. 318). On the other 
hand, Anders had always appreciated Adorno's philosophical, especially music-
philosophical, gifts. Moreover, the closeness of these two thinkers in terms of 
content is so evident that an enmity out of similarity seems conceivable. Out of all 
the Frankfurt School theorists, Adorno, whose critique of Heidegger also owes a 
great deal to Günther Anders, was the only one who for a moment, in Negative 
Dialectics came close to Günther Anders' radical concern about the man-made 
apocalypse: "No universal history leads from savagery to humanity, but certainly one 
from the slingshot to the mega-bomb. It ends in the total threat of organised 
humanity.” (Liessmann 2002, 140, computer generated translation) 
His proximity and distance from the Frankfurt School illustrates how Anders came to occupy 
the position of an ‘outsider of philosophy’ [Außenseiter der Philosophie] (Putz 2017, 160) of 
20th century philosophical circles. This explains why interest in Anders is legitimate, but also 
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only began to gain momentum belatedly outside of Germany in the last decade, particularly 
in Italy, France and now the US and the UK. 
After his setback in Frankfurt in the 1930s, Anders returned to Berlin where he became a 
journalist for the Berliner Börsen-Kurier (Driers 2018). According to a widespread but 
unverified anecdote, in the context of the rise of Hitler to power, the editor of this 
newspaper was concerned that the Jewish surname Stern was appearing under too many 
articles. Anders therefore chose a pseudonym, Günther Anders, which in German literally 
means different. When Hitler gained power, the Gestapo raided playwright Bertolt Brecht’s 
apartment and found Anders’ details on his address book (Liessmann 2002, 164). Anders 
had to suddenly flee Berlin. He moved to Paris, which he had already visited between 1926 
and 1928 (Arendt and Anders 2017, 187). Here he quickly became integrated within Parisian 
intellectual circles. For instance, he assisted Kojève’s lectures on Hegel (Young-Bruehl 1986, 
116). Hannah Arendt joined him later that year. This is where she would subsequently meet 
her second husband, Heinrich Blücher. 
From Paris, Anders eventually fled to New York in 1936 (Anders [1980] 1992, 431). Here 
he initially sustained himself through factory work and journalism. In 1939, he moved to Los 
Angeles where he also spent time working as a cleaner in prop rooms in Hollywood studios 
(Liessmann 2002, 24), possibly in the hopes of becoming a screenplay writer (Anders and 
Eatherly 1962, 28). These odd jobs were to provide him with significant observational 
material without which, he later professed (Anders [1979b] 2008, 69), he could not have 
written his magnus opus, Die Antiquiertheit Des Menschen [The Obsolescence of Man], vol. I 
and II, (Anders [1956] 1961, 1980). In particular, Anders' experience of the production line 
and the world of cinematic entertainment helped solidify this work's focus on the relation 
between humans and technological systems. Anders finally returned to Europe in 1950, 
after both his parents, who had also fled to the US, died in New York. He moved to Vienna 
and took up Austrian citizenship (Driers 2018). The city would constitute his base from then 
on.  
19 
Anders first published Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, vol. I [The Obsolescence of Man] 
(Anders [1956] 1961), in 1956. This work contained both a critique of the information 
communication of technologies (ICTs) of Anders’ time, the radio and the television, and a 
critique of the nuclear bomb. In a letter to Anders dated 9 January 1957, Arendt defined this 
as ‘excellent – the best piece which exists on the topic’ (Arendt and Anders 2017, 44, my 
translation). Overall, the work deals with the ways in which technology frames and 
conditions human life. Anders further shows how technology problematises humans’ 
relation to their actions, complicating their moral and emotional appraisal of them. This 
work crystallised Anders’ as a critical theorist of technology. His almost exclusive focus on 
technology sets him apart from most other critical theorists with affiliations to the Frankfurt 
School. Perhaps in some respects Anders’ work mirrors Marcuse’s while being tangibly 
different. 
However, Anders shunned an academic career, refusing a post as professor at the Free 
University of Berlin in 1958. Liessmann writes that Anders  
turned down a possible career as a literary essayist, which could have arisen after the 
success of his book Kafka - Pro und Contra, as well as a professorship allegedly held 
out for him by Ernst Bloch. (Liessmann 2002, 25, computer generated translation) 
This decision was probably due to Anders’ desire to address everyday people rather than 
academic circles.  
In fact, Anders states in the introduction to The Obsolescence of Man, vol. 1 (Anders 
[1956] 2003), that: 
the following pages are addressed first and foremost to consumers, that is, to the 
radio listeners and television viewers. They are only in second place addressed to 
professional philosophers and to the specialists of radio and television (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 98, my translation) 
In a later interview, Anders further argued that during the war: 
writing texts on ethics that only academic colleagues would have read and 
understood, would have been senseless and absurd, not to say immoral. Just as 
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senseless as if a bread maker only made bread for other break makers (Anders 
[1979b] 2008, 61, my translation) 
This gives an insight into Anders bitter view and relation to academia. Indeed Anders only 
published the second volume of The Obsolescence of Man (Anders [1980] 2011) in 1980 
towards the end of his life.  
Anders’ commitment to activism occupied most of his schedule and would have been 
hard to sustain through an academic career. Liessmann describes how: 
The extermination of humankind made possible by the construction of the atomic 
bomb became the subject to which he devoted the following decades of his life as a 
freelance journalist. In 1954, he became a co-founder of the anti-nuclear movement, 
travelled to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and published his reflections and observations in 
the volume The Man on the Bridge. In 1958, he flew to Tokyo to participate in the 
anti-nuclear congress taking place there, where he led a seminar on "Morality in the 
Atomic Age". In 1959, he began a correspondence with Claude Eatherly, the 
reconnaissance pilot who gave the signal to drop the first atomic bomb. (Liessmann 
2002, 25, computer generated translation) 
This mirrors Anders’ description of how: 
[b]etween the publication of the first volume and that of the second, I therefore 
dedicated the most part of my activity to opposing nuclear armament and the 
Vietnam war (Anders [1979] 2002, 12, my translation) 
The second volume of this work is largely a collection of essays written from the 1960s 
onwards. Anders maintains a provocative style in both these volumes. In them, he primarily 
took on the role of a ‘spreader of panic’ (Anders [1987] 2008, 84, my translation), largely 
alerting the world to the danger of nuclear weapons. Hence Anders did not arouse academic 
interest during most of his life. His work was primarily recognised toward the end of his life. 
For instance, he received the Adorno Prize in 1983 and the Sigmund-Freud-Prize in 1992 
(Driers 2018).  
 
1.3 Did Anders' alleged personal pessimism influence his critical view of 
technology? 
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Anders remained in contact with Hannah Arendt after helping her and her second 
husband Heinrich Blücher flee to the United States in 1941. The correspondence between 
the two (Arendt and Anders 2017) shows that they had a complex relationship. There are 
many points when the pair fail to meet. In fact, they only met twice after 1950. There is also 
a gap in the correspondence of nearly a decade and a half. Some have suggested that this 
indicates that Anders had a bitter and pessimistic character. According to this view, Anders’ 
rather pessimistic philosophy of technology derives from his equally negative personality. 
For instance, Di Cesare comments that, in the correspondence with Arendt, Anders 
employs a ‘cold and detached’ (Di Cesare 2017, XIV, my translation) tone indicating that he 
felt resentful and irritable towards Arendt. Di Cesare speculates that this is due to his 
jealousy at her success and notoriety. She hypothesises that, in turn, Arendt considered 
Anders to be a ‘megalomaniac, who was incapable of stable affection, and clumsy even in 
his work’ (Di Cesare 2017, XIV, my translation). She further portrays Anders as a failed 
intellectual with artistic aspirations, noting that for Anders the ‘outcome of the 17 years of 
emigration was disastrous’ (Di Cesare 2017, XIII, my translation). His poverty during this 
period ‘buried his dreams’ (Di Cesare 2017, XIII, my translation). Putz further notes that, 
with age: ‘Anders developed an image of himself that was not very humble. He sometimes 
adopted a superior tone. In short, he was not very easy company’ (Putz 2017, 156, my 
translation). 
Anders’ philosophy of technology is arguably fairly pessimistic. In the conclusion, I 
comment on whether it constitutes a form of techno-determinism, arguing instead that it is 
a form of techno-pessimism without techno-determinism. It therefore seems fair to 
speculate that Anders had a degree of pessimism within his character and that this was 
reflected in his work. However, the construction of the negative myth of Anders as a failed 
intellectual become bitter and existing in the shadow of Arendt — a difficult husband, with 
three failed marriages — is unhelpful in attempting to evaluate Anders’ unique philosophy 
of technology. In this thesis, I focus on Anders’ theoretical contribution. I exclusively look at 
his life history to further clarify his theory, without speculating on his personal character 
22 
and personal relations. In particular, I make the argument that Anders experienced a turn 
away from a Husserlian and Heideggarian influence and towards Marx and Marxism during 
and after the Second World War. 
Hence, in this thesis, I do not focus so much on Anders the polemicist or the activist but 
rather on Anders the theorist. The same condition as an outsider of academic circles which 
allowed Anders to be provocative also enabled him to develop an original and valuable 
theory of technological domination, alienation and ideology. In this thesis I argue that the 
latter can be seen as a continuation of Marxist themes applied to technology. The resultant 
theory is highly relevant to the digital era. 
 
1.4 Anders' reception and my argument regarding Anders' Marxism 
In Germany, scholarship on Anders started gaining momentum towards the end of his 
life. It then reached other continental European countries relatively quickly. In Italy, an 
edition of The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I, was published as early as 1963 by Il Saggiatore 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 4). His most important books were then published and republished in 
the early 1990s (e.g. Anders [1956] 2003, [1980] 1992). Interest in France followed, with his 
books being translated beginning from the early 2000s (e.g. Anders [1956] 2002, [1980] 
2002, [1984] 2015). Awareness of Günther Anders is just starting to gain momentum in the 
English-speaking world, though many of his books have yet to be officially translated into 
English. Christopher Müller, Jason Dawsey and Babette Babich are some of the first German-
speaking academics to promote Anglophone research on Günther Anders. Müller has 
translated some important texts of Anders’ into English such as Anders’ essay on 
Promethean shame (Müller 2016) and most recently Language and End Time (Sections I, IV 
and V of ‘Sprache und Endzeit’) (Anders 2019). Mounting interest in Anders in the English-
speaking world became tangible in 2019 when the journal Thesis Eleven (vol. 153, issue 1) 
dedicated a special issue to Anders. 
The German scholarship on Anders is arguably the most advanced. It is unique in 
evaluating Anders’ influences in terms of Husserl and Heidegger while at the same time 
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highlighting his, in some respects, less evident influences from Marx (see Dijk 2000; Clemens 
1996). The fact that I don’t speak German has meant that I have had limited access to the 
complete secondary literature on Anders. However, because growing up I spent 7 years in 
the Italian school system and the 5 remaining years in the French one, I am fluent in both 
Italian and French. This has allowed me to access the secondary literature on Anders in Italy 
and France. I have also been able to read an extensive range of Anders' work, as most of 
Anders’ books have been translated and published in Italian.  
Some translations into English of Anders’ work remain attached to anonymous 
documents found on the internet and particularly from sites such as Lib.com. An English 
translation of The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011), for instance, is a PDF 
document that appears to be translated from a Spanish version of this text. I have used 
these texts after evaluating that the quality of the translation is sufficiently good through 
comparisons with the Italian and French versions. When English texts were not available, 
wherever possible I have looked at Italian versions owing to the more established nature of 
the book editions compared to the French ones. I have looked at the original German 
versions of these works when I needed to consider specific terms used by Anders. Finally, as 
seen above, I have employed translation software to quote some passages on Anders from 
the German secondary literature. 
In preparing the theoretical foundations for the qualitative empirical analyses, I have had 
the opportunity to make a theoretical contribution to Anders studies. The latter follows 
leads within the German secondary literature, which emphasise Anders' affiliations to 
Marxism. Specifically, I have used Anders’ interview with Mathias Greffrath (Anders [1979b] 
2008), given at the age of 77, together with a comprehensive reading of Anders’ works to 
highlight that Anders’ thought is not continuous but subject to radical breaks. I have argued 
that Anders underwent an epistemological break with his early Heideggerian and 
phenomenological influence. Beginning from his early thirties, he turned instead toward 
Marx. Hence, in Chapter 3, I map biographical elements of Anders’ against the development 
of his thought. I originally argue that Anders’ thought can be divided into an early, middle 
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and mature period. Anders underwent an intensifying rapprochement with Marxism, which 
began from his middle period after his emigration to Paris. It intensified with his coming to 
terms with the Second World War, his emigration to the US and return to Europe in the 
1950s. This argument has allowed me to show that Anders’ theory can help us understand 
how technology is involved in the modern re-production of domination, alienation and 
ideology understood in Marxian terms. I have, moreover, updated Anders’ notion of 
Promethean shame through outlining a new concept arising out of my research: that of 
technological splitting. I outline this in the conclusion, tying it to domination, alienation and 
ideology.  
My reading of Anders as a Marxist represents a point of departure from most of the 
English-language secondary literature on the topic. For instance, Müller has highlighted 
parallels between Anders’ philosophy and postmodern thinkers. Thus Müller compares 
Anders with Derrida (Müller 2015). He further foregrounds how Anders’ philosophy can be 
linked to questions of big data and privacy, the hyper-visible (Müller 2017) and Masco’s 
concept of the ‘nuclear uncanny’ (Masco 2006, 27). Babich has focussed on how Anders’ 
philosophy relates to questions of the posthuman, reading Anders through reference to 
Husserl and Heidegger and comparisons to Donna Haraway, Friedrich Kittler and Bruno 
Latour (Babich 2013, Babich 2019).  
A notable exception is constituted by Dawsey (2019), whose latest work explicitly 
highlights Anders’ influence by Marx. In contrast, to Dawsey’s overall understanding of 
Anders as a post-Marxist, however, I view Anders as a humanist-Marxist. Humanist-
Marxism, which is also sometimes known as Socialist humanism, comprises theorists such as 
Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. It is notable for its focus on alienation and its rejection of 
a purely economistic understanding of the latter. Humanist-Marxists are also generally 
influenced by Marx’s early writings as well as his later ones. This chimes with Anders’ 
statement in 1979 that during his late twenties: 'the young Marx started to have a certain 
influence [on me], but that occurred only after my thesis' (Anders [1979b] 2008, 57, my 
translation). Barbara Epstein argues that: ‘Socialist humanism asked what human nature 
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consists of and what sort of society would be most conducive to human thriving’ (Epstein 
2017, 17). She further states that: 
What socialist humanists did (and do) believe is that there is such a thing as human 
nature, that is, that humans, like other animal species, have characteristics, including 
specific needs, abilities, and limits to those abilities. (Epstein 2017, 17) 
This view is compatible with Anders’ view of technology as exceeding the normal limits of 
human sentiments and faculties of understanding. 
Beyond its theoretical contribution, this thesis is globally an original application of 
Anders' theory to a qualitative empirical analysis of two case studies: military drones and 
dating apps. Overall, it shows how Anders’ theory can illuminate aspects of contemporary 
digital societies, while equally updating a humanist-Marxist critique of the latter. I show how 
Anders' theory can help clarify in what respects military drones and dating apps are involved 
in the reproduction of modern forms of domination, alienation and ideology. For the 
military drone case study, I look at a variety of material including poems, blogposts and 
interviews involving current and former military drone operators (chapters 9, 10 and 11). I 
equally supplement this material with YouTube comments and leaked documents. For the 
dating app case study, I conduct 18 1 hour-long semi-structured interviews with dating apps 
users (chapters 9, 10 and 11). I then employ CDA to evaluate the material and demonstrate 
how it both illustrates, and is clarified by, Anders’ theory. 
 
1.5 Anders' theory in relation to the case studies 
Anders’ critique of the nuclear bomb highlights its absolute nature, which arises from its 
power to destroy humanity. His critique is unique in employing the all-encompassing nature 
of this threat as a springboard to discuss the role of capitalist technologies more generally. 
Thus Anders’ theory connects weapons of destruction with ICTs. For instance, he argues that 
modern humans only apprehend nuclear explosions in the form of televised images of 
detonations from the comfort of their living rooms. According to Anders, the small format of 
television sets from the 1950s meant that nuclear explosions were represented as 
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insignificant, far-off events that did not directly concern the viewer. Thus Anders highlighted 
how modern media dissociated human perception and emotions from human actions, 
facilitating modern forms of domination, alienation and ideology. The fact that nuclear 
bombs could spell the end of the very people who built them illustrated this disconnect. 
Just as Anders’ theory produces a broad view of technology as a whole, I focus my case 
studies on two apparently disparate yet related pieces of technology: military drones and 
smartphone-enabled dating apps. Anders was concerned with assessing how technology 
mediated and framed human emotions, such as feelings of empathy and moral 
responsibility. Anders argued that: ‘Our soul has stayed way behind compared to the point 
reached by the metamorphosis of our products, that is of our world’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 
26, my translation). Hence he highlighted ‘the limits of all [man’s] faculties (of his 
imagination, of his capacity to feel, of feelings of responsibility etc.)’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 
26, my translation). If Anders was alive today, he would be interested in military drones and 
dating apps because these modern forms of technology frame and complicate two 
interrelated primary human drives: hate and love.  
Anders discussed how the individuals occasioning nuclear explosions were only directly 
involved in the factory production and aerial deployment of atomic weapons. They did not 
directly witness the devastation they achieved as a result of this activity. Thus nuclear 
bombs made killing operations seem ‘in order and clean’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 231, my 
translation). Military drones are unmanned planes that can stay in the air for extended 
periods of time. They are equipped with cameras and laser guided missiles. These are 
directly operated by two personnel that control the plane and receive battleground 
information through video- and audio-feeds, through monitor screens and earpieces. 
However, other teams also check the footage in real time and direct the operations. All 
personnel can sit completely out of harm’s way tens of thousands of kilometres away from 
the aircraft, which is controlled remotely via satellite and cable links. Just like the nuclear 
bomb, military drones involve a sanitisation of killing. They enable operators to conduct 
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strikes at a distance, viewing humans targets as pixelated silhouettes on black and white 
screens.  
Anders further discussed how the radio and television came to fulfil sociality needs of 
individuals who treated the images and voices they saw and heard as ‘portable chums’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 122, English in original). Anders described how humans could feel 
emotionally close to these ‘intimate ghosts’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 121, my translation), going 
so far as to prefer their company to that of actual people. I similarly look at how dating apps 
respond to users’ desire for proximity. Dating apps are image and geo-localisation-based 
smartphone applications that facilitate sexual and romantic communication. They enable 
users to assess and engage with others who are situated within a certain geographical 
region. This happens primarily through the digital portraits that each individual uploads 
onto their profile. If users mutually approve each other’s profile, they can send direct 
messages to one-another. Dating apps thus offer humans the opportunity to develop 
feelings of love and attraction through images and short form written communications on 
virtual chats. In chapters 9, 10 and 11, I analyse how this practice frames and influences 
modern sentiments related to sex and romance. 
Just as Anders did with the nuclear bomb and the television, it is possible to establish a 
connection between drones and smartphones, the hardware component of dating apps. 
Modern drone operations are based on the surveillance of phone networks and internet 
surveillance. For instance, SIM signals are often employed, instead of a laser beam, to aim 
weapons at individuals (U.S. Military 2013a) (B.5). Smartphones, in turn, can be used to view 
footage from drone video feeds, which record attacks and make their way onto video 
sharing platforms. These images show a sterilised view of killing that contributes towards 
modern ideologies and war propaganda. Similarly, Anders analysed how televised images of 
mushroom clouds could inspire enthusiasm for, rather than fear of, atomic bombs. 
Nuclear weapons can kill the humans deploying them. Similarly, there are contradictory 
aspects to the possibilities of riskless killing granted by military drones. Despite being 
considered ‘precision weapons’ (General Atomic Aeronautical Systems 2017, 4) (B.11), drone 
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operations are often conducted in remote areas. This means that there is limited 
accountability for who is killed, as there are no personnel on the ground to assess casualties. 
Innocents can be mistaken for enemies. At a distance, their killing may be perceived as a 
positive event. All this may fuel radicalisation, meaning that military drones can be involved 
in a form of technological overkill. Indeed one drone operator states: 
Obviously you're taking out a lot of targets and it looks good. But oftentimes, the bad 
side of a drone is the only thing that a person on the ground would see. 
(Westmoreland in Heller 2015, 50 sec) 
Here we find the interplay between 'appearance' and 'true function' (Anders [1997] 2014, 
48/83) that Anders highlights in relation to technology. It is not clear that ‘precision 
weapons’ (General Atomic Aeronautical Systems 2017, 4) (B.11) and the apparent effective 
use of drones is an accurate solution against terrorism. The use of such weapons may make 
the problem worse in the long run. 
In turn, there are contradictions within the affordances for high-speed sexual and 
romantic communication granted by dating apps. These are often advertised as a tool which 
opens countless possibilities of communication. However, use of smartphones also 
frequently interrupts and, sometimes, ruins direct face-to-face communication, as 
individuals develop the habit of constantly using and looking at their phones. Some have 
called the effect this gives rise to the ‘death of proximity’ (Miller 2021, 8). This resembles a 
process of alienation Anders described with regard to the television. He highlighted how the 
introduction of television sets within the home created obstacles for domestic 
conversations because ‘family members are no longer sat in front of each other’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 103, my translation). Dating apps similarly function through smartphones, 
which are individually handheld devices. This heralds the possibility of individuals being 
physically isolated from others and almost exclusively conducting sexual and romantic 
initiations through screens, rather than a fuller sensory appraisal of the other.  
There is evidence that many people are not satisfied with this situation. Most of my 
participants conveyed the sense that meeting people through dating apps is 'not as 
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interesting of a story' (J, female, age: 29) as meeting someone through chance encounters. 
Hence, similarly to drones, dating apps can be said to contain an element of technological 
overkill. In chapter 10, I argue that there is a reductive and standardising dimension within 
smartphone-enabled sex and romance. For instance, dating app use tends to diminish the 
narrative dimension of sexual and romantic encounters, which many people find appealing. 
In staging seduction as a competitive game, they further contribute toward general social 
media trends through which: 
friendships or romantic relationships are inscribed in ‘today’s new ethos of elective 
intimacy’ (p. 139) which emphasises choice, compatibility and mutual benefit. 
(Chambers in Gangneux 2021, 996) 
Similarly, dating apps offer affordances for users to pre-emptively describe what type of 
person (or in some cases what type of sex) they are looking for, even before they interact 
with their partners. Consequently, many respondents reported a ‘transactional’ (R, male, 
30; N, female, 30; E, male, 21; A, male, 27; Q, male, 27) and ‘disposable’ (S, female, age: 29; 
P, male, age: 31; J, female, age: 29) dimension within sexual and romantic encounters 
mediated by dating apps. For instance, one user stated that: 'the fact that everything 
becomes sexual might devalue relationships overall' (K, male, age: 30). Users must 
overcome these negative dimensions to establish the strong relationships many of them 
desire while using dating apps. 
The trend towards the standardisation of sex and romance resembles the one criticised 
by Anders in describing how lovers’ meetings now happen under the tutelage of a 
‘mechanical chaperone’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 108, my translation), the transistor radio. 
According to Anders, the radio sets the mood of the lovers’ encounter, as their simple 
human proximity no longer suffices. It thus offers a ‘pre-masticated sexual excitation’ 
(Anders [1984] 2004, 129, my translation). Anders also criticised the use of pre-recorded 
musical letter tapes, over which people could record a message to send to their lovers, 
stating that this meant that their simple voice was not enough. He consequently called 
these tapes a ‘wedding matron made thing’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 105, my translation). 
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Similarly, dating apps represent a matchmaker made thing, as users rely significantly less on 
friendship networks and spontaneous social interactions to find sexual and romantic 
partners.  
They therefore also illustrate the general social trend toward mediatisation, ‘understood 
as the progressive temporal, spatial and social spread of mediated communication’ 
(Murdock 2017, 120), including within the intimate sphere. Their reliance on a business 
model centred on data mining, advertising and continued user engagement structures their 
design. They thus can be said to further illustrate the ‘commodification of social 
relationships’ due to ‘commercial dynamics’ (Hepp Hjavard and Lundby in Murdock 2017, 
129) and the notion of audience labour (Fuchs 2014a, 74). 
Dating apps experienced a boom during the Covid-19 pandemic as they became virtually 
the only legal space for sexual and romantic communications during lockdowns. In the US, 
according to some estimates 30% of all adults had previously used dating apps (Anderson, 
Vogels and Turner 2020, 6). A further 48% of adults between the ages of 18 and 29 had used 
these services (Anderson, Vogels and Turner 2020, 6). The pandemic saw around a 20% 
increase in dating app use. Tinder reports that 60% of its users reported feeling lonely 
during the pandemic (Tinder Newsroom 2021, 3). This suggests that dating app use is 
correlated with general feelings of loneliness in its users. The pandemic thus accelerated a 
pre-existing trend towards people increasingly relying on smartphones and social 
networking sites (SNSs) to fulfil their need for sociality (Lisitsa et al. 2020). In light of their 
increased popularity, one 2021 BBC podcast sought expert advice for their listeners on how 
to successfully use dating apps. A dating coach on the programme stated: 
the problem is it’s not so accurate because, you know, if you’re face-to-face, you’ve 
seen someone, you’ve had a connection… whereas if you’re on the app, [i]t could be 
an old profile. […] Nothing really replaces a face-to-face connection […] you can be 
messaging for weeks which is what I tell my clients to avoid, because you can waist a 
lot of time really, chatting to someone where you just really end up not having a 
proper connection with. (BBC 2021, 23 min 27 sec) 
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The advice is to just meet people face-to-face because that is when users will see if there is 
chemistry between them and their partners. So the question arises: in a non-pandemic 
situation, why is an app for sex and romance necessary in the first place? Does the use of 
dating apps not highlight the lack of free time and physical space at people’s disposal for 
general sociality? In that case, why should this increased use be celebrated in accordance 
with dominant techno-solutionist/optimist ideology, which I review below? 
 
1.6 How Anders' work fits into Marxist debates surrounding technology 
My thesis illustrates how Anders both challenges and adopts a Marxist perspective. This 
is useful in view of contemporary debates within post-2008 Marxism. Within Marxist theory 
generally, technological advance is the foundation for moving to a communist society. 
Increases in productivity mean that there is less labour time required to meet humanity’s 
needs. This leaves the rest of individuals' time free for a new kind of activity described by 
some as 'productive leisure' (Kurz [1991] 2011). However, at the same time, Capital, vol. 1 
(Marx [1967] 1990), already introduces the notion that machinery can become a mechanical 
vector of domination and exploitation. Here Marx states: 
all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that 
they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort 
the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage 
of a machine (Marx [1867] 1990, 799) 
This is despite the fact that Marx was not alive to witness the industrial killing of the First 
and Second World Wars, nor did he see the advent of nuclear weapons. Marx could 
moreover not foresee how deeply digital technologies would permeate everyday 
interactions in the 21st century. 
In the post-War era, Marxist theorists such as Marcuse did not hesitate to speak of how: 
Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and 
its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. (Marcuse [1968] 2009, 168) 
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This opens the paradox that 'to the extent that the technological project is in itself inimical 
to liberation it cannot serve as a foundation for it' (Vogel 1995, 25). Hence Marcuse calls for 
the production of a "liberated technology" (Vogel 1995, 25). The idea is not to reject 
technology wholesale but to think about the ways science and technology must be changed 
if they are to be integrated into an emancipatory political project. 
It is not immediately clear whether Anders' fits into this tradition. Indeed some of 
Anders’ statements such as that technology is ‘the subject of history’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 
1) appear to constitute a form of pessimistic techno-determinism. For instance, reflecting 
his broad interest in how technology shapes human life, Anders’ states that now it is not 
only human masters who determine social life directly: 
The determinant factor is, rather, the fact that the products have taken the place of 
our fellow men; therefore, also the fact that they mold the way man behaves with 
man. The fact that the motorbike or the television set or the world of phantoms that 
is shown every day on the screen has an impact on our behavior vis-à-vis these 
products is only one characteristic aspect of our current situation; another aspect is 
the fact that these products (or their possession) also collaborate in the molding of 
the forms of behavior with our own kind, whether our mother, the teacher or the 
girlfriend. To the extent that we have a code of conduct today, it is dictated by things. 
And social life, which takes place within the world of products, is a life molded by 
that world of products. (Anders [1980] 2011, 182) 
Some might link such a view to Anders’ Heideggerian background. Indeed Anders’ techno-
pessimism seems incompatible with Marxism’s reliance on technology as a foundation for 
human emancipation. 
However, I argue that these statements are instead connected to Anders’ later ‘contacts 
with Hegel and Marx’ (Anders [1973] 2017, 129). They should be understood in terms of a 
reversal of subject and object. This is the hallmark of Marx's notion of alienation and 
ideology. Indeed the above quote parallels Marx's statement that in the factory system of 
organised machinery 'the automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely 
conscious organs' (Marx [1867] 1990, 544) of the machine. Similarly, Anders' theory is not 
one of direct determinism but rather of subject-object inversion. Anders’ highlights how 
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modern humans are influenced by the mode of use, of modern technologies. These are 
what the contemporary literature refers to as affordances, in an effort to find a middle 
ground between technological determinism and social constructivism (Comunello, Parisi and 
Lercitano 2020). This refers to the intended, as well as possible, uses that are embedded 
within a technology’s design. The latter are not neutral but largely derive from the economic 
interests of producers acting within the capitalist system. According to Anders, when human 
life is heavily mediated by such a technology, one which, in some respects, crystallises 
capitalist dynamics, humans' relation to themselves and their actions is fragmented and 
complicated as a result. Humans lose full cognisance of what they are producing and hence 
no longer fully control the objective world as subjects. 
Anders wanted to guard against dogmatic Marxism, which had emerged with the main 
European communist parties and their continued support for the Soviet Union. They were 
involved in a purely economistic view of alienation whereby the adoption of technology was 
seen as an easy solution to overcome poverty and alienation. Anders felt that this denied 
other forms of alienation, including technological alienation, which Marx had already 
discussed. Hence the economistic, dogmatic Marxist view showed a lack of understanding of 
Marx’s core message. It was unable to apply the theory to changing circumstances and the 
advent of industrial warfare. Accordingly, in his mature years, Anders states: 
We should not be very surprised that the believers in progress, whether pro-Marxists 
or anti-Marxists, should be so naïve as to praise technology in every circumstance. 
Those Marxists, however, who treat the term, “dialectics”, with more respect than 
they would a mere official business card, must not allow themselves to do so: they 
are obliged to recognize, investigate and combat the contradictions inherent to 
technology as such and therefore its potential dangers. There is nothing more 
ridiculous than to view these dangers as derisory and to view the investigation of 
these dangers as something ridiculously anti-Marxist. From the moment that Marx 
made the machine and the technology of capitalist society responsible for alienation 
and announced the self-transformation of the capitalist system into a socialist system 
—it does not matter whether correctly or incorrectly—he also affirmed the 
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dialectical overthrow precisely with respect to technology. (Anders [1980] 2011, 84-
5) 
This understanding cannot only help us think about the role of modern ICTs within modern 
digital societies. It can also help address the often-cursory look at technology provided by 
Marxist theories, which often are reductive in saying that it is simply a question of the 
capitalist application of technology that is the problem. These views do not adequately deal 
with how the design and function of modern technologies is also deeply structured by the 
dynamics of capital. They can therefore be a factor in reproducing the latter. 
The most striking examples of this form of reductive thinking within contemporary 
Marxism is provided by techno-optimistic/euphoric accounts such as Inventing the Future 
(Srnicek and Williams 2015) and Fully Automated Luxury Communism (Bastani 2019). The 
passage (Srnicek and Williams 2015, 145-153) in the former book where the question of a 
need to re-design technology is confronted is too small compared to the pivotal role 
technology plays in its main argument. For instance, Srnicek and Williams state that 'the 
design, meaning and impact of a technology are constantly shifting, altering as users 
transform it and as its environment changes' (Srnicek and Williams 2015, 152). Even though 
it is true that users can resist technological changes, there is a power imbalance when it 
comes to control over technology. This is due to how capitalist private property relations 
structure production. Existing technologies are not the result of free creative activity on the 
part of users. At best, they are commodities that are designed to appeal to consumers. 
In turn, Bastani's vision of technology tends to maintain its present role as a means of 
limitless accumulation. Accordingly, he promotes the notion of 'extreme supply' (Bastani 
2019, 37) supposedly granted by future advances in technology. Mirroring contemporary 
techno-solutionist ideologies, summarised in the expression 'click here to save everything' 
(Morozov 2013), he states that the 'technological fix is different' (Bastani 2019, 36) to other 
fallacious fixes. Techno-optimist/euphoric accounts thus risk celebrating the given, focussing 
on the ‘is’ rather than the ‘ought’ (Lukács [1923] 1971, 160-163) of technology. These 
accounts come very close to ‘identify[ing] technological progress with social progress, and 
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therefore political progress’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 16). They do not sufficiently emphasise 
some of the negative effects of capitalist technological systems. They do not highlight how 
the latter should be deeply transformed. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted what is problematic with techno-euphoric 
perspectives that celebrate the fact that individuals’ virtual life is their life and deride ‘a 
return to some human desire for face-to-face sociality and simple cooperation’ (Srnicek and 
Williams, 2015, 81). On the one hand, during the pandemic many people felt thankful for 
modern ICTs. These offered the possibility of a relatively rich communication at a distance. 
This improved people’s experience of lockdowns and social isolation. On the other hand, the 
limits of technological communication became apparent. For instance, in the context of the 
Covid-19 pandemic Fuchs states: 
Mediated communication can provide some emotional support, but lacks the 
capacity of touching, feeling, smelling, hugging, etc. one another. You can say nice 
words to a friend or relative via a webcam, but you cannot look him or her into the 
eyes, which is part of empathetic communication. […] It is much more difficult to 
communicate emotions, love, solidarity, and empathy in mediated communication 
than in face-to-face communication. (Fuchs 2020b, 380) 
Hence the experience of lockdowns has highlighted the limits of the ubiquitous use of 
modern ICTs. It has shown that the excessive use of digital technology can be sub-optimal in 
at least some areas of human life.  
In this thesis, I argue that two such spheres are the expression of aggression and love. If 
specific forms of technology have nevertheless been designed for these areas, this is 
perhaps an indication of them fulfilling a palliative function within modern capitalist 
societies. In the case of military drones, this fulfils a potentially counter-productive desire 
for de-caffeinated wars, wars without casualties on one side. These create an unjust 
situation that can fuel radicalisation. In the case of dating apps, smartphone technology 
provides an answer to the desire for efficient sexual and romantic encounters. However, my 
interviews suggest that, for many users, this desire arises out of a material limitation, 
namely the lack of space and time allowing for more general forms of socialisation. It is not 
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due to an inherent desire for efficiency in the sphere of love. This suggests that some forms 
of modern technology address the symptoms but not the causes of social unease. 
 
1.7 Presentation of the thesis 
This thesis first discusses abstract and essential concepts. It then applies them to more 
concrete examples. Hence the first half of the thesis is theoretical and the second is 
empirical. This allows me to show how Anders’ theory applies to the case studies. In each 
section, I focus on essential categories for social theory constituted by the human, 
technology, domination, alienation and ideology. These are also ordered from the most 
essential to the most complex categories. ln the case study chapter, the human and 
technology are involved in each of the subsequent concepts. This means that I focus on 
domination, alienation and ideology, from chapter 4 onwards. 
In chapter 2, I look at Marxian theory’s underlying theoretical foundations with regard to 
the human, technology, domination, alienation and ideology. I discuss the concept of 
human essence tying it to social production. This view encompasses humans' physical being 
as well as their capacity for conscious thought. Accordingly, I argue against anti-essentialist 
postmodern conceptions. I further argue against Heidegger's understanding of machines as 
separate from humans. Finally, I show how a Marxian view of domination, alienation and 
ideology is characterised by a separation and inversion of subject and object. 
In chapter 3, I make the argument that Anders' thought is not continuous but subject to 
radical breaks. Anders turned away from phenomenology and Heidegger and toward 
Marxism during the Second World War. His shift towards Marxism intensified during the 
remainder of his life. Hence Anders’ theory updates Marxian theory to account for modern 
technology. He develops the notion of technological alienation already present in Marx. 
In chapter 4, I show how Anders can be contrasted with other theorists of technology. I 
show that Anders is unique in focussing on technology. However, he also highlights that 
modern technical appliances are first and foremost commodities. They are shaped by this 
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condition. Consequently Anders shows how the television and weapons are artefacts that 
accommodate the demands of consumer capitalism. 
In chapter 5, I present the case studies and introduce the methodology I will use to 
analyse them. I show how military drones and dating apps mediate two interrelated drives: 
aggression and love. I show how I will analyse existing material relating to military drones 
including material written and spoken by drone operators. I further outline how I will 
conduct semi-structured interviews with dating app users, outlining a questionnaire. I show 
how I will use tools offered by critical discourse analysis to evaluate the resulting material. 
In chapter 6, I discuss how military drones make killing easy by analysing the terms used 
to conduct strikes and designate targets. In chapter 7, I discuss how use of military drones 
complicates individuals' relations to their own actions. Military drones offer affordances for 
operators to compartmentalise their 'war lives' and view the latter as something separate 
from their identity. Subsequently, I show how drone operators can adopt either distancing 
strategies or strategies of identification with regard to their part in drone killings. In chapter 
8, I show how videos of drone killings widely circulate on the internet and feed into racist 
ideologies, which pit good vs bad. I do this by analysing YouTube comments under such 
videos. 
In chapter 9, I discuss how dating apps reflect and reproduce lad and hook-up culture 
which pre-existed dating apps. Hence their structure is not neutral but tends toward 
organising sex and romance according to these very standards. I show how their very 
functioning offers affordances for individualistic attitudes regarding sex and romance. I 
discuss instances of sexual harassment reported by some of my participants. In chapter 10, I 
highlight how dating apps tend toward fragmenting and standardising individuals' 
experiences of sex and romance. For instance, I discuss practices of direct sex on dating 
apps and users' feelings of alienation stemming from the standardised, mechanical nature. 
In chapter 11, I discuss how dating app companies' public relations (PR) has evolved and has 
had to adapt to users’ common sense regarding dating apps. 
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In chapter 12, I conclude by updating Anders’ concept of promethean shame through the 
notion of technological splitting. I show how this notion relates to the spheres of 
domination, alienation and ideology. It concerns a split between the self-presentation of 
users and their ‘real life’ identity. As a result, individuals tend to express aggressive and 
libidinal drives in a more direct, unsophisticated way. They thus deny feelings of 
responsibility and adopt reductive ideologies. I conclude by arguing that Anders’ philosophy 
of technology is not techno-determinist but techno-pessimist. Anders never saw technology 
as separate from capitalist dynamics, but as embodying and crystallising the latter. 
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2. Theoretical Foundations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the main arguments I make in this thesis, and which I detail in chapter 3, is that 
Günther Anders can be understood as a humanist-Marxist. Hence I resist the temptation to 
categorise him as a postmodern thinker, as other scholars have tended to do (e.g. Babich 
2013, 2019; Nosthoff and Maschewski 2019; Beinsteiner 2019; Müller 2015). The latter may 
arise because of his focus on elements that seem so relevant to the period in which 
postmodern theory arose (1970-1990). But, instead, in this thesis I show how this focus can 
be used to update Marxian theory. 
I use this theoretical chapter to build a foundation for this argument by highlighting some 
of the weaknesses of postmodern theory. I look at Marxist and alternative views of the 
fundamental concepts involved in my thesis. Accordingly, I evaluate and contrast Hegel’s, 
Marx’s, Lukács’, Heidegger’s and Foucault’s understanding of the human, technology, 
domination, alienation and ideology. I contribute to debates surrounding Marxist versus 
postmodern views of these concepts by reformulating a dialectical materialist (Marxist) 
approach that links ideal and material processes. Indeed I use Marx’s and Engels’ criticism of 
the Young Hegelians to argue against what I see as equivalent positions held by postmodern 
theorists. I argue that the notion of human essence is not purely abstract and 
transcendental, as is suggested by thinkers such as Foucault. On the contrary, it is tied to the 
idea of man as a concrete, natural being. In turn, looking at the concept of human essence 
sets the ground for me to counter Heidegger’s notion that technology has an autonomous 
essence which is independent from humans. Instead, I argue that technology’s essence is 
tied to human activity. Beyond this, I praise some aspects of a postmodern theory of 
domination. But I show that these elements do not demand a complete rejection of 
Marxism. For instance, a concept of alienation grounded in human essence has some of the 
benefits of the postmodern diffuse and networked view of domination. But it makes this 
understanding more concrete, anchoring it to material processes. Moreover, in terms of 
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ideology, the postmodern overemphasis on discourse obscures the mechanism through 
which ideas can potentially be false and produce an inverted image of real phenomena. 
Indeed I argue that ultimately the postmodern argument re-establishes a form of idealism 
that understands ideas as a driving force behind material developments. One implication is 
that purely mental criticism is deemed sufficient for driving human emancipation. 
I now explain the order in which I treat the themes of my thesis: the human, technology, 
domination, alienation and ideology. This mirrors Marx's method of analysis. In the 
Grundrisse (Marx [1857] 1993), Marx lays out his method in opposition to that of the 
political economists of his time. This consists in ‘advancing from the abstract to the 
concrete’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 101). The reason that Marx gives for this rather counter-
intuitive approach is that ‘the concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many 
determinations, hence unity of the diverse’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 101). Therefore it should not 
constitute the starting point for the formation of categories of analysis. If one agrees with 
Marx’s method, the analysis should start from the most core, abstract categories and build 
successive layers of complexity on top of these. Hence adopting this method allows me to 
show how each category forms a basis for the next. In turn, this helps me show how the 
themes of the human, technology, domination, alienation and ideology are logically related. 
Thus in this chapter I make several arguments in relation to how the thesis’ essential 
themes fit together. Human essence is the starting point for my analysis. Human essence is 
revealed to be tied to community and social production. It is moreover characterised by 
subject-object identity, as humans can realise their subjective designs in the objective 
world. Technology, in turn, is shown to be dependent on humans. It represents the 
application of scientific knowledge about nature to practical ends. Hence technology and 
humans are closely connected. Subsequently, tools and technology can be linked to 
domination, because direct forms of domination depend on material resources. However, 
domination is also related to how individuals interact in their daily lives. Alienation 
represents a specific dynamic where domination is linked to systems that all actors feed into 
though their daily activity. Alienation distorts human essence, which is related to mastery 
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over the objective world, by separating and inverting subject and object. With alienation, 
the subject is now dominated by the object, the worker by his/her own product. As 
alienation inverts subject and object, it simultaneously concerns the ossification of 
subjective consciousness. Fixed ideas that mask and legitimate material domination and 
alienation form ideology. Class based society produces abstract, universal ideas that obscure 
concrete processes. These ideas feed back onto the interplay between human essence, 
technology, domination and alienation. 
Hence I structure my chapter according to this logic. In the section on the human, I first 
look at Aristotle’s and Hegel’s concept of human essence (2.2.2). I then oppose this to 
Foucault’s postmodern anti-essentialism (2.2.3). I conclude arguing in favour of Marx’s 
concrete, potentiality-based conception of human essence (2.2.4). In the section on 
technology, I first discuss Babbage’s distinction between tools and machines (2.3.2). Then I 
discuss Heidegger’s notion that technology has an autonomous essence, finally arguing 
against it (2.3.3). In the section on domination, I firstly discuss Marx and Engels’ critique of 
the Young Hegelians’ idealist concept of domination (2.4.2). Subsequently, I apply this 
criticism to postmodern theorists. In the section on alienation, I discuss religious (2.5.2), 
political (2.5.3) and economic alienation (2.5.4). These concepts highlight how alienation is 
characterised by a process of separation and inversion of subject and object. In the section 
on ideology, I discuss Marx and Engels’ materialist conception of the link between ideas and 
reality and show how they conceive ideology as a material inversion of this relation (2.6.2). 
Finally I show that the postmodern criticism of the concept of truth and emphasis on 
discourses risks reproducing an idealist concept of domination (2.6.3). 
 
2.2 Human essence 
 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Thinking about the human means engaging with the idea of human essence. An essence 
can be defined as that which unites members of a group of objects ‘regardless of the 
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endless multiplicity of their attributes’ (Marcuse 2009, 33). It reflects ‘a quest for the unity 
and universality of Being in view of the multiplicity and changeability of beings’ (Marcuse 
2009, 32-33). For instance, arguably, subjective consciousness is one of the essential 
features of humans. According to Hegel, humans can only discover their subjectivity by 
interacting with other humans. Moreover, humans can only realise this subjectivity by 
engaging with the objective world. Therefore essence is nested within the objective world 
and expresses itself in the latter. On this ground, I reject Foucault’s anti-essentialism, 
because it is based on the idea that essence is, on the contrary, transcendental. Foucault 
argues that any concept of essence posits the latter as existing in a completely separate 
realm. But this is not the case for Hegel’s conception of human essence. 
However, Hegel’s conception is not faultless. I show that it is idealist, as it assumes that 
reality and thought automatically mirror one-another. In this sense, it falls prey to Foucault’s 
criticism that the notion of essences denies the world any flexibility. Consequently, I show 
that human essence is best conceptualised in Marx’s terms. Marx understands human 
essence as tied to both natural necessity and freedom. Hence it gets expressed historically. 
This is because humans are able to consciously act on themselves and the objective world, 
bringing the latter closer in line with their internal designs.  
First, I look at Hegel’s conception of the human (2.2.2). Subsequently, I show that 
postmodern theorists such as Foucault have a reductive, transcendental view of essence 
(2.2.3). Finally I argue that Marx’s conception is the best at showing how essence is both 
tied to reality and expressed in various forms, meaning that human life can take on many 
different shapes (2.2.4). This understanding overcomes Foucault’s criticism to Hegel while 
carrying Hegel’s legacy forward. 
 
2.2.2 Hegel and Aristotle 
Hegel’s understanding of human essence mirrors Aristotle’s conception of man as social 
and political. In Politics, Aristotle famously argues that ‘man is by nature a political animal.’ 
(Aristotle 1999, 5) 
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However, Hegel’s conception is more dynamic. A social instinct is not simply ‘implanted’ 
(Aristotle 1999, 6) in man, as with Aristotle. For Hegel, on the contrary, human essence 
comes to fruition through a community. This is an idea that he fleshes out in 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel [1807] 1977). Here Hegel argues that ‘[o]nly in a self-
consciousness for a self-consciousness do we have a true accomplished case of self-
consciousness, where the object of consciousness is also its subject’ (Hegel [1807] 1977, 
520). Indeed one can regard the mind of another person both as a subject and object. One 
also distinguishes him/herself from such another through his/her dealings with them. 
Consequently, Hegel argues that ‘human nature only really exists in an achieved community 
of minds.’ (Hegel [1807] 1977, 43) These last element shows how, for Hegel, human essence 
is tied to subject-object identity, which he believes can only be achieved through 
cooperation. 
Another significant theme in this relational conception of human essence is desire and 
work. For Hegel, desire expresses the relation of the subject to the object at a fundamental 
level. The desired object denotes both the subject’s separation from (as in the case of a 
frustrated desire), and unity with, the object (as in the case of obtaining the object of 
desire). Subsequently, Hegel defines work as ‘desire held in check’ (Hegel [1807] 1977, 118), 
because it represents a deferral of gratification. But it is also an activity through-which the 
worker objectifies him/herself, i.e. transfers part of him/herself onto the object. In doing 
this, the object, which initially frustrated subjective desire, goes from being that which 
stands in the way of the realisation of the subject to the thing that helps him/her realise 
his/her freedom. Hence, for Hegel, ‘consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the 
independent being [of the object] its own independence.’ (Hegel [1807] 1977, 118) In other 
words, when it recognises that its activity can make the external world accord with its 
internal designs, consciousness gains a higher level of independence. Through work, 
humans can make the objective world theirs. 
 
2.2.3 Postmodern anti-essentialism 
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The preceding analysis reveals that Hegel’s notion of essence is tied to the objective 
world. Nevertheless, the notion of essence and human nature has been criticised by 
postmodern theorists for being transcendental. According to Foucault (1926-1984), one of 
the main thinkers that influenced this current, essence denotes an inner truth that lies at 
the origin of things. Foucault succinctly formulates his rejection of essence by stating that 
s/he who properly observes history  
finds that there is “something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless and 
essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was 
fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms (Foucault [1971] 1980, 78) 
In this formulation, Foucault reveals that, for him, what really counts in constituting what a 
thing is are all of its accidents, i.e. the forces that are exerted onto it externally. Foucault has 
drawn on Nietzsche to make this argument. The latter’s idea that things are subjected to 
change contrasts with Hegel’s notion of history as tightly connected to a subject both 
preserving and going beyond itself through change (Marcuse [1941] 1954, 138-142). 
According to Lukács (1885-1971), one of the most influential Marxist philosophers of the 
20th century, this type of relativism, which he saw in Nietzsche, is one 'where an 'absolute' 
is in some sense assumed' (Lukács [1923] 1971, 187). Thus endless fluidity becomes the new 
absolute. Accordingly, Lukács criticises Nietzsche because his 'relativism only abolishes the 
absolute in appearance' (Lukács [1923] 1971, 187). Paradoxically, by calling for an infinitely 
fluid approach, Foucault’s framework ends up asserting a form of rigid structuralism 
whereby there are no agents, only ever-changing paradigms in which individuals find 
themselves. For instance, Foucault substitutes for the notion of essence the notion of 
‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1980, 131) which structure human actions. 
On these grounds, I argue that Hegel’s conception represents a middle ground and a 
better way of conceiving essence as tied to material reality. In the next section I will show 
how Hegel’s conception of essence and human nature forms the basis for Marx’s normative 
conception of human essence. 
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2.2.4 Marx's reversal of Hegel's idealism 
There are many points on which Marx agrees with Hegel’s social and dynamic conception 
of human nature. For him, humans are socially productive animals because 
[n]ot only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product […] that which 
I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as 
a social being. (Marx [1844b] 2010, 298) 
Under this premise, Marx gives his key definition of human essence, which parallels Hegel’s 
notion of subject-object unity. For Marx, the distinguishing feature of humans is that ‘[m]an 
makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness’ (Marx [1844b] 
2010, 275-6). The subject can treat itself as an object. In Marx’s words, ‘just as society itself 
produces man as man, so is society produced by him’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 298). It is in this 
sense that Marx defines man as ‘universal’ and a species being [Gattungswesen]. This means 
that humans can modify the character of their own existence by understanding and 
determining their activity. 
However, Marx highlights how Hegel’s understanding of work in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit ([1807] 1977) is idealist. It is one where reality automatically follows the logical 
movement of thought. For Hegel, ‘a particular individuality is reconciled with pure thought 
itself’ (Hegel [1807] 1977, 130). Thus ‘[s]pirit becomes an ‘other’ to itself, or enters into 
existence, and directly into immediate existence. Accordingly, it creates a world’ (Hegel 
[1807] 1977, 467). Put simply, ‘thought is thinghood, or thinghood is thought’ (Hegel [1807] 
1977, 352). Consequently, Hegel defined the state as an “[o]bjective mind” (Hegel in 
Marcuse [1941] 1954, 213), a universal that perfectly regulated individual and collective 
interests. Opposing this, Marx and Engels criticised German philosophy for ‘descend[ing] 
from heaven to earth’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 36). For Hegel, ideas, not concrete 
activity, were the driving force behind objective developments. In contrast, in Marx’s 
analysis, concrete activity, or work, is not equivalent to thought but to material production.  
Marx insists on the idea that man ‘must remain in continuous interchange [with nature] if 
he is not to die’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 276). It is in the sense of this material necessity that 
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work is, first and foremost, a characteristic of human essence. Hence it is concrete work that 
makes human essence universal, for Marx. Marx and Engels will later argue that what men 
are ‘coincides with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce’ 
(Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 31-2). As will become clear throughout the thesis, Anders’ 
focus on consumer technologies analyses the link between humans and what they produce. 
Moreover, Marx argues that man is part of nature in so far as he is endowed with ‘natural 
powers’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 336) and ‘instincts’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 336). In this sense, 
Marx did not completely dissolve the concept of essence into endless flux as postmodern 
theorists such as Foucault sought to do, nor did he produce a completely abstract version of 
this like Hegel. For Marx, there is an original link to nature from which humans emerged and 
which they are not able to shake off. However, this should be understood as a beginning for 
a dialectical, i.e. historical, process.  
Thus Marx’s understanding of human nature as universal is best understood as 
maintaining and encompassing these contradictory elements. His concept of universal 
essence is summarised by Marx when he says that 
[a]n animal forms objects only in accordance with the standard and the need of the 
species to which it belongs, whilst man […] knows how to apply everywhere the 
inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with 
the laws of beauty. (Marx [1844b] 2010, 276) 
This invocation of ‘the laws of beauty’ shows how, for Marx, human essence can be 
understood in terms of the inherent actualities/potentialities of nature considered as a 
whole. Humans are universal because they are able to bring the immanent, ideal side of 
nature into existence. This equally means that they are able treat themselves as natural 
beings, while also fully developing their capacities and potentialities. 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
The idea of human essence need not be disconnected from reality as Foucault argued. 
Marx’s reversal of Hegel shows that human essence is both connected to reality and 
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expressed historically. Humans tend to want to harmonise subject and object, the ideal and 
the real. Hence there is an interplay between freedom and necessity, consciousness and 
human biology, when it comes to the expression of human essence at the level of existence. 
This shows how Marx’s conception does not posit human essence as transcendental, as 
Foucault would suggest, nor does he posit its expression as completely abstract. Instead, 
human essence is tied to, and gets expressed in, material reality. 
Technology, for instance, is a sphere where humans have objectified their powers and 






Basing himself on the work of Babbage, Marx argued that technology can be 
distinguished from mere tools in that it forms an integrated system where the action of 
many tools is joined together and operated by a simple transmission of power that sets 
them in motion. However, this does not mean that technology’s essence is disconnected 
from humans, as Heidegger’s conception suggests. Technology is based on human scientific 
discoveries, and it has to be built and maintained by individuals. Hence technology’s essence 
is not independent from humans but fundamentally connected to them. 
Firstly, I look at how Marx defined machines in line with the scientific thought of his time. 
I also show how Marx and Engels produced a demystifying view of machines that shows 
how they are built by humans. Secondly, I argue against Heidegger’s notion that technology 
has an independent essence that is separated from humans. 
 
2.3.2 What is a machine? 
The word technology comes from the Greek technē, which means art or craft. However, 
as opposed to simple tools, the notion of technology refers to complex systems, especially 
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in industry, as well as the branch of knowledge dealing with the latter. Consequently, I will 
begin my treatment of technology by discussing the emergence of machinery from the start 
of the industrial revolution. I use Marx because his work dealt with this time-period. 
As has been highlighted by Wendling (Wendling 2009, 61), Marx was an attentive reader 
of the scientific literature that accompanied the new inventions and discoveries of his time. 
His mature thinking surrounding machines is significantly based on the writings of Charles 
Babbage (1791-1871), an English philosopher and engineer. Babbage is credited with 
conceptualising the first computer. The latter was not electric but mechanical in its 
proposed operation and a working model of it was only built long after Babbage’s death. 
A central theme that emerges out of Marx’s reading of Babbage is that what 
distinguishes a machine from a mere tool is that machines incorporate the action of many 
different tools, which are activated through a single driving mechanism. Accordingly, Marx 
cites the following passage in Babbage’s Traité sur l'économie des machines [Treatise on the 
Economy of Machines] (Babbage 1833, 230). 
While the division of labour has reduced each particular process to the use of some 
simple tool, the union of all these tools, actuated by one moving power, constitutes a 
machine. (Babbage in Marx [1861] 2010, 388) 
It does not matter whether the source of power is a human, an animal or an engine for this 
combination of instruments to qualify as a machine. In fact, Marx states that during the 
initial phase of the industrial revolution, ‘The motive force here is at first still man himself’ 
(Marx [1861] 2010, 392). The main fact is, however, that 
operations such as previously needed the virtuoso to play upon the instrument, are 
now brought about by the conversion of the movement directly effected by the 
simplest mechanical impulse (turning the crank, treading the wheel) of human origin 
into the refined movements of a working machine. (Marx [1861] 2010, 392) 
For Marx, this latter aspect is the real ‘turning point’ (Marx [1861] 2010, 392). It reveals that 
machines are things that replace the functionality of the worker. Marx will later reformulate 
a similar idea in the Grundrisse (Marx [1857] 1993) and Capital, Volume I (Marx [1867] 
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1990). Marx therefore argues that ‘the skill of the worker in handling [the tool] passes over 
to the machine’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 545). Consequently, Marx speaks of how capital aims ‘to 
transfer skill […] into the dead forces of nature’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 587). This gives a 
glimpse into the notion of technological alienation that I will develop in section 3.3 and 3.5. 
However, Marx also characterises capital in the form of machines as ‘dead [i.e., past] 
labour’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 548). Machines need to be firstly discovered through scientific 
work. Moreover, the machine itself is a structure that needs to be built and maintained by 
humans. Accordingly, Marx talks about how machines continuously enter ‘piece by piece 
into the process of valorisation’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 509). This forms the basis for their cost 
and shows that they are not completely free and independent. As a result, Marx’s 
understanding of technology is demystifying. Marx sees technology as tied to humans and 
as the result of their work. It is tied to the discovery and application of natural laws. 
Through speaking of how machines replace the functionality of workers but are 
nevertheless produced by them, this sets the ground for the notion of technological 
alienation. The worker confers life onto machines while sacrificing his own in the form of 
labour to maintain them. 
 
2.3.3 Does technology have an autonomous essence?  
However, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), one of the most influential philosophers of the 
20th century and one of Anders’ teachers, argued that it is not humans that structure 
technology but technology that moulds and conditions people. For Heidegger, technology 
encompasses humans instead of the other way around. According to Heidegger technology 
has an essence which is independent of humans. In other words, technology is autonomous 
and can bring its own essence into existence. 
There are two steps to this argument. The first can be found in the section of Being and 
Time (Heidegger [1927] 1967) which is commonly referred to as the “tool analysis”. Here 
Heidegger discusses the relation between individual phenomena and the world, or their 
environment. In this passage Heidegger discusses how we come to know things and their 
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relation to the world through our practical ‘concern’ and ‘dealings’ with the latter 
(Heidegger [1954] 1977, 97).  
Two important arguments emerge out of this discussion. The first is an embodiment of 
the idea that we discover what tools really are by using them. This is what Heidegger means 
by ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 99). It is only in this way that the tool 
‘manifests itself in its own right’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 98). In this regard Heidegger 
asserts that  
the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, the more we seize hold of it and use it, 
[…] the more unveildly is it encountered as that which it is. The hammering itself 
uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 98) 
This implies that tools guide our discovery and knowledge of the world while, at the same 
time, shaping our activity.  
The second is the finished version of Heidegger’s argument regarding technology, which 
can be found in his essay On the question concerning technology (Heidegger [1954] 1977). 
Here Heidegger argues that the essence of technology is tied to revealing. This is because 
new inventions allow humans to discover truths that they did not know previously. For 
Heidegger, technology ‘brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment’ 
(Heidegger [1954] 1977, 11). Consequently, it discloses to humans that of which they are 
capable. Moreover, a tool’s use is linked to its materiality because every technology has an 
adequate use. In this regard, Heidegger argues that the action of ‘hammering’ both 
produces ‘knowledge about the hammer’s character as equipment’ and appropriates ‘this 
equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 98). 
As a result, technology and tools have a determining effect on human life. They uncover 
truths hidden within the world and develop our consciousness. But they also determine 
their own mode of use. Therefore they shape both our knowledge and our activity. 
However, Heidegger distinguished between tools’ fundamental essence of revealing and 
modern technology. For Heidegger, modern technology has a specific mode of revealing 
called Gestell, or enframing. According to this view, modern technology does not bring-forth 
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the truth contained in nature, helping actualise its inherent potentialities. Rather, Gestell 
implies the notion of challenging nature and of placing upon it unreasonable extractive 
demands (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 15). Hence for Heidegger, modern technology has a 
specific internal logic, that of ‘maximum yield at minimum expense’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 
15). 
Thus Heidegger considers technology to have a fixed and autonomous essence that 
follows its own inner logic. For Heidegger, although ‘man drives technology forward [he is 
also] challenged, ordered, […] even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve’ 
(Heidegger [1954] 1977, 18). Hence ‘the unconcealment itself, within which ordering 
unfolds, is never a human handiwork’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 18). 
This highlights how Heidegger sees technology as prior to other factors such as the 
economy and society. He only mentions ‘profit-seeking’ once in his essay. He speaks of ‘the 
forester […] commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry’ and hence being ‘made 
subordinate to the orderability of cellulose’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 18). However, this is 
preceded by a discussion of how technology enframes nature. Therefore this argument 
seems to imply that profitability arises out of technology rather than the other way around. 
 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
I argue that this is the problem with Heidegger’s idea that technology has an autonomous 
essence separated from humans. This implies viewing technology’s logic of ‘maximum yield 
at minimum expense’ as solely related to the technology itself and as isolated from other 
social factors, such as the economy. 
By using Marx and Engels’ understanding that machines do not have a will of their own 
but that they depend on humans designing them and setting them in motion, we can link 
what appears to be the inner logic of modern technology to other social factors. I argue that 
the supposedly ‘inner’ logic that Heidegger attributes to technology is in fact related to a 
capitalist organisation of production and society. Social dynamics can become ingrained 
within technology. 
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Technology confers power to whomever controls it. Technology can therefore become an 
instrument of domination. Hence I place my discussion of domination after my discussion of 
technology. This is not to say that technology necessarily results in domination, but that it 





Domination can be understood as the use of power by an actor A over and against an 
actor B. For instance, Max Weber’s (1864-1920) definition makes domination practically 
synonymous with power. He states:  
In general, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or of a number of men to 
realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who 
are participating in the action. (Weber, Gerth and Mills 2009, 180) 
Hence arguably power involves domination and, in turn, domination is based on power 
over.  
This point is further developed by Weber’s discussion of how institutions are often 
involved in the exertion of power and domination. Hence Weber asserts that the 
'bureaucratic organization is technically the most highly developed means of power in the 
hands of the man who controls it' (Weber, Gerth and Mills 2009, 232). 
A more basic view is that control over means and resources, a category which includes 
instruments and machines, confers power and therefore can be used to dominate others. In 
what follows, I show how, in its simplest form, Marx and Engels' understanding most 
resembled this one. However, their conception also includes the idea that the organisation 
of production itself, and structures such as the state, indirectly subjugate workers. 
Firstly, I show how Marx and Engels’ view of domination was built in opposition to the 
Young Hegelian’s idea that domination was purely tied to false beliefs. Secondly, I show how 
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the postmodern conception risks falling into the same trap. I conclude that the view that 
domination is tied to material factors is preferable. 
 
2.4.2 Marx and Engels' critique of the Young Hegelians 
The Young Hegelians were a group of 19th century German philosophers. Marx was 
initially part of this group of ‘unruly spirits’ (Mehring 1962, 16), who contributed towards 
breaking the the ‘alliance between the philosophy of Hegel and the State of the Frederick-
William’ (Mehring 1962, 16). Indeed, Marx collaborated in journals with one of its main 
members, Bruno Bauer. However, he subsequently broke with the group because of what 
he saw as the members’ excessive idealism; that is, their faith in purely philosophical 
criticism as a means for emancipation.  
The German Ideology (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010) represents Marx and Engels’ major 
criticism of the Young Hegelians. The Young Hegelians adopted a position that saw ideas and 
beliefs as the source of domination. Thus they saw the role of philosophy in criticising these 
ideas as directly emancipatory. In their opposition to this view, Marx and Engels ridiculed 
the Young Hegelian’s idea that it was ‘only because of the domination of ideas and concepts 
that mankind has up to now been subjected to all sorts of misfortunes’ (Marx and Engels 
[1845a] 2010, 431). To them, it was fantastic to believe that ‘”the offsprings of [man’s] own 
head" […] begin to dominate’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 161) him as though they are 
concrete entities. They concluded that, through their understanding, the Young Hegelians 
ended up brushing aside the fact that domination happens because of real processes. The 
Young Hegelians were thus talking about ‘domination of spectres’, i.e. of ideas, in place of 
‘the domination of the many actual masters’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 223).  
Indeed, for Marx and Engels, domination had developed into class domination. A ruling 
class dominated an impoverished labouring class through their control of social production. 
Accordingly, the ‘personal power’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 329) of the ruling class 
was based 
54 
on conditions of life which as they develop are common to many individuals, and the 
continuance of which they, as ruling individuals, have to maintain against others and, 
at the same time, to maintain that they hold good for everybody (Marx and Engels 
[1845a] 2010, 329) 
To say this means taking an active position with regard to the idea that power is based on 
the possession of material means and resources. For Marx and Engels, it is not just who 
possesses what at a given moment that counts, but how resources actively get produced 
and distributed. 
Accordingly, for Marx, there is also a transition from direct forms of domination to ones 
that are indirect and less reliant on the exertion physical force. For instance, Marx states 
that in an advanced capitalist system ‘[d]irect force, outside economic conditions, is of 
course still used, but only exceptionally’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 899). Here Marx alludes to the 
fact that the mere threat of physical violence is enough to dominate people indirectly. For 
instance, Marx quotes the Morning Star, a left-wing newspaper, to argue that in early 
capitalist systems ‘the scourge of starvation’ is used, ‘instead of the crack of the whip, as the 
instrument of compulsion’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 365). He further remarks how within the 
factory ‘the overseer’s book of penalties replaces the slave driver’s lash’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 
550). This suggests that domination becomes embedded within the organisation of 
production. 
Indeed as an increasingly complex system of production is established, the conditions 
that reproduce it are recreated so perfectly that a working class develops ‘which by 
education, tradition, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-
evident laws of Nature’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 899). This also highlights the interplay between 
domination and ideology Marxist conception, which I further detail in section 2.6. Thus, ‘the 
organisation of the capitalist process of production, once fully developed, breaks down all 
resistance’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 899). Therefore, according to Marx, the ruling class can exert 
control over individuals both by controlling the system of production and making them feel 
powerless to change it. 
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In determining the general conditions of life, the ruling classes also tend to produce 
structures that reinforce this same organisation. Marx and Engels’ argued, for instance, that 
‘the state arises from the material mode of life of individuals’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 
2010, 330). The state is therefore linked to power because it represents a structure that 
regulates and controls production. Accordingly, Marx and Engels argued that ‘the ruling 
class establishes its joint domination as public power, as the state’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 
2010, 355) and that the state was not, as some Young and Old Hegelians believed, the result 
of a rational concept. I argue that the state can be understood as a technology of 
domination, an apparatus which exists to serve the purpose of social control and 
maintaining power.  
Moreover, technology itself can fulfil this role, highlighting a technological aspect to 
domination. In fact Marx speaks of the ‘technical subordination of the worker’ (Marx [1867] 
1990, 549) and speaks of the ‘’master’, […] in whose mind the machinery and his monopoly 
of it are inseparable’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 549). On the whole, this understanding shows how 
domination is both active and reliant on material structures. 
 
2.4.3 Critique of the postmodern conception of power 
Later postmodern theorists such as Foucault produced an interpretation of power that 
emphasised the active aspect of domination. For Foucault, power was both dynamic and 
relational. According to Fuchs, Foucault produced a conception in which power primarily 
had a ‘networked character’ (Fuchs 2015b, 5). Moreover, for Foucault, the exercise of power 
is not simply a relationship between partners but is ‘a way in which certain actions modify 
others’ (Fuchs 2015b, 5). Hence for Foucault ‘[p]ower exists only when it is put into action’ 
(Fuchs 2015b, 5). For instance, Foucault pointed out how ‘power is related to people’s 
bodies, sexuality, consciousness, and everyday life’ (Fuchs 2015b, 5). In acquiring this active 
character, power relations come to possess not only an objective but also a subjective side. 
This makes power increasingly tied to the production of knowledge. Indeed Foucault states 
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There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses 
of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are 
subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power 
except through the production of truth. (Foucault 1980, 93) 
Hence for Foucault  
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the 
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. (Foucault 1980, 131) 
There is no doubt that power possesses a subjective character. But Foucault’s conception 
over-emphasises the diffuse and subjective aspects, theoretically minimising material 
factors. An over-emphasis of this conception can end up conflating structures of power with 
discourses, or regimes of truth. This risks falling into the same fallacy as the Young 
Hegelians; that is, believing that changing one’s mindset is sufficient to liberate oppressed 
individuals. 
Foucault later produced a more concrete idea of domination, but not at a theoretical 
level. He did this through his historiography. For instance, in his 1975-6 lectures at the 
Collège de France ‘Society must be defended’ (Foucault 2003), Foucault suggests that new 
forms of domination have emerged out of the search for increasingly cost-effective ways of 
asserting domination. Hence Foucault highlights the importance of 
techniques for rationalising and strictly economising on a power that had to be used 
in the least costly way possible, thanks to a system of surveillance, hierarchies, 
inspections, bookkeepings and reports–all the technology that can be described as 
the disciplining technology of labour. (Foucault 2003, 242) 
This account is more material because it does not exclusively explain domination through 
ideas that people hold. Rather, it explains it through the material and social environment 
people find themselves in. Here the idea that domination can be tied to technology, which, 




The Young Hegelians produced a conception where domination was the result of a mind-
set, ideas or concepts. The postmodern understanding risks reproducing this notion. It 
implies that the response to domination should occur at the level of individual actions and 
conceptions. However, Marx and Engels show that complex forms of domination are tied to 
the organisation of social production and embedded in structures such as technology and 
the state. This view shares some aspects of the postmodern conception, such as 
conceptualising how domination can be tied to diffuse factors. Actions that reproduce 
domination can become a matter of routine. Domination can become bound up with 
everyday practices that seem mundane and not directly violent. However, it does not fall 
into the trap of positing a completely immaterial form of domination. Contrary to the Young 
Hegelians and postmodern theorists, for Marx and Engels, domination can only be 
overcome through collective action and class struggle which change material structures of 
production. 
As domination becomes more complex and ingrained within routines and social 
structures it comes to resemble alienation. Alienation can be conceptualised as not only the 
subjugation of some actors by others but as that of all actors to an object, be it the state, 





The change from direct domination to domination mediated by the state and technology 
reflects a shift towards alienation. Indeed the state and technology are examples of 
structures that are produced socially but which can also be used as instruments of social 
control. I will show that Marx’s conception of alienation pushes this idea even further, as it 
is characterised by an inversion whereby the object controls the subject. 
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Marx built his understanding of alienation on Feuerbach’s notion of religious alienation. 
This is highlighted in Contribution to a critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Marx [1843] 
2010), a text which predates Marx’s first exposition of economic alienation contained in 
Comments on James Mill (Marx [1844a] 2010) and the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts (Marx [1844b] 2010). Here Marx implicitly references Feuerbach’s criticism of 
religion contained in the Essence of Christianity (Feuerbach [1841] 1881). Accordingly, he 
states that ‘[f]or Germany the criticism of religion is in the main complete, and criticism of 
religion is the premise of all criticism’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 175). Hence Marx builds on the 
notion of religious alienation to produce a conception of political alienation. Through 
engaging with Marx’s earlier conceptualisations of religious and political alienation, I aim to 
show how Marx developed his idea of alienation as a division and inversion of subject and 
object. I further show how this idea can be applied to machinery. 
Firstly, in section 2.5.2, I look at how religious alienation was the basis for Marx’s later 
conception of alienation. Subsequently, in section 2.5.3, I show how Marx produced a 
conception of political alienation that mirrored the latter. Finally, in section 2.5.4, I show 
that Marx’s concept of economic alienation shows how alienation can primarily be defined 
as a division and inversion of subject and object. 
 
2.5.2 Religious alienation 
Marx’s idea of economic alienation is built upon Feuerbach’s criticism of religious 
alienation. According to Feuerbach’s (1804-1872) influential formulation, religious 
alienation is based on humans misrecognizing their own creations, such as idols, as 
detached from them. These representations are invested with powers and qualities that are 
tied to humans, but which believers attribute to the representations. Hence Feuerbach 
states that 
The divine being is nothing else than the human being […] contemplated and revered 
as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, 
attributes of the human nature. (Feuerbach [1841] 1881, 14) 
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Similarly, Marx speaks of religion as the ‘fantastic realisation of the human essence because 
the human essence has no true reality’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 175). For Marx, religion put 
forward an idealised version of human essence because this essence was not allowed full 
realisation in everyday life. But this version of human essence remained confined to a 
‘fantastic reality’, i.e. in an abstract realm.  
Indeed Marx’s understanding of religion sees it as having a functional role in maintaining 
order by making social ills bearable. It is in this sense that Marx states that ‘religion is the 
opium of the people’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 176). For Marx, ‘[t]he struggle against religion is 
therefore indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma’ (Marx 
[1843] 2010, 175) and that it carries ‘[t]he demand to give up a state of affairs which needs 
illusions’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 176). 
This view carries within it, in germ form, the idea that the subject (believers) are 
subjugated by the object (idols) they have created. I will show how Marx further developed 
this notion through his other understandings of alienation. 
 
2.5.3 Political alienation 
Whereas the introduction to Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Right (Marx [1843] 2010), which was written last, focuses on the criticism of religion, the 
main body of the work discusses political alienation. I will show how these two forms of 
alienation are connected. 
Political alienation concerns the fact that people are represented in political institutions 
only as abstract individuals divorced from their real-life activity. For instance, they are not 
free to form political associations on the basis of their trade or guild. This diverts people 
from engaging in the sort of politics that directly concerns their daily lives. Marx formulates 
this idea through a criticism of Hegel for not accounting for the ‘realisation of the actual 
empirical person’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 38) in his theory of the state and civil society. For 
Marx, Hegel treats institutions that are supposed to represent man’s ‘actual empirical 
person’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 39), such as family and guilds, as though they reflected an 
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‘abstract person’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 39). This means that the individual must ‘effect a 
fundamental division with himself’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 39). Hence Marx states 
[i]n order to be an effective state member, he needs to withdraw from the 
organisation that reflects his daily life (civil reality) and become a pure abstract 
individual (blank individuality). (Marx [1843] 2010, 77) 
Hence Marx accuses Hegel of treating the latter’s ‘personality as yet only abstractly’ (Marx 
[1843] 2010, 39). This parallels the idea of the abstract realisation of human essence 
effected by religion. The point is that there is a disconnect between the political life and the 
real life of individuals. 
Because the significance of the individual within the estate is divorced from his/her 
significance within the state, Marx argues that ‘the estate has the significance that 
‘difference and separation constitute the very existence of the individual’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 
81). This theme of ‘separation’ is a significant basis for Marx’s later development of the 
concept of alienation. For instance, Marx states that the estate system ‘separates the 
human being from his general essence, it turns him into an animal that is directly identical 
with its function’ (Marx [1843] 2010, 81). Individuals are not allowed to think politically 
about their daily activity. If one takes politics to be an essential characteristic of humans, 
this means that they are not able to realise their inner nature in their concrete existence. 
This provides the foundation for Marx’s mature understanding of alienation as one where 
social production is no longer free and conscious. On the contrary, ‘individual life in its 
abstract form’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 276), i.e. the narrow idea of individual survival, has been 
made its ‘purpose’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 276).  
The separation outlined with political alienation emphasises how individuals can be 
estranged from their essence in their political and social existence. Hence this idea 
concretises the idea of subject-object separation contained in religious alienation. Next, I 
show how Marx’s idea of economic alienation develops this idea further by showing, in 
concrete terms, how the object can control the subject. 
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2.5.4 Economic alienation 
Marx’s conception of alienated labour under conditions of capitalist production is one 
where the function of work in realising the designs of the subject in the object is no longer 
fulfilled perfectly. Now labour represents a process through which humans, on the contrary, 
lose control over the object. Consequently, the product and instruments of their labour 
actually start to control them. 
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx [1844b] 2010), Marx sets out his 
four-fold conception of alienation. For him, alienation concerns an estranged relation (1) to 
the product of labour; (2) to the activity of labour; (3) to the species as a whole and (4) to 
other humans. In what follows, I pay greatest attention to the first two aspects, as these are 
closely tied to my argument in this section, which is that alienation concerns a concrete 
separation and inversion of subject and object. 
An analysis of private property forms the backdrop for (1) alienation from the product of 
labour. When social production is structured by the market and private property, workers 
do not possess the materials and means of their labour. These belong to their employer who 
consequently has automatic claim over the product. Thus Marx argues that the ‘realisation 
of labour appears as a loss of realisation for the workers; objectification as a loss of the 
object’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 272). Hence Marx applies the notion of separation that he 
developed in the context of political alienation to production proper. In doing this, Marx 
also recovers the notion of inversion of subject and object which is contained in the idea of 
religious alienation, where objects and idols are worshiped as though they had 
(super)human powers. 
In fact, Marx argues that, with the further development of these conditions, the worker, 
the subject, comes to be dominated by the object. For instance, in Marx’s earlier text 
Comments on James Mill (Marx [1844a] 2010) Marx speaks of money as ‘the sensuous, even 
objective existence of this alienation.’ (Marx [1844a] 2010, 221) It heralds ‘the general 
domination of the thing over the person, of the product over the producer.’ (Marx [1844a] 
2010, 221) This is because money actively regulates social relations. It determines how 
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much of one commodity another can fetch. Consequently, it also conditions how humans 
interact to acquire the material goods they need to live. Accordingly, Marx states that ‘this 
mediator [money] now becomes a real God, for the mediator is the real power over what it 
mediates to me. Its cult becomes an end in itself’ (Marx [1844a] 2010, 212). 
The active element in the alienation produced by both money as mediator is the basis for 
the second dimension of alienation highlighted by Marx. In terms of (2), i.e. the 
estrangement of the worker’s activity, Marx reasons that if ‘the product of labour is 
alienation, production itself must be active alienation’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 274). What this 
perspective emphasises is that alienated labour does not just result in the loss of the 
objective world for the worker but also in the separation between his/her essence and 
existence. Consequently, in his/her work the labourer  
does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does 
not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his 
mind. (Marx [1844b] 2010, 274) 
In other words, the worker cannot express his/her human essence in the one activity which 
is properly human: work, understood broadly as a creative and social activity that mediates 
between subject and object. 
This active notion of alienation demonstrates that a framework based on the notion of 
human essence can produce an understanding of how domination and power is exerted 
diffusely and through networks, like in Foucault’s conception. These consist in the worker’s 
social relations and his/her environment. For instance, the case of machinery exemplifies 
how this effect is compounded by the worker’s objective environment becoming 
increasingly alien. 
Indeed, beginning from his early work and speaking of the products of labour, Marx 
already explains how, for the worker, ‘the life which he has conferred on the object 
confronts him as something hostile and alien.’ (Marx [1844a] 2010, 272). But in his later 
work, particularly in the Grundrisse (Marx [1857] 1993), Marx ties this idea to machinery 
specifically. For instance, Marx described how, with machinery, the worker produces a 
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‘power independent of himself’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 453) that ‘rules over him through his 
own actions’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 453). Marx further describes how, through machinery, ‘the 
appropriation of labour by capital confronts the worker in a coarsely sensuous form’ (Marx 
[1857] 1993, 704). Like with money, this alienation achieves a ‘direct reality’ (Marx [1857] 
1993, 704). In fact, mirroring the passage above on money, Marx will state that it is equally 
in ‘fixed capital [i.e. machinery] that capital posits itself as an end-in-itself’ (Marx [1857] 
1993, 710). This is because machinery is ‘active’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 710) and its structure 
incorporates ‘the aim of production’ (Marx [1857] 1993, 710). Thus I argue that Marx’s work 
contains the notion of technological alienation. 
(3) and (4) are consequences of this dynamic. As human activity becomes alienated, 
humans’ existence conflicts with their essence as a socially productive species. They no 
longer make conscious decisions that impact their life-activity, and they lose the bond that 
connects each individual to society and to one-another. 
 
2.5.5 Conclusion 
By developing the notions of religious, political and economic alienation Marx developed 
a conception of alienation that is characterised by a separation and inversion of subject and 
object. For instance, with economic alienation, individuals act within parameters they do 
not control. They thus confer an independent life onto the object of their labour. Hence the 
subject becomes dominated by its own object. 
Thus Marx’s notion of alienation allows us to show how social control can be effected in a 
diffuse way and with a networked character. However, this conception does not require a 
rejection of the notion of essence and an emphasis on discourses, as is suggested by 
postmodern theorists. On the contrary, a conception of alienation which is based on 
essence and material factors, including technology, can help explain mechanisms that lead 
to social unfreedom. 
As is most clear with religious alienation, the concept of alienation encompasses the 
notion of consciousness and beliefs. Ideology represents a more developed and concrete 
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manifestation of these types of warped beliefs. In the next section, I show how class-based 
production spreads distorted understandings of the world. Hence I now move onto 





Marx and Engels’ conception of ideology is based on a critique of the post-Hegelian 
philosophy of their time, which is contained in The German Ideology (Marx and Engels 
[1845a] 2010). Marx and Engels denounced post-Hegelian philosophy for glorifying and 
legitimating the status quo, while nevertheless presenting itself as critical. Their critique of 
idealism is important for understanding their conception of ideology because it reveals 
Young Hegelian philosophy as a form of ideology. The Young Hegelians produced theories 
that were intent on purely intellectual critique. They therefore did not challenge their own 
bourgeois class interests. Marx and Engels’ conception of ideology avoids the idealism of the 
Young Hegelians, for whom ideas were directly dominating. In contrast, for Marx and 
Engels, ideologies are both tied to material processes and mask and distort our 
understanding of these processes. 
Firstly, in section 2.6.2, I look at Marx and Engels’ materialist framework, which views 
ideas and actions as dynamically related. I show how this conception was built through a 
criticism of the Young Hegelians. Then, in section 2.6.3, I show how this same criticism 
applies to postmodern understandings. 
 
2.6.2 Materialist conception: ideas as tied to the mode of production 
Marx and Engels’ materialist conception emphasises the fact that ideas and 
consciousness arise out of the material conditions established by the mode of production. 
Ideas are generated by the particular way in which humans associate in order to produce 
what they need to live.  
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In formulating the mode of production as a premise for consciousness and history, Marx 
and Engels reversed the direction of causality of the Hegelian approach, which saw logical 
thought as a primary driver. Hence they state that 
[i]n direct contrast to the German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, 
here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven. That is to say, not setting out 
from what men say, imagine, conceive […] in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but 
setting out from real active men, and on the basis of their real life process 
demonstrating the development of their ideological life processes and the echoes of 
this life process. (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 36) 
Thus Marx and Engels show that activity and consciousness are tightly linked. However, they 
show that ideology obscures this connection. Indeed, the first determinant of ideology is 
that it produces a separation whereby ideas appear detached from their material base. The 
fact that ideas reflect the interests and circumstances of those producing them is concealed.  
This outcome depends on the stage of development of the forces of production. Marx 
and Engels argue that: ‘The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men’ (Marx 
and Engels [1845a] 2010, 36). However, as social intercourse becomes more complex, ideas 
also become more detached. For Marx, this dynamic reaches its decisive stage with the 
separation of mental from physical labour. It is only now that consciousness ‘can really 
flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really 
represents something without representing something real’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 
45). 
At this stage, a narrow section within the ruling class has the time and resources to 
produce concepts. The rest of the population, on the other hand, is burdened with physical 
labour and does not possess the means to come up with and disseminate ideas. It therefore 
simply consumes the mental production of the intellectual class. Thus Marx states that 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas. […] The class which 
has the means of intellectual production at its disposal, consequently also controls 
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the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are on the whole subject to it. (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 59) 
What’s more, Marx argued that the ideas of the ruling class inevitably tended to reflect the 
latter’s particular interests. However, from their position of control, each new dominant 
class is ‘compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the 
common interest of all the members of society’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 60). 
Hence the second characteristic of ideology is that ‘ever more abstract ideas hold sway, 
i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 
2010, 60). In acquiring this abstract character, the link between ideas and material relations 
appears ‘upside-down’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 36). Universal concepts seem to 
stand at the root of concrete social relations, thus concealing the fact that they are in fact 
products of the latter. For instance, an abstract concept of man as essentially selfish is the 
product of market relations. But it can also be used to justify them. Hence, ideology is, on 
the whole, characterised by an inversion whereby the fact that ideas reflect the interests of 
a narrow elite is concealed. They no longer appear to be produced by particular social 
relations but appear as the universally valid foundation for these social relations. The view 
of their relationship with the material base is thus distorted. 
Marx and Engels’ applied this understanding to the Young Hegelians. Their conception is 
materialist because it shows how the material intercourse of humans, itself, produces an 
inversion of objective processes, which conceals and justifies them. Hence they state that, 
[i]f in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomena arises just as much from their historical life-processes as 
the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. (Marx and 
Engels [1845a] 2010, 36) 
Accordingly, their critique of the Young Hegelians didn’t simply dismiss their idealism but 
analysed it from a material perspective. They established a ‘connection of German 
philosophy with German reality’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 30). They argued that the 
historical method which reigned in Germany could be traced back to the ‘dogmatic 
dreamings and distortions’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 62) of jurists and politicians. It 
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could be explained by ‘their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour’ 
(Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 62). This explained why the Young Hegelians created works 
that used flowery concepts that were not connected to any material demands, passing 
these off as critical. This was simply a way for them to maintain their social position as 
bourgeois intellectuals. 
 
2.6.3 Criticism of the postmodern view of ideology 
However, this conception, which encompasses both ideal and real sides of existence, has 
been criticised by postmodern theorists. Postmodern theorists focus heavily on the 
production of ideas, discourses and narratives. For them, these elements are so strong that 
they have direct influence over the real world. Consequently the distinction between the 
ideal and the real no longer holds. 
For instance, postmodern theorists, such as Foucault, reject the idea of truth. In a 
situation where things are subject to external factors and change constantly, truth is 
relative. This rejection goes hand in hand with a rejection of the notion of ideology. Foucault 
suggests that any form of knowledge is already ideological because it is bound up with 
power relations. For instance, Foucault states that  
truth isn’t outside power […] Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each 
society has its regime of truth […]: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true (Foucault 1980, 131) 
Moreover, Foucault speaks of ‘the power of knowledge of the truth and the power to 
disseminate this knowledge’ (Foucault 1980, 34). As a result, Foucault argued that ‘power 
and knowledge imply one another’ (Foucault 1975, 27). 
The problem with this conception is that it can end up re-establishing a form of classical 
idealism whereby ideas drive developments in objective reality rather than the other way 
around. With postmodern criticism there is no precise distinction between power and 
discourse. This can result in criticism of discourses being deemed sufficient. Hence, at the 
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level of explanation and theory, the postmodern view does not separate objective processes 
from their ideal representations. Marx and Engels’ view, on the other hand, demystifies 
complex ideas by showing how they result from simple material interests. They show that 
the latter’s abstract character has a functional role in obscuring these material interests. 
This abstract character makes such ideas more universal and hence more appealing to a 
broader section of people. 
 
2.6.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, Marx and Engels’ criticism of the Young Hegelians helps create a framework 
for understanding how ideology is characterised by a material inversion that leads to 
increasingly abstract ideas being produced. These appear as the foundation for social 
relations instead of their product. Hence ideology is characterised by the same inversion 
dynamic as alienation. However, it is a more specific form of alienation which concerns 
ideas and consciousness. Postmodern theory’s rejection of the notion of truth and intense 
focus on discourses risks concealing these objective dynamics and making the same mistake 
as the Young Hegelians. One implication is the idea that freeing one’s consciousness and 
spreading ideas is sufficient to enact emancipatory change. Modern day examples of this 
dynamic can be seen with ‘clicktivism’ (Dean 2012, 233), the idea that simply liking and 
sharing posts on social media is sufficient to enact emancipatory change. This neglects the 
need for making material and structural changes. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, my argument has used Marx and Engels' criticism of the idealism of the 
Young Hegelians to reformulate a dialectical materialist approach. The latter always seeks to 
link the subjective and objective sides of social processes. This has allowed me to criticise 
postmodern understandings. I have argued that these represent a modern version of the 
idealism of the Young Hegelians. This is because postmodern theory similarly tends to take 
our focus away from material processes and set it solely on ideas and discourses. In treating 
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human essence, technology, domination, ideology and alienation, I have shown how, on the 
contrary, subject and object are interrelated.  
I have shown that human essence is tied to human natural powers and instincts. But, at 
the same time, this means that humans are conscious and socially productive. Hence human 
essence implies a dialectic between subject and object that tends towards their 
harmonisation. Technology is an object that is produced by humans and is dependent on 
them. Hence it does not have a prior and autonomous essence, as suggested by Heidegger. 
Domination is firstly based on power relations between people. These in turn are based on 
material resources and direct physical violence or its threat. But domination can also have a 
diffuse and networked character. Alienation reflects the domination of the subject by the 
object. Alienation is produced by people acting within parameters that they do not set that 
distance them increasingly from their own product. This inverts the relation of mastery of 
the subject over the object that characterised human essence. Alienation can take on a 
concrete manifestation at the level of machinery in instances where the worker must follow 
the rhythm of the machine, rather than the other way around. Alienation shows that a 
diffuse and networked concept of domination need not dissolve the concept of essence into 
endless flux, as Foucault did. Similarly to alienation, ideology inverts the relation between 
humans and their ideas and consciousness. These ideas are no longer free and 
representative of each individual’s experience of material reality. Instead, they are 
produced by a particular class. Ideology is characterised by abstract, universal ideas that 
seem divorced from the particular social relations from which they arise. This conceals the 
fact that they reflect the interests of a narrow group. Therefore ideology can serve to 
legitimate material forms of domination and alienation. Consequently ideas should not be 
understood, as they were by the Young Hegelians and risk being by postmodern theory, as 
directly dominating but as always linked to material processes.  
In treating these concepts in this order, I have shown how we advance to increasingly 
specific and complex categories from more abstract and general ones. Categories that are 
closer to the beginning, like human essence and technology, are more susceptible to form a 
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basis for alternative social trajectories. Categories that are closer to the end are more 
susceptible to perpetuate an alienating cycle by feeding back onto these basic categories 
(Figure 2.1). For instance, ideology can give rise to toxic human subjectivities.  
 
Figure 2.7.1: The cycle of technology, domination, alienation and ideology 
Hence Figure 2.7.1 could be conceptualised as a downward spiral seen from above, 
where each revolution adds a layer to the process of alienation that the cycle outlines. This 
spiral incorporates an abstract dimension towards the beginning. It becomes increasingly 
more concrete towards the end, forming concrete abstractions such as money, technology 
and mystifying world views. Ideology gives rise to alienated human subjectivities, which 
produce technologies for domination, which also perpetuate alienation and are legitimated 
by contemporary forms of ideology, which they ultimately incorporate.  
71 
The next chapter discusses the following layer of this spiral. Indeed in looking at Anders’ 
theories, I move from analysing the dynamics of early capitalism to those of established 
capitalism, where production is abundant and the logic of capital has crystallised into the 
mode of operation of machines and technology. 
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Günther Anders (at the time: Günther Stern) was a student of Heidegger and Husserl in 
Freiburg, ultimately conducting his PhD under the supervision of Husserl. His thesis 
dissertation, entitled Über die Situationskategorie bei den ‚Logischen Sätzen‘. Erster Teil 
einer Untersuchung über die Rolle der Situationskategorie [On the situational category in the 
'Logical sentences’: First part of a study on the role of the situational category] (Anders 
[Stern] 1924), which he defended in 1924 and remains unpublished, was nevertheless 
critical of Husserl’s philosophy (Dawsey 2004). He later did postdoctorate work with 
Heidegger at Marburg and further assisted Max Scheler afterwards in 1926 (Dawsey 2004). 
Hence Anders studied under some of the most important non-Marxist philosophers of the 
20th century. Yet Anders also had ties with Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt School. 
Anders’ career was further overshadowed by his first wife’s. He was married to Hannah 
Arendt (1906-1975) from 1929 to 1937 (Young-Bruehl 1982). Arendt had also been an 
enthusiastic student of Heidegger’s, with whom she had an affair from 1924 (Young-Bruehl 
1982, 53).  
Hence Anders’ late 20s were filled with the influence of Heidegger and phenomenology. 
However, over the course of the rise of the Nazi’s, Anders lost this focus and turned to 
engaging with Marxism as an alternative to Heidegger’s phenomenology. In what follows, I 
map this turn through the principal events that marked Anders’ life. I argue that the 
influence of Marxism on Anders’ thought has been under-appreciated. In some respects, 
Anders’ work can be seen to pick up and develop threads that were already contained in 
Marx. 
In his interview with Mathias Greffrath (Anders [1979b] 2008, 51-85), Anders speaks of 
the four fundamental breaks of his life (Anders [1979b] 2008, 60). The first one consists in 
Anders’ witnessing the horrors of the First World War. In 1917, around the age of 15, 
73 
Anders was forced to join a paramilitary organisation which travelled to occupied France 
near the Western front. Here he witnessed the ill-treatment of the civilian population by the 
Germans and was particularly shocked by the sight of mutilated soldiers ‘that started at the 
waist’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 60, my translation) waiting for a train. Moreover, he 
experienced anti-Semitic attacks from other members of the group. All this contributed to 
Anders’ becoming a moral philosopher (Anders [1979b] 2008, 60). These early experiences 
represent the first intellectual turning point of his life. 
The next three are Hitler’s rise to power, the discovery of the existence of Nazi 
extermination camps and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I argue that 
these last three events caused Anders’ to develop his thought in a non-continuous way. For 
instance, Anders describes how:  
[i]t is undeniable that the 6th August 1945, that is Hiroshima, meant a break. It was 
the most profound caesura of my life, though certainly not the first. (Anders [1979b] 
2008, 72-73, my translation) 
I argue that this event was the culmination of a development that saw Anders resolve to 
update and apply Marx’s concept of alienation to the modern era. 
Indeed, in the early 1930s during Hitler’s rise to power, Anders abruptly abandoned his 
focus on philosophical anthropology and lurched into producing ‘political’ (Anders [1979b] 
2008, 73 my translation) writings. This is evidenced by his early anti-fascist novel Die 
Molussische Katakombe [The Molussian Catacomb] (Anders 1992b). This work’s manuscript 
was ready for the press in 1933 but found no publisher. Anders later produced a second 
draft of the novel in 1938, but the work was only finally published near the end of Anders’ 
life in 1992. It tells the tale of a fictional land dominated by a fascist regime. It is therefore 
an allegorical tale about the Nazis. This can be contrasted with, for instance, Anders’ first 
monograph Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel zur Ontologie der Erkenntnis [About having: 
Seven chapters on the ontology of knowledge] (Anders [Stern] 1928), which was more 
philosophical and dealt with ontology. This illustrates how Anders went from doing 
phenomenology to anti-fascism. 
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Subsequently, there was yet another break. To come to terms with the human loss 
caused by the industrial warfare of the Second World War and following his experience of 
factory work in the US in the 1940s, Anders decisively turned to engaging with early Marx 
and Marxism. Indeed Anders’ found Heidegger’s analysis increasingly unsatisfactory for 
understanding industrial society, as it did not account for modern technology. As an 
alternative, he picked up on a conception of technological alienation already contained in 
Marx’s work. This conceived workers as living appendages of machines. It allowed Anders to 
produce an analysis of how domination, alienation and ideology were increasingly tied to 
technology. Anders’ adoption and engagement with Marxism increases in strength 
throughout his life. It is at its most intense and explicit in his later years, for instance with 
the 1992 publication of Die Antiquiertheit des Proletariats [The Obsolescence of the 
Proletariat] (Anders 1992a, [1992] 2013). However, in identifying technology as the main 
alienated driver of human affairs, over and above capital, Anders can also be said to have 
developed the notion of technological alienation beyond Marx. 
Thus I argue that the current literature is limited in simply describing Anders as 
idiosyncratic and hard to classify. Specifically, this literature frames Anders as primarily a 
student of Heidegger and Husserl that was somewhat influenced but also critical of Marxism 
(Dijk 2000; Sonolet 2006). Babich further frames the writing of Anders’ main book Die 
Antiquiertheit Des Menschen: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution 
[The Obsolescence of Man: on the Soul in the Epoch of the Second Industrial Revolution] 
(Anders [1956] 1961) as ‘reflecting his formative experiences with Husserl and Heidegger’ 
(Babich 2013, 52). Hence for Babich: 
Anders undertakes his discussion of radio ghosts via the phenomenological 
modalities he learned as a student of both Husserl26 and Heidegger. (Babich 2019, 
62) 
And: 
Anders’ critical reflections on technology can be understood only in the context of his 
understanding of Heidegger. (Babich 2013, 47) 
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While Babich is careful not to identify Anders’ thought with Heidegger’s, her statements 
contrast with Dawsey’s finding that Anders was ‘[a]mong the very first of his peer group to 
break with Heidegger’ (Dawsey 2017, 2-3). Dawsey further states that around 1929 Anders 
‘intensively studied the critical theory of the early Karl Marx, whose ideas on alienation and 
dehumanization shaped him for years to come’ (Dawsey 2017, 8). Much of the literature on 
Anders fails to highlight this engagement with early Marx, which further evidences the 
discontinuities in Anders’ thought. Anders lived through the huge upheavals of the 20th 
century, moving to and from very different contexts. For instance, he went from Nazi 
Germany to intellectual circles in Paris, to working odd jobs in California. In the following 
chapter, I show how this led to changes in Anders thinking and how his critical theory of 
technology is profoundly influenced by Marx, and not just Heidegger. 
To make my argument, I look at each of the themes of this thesis, the human, 
technology, domination, alienation and ideology. For each theme, in a first subsection, I 
outline Anders’ early thought. Then, in a second subsection, I discuss the historical factors 
which produced an epistemological break in Anders thinking and show how this made 
Anders’ thought take on a new direction. Finally, in a third subsection, I present Anders’ 
mature thinking, showing how it is inspired by Hegel and Marx, not just Heidegger as is so 
often claimed.  
Hence in the section on the human, first, in section 3.2.2, I show how Anders’ early 
conception ties the notion of the human to abstraction and indeterminateness, rejecting the 
concept of human essence. Secondly, in section 3.2.3, I show how Hitler’s rise to power 
meant that Anders lost interest in pursuing the question of characterising what humans are 
authentically, preferring to focus on political writings. Finally, in section 3.2.4, I show that, in 
his mature years, Anders characterises humans as social homo faber partially contradicting 
his initial position that humans have no essence. In the section on technology, first, in 
section 3.3.2, I show that Anders did not focus on the question of technology in his early 
work, which instead deals with ontology and phenomenology. Secondly, in section 3.3.3, I 
show that Anders’ period in factories encouraged him to turn to a Hegelian analysis of 
76 
machines. Indeed Heidegger’s theory’s omission of modern machinery proved untenable. 
Finally, in section 3.3.4, I show that Anders adopted a conception of technology which 
mirrors Marx’s conception of capital. In the section on domination, I firstly, in section 3.4.2, 
show that Anders’ early work focuses on domination within a human centred context. Here 
domination is tied to power being exerted within and between groups. Secondly, in section 
3.4.3, I show that, over the course of the 1940s, Anders reckoned with the industrial killing 
of the Second World War. Consequently, Anders started to grapple with the idea that 
technology and weapons were a factor in domination. Finally, in section 3.4.4, I show that 
Anders’ mature work emphasises that industrial technology is a factor in re-producing 
capitalist domination and seeks to enlarge the concept of the proletariat on this basis. In the 
section on alienation, firstly, in section 3.5.2, I show how Anders’ early concept of alienation 
is tied to Heidegger’s idea of inauthenticity. Secondly, in section 3.5.3, I show that, after 
Anders’ period in factories, his concept of technological alienation becomes more concrete 
and Marxist. Finally, in section 3.5.3, I show that Anders produces a concept of technological 
alienation beyond Marx. In the section on ideology, firstly, in section 3.6.2, I show that 
Anders had a phenomenological view of ideology in his youth. Secondly, in section 3.6.3, I 
show that he broke radically from this understanding after his time in Paris. Finally, in 
section 3.6.4, I show that he took inspiration from Marx and Engels’ conception of ideology, 
while going beyond it. Indeed he suggested that ideology is automatically produced by 
humans interacting with the structure of the media. 
 
3.2 The human 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Anders developed a theory of the human during his youth. In parallel, he wrote about art 
and aesthetics. However, during Hitler’s rise to power, Anders abandoned this focus and 
turned his attention to politics. This marks Anders’ turn to analysing the distorted existence 
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of humans rather than their true essence. Below I show how this led Anders to adopt a 
vision of the human that was closer to Marx’s. 
Anders’ early writings on the human are still heavily under the influence of Heidegger 
and phenomenology. This is despite the fact that Anders is critical of Heidegger from very 
early on. In this early work, Anders heavily emphasises the instability of human essence, 
coming close to rejecting the notion of essence altogether. In his mature work, Anders does 
not deny the accuracy of his early conception of human essence as artificial or unstable. He 
simply questions the value of thinking about what man is authentically when the very 
survival of humans is jeopardised by atomic weapons (Anders [1979b] 2008, 77-8). 
However, this encourages Anders to talk about human essence synthetically. He summarises 
his conception of the human into the idea of homo faber [man as a maker]. In summarily 
talking about the fact that man’s essence is that of a social homo faber, Anders contradicts 
his initial position that man has no essence. This, in turn, shows that Anders becomes less 
concerned with defending an existentialist conception of man, whereby humans can 
reinvent themselves at each moment. He becomes more concerned with describing man’s 
alienation from his essence as a socially productive species, bringing him closer in line with 
Marx’s work. 
Firstly, I look at how Anders’ conception of man is based on abstraction and therefore 
contrasts with Marx’s idea that man is nature. Secondly, I show how Anders’ focus moved 
away from philosophical anthropology and how this coincided with a move towards 
Marxism. Finally, I show that Anders’ mature theory prioritises theorising alienation as a 
distancing of humans from their essence as social producers over maintaining his argument 
that humans have no essence. 
 
3.2.2 Early Anders 
Anders grounds his early conception of the human on a distinction between humans and 
nature. Indeed one of Anders’ earliest works published in 1930 is entitled Die Weltfremdheit 
des Menschen: Schriften zur philosophischen Anthropologie [The Strangeness of Man: 
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Writings on Philosophical Anthropology]. As there is no English translation of this work, I rely 
on some later texts published by Anders in French in the journal Recherches Philosophiques 
between 1934 and 1937. According to this early philosophy, man differs from animals in 
that he ‘is not cut out for any particular material world’ (Anders [Stern] [1937] 2009, 279). 
Anders argues that human freedom arises out of this disconnect: 
[t]o be free, this means: to be strange, to be bound to nothing specific, to be cut out 
for nothing specific, to be within the horizon of the indeterminate (Anders [Stern] 
[1937] 2009, 280)  
Hence, for Anders, ‘the retreat from the world’ (Anders [Stern] [1937] 2009, 279) and 
‘within himself’ (Anders [Stern] [1937] 2009, 280) is what makes man free. Hence, at first 
glance, Anders makes human freedom exist in the gap between humans and nature.  
This characterisation of human freedom as residing in the abstract, as opposed to nature, 
and being completely indeterminate, contrasts with Marx’s concept of human freedom. For 
Marx, it is ‘natural powers’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 336) and ‘instincts’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 
336) that form the basis for human freedom. Indeed Marx states that man 
acts objectively, and he would not act objectively if the objective did not reside in the 
very nature of his being. He only creates or posits objects, because he is posited by 
objects—because at bottom he is nature. (Marx [1844b] 2010, 336) 
For Marx, humans are so closely tied to nature that they are nature, a point which seems 
diametrically opposed to Anders’ insistence that humans are disconnected from nature. 
Marx ties human freedom to the fact that humans are a socially productive species. Hence 
Marx has a concrete conception of human freedom. 
 
3.2.3 Epistemological break 
It is possible that Anders’ early insistence on human beings being outside the world is a 
critical reaction to the insistence on rootedness in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Heidegger 
[1927] 1967). Subsequently, Heidegger moreover criticised what he would call the 
‘homelessness of contemporary man’ (Heidegger 1992, 241-244). In fact, this aspect of 
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Heidegger’s thought has been linked to his antisemitism. During the Nazi era, Heidegger 
wrote privately of the ‘worldlessness of Judaism’ (Faye 2015, 115, my translation). He saw 
this as the foundation for Jews’ ‘gigantic [and] tenacious ability to calculate’ (Faye 2015, 
115, my translation). I argue that Anders detected traces of these beliefs in his interactions 
with Heidegger and reacted against them. However, this form of resistance ultimately 
proved insufficient, for Anders. 
In his interview with Mathias Greffrath given at the age of 77 (Anders [1979b] 2008, 51-
85), Anders refers to his writings on ‘anthropology and philosophy of art’ (Anders [1979b] 
2008, 60, my translation) as belonging to a ‘pre-Hitlerian period’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 60, 
my translation). Anders later discusses the break from this period as being due to the 
political circumstances in Germany at the time. Hence he states that ‘[t]he content of my 
writings was, between 1931 and 1945, exclusively National Socialism and war’ (Anders 
[1979b] 2008, 61, my translation). He adds that writing academic texts about ethics, given 
the political context, would have been ‘foolish, absurd if not immoral’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 
61, my translation). This suggests that Anders’ focus shifted away from academic philosophy 
even before most of his early works were published. 
Anders reveals that, during his political phase, he started to become influenced by Marx. 
In his interview with Mathias Greffrath, Anders states that ‘the young Marx started to have 
a certain influence [on me], but that occurred only after my thesis. I became acquainted 
with him before Hegel’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 57, my translation). Here Anders refers to his 
thesis dissertation (Anders [Stern] 1924). 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology were first 
published in 1932. Hence it is likely that Anders became acquainted with Marx during his 
time in Paris between 1933 and 1936. Anders had fled Berlin in 1933 because the Nazi’s 
seized Bertolt Brecht’s contact booklet, which had his details on it (Young-Bruehl 1982, 102). 
Brecht was an active communist at the time. Moreover, in the following years in Paris, 
Anders’ ‘circle of acquaintances during the months he worked on his novel consisted largely 
of artists, journalists, and intellectuals in and around the Communist party’ (Young-Bruehl 
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1982, 99). Anders’ later writings bear the trace of this engagement with Marxist circles. 
Indeed Anders’ exposition of human nature in his main work Die Antiquiertheit Des 
Menschen: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution [The 
Obsolescence of Man: on the Soul in the Epoch of the Second Industrial Revolution] (Anders 
[1956] 1961) becomes less existentialist and more concrete and social. Here Anders speaks 
of man creating ‘on each occasion the framework of his world and his society [and] carrying 
within himself […] a “generic sociality”[, a] sociality in itself’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 290, my 
translation). 
 
3.2.4 Mature Anders 
Overall, in his mature work, which includes The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I, (Anders 
[1956] 2003) and the second volume, originally published as Die Antiquiertheit des 
Menschen Bd. II: Über die Zerstörung des Lebens im Zeitalter der dritten industriellen 
Revolution [The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: On the Destruction of Life in the Epoch of 
the Third Industrial Revolution] (Anders 1980a), Anders does not deny the validity of his 
early conception of man. He reasserts his early response to philosophical anthropology’s 
question regarding human essence, stating that “[a]rtificiality is the nature of man” (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 289, my translation) and “[t]he essence of man consists in not having an 
essence” (Anders [1980] 2011, 12). Thus Anders uses a paradoxical definition of human 
essence to emphasise human freedom and consciousness. However, this does not mean 
that Anders does away with the concept of essence completely, as Foucault would later do. 
For instance, in The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II, Anders calls his work ‘a philosophical 
anthropology in the epoch of technocracy’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1), suggesting that an idea 
of the human is important for his theory. He further asserts ‘that the complaints about the 
“end of man” must be based on a particular image of man. In a formal sense this argument 
is not false’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 298). 
This produces a contradiction within Anders’ thought whereby, on the one hand, Anders 
asserts that ‘anyone who still speaks today of [man’s] “essence” (as Scheler still did) is a 
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figure from the distant past’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1). However, on the other hand, in The 
Obsolescence of Man, vol. II, Anders speaks of man as homo faber as if this constitutes 
man’s fixed essence. For instance, Anders argues that automation means that man ‘is 
defrauded, however, with respect to his own productive activity’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 42) 
and claims that this, ‘if one takes seriously the definition of man as homo faber, means that 
he is defrauded with respect to his essence’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 42). Hence here Anders 
appeals to the notion of essence to ground his criticism of modern society. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Anders early theory of the human critically plays on many aspects of 
Heidegger’s work. For instance, it makes wordlessness into a positive characteristic of man. 
However, Anders soon abandoned his exclusive focus on philosophical anthropology during 
Hitler’s rise to power. Moreover, Anders became engaged with Marxism during his years in 
Paris between 1933-36 and this led him to adopt a more social view of the human in The 
Obsolescence of Man, vol. I (Anders [1956] 2003). Nevertheless, Anders both defended and 
contradicted his early conception of man in his mature years. The conception he produced 
in his early 50s maintained a vision of man as having a very unstable essence, or no essence 
at all. However, in all his mature work, and especially in his later years, Anders explicitly 
described man’s alienation from his essence as homo faber. Hence I argue that the need he 
felt to analyse post-War society meant that Anders prioritised producing a theory of 
alienation over defending the idea of human essence as totally fluid. This, in turn, made him 
adopt a determinate conception of man’s essence which contradicted his initial 
characterisation of this essence as non-fixed. All these elements show that Anders overall 
conception of man shares more with Marx than postmodern theorists, for instance. He 
conceives humans as essentially free, conscious and socially productive. 
Anders often adopts the concept of Prometheus (Anders [1956] 2003, 30-33, 50, 253; 
[1980] 2011, 203, 204, 279) to describe human essence as homo faber. Thus Anders 
highlights how humans are tightly connected to technology. Humans arguably appropriated 
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fire, which is a central feature of the Greek myth of Prometheus, as an early form of 
technology that allowed them to develop as a species. Hence technology, which I discuss 





In this section, I show that Anders’ intense focus on technology began after his 
experience of working in factories following his emigration to the United States in 1936. 
Before this period, Anders' work does not deal with the question of technology. It is instead 
focussed on phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. When Anders does confront 
the question of technology after 1936, this also coincides with a definite shift away from 
Heidegger’s philosophy. Heidegger’s theory did not account for modern machinery. 
Therefore Anders found it unsatisfactory for dealing with his experience in the mid 20th 
century. He instead opted for using a Hegelian and Marxian framework for analysing the 
role of technology in modernity, while nevertheless retaining some insights from 
Heidegger’s work. Overall, this predominantly Hegelian-Marxian framework allowed him to 
think of technology as a system within which humans were situated and integrated. 
Firstly, I show that Anders’ early work does not have an intense focus on the question of 
technology. Secondly, I show that Anders moved to a more Hegelian conception in order to 
conceptualise modern technology, as this need became felt in the wake of the Second 
World War. Finally, I show how this brought Anders’ conception closer to Marx. Indeed 
Anders plays on, and develops, Marx’s analysis of machines. 
 
3.3.2 Early Anders 
Anders’ writings before 1936 were produced during his time in Berlin and Paris. They are 
characterised by the fact that they do not address the question of technology. For instance, 
there is no mention of technology in Anders’ work on phenomenology in Über das Haben 
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[On Having] (Anders [Stern] 1928), nor in Anders’ later presentation of his philosophical 
anthropology in Une Interpretation de l’aposteriori [An Interpretation of Aposteriori] (Anders 
[Stern] 1934). In Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen [The worldlessness of man] (Anders 
[Stern] [1930] 2018), Anders discusses the notion of progress in its connection to 
technology, stating that the vocabulary of progress grew out of the technical vocabulary of 
the 20th century (Anders [Stern] [1930] 2018, 328). But the notion of progress is the main 
theme of this passage and technology is secondary to an analysis of the latter. Indeed Die 
Weltfremdheit des Menschen (Anders [Stern] [1930] 2018) is mainly a work of philosophical 
anthropology (Dawsey 2017, 8). It does not put forward a critical analysis of humans’ 
interaction with technology, as Anders’ later work will do. 
 
3.3.3 Epistemological break 
However, there is a moment in Anders’ life at which he began to focus very intensely on 
technology. This also coincides with a partial rejection of Heidegger's understanding of the 
latter. At this point, Anders began adopting the dialectical framework of Hegel and Marx.  
During Anders’ stay in Paris from 1933 to 1936, Kojève was giving lectures on Hegel at 
the École Normale Supérieure, which combined aspects of Heidegger’s existentialism with 
Hegel. Anders and his first wife, Hannah Arendt, were able to attend these lectures thanks 
to Raymond Aron, who introduced them to Parisian intellectual circles (Young-Bruehl 1982, 
116-117). In fact, Anders published his early works of philosophical anthropology in the 
journal Recherches Philosophiques, whose main editor was Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), a 
student of Kojève’s. Young-Bruehl states that 
thanks to Aron's introductions, [Arendt] and Stem [Anders] were able to attend 
several of Alexandre Kojeve's seminars at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes. These 
seminars were the basis for Kojeve's Introduction à la lecture de Hegel [Introduction 
to the Reading of Hegel] (Young-Bruehl 1982, 116-117) 
This suggests that Anders came into contact with Hegel during his years in Paris. Indeed his 
early work on the human critically references Hegel (Anders [Stern] [1937] 2009, 306). 
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This engagement with Hegel was succeeded by a formative life-experience that 
motivated Anders to analyse technology. In his interview with Mathias Greffrath (Anders 
[1979b] 2008, 51-85), Anders discusses how the time after he emigrated to the United 
States from France in 1936 influenced his later work. During this period, Anders was obliged 
to take up odd jobs in factories in order to make ends meet. Anders reveals that:  
without my period in factories, I would never have been able to write my critique of 
the era of technology, i.e. my book The Obsolescence of Man (Anders [1979b] 2008, 
69, my translation) 
I argue that Anders found a Hegelian Marxian approach more adequate for analysing this 
experience than Heidegger's philosophy. This is because Hegel’s notion of dialectic and 
totality are tools that can help theorise the complex systems of technology that Anders 
encountered on the production line. 
In contrast, Heidegger’s thought did not account for modern machinery. Hence, in the 
same interview, Anders argued that Heidegger’s  
“Zeugwelt” is an artisanal village-like world, a world of workshops. This is why 
Scheler called his philosophy a “shoemaker’s ontology”. In Sein und Zeit there are still 
no factories; the analyses are not only non-Marxist or anti-Marxist but pre-Marxist, 
actually they are even pre-capitalist. (Anders [1979b] 2008, 54, my translation)   
These last mentions of Marxism suggest that Anders saw the latter as the alternative theory 
that instead did deal with factory life. Anders published a critique of Heidegger called On the 
Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy in 1948 (Anders [Stern] 1948). In this work, 
Anders summarises his key criticisms of Heidegger. Here Anders states that ‘[t]he province 
of Heidegger’s concreteness […] ends before economy and machine’ (Anders [Stern] 1948, 
347). This mention of the machine in connection to the economy is reminiscent of Marx and 
suggests that Anders was engaging with Marxism at the time. 
On the whole, Heidegger had joined the Nazi party in 1933. This confirmed Anders 
suspicions about Heidegger’s antisemitism, discussed in the previous section. In light of this, 
Heidegger’s analysis of machines appeared, more clearly than ever, to romanticise a 
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forgotten, artisanal past, which resembled the Nazi ideal of traditional German society. I 
argue that Anders was, to a significant degree, consequently repelled by Heidegger’s 
conception of technology. This made him open to exploring other frameworks. 
 
3.3.4 Mature Anders 
Anders’ mature work, especially his writings that succeed the publication of The 
Obsolescence of Man, vol. I (Anders [1956] 2003), start to increasingly analyse technology in 
terms of it forming a system or totality. This shows how Anders’ analysis of machines is 
arguably both Hegelian and Marxian. 
In his open letter to Claus Eichmann, Anders explains that all machines tend to become 
‘machine parts’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 18) because ‘they would be mechanical components 
of one gigantic “total machine,” into which they would be merged’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 
18). Hence Anders here applies Hegel’s concept of totality to machines. Moreover, in The 
Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011), in an essay called ‘The Obsolescence of 
Machines’ dated 1969, Anders speaks of a ‘dialectic of the machine’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 
84), a clear reference to Hegel’s dialectical philosophy. Indeed Hegel’s dialectic helps us 
understand relations between the whole, or totality, and its parts (e.g. Hegel [1830] 2010, 
204). This can ground an understanding between separate but mutually constituting 
elements, such as humans and technology. In following this Hegelian logic, Anders comes 
close to Marx’s analysis of machines. This is because Marx also used a Hegelian framework. 
Indeed Anders’ ‘great machine’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 84) which is a ‘functional complex of a 
higher order’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 84) resembles Marx’s understanding of a ‘collective 
working machine’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 502) which includes ‘various kinds of single machine’ 
(Marx [1867] 1990, 502). Here Marx is also adopting Hegel’s notion of totality and applying 
it to machines. Hence Anders’ analysis is very similar to Marx’s. 
Anders moreover attributes an expansionary drive to machines that mirrors Marx’s 
definition of capital. Indeed both conceptions are tied to Hegel’s notion of spurious infinity. 
For instance, Anders states that ‘[i]n short, their self-expansion is limitless; the machines’ 
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thirst for accumulation is insatiable’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 17). This corresponds to Marx’s 
description of capital’s ‘blind measureless drive [and] insatiable appetite [which] oversteps 
[…] physical limits’ (Marx 1967, 375). Finally, for Anders, technology is so totalising that it 
‘has actually become the subject of history’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1). This echoes Marx’s 
characterisation of capital as an ‘automatic subject’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 255).  I argue that 
Anders saw modern technological systems as mirroring the capitalist social system 
described by Marx. Anders defined the principle, or essence, of machines as ‘maximum 
output, [for which] they need surrounding worlds that can provide maximum input’ (Anders 
[1964] 2015, 17). This is different to Heidegger’s notion of technology’s essence as 
‘maximum yield at minimum expense’ (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 15). Indeed it mirrors 
Anders’ understanding of ‘the ideal of the world of work of maximum yield and the 
economic principle’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 311, note 5). This conception reveals how Anders 
understanding of machines is influenced by Marx’s analysis of capitalism as characterised by 
a limitless drive for profit, which sucks dry surrounding resources. 
Nevertheless, I do not wish to deny that Anders gained important insights from 
Heidegger’s work. In fact, I argue that he integrates these into his mature analysis of 
technology. One of the main insights he adopts from Heidegger is that technology’s design is 
related to a specific purpose or use. Marx’s work also describes this but not in as much 
detail as Heidegger’s. Indeed Heidegger produced the notion that technology is 
characterised by Stellen. This word refers, among others, to bestellen, which means to set in 
order, order and command (Heidegger [1954] 1977, 15). The implication for Anders is that 
technology is tied to a specific mode of use, which conditions human activity. Hence Anders 
argues that what 
shapes and deforms us, are not just the objects that the “means” mediate, but the 
means and contraptions themselves. These are not merely objects multiple possible 
uses, but have their own determinate structure and function. (Anders [1956] 2003, 
98, my translation) 
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Taking the television as an example, Anders states that what “moulds” us and “alters” us 
just as much as the programme that we choose to watch is the fact that ‘we do not take 
part in it but only consume its image’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 98, my translation). 
Hence Anders uses Heidegger’s insights into technology having a specific structure and 
mode of use to produce a micro-level explanation that complements his general view of 
machines as forming a totality. The two levels of his analysis combine to shed light on why 
technological systems have such a profound effect on human life. This is something I will 
look at in more detail in the next section on domination when I outline Anders’ idea that the 
division of labour tied to machines can be a factor in facilitating acts of domination. 
 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, after Anders’ experience of factory work in 1936, he became critical of 
Heidegger’s conception of technology. Indeed Heidegger omitted modern technologies and 
factories from his analysis. This criticism reinforced Anders’ more general shift away from 
Heidegger’s philosophical influence, which had gathered pace after the latter joined the 
Nazi party in 1933. I argue that consequently Anders turned toward Hegel and Marx in order 
to formulate a more complete analysis of technology, which accounts for modern 
machinery. Accordingly, Anders started to view technology as forming a totality, or system, 
within which humans are situated. Hence, for Anders, technology had a profound influence 
on human life. In characterising technological systems as expansionary and all-
encompassing, Anders ends up mirroring Marx’s thought surrounding capital but applying it 
to technology. For instance, Marx calls capital an ‘automatic subject’ whereas Anders says 
that technology is the ‘subject of history’. As I show in section 3.5, Marx also thought that 
machinery was a material embodiment of capital. 
I argue that it is this thread that Anders picked up on and developed in Marx. 
Nevertheless, Anders supplemented his re-interpretation of Marx by applying some of 
Heidegger’s insights on technology to the notion of technology as a subject. In particular, 
Anders analysed in detail how technology came with a particular mode of operation, 
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functioning, structure or design which influenced human consciousness and actions. For 
instance, the next section will show how Anders highlighted the moral issues arising out of 





Anders’ early work deals with the theme of domination as enacted within and between 
groups of people. However, I argue that after the Second World War, Anders’ focus shifted 
toward thinking about technology as a crucial factor in producing domination. Anders was 
shocked to the core by the discovery of Nazi concentration camps and the atomic bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both were examples of scientific rationality being applied to 
killing. In fact, Anders referred to Hiroshima as the ‘day zero of a new era’ (Anders [1979b] 
2008, 73), as nuclear weapons made possible total human annihilation. Anders’ dismay at 
the industrial killing of the war was compounded by his personal experience of factory work 
in New York immediately after his emigration to the United States in 1936. Accordingly, 
Anders started to analyse how domination was facilitated by industrial technology, i.e. by 
the division of labour, weapons and surveillance. Anders adopted a progressively more 
Marxist view in parallel to this shift. For instance, he began to understand domination in 
terms of class, albeit unconventionally. In one of his last essays, Die Antiquiertheit des 
Proletariats [The Obsolescence of the Proletariat] (Anders 1992a), Anders attempts to 
redefine what the proletariat is in the technological era based on a standard of freedom 
(not living) (Anders [1992] 2013, 147). He concludes that the new proletariat includes 
almost everyone who does not control the effects of their actions mediated by technology. 
First, I look at Anders’ early notion of domination through social control (3.4.2). Then I 
show how this consisted in an early subversion of Heidegger and how Anders’ focus shifted 
with his experiences of the end of the first half of the 20th century (3.4.3). Finally, I show 
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that Anders mature writings shift toward a focus on technology as the main factor in 
producing domination (3.4.4). 
 
3.4.2 Early Anders 
Anders’ early anti-fascist novel Die molussische Katakombe [The Molussian Catacomb] 
(Anders 1992b, [1992] 2003) was ready for publication in 1933 and was later revised by 
Anders in 1938. It deals with the theme of domination and social control. However, in stark 
contrast to Anders’ later work, in this book technology is not the main factor in producing 
domination. Rather, the novel is primarily set in a prison. Here the characters relate to each 
other tales of resistance within their fictional land dominated by a fascist regime. Hence the 
novel is an allegory for the mass politics and repression of the Nazis.  
This early work contains the theme of power being exerted within and between groups. 
The characters of the novel are often gently coaxed into following orders. For instance, the 
novel contains the maxim “[i]f you want a loyal slave, give him an underdog” (Anders 
[1979b] 2008, 51, my translation) and discusses how, appearing as lords, characters ‘forgot 
that they continued to be servants’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 51, my translation). Hence this 
early work theorises domination as arising from power being exerted by one group over 
another. Hierarchical social structures create an authoritarian chain of command that 
encourages people to mistreat others. 
It is possible that Anders developed this theme to oppose his old teacher, Heidegger. For 
early Anders, being strongly embedded within a social hierarchy is a source of domination. 
Here Anders plays on Heidegger’s idea of Dasein as Being-in-the-world (Heidegger [1927] 
1967, 94) and as having a rooted existence, which Heidegger saw in a very positive light. For 
Heidegger, 
[i]t is not the case that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-
Being towards the ‘world’—a world with which he provides himself occasionally. 
Dasein is never ‘proximally’ an entity which is, so to speak, free from being-in, but 
which sometimes has the inclination to take up a relationship with the world. 
(Heidegger [1927] 1967, 84) 
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In opposition to the positive role rootedness plays in Heidegger’s search for authenticity, 
Anders suggests that being one with the world can be a source of unfreedom. Hence Anders 
will later speak of ‘being-unfree-in-the-world’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 152). For early Anders, 
being too rigidly inserted into any kind of social structure is a source of unfreedom. 
 
3.4.3 Epistemological break 
However, there was a break from Anders’ early period which made him develop another 
conception of domination. This conception emphasised the technological factor as well as 
the human factor in the production of domination. According to this conception, being 
integrated into technological systems which escape individual and social control is also a 
source of domination. 
This view was shaped by Anders’ experience of the Second World War. Anders described 
the news of the existence of concentration camps and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima as 
the third and fourth great breaks of his life (Anders [1979b] 2008, 73). Given his Jewish 
heritage, Anders had intense and complex feelings about these two events. Indeed, through 
witnessing these events and his experience of the production line, Anders had gained an 
insight into how ‘man of the time of mass production could also industrially produce 
millions of corpses’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 73, my translation).  
Anders focussed on the fact that industrial technologies, such as the atom bomb and 
asphyxiating gas Zyklon B, had been employed for mass killings and genocide (Anders [1956] 
2003, 271). This made Heidegger’s omission of industrial technology even more 
unjustifiable. In contrast, Anders’ argued that the machine’s 
"alienation" is obviously reckoned with in present-day society and in its division of 
labor. Already this preliminary example proves that at the point where Heidegger 
seems to become "concrete" or " pragmatic," he is most obsolete, shows, so to 
speak, a machine-smashing attitude, for all his examples are taken from the 
provincial shoemaker workshop. The alienation produced precisely by those tools 
that are supposed to be revealing, is alien to him. (Anders [Stern] 1948, 344) 
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I argue that Anders therefore turned away from Heidegger and toward Marxism. To analyse 
the industrial killing of the Second World War, Anders became much more prepared to 
engage in crucial Marxist concepts such as labour and its fragmentation. Hence his concept 
of domination was no longer solely based on divide and rule tactics but on the development 
of integrated technological systems under capitalism. These broke down dominating actions 
into many different steps. Anders’ theory laid emphasis on how being embedded within a 
social system of technology entailed being separated from the effects of one’s actions. 
 
3.4.4 Mature Anders 
Thus Anders’ mature work analyses how technological mediation facilitates domination 
and how the nuclear bomb exemplifies this trend. For Anders, one of the basic problems of 
the nuclear bomb is that the complexity of its production and deployment explodes the 
notion of individual responsibility. Hence Anders states that the use of nuclear weapons 
from their production to their deployment  
would consist of so many steps and intermediate partial steps, of so many instances, 
of which no single one would constitute the step that, finally, everyone would have 
merely done something, but no one would have “done” it. Ultimately it will have 
been no one. (Anders [1956] 2003, 230, my translation) 
In The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011), Anders will formulate this idea 
more clearly in terms of industrial labour, suggesting an even closer move to Marxism. 
Hence he states  
there is no longer any difference between punching a hole in a piece of sheet metal 
and the destruction of a city located on another continent. (Anders [1980] 2011, 46) 
Anders concludes this analysis by arguing that in the modern age ‘the distinction between 
the worker and the soldier [has been] abolished’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 46) Hence 
technology, and the division of labour it implies, become pernicious vectors of domination 
for Anders. 
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For instance, in an essay On Privacy, written in 1958, Anders speaks of how surveillance 
technology leads states to become more totalitarian. He argues that ‘surveillance devices 
are totalitarian merely by virtue of the fact that they are used’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 152). 
This is because they eliminate the difference between the public and the private sphere, 
making the person “totally deliverable” (Anders [1980] 2011, 151, italics in original). Hence 
Anders speaks of how 
the individual must remove all impediments to and deliver over to the totalitarian 
power the “internal space” that he had taken and reserved for himself as an isolated 
and “discrete” being. (Anders [1980] 2011, 154) 
Anders further details how the ubiquity of surveillance devices can facilitate mass control. 
Hence he states that 
From the times of the dictatorship we know that, from the moment when one 
considers that it is possible or even only not impossible that one is under 
surveillance, one feels and behaves differently than one did before, […] The 
unverifiable possibility of being under surveillance has a decisive capacity for 
molding: it molds the entire population. (Anders [1980] 2011, 155-156) 
Hence surveillance technologies erode individual autonomy with respect to society. Hence 
Anders states that  
As surveillance devices are used routinely, the main premise of totalitarianism is 
already created and, with it, totalitarianism itself. (Anders [1980] 2011, 154) 
Thus Anders moves away from an idea where social hierarchies are the main factor behind 
domination. He moves towards the idea that technology itself drives universal domination. 
The result is a reformulation Marxism, which is humanist and centred around technology. 
Anders’ ultimate conception is one where domination is class-based and completely 
mediated by technology. Hence, in one of his last essays Die Antiquiertheit Des Proletariats 
[The Obsolescence of the Proletariat] (Anders 1992a), Anders produces a new enlarged 
concept of the proletariat. The latter is not based on the ‘standard of living but on that of 
freedom’ (Anders [1992] 2013, 147, my translation). Anders argues that, for instance, an 
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engineer and with him the 99 per cent of his colleagues – lives and works as blindly 
as the unqualified industrial worker, who without knowing for what purpose […] 
presses a lever up and down a thousand times a day (Anders [1992] 2013, 147, my 
translation) 
Anders therefore argues that ‘today we are all proletarian’ (Anders [1992] 2013, 149, my 
translation) and favours ‘extend[ing] solidarity as far as our weapons can be deployed’ 
(Anders [1992] 2013, 145, my translation). This shows how Anders’ theory adopts elements 
of Marxism but ultimately seeks to go beyond Marxism. 
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
Anders early thinking around domination focuses on domination as it occurs within social 
hierarchies and groupings. According to this view domination was dependent on individuals 
being rigidly inserted into a social hierarchy. However, after the industrial warfare of the 
Second World War, Anders turned his attention to focussing on how technology was a 
factor in producing domination. In his mature years, Anders adapted a Marxist framework in 
order to analyse the division of labour operated by technology. His idea was that this 
amplified and removed emotional safeguards that could prevent humans form effecting 
brutal acts of domination. This led Anders to radically enlarge the notion of the proletariat, 
stating that all those who do not control the effects of their own actions are proletarians. 
Hence Anders’ theory is influenced by Marxism but also sought to go beyond Marxism. 
In discussing how domination can affect everyone but is also universally produced 
Anders’ concept of domination starts to increasingly resemble alienation, which in the last 
chapter I described domination of the subject by the object. Indeed alienation can be 
understood as a general inversion of subject (humans) and object (including technology). 






Anders’ early writings include an analysis of Alfred Döblin’s novel Berlin Alexanderplatz 
(Döblin [1929] 2018). This was finished in 1931 and is contained in Anders’ book Mensch 
Ohne Welt: Schriften zur Kunst und Literatur [Man without world: writings on art and 
literature] (Anders 1984b; [1984] 2015). I will argue that Anders’ early analysis of Döblin is 
made through the lens of Heidegger’s concept of inauthenticity. According to this 
conception, alienation is characterised by external social pressures. Individuals are 
pressured to conform to society by the judging gazes of the ‘they’. However, after Marx’s 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts became available in German in 1932 and his 
experiences in factories, Anders moved away from focussing on a Heideggerian concept of 
inauthenticity. He started to view alienation primarily in early Marx’s terms as a separation 
and inversion of subject and object. Anders analysed the industrial killing of the Second 
World War through this lens. For mature Anders, it is technical apparatuses’ destructive aim 
coupled with their immense power that means that their effect escapes human 
understanding and control. This creates a negative relation between individuals, technology 
and other people, but also between individuals and their own identity, as they no longer 
identify with their own actions. Anders calls this form of alienation Promethean shame. I 
show how it is influenced by Marx’s concept of alienation.  
Firstly, I look at Anders early analysis of Döblin’s characters and show how it is influenced 
by Heidegger’s philosophy (3.5.2). Secondly, I map Anders’ shift toward Marx’s conception 
of alienation. To do this, I show how mature Anders builds on Marx to produce a new 
concept of alienation (3.5.3). Finally I discuss how Anders’ concrete examples of 
Promethean shame in both the sphere of production and consumption develop Marx’s view 
of alienation (3.5.4). 
 
3.5.2 Early Anders 
In his writings from the early 1930s on literary criticism, Anders’ understands Döblin’s 
work as painting a picture of a modern man who lacks a world of his own and must adapt to 
the one in which he is thrust by circumstances. Indeed the book begins with the main 
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character, Franz Biberkopf, being released from prison and having to start a new life in the 
Berlin of the 1920s (Döblin [1929] 2018, 5-36). Embarking on his new life, the character is 
faced with constraints foisted onto him by society. For instance, Anders says of one of 
Döblin’s characters,  
his life [is] the narrow path along which he is pushed and on which he advances just 
because, behind him, they are throwing rocks and he is exposed on all sides to 
critical gazes. (Anders [1984] 2015, 62, my translation)  
This talk of life as a narrow path one has no choice but follow stands opposed to Heidegger’s 
notion of authenticity. For Heidegger, 
Distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, as ways of Being for the “they”, 
constitute what we know as ‘publicness’. Publicness proximally controls every way in 
which the world and Dasein get interpreted […]  it is insensitive to every difference of 
level and of genuineness (Heidegger [1927] 1967, 165) 
Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity in relation to Dasein, which is a term that Heidegger 
uses to designate the conscious subject, contrasts with this. For Heidegger, ‘Dasein is in 
each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose' itself and win itself; 
it can also lose itself and never win itself’ (Heidegger [1927] 1967, 68). This shows how, for 
Heidegger, authenticity means discovering one’s own path.  
In fact Heidegger later discusses how inauthenticity is connected to paying too much 
close attention to others and forgetting what one is oneself. For instance, he states that  
Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic 
potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Falleness” into the 
‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is 
guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. (Heidegger [1927] 1967, 220) 
This indicates that Anders’ description of a character being ‘pushed’ (Anders [1984] 2015, 
62, my translation) onto a path which is not his own and ‘exposed on all sides to critical 
gazes’ (Anders [1984] 2015, 62, my translation) is likely inspired by Heidegger’s notion of 
inauthenticity.  
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Hence, in 1931, Anders does not see human alienation as the result of the separation of 
subject and object, or the worker from his/her product. This is the theme that pervades 
Marx’s early writings, which were only finally published in 1932. Rather, Anders understands 
individuals as slipping into inauthenticity as they succumb to external pressure. Hence it is 
the force of Heidegger’s ‘they’ that still defines alienation for Anders at this point. 
However, I will show that Anders’ work between 1933 to 1944 shifts away from this 
conception. Hence Anders started to adopt a new framework of analysis in his 30s. After his 
period in factories and the Second World War, Anders will adopt a conception that views 
human relations as fundamentally affected by production and the fact that the worker is 
separated from his/her product. Hence there is a shift in Anders whereby early Anders 
thinks of alienation in terms of inauthenticity (Heidegger) and mature Anders thinks of 
alienation in terms of a separation and inversion of subject and object (Marx). 
 
3.5.3 Epistemological break 
There is a clear moment in his early 40s where Anders started to formulate his concept of 
Promethean shame. This marks the point where Anders started to develop his own theory 
of technological alienation. The first building block for this conception is the notion of 
Promethean discrepancy. The latter is based on the contrast between the limited human 
faculties of imagination and the immense power of human actions executed through 
technology. 
Anders developed this idea at a time when he was coming to grips with the huge human 
loss caused by the industrial warfare of the Second World War. In an excerpt from Anders’ 
journal from 1944, Anders expresses his concern that the destruction caused by modern 
weaponry is too big to adequately register on the human psyche. Indeed he states:  
7000 people died, he told me. 
[…] 
Who is capable of holding within their hands the sum of this horror? 
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We are inferior to ourselves. Our actions are too big for us to comprehend them. 
(Anders [1979a] 2008, 32, my translation) 
This provides one of the first articulations of an idea that Anders will later further detail in 
the The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I and II (Anders [1956] 2003, [1980] 2011). Here Anders 
calls for a critique of the limits of man, of ‘the limits of all his faculties (of his imagination, 
feeling, responsibility etc.)’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 26, my translation) in an age where ‘his 
productive activity seems to have surpassed every [one of these] limits’ (Anders [1956] 
2003, 26, my translation). Hence Anders made the idea of dissociation and separation, 
between limited human faculties and the great effects of human actions produced via 
technology, central to his understanding of alienation.  
Because of their focus on technology, Anders’ reflections form an understanding of 
technological alienation. This is the idea that the increasing size, power and complex 
workings of machinery plays a role in the fact that the worker is reduced to a mere 
appendage of the machine. However, before Anders, Marx had a similar idea of how  
all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that 
they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers; they distort 
the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage 
of a machine (Marx [1867] 1990, 799) 
Marx further described how the 
factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity before the science, the 
gigantic physical forces and the mass of labour that are embodied in the factory 
mechanism (Marx [1867] 1990, 286) 
This shows how, already in Marx’s work, the inverted relation between machine and worker 
is in part tied to the objective size, power and workings of the technology used in capitalist 
production. 
Thus Anders produced a concept that fits with Marx’s. Indeed it is very likely that Anders 
was influenced by early Marx during the period when he first developed these ideas, 1944-
1956. For instance, in his work criticising Heidegger, Nihilismus und Existenz [Nihilism and 
Existence], written in 1946 and only published posthumously in Über Heidegger [On 
98 
Heidegger] (Anders 2001), Anders mentions Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
(Marx [1844b] 2010). This is the crucial work in which Marx outlines alienation as a 
separation and inversion of subject and object. In his essay, Anders argues that Marx 
addressed the question of authenticity for workers whereas Heidegger was only interested 
in a bourgeois concept of authenticity. He states:  
But the despair of the unfree, although a fact of more than a hundred years, was not 
subtle enough to be ontologised by Heidegger. He could easily have shown that the 
Dasein of the proletarian is "inauthentic" because, as labour-time made flesh, it 
belongs to other Dasein; he could easily have seen that their struggle for liberation 
aims to win "authenticity" and "selfhood". But Heidegger left that to someone who, 
eighty years before him, in his Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts and in the 
German Ideology discussed these concepts of actuality, and whose aim was to turn 
the insight into inauthenticity into something other than a ritual. (Anders 2001, 67, 
computer generated translation). 
This shows that Anders’ preference for Marx’s concept of alienation over Heidegger’s was 
established by his early 40s. Anders striking reference to the proletariat as ‘labour-time 
made flesh’ further evidences his Marxist understanding of factory labour and command of 
Marxist terminology. 
 
3.5.4 Mature Anders 
The initial description of Promethean shame is philosophical. It is tied to a discrepancy 
between the absolute power of technology and man. However, in his mature formulation of 
this concept, Anders discusses concrete examples of Promethean shame. These further 
highlight how Anders’ concept of alienation is compatible with, but also goes beyond, 
Marx’s.  
Indeed Anders argues that a concrete manifestation of Promethean shame occurs with 
the worker’s inability to follow the rhythm of the production line. Anders describes this as 
‘the fact that his body is not able to adapt to the combination of movements that are 
required for the necessary operation’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 89, my translation). In this 
mature formulation, Anders draws from his experience as a factory worker during the early 
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years of his emigration to the US in 1936 (Anders [1979b] 2008, 69). For instance, he states 
that  
whoever has already found himself facing the task of working at the production line 
for the first time knows the effort that is necessary to transform the first contact into 
an adequate rhythm for the machine (Anders [1956] 2003, 86, my translation) 
This is a concrete example of humans feeling themselves to be at odds with the workings of 
the machines they operate. Hence I argue that Anders’ work on production lines helped him 
develop and concretise his notion of Promethean shame in line with Marx’s concept of 
alienation. Indeed Marx describes how ‘it is not the worker who employs the conditions of 
his work, but rather the reverse, the conditions of work that employ the worker’ (Marx 
[1867] 1990, 548).  
However, Anders also went beyond Marx in applying this idea to the industrial 
annihilation he witnessed during the Second World War and post-War consumerism. For 
instance, the former opened up the question of who is responsible for the operation of 
killing machines. Indeed Promethean shame also means that humans do not take 
responsibility for their own actions because they see these as distinct from themselves. 
Technological systems are mistaken for the subject which is responsible for these actions. 
Anders takes Adolf Eichmann as a paradigmatic example of this. In his open letter to his son, 
Claus Eichmann, Anders addresses the Nazi holocaust, which he theorised as a ‘systematic 
production of corpses’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 34). The excuse people like Eichmann gave for 
participating in the latter is: ‘No, actually, I did not do anything; at most I only collaborated” 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 44). They saw their role as limited to the technical task they had been 
set within the whole operation. They can be said to feel Promethean shame in that they do 
not want to recognise their part in perpetrating the brutal actions they have helped carry 
out. 
Moreover, with Promethean shame, brutal actions did not seem to be questionable, 
because of the smooth operation of the system through which they were carried out. 
Anders explains that the fact that ‘everything is “in order”’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 231, my 
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translation) means that the ‘operation is clean’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 231, my translation). 
This makes individuals feel as though it is they themselves who are fallible and not these 
technical systems. Thus people undertaking brutal acts dismiss their own reserves, because 
the ‘perfected devices’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 48) they operate must be right. Anders 
discusses how, even in the context of nuclear weapons, it is humans who are ‘principally 
considered as a [potential] source of error’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 304). This notion is tied to 
Anders’ initial observation regarding Promethean shame. Anders notes that when humans 
compare themselves to machines, they feel themselves to be of little worth and as though 
they were ‘faulty constructions’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 39, English in original). This is an 
example of subject-object inversion that goes beyond Marx’s because it concerns feelings of 
inferiority humans experience in relation to machines, which they anthropomorphise. 
Indeed, the theme of Promethean shame also has a concrete manifestation in the sphere 
of consumption. One instance of Promethean shame in this sphere is when humans feel 
that their bodies are inadequate compared to the idealised images of human bodies they 
see on the media. Thus, in a passage of his diary from 1941 quoted in The Obsolescence of 
Man, vol. 1, (Anders [1956] 2003), Anders discusses plastic surgery and pressures for 
actresses to conform to the beautified image of their own televised reproductions (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 192-195). This is also a concrete example of Promethean shame. Here 
mechanical representations acquire a ‘higher ontological status’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 196, 
my translation) than the persons they are modelled after. 
Hence Anders built on Marx’s concept of alienation and applied it to spheres that were 
not as significant during Marx’s time, such as technologies of destruction and consumption. 
 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
Up until the 1930s, Anders’ concept of alienation follows Heidegger’s idea of 
inauthenticity. This is tied to succumbing to the external social pressure of ‘the they’ 
(Heidegger [1927] 1967, 165). However, after 1932 Anders’ engaged with Marx’s concept of 
alienation as outlined in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx [1844b] 2010). 
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Here alienation is characterised as a division between subject and object. Anders’ concept 
of alienation thus became centred on the discrepancy between man and the immense 
power of technology. What’s more, between 1936 and 1944 Anders’ experienced factory 
work and witnessed the industrial killing of the Second World War. This meant that his 
conception of the inversion between man and machine became more concrete. With this, 
Anders’ theory of technological alienation is no longer simply one where man is faced with 
the immense effects of technology, but one where man’s everyday activity is conditioned by 
machine production. This dissociates people from their actions, which they no longer 
recognise as their own. But they also feel themselves to be inferior to the notion of 





Anders initially resisted the notion of ideology on ontological and phenomenological 
grounds. Anders’ early 1930s conception was against disconnecting thoughts from reality. 
However, very soon afterwards, Anders came closer to a Marxist understanding. His novel 
Die molussische Katakombe [The Molussian Catacomb] (Anders [1992] 2003), which was 
completed during his years in Paris between 1933-1936, dealt with how power is based on 
lies and vice-versa. This resembles the Marxist idea of base and superstructure. Finally, in 
his mature years after the Second World War, Anders speaks of how ideology is no longer 
necessary because the very structure of media, such as the television, invert the truth and 
collapse the difference between appearance and being. This criticism seems to be based on 
Marx’s understanding of the concrete basis underlying ideology production. However, it 
takes this conception beyond Marx by making technology the driving material factor. Hence 
with late Anders it is as though the production of ideology is, to some extent, automated by 
the very structure and design of media.  
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Firstly, I show how Anders early conception is still very influenced by phenomenology 
(3.6.2). Subsequently, I show that Anders broke radically from this framework in favour of a 
more Marxist and Hegelian lens (3.6.3). Finally, I show that Anders took inspiration from a 
Marxist conception of ideology to then go beyond it (3.6.4). This is because he argued that 
ideology was automatically produced by the structure of the media. 
 
3.6.2 Early Anders 
In his youth, Anders wrote a review of Mannheim’s book Ideology and Utopia ([1929] 
1954) entitled “Über die sog. ,Seinsverbundenheit' des Bewusstseins. Anläßlich Karl 
Mannheim ,Ideologie und Utopie’” [On the so called ‘situational determination’ of 
conscience in Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia] (Anders [Stern] 1930). Here he 
criticises Mannheim’s conception for not accounting for how ideologies are also part of 
reality.  
The young Anders adopts an ontological and phenomenological approach that 
encourages him to argue that it is not valid to assume that history is an absolute against 
which the truth or falsity of opinions and beliefs can be measured. He states that: ‘[i]f 
consciousness is situationally determined, then it constitutes the character of being itself’ 
(Anders [Stern] [1930] 2017, 120, my translation). What’s more, ‘consciousness is a 
character of being contributing to the constitution of the same historical situation up 
against which it is measured’ (Anders [Stern] [1930] 2017, 121, my translation). Hence 
ideologies cannot be definitively judged false according to the young Anders because:  
if consciousness is thought of as a function of the ontological situation, then it 
cannot be compared to it or judged “false” compared to it, because the situation is 
nothing without that function. (Anders [Stern] [1930] 2017, 119, my translation) 
Indeed the young Anders argues against the notion of a single vision of history. He conceives 
of history as approximations and narratives told after the fact. This is an anti-Marxist 
position close to the postmodern one. It questions the idea that historical development 
follows a logic of progress and emancipation. Indeed the young Anders argues that ‘[a] 
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historical subject never belongs to the history that is attributed to it a posteriori’ (Anders 
[Stern] [1930] 2017, 127, my translation, italics in original). This conception takes away 
agency form the subject.  
This rejection of the notion of the subject of history contrasts with Anders’ later 
proclamation that technology is ‘the subject of history’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1). 
 
3.6.3 Epistemological Break 
In a brief afterward written in 1973, Anders explains that ‘[t]his essay, which was written 
48 years ago, does not contain a single thesis to which I would still subscribe’ (Anders [1973] 
2017, 129, my translation). He goes on to detail how this divergence stems from the fact 
that he was still under the influence of Heidegger and Husserl and that, ‘at the time of the 
text’s writing, [the young him] had had very few contacts with Hegel and Marx’ (Anders 
[1973] 2017, 129, my translation). This comment suggests that Anders broke radically with 
this kind of ontological and phenomenological view. It suggests that Anders made a 
conscious shift toward Hegel and Marx. In fact, he adds that the reservations that he 
maintains about Mannheim’s book are that it ‘exposes Marxism itself to a Marxist critique 
of ideology so as to disempower it’ (Anders [1973] 2017, 129, my translation). This last 
comment suggests that the mature Anders is sympathetic to Marxism. 
In fact, false conceptions of the world gain a progressively more important role in Anders’ 
thought. The completion of Anders’ book Die molussische Katakombe [The Molussian 
Catacomb] (Anders 1992b) follows his essay on Mannheim by just a couple of years. Yet, in 
this work, the concepts of truth and lies play an important role in subjugating populations. 
For instance, one of Anders’ characters speaks about how some people are ‘fooled; they 
consider lies to be the truth and are ready to sacrifice themselves for them’ (Anders [1992] 
2003, 207, my translation). Moreover, there is a conversation between the two main 
characters where the question is asked of whether ‘[p]ower is founded on lies’ (Anders 
[1992] 2003, 203, my translation). The other character responds: ‘And what do lies rest on?’ 
(Anders [1992] 2003, 203, my translation) On ‘nothing other than power as such’ (Anders 
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[1992] 2003, 204, my translation), the other responds. Hence the conclusion that ‘lies rest 
on power’ (Anders [1992] 2003, 204, my translation) is reached. 
This expresses a dialectical conception which fits with the Marxist vision of base and 
superstructure. In fact, the characters follow by speaking of a ‘process that transforms the 
sincere man into a liar and makes appear, to his eyes, truths as lies’ (Anders [1992] 2003, 
207, my translation). Hence for Anders everyday people may come to believe lies about the 
world without being aware of this. This appears to pick up on Marx’s idea that it is class 
distinctions that produce ideology as inversion of reality. This is because the majority of the 
population does not have the means for intellectual production and must accept that of a 
narrow elite. For Anders, too, ‘the power of lies is based on that of the liar’ (Anders [1992] 
2003, 576). 
However, a second shift seems to have occurred whereby, after the Second World War, 
Anders started to focus on how lies are a structural part of the media and technology. I 
argue that this idea originated with Anders’ experience of factory work in the US in the late 
1930s and early 1940s. This was compounded by his reckoning with the huge human loss 
produced by industrial warfare during the Second World War. Indeed, in opposition to 
Heidegger’s idea that tools reveal hidden truths through their use, factory work led Anders 
to ask:  
Are modern machines really "revealing" themselves by their operation? Is their 
product their purpose? Is not their purpose to be seen only by making transparent 
much more than the machines themselves? (Anders [Stern] 1948, 344) 
Anders answers that ‘[o]perating a modern machine does not reveal it at all’ (Anders [Stern] 
1948, 344). He consequently questioned whether ‘our simple perception is insufficient to 
comprehend the modern world’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 33, my translation) and therefore 
becomes ‘a kind of “fantasy”’ (Anders [1979b] 2008, 33, my translation). With this, he shifts 
towards an understanding where the prevalence of media and technology obfuscates 




3.6.4 Mature Anders 
Hence in his mature work, Anders argues that advanced industrial societies have moved 
beyond the need for ideologies, understood as false conceptions of the world. This is 
because technologies like the television make us mistake a particular image or 'fragments of 
the world' (Anders [1956] 2003, 129, my translation) for the world itself. This because the 
structure of the television means that viewers interpret the images they are seeing as 
though what they show is right before them, and they are seeing it with their own eyes. 
Hence Anders states that the ‘television passivizes man and teaches him to systematically 
mistake being and appearance’ (Anders [1979] 2002, 12, my translation). 
Indeed, for Anders, a media image is always loaded with a message, through how the 
pictures are shot or how the sequence is edited, for instance. The image thus already tells us 
the ‘sentiment that it must provoke in us’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 186, my translation) and 
what we must think of it. Consequently, there is no longer the space or the need for 
individuals themselves to produce rationalisations and narratives about the world. For 
instance, Anders states that  
we cannot cook and cut at home pre- cooked and cut bread. In the same way we 
cannot ideologically re-arrange and reinterpret the events that reach us ideologically 
"pre-cut", pre-interpreted and arranged; or we cannot "imagine" all over again that 
which is presented to us in the form of an image. (Anders [1956] 2003, 185 my 
translation) 
This shows how, for Anders, the technological system inherently produces false conceptions 
of the world. Hence Anders argues that the assumption that everyone ‘“has” his own 
opinion [is] unjustified’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 130, my translation).  
For Anders, it is as though the television screen is like Marx’s famous example of the 
camera obscura, which produces an inverted image of reality. Anders questions whether it 
is really possible to accurately represent an event so big as the detonation of a nuclear 
bomb through the small screen of television sets. Indeed, he speaks of how ‘the TV 
transforms all events into playthings’ and how this produces a ‘serious lack of seriousness’ 
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(Anders [1956] 2003, 143, my translation). Hence Anders builds on Marx and Engels’ idea 
that it is the material social intercourse of people, ‘their historical life-processes’ (Marx and 
Engels [1845a] 2010, 36), which produces the inversion whereby ‘men and their relations 
appear upside-down as in a camera obscura’ (Marx and Engels [1845a] 2010, 36). He adds to 
it the idea that this inversion is produced mechanically by the very structure of ICTs. Small 
screens act like the small hole of the camera obscura, according to Anders. In this sense, 
Anders mature conception of ideology goes beyond Marx, as it is no longer people or social 
structures that are the main factors in producing ideology. It is technological structures. 
 
3.6.5 Conclusion 
Anders’ conception of ideology is initially anti-Marxist and phenomenological. However, 
during his time in Paris, Anders quickly radically broke from this conception and became 
more sympathetic to Marxist understandings. Subsequently, Anders’ experience of factory 
work in the US helped him produce his mature notion that capitalist technology obscures 
human perception. This culminates with his conception that ideology is, to some extent, 
automatically produced by the structure of media and technology. The television comes to 
resemble Marx’s example of a camera obscura in Anders’ conception, as it minimises the 
importance of horrific events such as atomic bombings. It inverts the fragment into the 
whole, the image into world and the bad into the good. 
I argue that this conception can be distinguished from postmodern understandings in 




I have based much of the autobiographical material in this chapter on Anders’ interview 
with Mathias Greffrath in 1979 which he gave at the age of 77 (Anders [1979b] 2008, 51-85). 
This has allowed me to map the development of Anders’ thought against what Anders 
himself described as the main breaks of his life. Thus I have demonstrated that Anders’ 
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oeuvre is not monolithic and closed to interpretation. On the contrary, I have shown how, 
starting out as a phenomenologist and philosophical anthropologist, Anders increasingly 
turned to Marxism throughout his life. 
Understanding Anders’ body of work as contradictory and containing internal 
epistemological brakes addresses a gap in the literature. The latter tends to dismiss the 
question of Anders’ Marxism by stating that Anders was an idiosyncratic critical theorist 
who was inspired but did not fit in with the Frankfurt School (Dijik 2000, 13; Sonolet 2006). 
This obscures Anders’ gradual engagement with Marxism, which, as I have shown in this 
chapter, intensified throughout his life. One exception is Dawsey’s most recent work, which 
argues that: ‘evaluations of [Anders’] critique of modern technology should stress the 
engagement with Marx more and that with Martin Heidegger less’ (Dawsey 2019, 50). 
However, Dawsey also defines Anders as a ‘post-Marxist’ (Dawsey 2004), which suggests 
that Anders’ theory came to fill a void left by Marxism. In contrast, I have argued that 
Anders actively applied Marx’s methodology and theoretical framework to the question of 
technology, picking up on threads already contained in Marx. Thus, although similarly 
dealing with contemporary issues, Anders’ work can be differentiated from postmodern 
accounts, which reject Marxism. 
In particular, I have argued that Anders developed the theme of technological alienation 
contained within Marx’s work. Marx’s work already features the idea that as machinery 
becomes bigger and bigger an inversion occurs whereby the worker is directed by the 
machine and not the other way around. Hence the worker appears as a mere conscious 
organ of the machine. Anders took this logic and applied it to the 20th century, arguing that 
what we are able to produce through technology exceeds our capacity of representation 
and imagination. Therefore technology escapes our immediate control while hugely 
impacting our lives.  
In doing this, Anders addressed the need to theorise technology as a new specific force. 
Indeed, after Marx’s death, technology entered as a major factor in world politics in the 
shape of the nuclear bomb. Hence for mature Anders technology is involved in each of the 
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subsequent themes of this thesis: domination, alienation and ideology. Referring back to 
Figure 2.1, Anders’ theory effectively represents an understanding where technology 
overreaches into all the categories that follow it. It therefore reflects a more advanced stage 
in the spiral, where technology has become structured by domination and alienation from a 
previous cycle. Consequently, it now reproduces these. Hence Anders’ theory shows how 
further theorisation of technology is required to understand the dynamics of modern 
capitalism. 
In this thesis, I primarily argue that Anders can be understood as a humanist-Marxist that 
resisted the economism of other forms of Marxism by focussing on the relation between the 
human and technology. However, to the extent that Anders made technology the new 
determining factor of his analysis media society, eclipsing capital and the economy, his 
theory can be understood as also going beyond Marxism. 





Humans are abstract 
and indeterminate 
 
Political period in 
Paris. Anders adopts 
the Marxist idea that 
human essence is tied 
to social production 
Contradicts initial 
position by speaking of 
alienation from human 
essence understood as 





Little mention of 
technology in Anders’ 
early work 
 
Various factors behind 
the break: period in 
factories, industrial 
killing of the Second 
World War. Anders 
criticises omission of 
modern machinery in 
Heidegger 
 
Turns to a more 
dialectical analysis in 
order to theorise 
modern machines. 
This analysis reflects 






within a social context. 




Time in factories and 
industrial killing of the 
Second World War 
means that conception 
of domination gets 
tied to industrial 
technology 
 
This concept of 
technological 
domination gets more 
concrete and Marxist. 
Domination is 
produced by machines 
fragmenting violent 
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acts. Anders produces 
an enlarged concept of 
the proletariat to fit 






submitting to the 





identifying with one’s 
actions, like Adolf 
Eichmann 
 
A concept of 
technological 
alienation beyond 










ideas can be deemed 
false 
 
Clear break with these 
early remarks and 
explicit reference to a 
later adoption of Hegel 
and Marx 
 
A concept of ideology 
beyond Marx: the 
structure of the media 
materially inverts what 
we perceive as reality 
Table 3.7.1: Summary of Anders’ epistemological break 
Table 3.7 traces the evolution of Anders’ concepts showing that an epistemological break 
occurs mid-way through Anders’ life. 
In the next chapter, I show how Anders’ thought stands out when compared to some of 
his contemporary theorists. I show that despite touching on some of the same themes, 
Anders distinguishes himself from other theorists through his engagement with Marxism. 
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4. Günther Anders and Other Theorists 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, I argued that Anders underwent a turn towards Marxism during the 
mature phase of his life. In this chapter, I continue to show that Anders’ work can be read as 
a humanist-Marxist analysis of technology. I do this by comparing and contrasting Anders’ 
work to other critical theorists of technology. I continue to look at the themes of the human, 
technology, domination, alienation and ideology. 
I engage with the work Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980), especially in section 4.2.2, 
because of his importance within media studies. However, elsewhere I have opted to place 
emphasis on comparing Anders’ work to French critical theorists, such as Jacques Ellul 
(1912-1994) and Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007). These thinkers have inspired contemporary 
critical theorists of technology such as Langdon Winner (1978 1980) and Andrew Feenberg 
([1999] 2001, 2002), whom I also compare to Anders. Indeed, David (2006) has argued that 
Anders’ theory shares remarkably strong similarities with Ellul’s. I take the opportunity in 
this chapter to argue against such a comparison. The question of technology occupies a 
strong position in both theorists’ analysis. Moreover, both theorists were influenced by 
Marxism. However, I argue that there are fundamental differences. Namely, Ellul departed 
from Marxism to primarily base himself in Christian theology. Conversely, as I argued 
especially in the last chapter, Anders turned towards Marxism. I argue that Anders can be 
understood, not only as a post-Marxist as argued by Dawsey (2004) but also more squarely 
as a humanist-Marxist. In this, he is fundamentally different to Ellul. 
In sections 4.3.3 and 4.5.3 of this chapter, I highlight how Anders did not think of 
technology as excluded from the capitalist economy. He thought of machines as 
commodities involved in the dynamics of consumer capitalism. I argue that Anders’ 
statement that ‘technology has actually become the subject of history’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 
1) can be viewed as a provocation, which is part of his method of philosophical exaggeration 
[gelegenheitsphilosophisch] (Anders [1956] 2003, 23, 86, 221). In the context of the 
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disproportionate dangers single nuclear bombs could produce, Anders sought to 
compensate by exaggerating his claims regarding technology. In contrast, Ellul argued that 
‘[t]echnique has become autonomous’ (Ellul [1954] 1964, 14) in a more literal sense.  
In turn, comparing Anders to Baudrillard, reveals that Anders had a similar intuition to 
Baudrillard. Both theorists produce the notion that the information conveyed by media has 
a virtual or phantom-like quality. Indeed it is possible that Anders’ stay in France between 
1933 and 1936, during which Anders participated in Parisian cultural life, meant that he 
received similar influences to French theorists such as Ellul and Baudrillard. However, I 
argue, especially in section 4.5.3, that Anders’ analysis of media is a lot more detailed and 
concrete than Baudrillard’s. It does not rely on the idea of semiotics and cybernetics as 
much as Baudrillard’s work. It, rather, outlines material mechanisms through which media 
can produce distorted and deceptive images of the world. 
Another influence on Anders’ work came from the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer helped 
Anders flee to New York from Paris in 1936 (Arendt and Anders 2017, 164). Moreover, 
Anders came into contact with Adorno in 1939 in Los Angeles after his stay in New York 
(Arendt and Anders 2017, 188). However, Anders’ relation with Adorno is documented by 
Young-Bruhel ([1983] 1992) and Liessmann (2012) as being tense. Moreover, there is a 
significant difference in style between Anders’ work, which is prosaic and non-academic, 
and Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s work in Dialectic of Enlightenment ([1944] 2002). Anders’ 
work aims to produce a deep analysis of the structure and affordances of modern forms of 
media and technology. It does not seek to describe the evolution of Western thought as 
Horkheimer and Adorno sought to do. Hence, in section 4.6.2, I outline how Anders’ 
conception of ideology is different to that of the culture industry approach of the Frankfurt 
school. 
Finally, in this chapter, I also compare Anders to contemporary discourses surrounding 
the potential harms of digital media such as smartphone technology. In recent years, a 
critique of social media and smartphone apps has become established within public 
discourse. Some of these criticisms have emerged from Silicon Valley developers 
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themselves. The argument goes that, in attempting to monetise platforms, developers 
designed interfaces to make them addictive. This has culminated in Tristan Harris, an ex- 
employee at Google, becoming a public intellectual and criticising the alienating dimension 
of modern apps and social media. A recent documentary called The Social Dilemma 
(Orlowski 2020) that features Tristan Harris has been seen by 38 million households, 
according to figures published on the documentary’s Twitter page. Consequently, in the last, 
subsection of each section of the following chapter, I show how Anders’ theory can help us 
go beyond these common-sense approaches and avoid some of their pitfalls. 
The structure of this chapter follows the order of the main themes involved in this thesis, 
which are the human, technology, domination, alienation and ideology. Each of these 
themes forms a section. Each section is divided into three subsections. Firstly, I present the 
other theorists I wish to compare Anders’ work to. Secondly, I show how Anders is different 
to these theories. Thirdly, I show how Anders’ theory can help us avoid falling into some of 
the oversimplifying traps of the contemporary discourses criticising modern media. I 
specifically refer to the theories of Tristan Harris in The Social Dilemma (Orlowski 2020). 
 
4.2 The human 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
It is hard to speak of the human in isolation from technology when comparing Anders to 
other media theorists, whose work is never far removed from the question of technology. 
Therefore, in this section, I focus on the relationship between the human and technology 
rather than just the human. 
In section 4.2.2, I look at how the theories of McLuhan and Simondon highlight how the 
relationship between humans and technology is continuous. According to these 
conceptions, humans and technology are not discreet entities. Technology extends humans 
faculties. Therefore humans and technology develop one-another. In section 4.2.3, I show 
how this understanding is brought to fruition in Haraway’s understanding of humans and 
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machines sharing a similar ontological status. According to Haraway, there is almost no 
separation between humans and machines. I show how Anders’ work militates against this 
conception.  
Anders views humans and machines as intimately connected and mutually influencing 
one-another. However, he also understands them as distinct. For Anders, a complete 
identification between humans and machines amounts to a form of Promethean shame 
characterised by submission to the mechanical rhythm of machines. In contrast, Anders 
argued that, through a conscious effort, human sentiments could adapt to technological 
developments to allow humans to gain better control over technology.  
In section 4.2.4, I show how Anders’ conception of humans as both mentally flexible but 
also fixed organic beings can counter a modern positivist turn toward genetically 
determinist evolutionary theories of the human and technology. These explain technological 
domination, alienation and ideology through the notion of physiological addiction and 
psychological hijacking. 
 
4.2.2 Other theorists: McLuhan, Simondon 
Lawson (2010) has shown how McLuhan’s conception of the human and technology does 
not pit one against the other. Rather, McLuhan understands humans and technology as 
forming a continuum. Hence she states that, for McLuhan: 
Electronic media are understood as extensions of the information processing 
functions of the central nervous system (Lawson 2010, 210) 
Lawson further highlights McLuhan’s statement that humans in the information age are ‘an 
organism that now wears its brain outside its skull and its nerves outside its hide’ (McLuhan 
in Lawson 2010, 210). Here McLuhan is suggesting that computers can be understood as 
human organs. 
Indeed McLuhan famously stated that, in turn, humans can become the ‘sex organs’ 
(McLuhan, [1964] 1967, 56) of machines. This implies that humans and machines are not 
discrete entities but share a symbiotic relationship. He states: 
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Physiologically, man in the normal use of technology (or his variously extended body) 
is perpetually modified by it and in turn finds ever new ways of modifying his 
technology. Man becomes, as it were, the sex organs of the machine world, as is the 
bee of the plant world, enabling it to fecundate and to evolve ever new forms. The 
machine world reciprocates man’s love by expediting his wishes and desires, namely, 
in providing him with wealth. (McLuhan, [1964] 1967, 56) 
A similar understanding is also shared by Simondon, who uses the image of organs to speak 
of machines, albeit while, according to Combes, specifying that:  
mechanical evolution is very different from that of organisms: with machines, it is as 
if the organ separated from the body and functioned as a seed or germ for a new 
individual or a new line of individuals. (Combes 2013, 104) 
Indeed Simondon provides theories of both human and technological individuation, or 
structuring. Regarding the human, Simondon asserts that ‘the human being still remains in 
evolutionary terms unfinished, incomplete’ (Simondon in Combes 2013, 49). Hence 
Simondon tends to see humans and technology as always in a process of becoming. 
Simondon’s notion of the ‘pre-individual’ (Combes 2013, 3) implies that humans contain 
potentials that are always in a process of actualising and are not yet complete. Both 
McLuhan and Simondon’s theories show how humans and technology can be understood as 
developing in an interconnected fashion through a mutual relation of influence. 
 
4.2.3 How Anders is different 
Anders also conceives of humans and machines as existing in relations of mutual 
influence. However, he never let this translate into a vision of how humans and machines 
seamlessly enmesh, as is suggested by Haraway’s theory, for instance. Haraway states that: 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized 
and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism—in short, cyborgs. (Haraway [1991] 
2013, 150)  
For Haraway, cyborgs are ‘couplings between organism and machine, each conceived as 
coded devices’ (Haraway [1991] 2013, 150). Hence she identifies humans and machines, 
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arguing that they are ontologically the same. In contrast, Anders prefers to conceptualise 
humans as both connected but also distinct from machines. Contemporary interpreters of 
Anders such as Beinsteiner (2019) have read Anders in light of Haraway’s work and pointed 
to some similarities and differences. For Beinsteiner, Anders’ work ‘aims to illustrate is that 
technologies mediate our access to ourselves and to reality’ (Beinsteiner 2019, 128). 
However, he also highlights that Anders’ notion of alienation, Promethean shame, ‘consists 
precisely in accepting machines’ agency and flexibility as the standards that our own bodies 
have to live up to’ (Beinsteiner 2019, 120).  
I agree with Beinsteiner’s conception here. Anders says that appliances and means 
‘mould and alter us’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 98, my translation). But he also insists on what he 
calls humans’ ‘ontic endowment’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 71, my translation). This refers to 
their organic being, i.e. ‘that which one inevitably is’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 70, my 
translation). For Anders, humans’ organic being is determined by chance evolutions. 
Humans are not designed for anything specific like the machines they build. This means that 
from the perspective of the logic machines, humans remain a ‘faulty construction’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 40, italics and English in original). For Anders:  
This derives, precisely, from the fact that, instead of being a real prime material, 
humans are “tragically” morphologically fixed, because they are pre-formed [by 
nature, i.e. not consciously designed] (Anders [1956] 2003, 54) 
This means that Anders conceptualises the relation of man and machine as one of mutual 
influence rather than fusion, like Haraway and to a lesser extent McLuhan and Simondon. 
This conception highlights how Anders could produce a theory of technological alienation 
based on the idea that technology can overwhelm human faculties of understanding and 
imagination (see sections 3.5.3-4) while not making this conception completely 
deterministic. As was shown in section 3.2.4, Anders’ understanding is based on the idea 
that humans are both fixed and malleable at the same time. Anders asserts that humans 
have a biological pre-disposition for social production but that this pre-disposition exists as a 
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‘blank check’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 290, my translation). Consequently, Anders believed 
that: 
Man is not obliged to accept a limited endowment of sentiments that is defined once 
and for all; instead he always invents new sentiments; in fact he even invents 
sentiments that exceed the normal volume of his soul. (Anders [1956] 2003, 295, my 
translation) 
Hence what Anders’ considers to be flexible in humans remains at the level of conscious 
social activity. Anders believed that technological advances necessitated the adaptation of 
man through the creation of new sentiments. He speaks of how: 
Today our crucial moral task consists in developing our moral fantasy, that is, in the 
attempt to overcome the “discrepancy”, of adapting the capacity and the elasticity of 
our imagination and of our sentiments to match the dimensions of our products 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 256, my translation) 
 Hence Anders thought that there is room for humans to enlarge the scope of their 
sentiments to keep up and gain better control over technology. But this process is not 
automatic, for Anders. It is part of a real and conscious struggle humans must undertake to 
appropriate emergent forms of technology. 
 
4.2.4 How this is relevant to today 
Today there is a positivist trend, in which Tristan Harris participates, of considering 
humans, including human psychology, principally on the basis of evolution and genetics. 
This has revived a discipline from the 19th century, evolutionary psychology, which 
reductively and deterministically explains human psychological behaviour principally 
through genetics. Hence Harris says that: 
We evolved to care about whether other people in our tribe... think well of us or not, 
’cause it matters. But were we evolved to be aware of what 10,000 people think of 
us? We were not evolved to have social approval being dosed to us every five 
minutes. That was not at all what we were built to experience. (Orlowski 2020, 43) 
Tristan states that consequently: 
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Human beings, at a mind and body and sort of physical level, are not gonna 
fundamentally change. […] you’re living inside of hardware, a brain, that was, like, 
millions of years old (Orlowski 2020, 48) 
Harris’ thinking displays a degree of Promethean shame and machine fetishism that Anders’ 
work highlights. He speculates that humans were ‘built’ (Orlowski 2020, 43) for something 
as though they were machines, or ‘hardware’ (Orlowski 2020, 48), created by a conscious 
entity. Instead, Anders highlights that humans were not purposefully designed for anything. 
In some respects, Harris’ conception resembles Anders’ idea that technology can exceed 
human faculties of understanding. However, ultimately Harris’ adopts a machine logic that 
conceptualises humans as ‘faulty construction[s]’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 40, English and italics 
in original). He depicts humans as inferior to ‘the supercomputer [which is] on the other 
side of that screen’ (Orlowski 2020, 77). He fails to recognise the plasticity of the human 
mind and gives into functionalist thinking mirroring technical sciences to speak of the 
human. He does not accept the part played by chance transformations in human evolution, 
which may explain human mental plasticity. It is interesting to note that Harris’ conception 
both resembles and stands diametrically opposed to Haraway’s conception that humans and 




Anders’ explanation manages to avoid both extremes of an infinitely fluid conception of 
the relation of humans and machines and one that is too rigid and based on a fixed view of 
human mental capacities. Anders argued that humans should attempt to grasp 
technological appliances through their mental faculties to better control them and steer 
them in the right direction. 
This conception is not opposed to McLuhan and Simondon’s conception of the relation 
between technology and the human. However, it is opposed to Haraway’s provocative 
questioning of the difference between humans and machines. It is also opposed to 
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genetically determinist evolutionary notions of humans, which regard modern human brains 
as Stone Age brains. In contrast, Anders’ theory acknowledges the plasticity of mental 





Just as in the last section I discussed the intersection between the human and 
technology, in this section I discuss technology as it intersects systems of power and 
domination. This is because I am comparing Anders to other critical theorists, who analysed 
how technology could re-produce systems of power and domination. 
Hence, in section 4.3.2, I discuss Feenberg’s notion of how technological systems can 
reproduce class domination. However, I argue that Feenberg produces a dualistic 
understanding of technology, which treats the general function of pieces of technology as 
neutral and necessary. Conversely, he treats the superficial design of these implements as 
open to transformations. He further fetishizes the notion that such emancipatory design 
transformations happen automatically.  
In section 4.3.3, I discuss how Anders’ understanding of technology goes against such 
dichotomisations. Anders’ theory shows how pieces of technology can not only form a 
system with other pieces of technology, but also fuse with the commodity-form. Therefore 
he conceptualised the link between technology and existing power-structures linked to the 
capitalist economy. For Anders, technologies are integrated within systems of social control, 
commodity production and consumerism. Hence I argue against many of the contemporary 
appraisals of Anders, which argue that Anders thought of technology in isolation from other 
factors. In section 4.3.4, I show how Anders’ conception of an integrated system of techno-
commodities can help us avoid dichotomising between hardware and software design, 
regarding the first as neutral and the second as dominating. 
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4.3.2 Other theorists: Feenberg 
Feenberg understands technology as non-neutral, arguing that technological systems are 
inscribed with a ‘technological code’ (Feenberg 2002, 76; [1999] 2001, 88) and can therefore 
re-enforce structures of power. He states that: 
invariant elements of the constitution of the technical subject and object are 
modified by socially specific contextualizing variables in the course of the realization 
of concrete technical actors, devices, and systems. Thus technologies are not merely 
efficient devices or efficiency oriented practices, but include their contexts as these 
are embodied in design and social insertion. (Feenberg [1999] 2001, xiii) 
This leads Feenberg to divide technological systems into what he calls ‘primary’ (Feenberg 
[1999] 2001, 202) and ‘secondary instrumentalizations’ (Feenberg [1999] 2001, 202). Based 
on Fuchs (2016a), I argue that this is dualistic because it dichotomises between the internal 
structure and outward design of technology. 
Primary instrumentalization concerns the ‘functional constitution of technical objects and 
subjects’ (Feenberg [1999] 2001, 202). The secondary instrumentalization concerns 
‘realization’ (Feenberg [1999] 2001, 202) through styling and design. Hence Feenberg states 
that ‘the orientation toward reality [primary instrumentalization] characteristic of 
technology is combined with the realization of technology in the social world [secondary 
instrumentalization]’ (Feenberg 2002, 175). According to Feenberg, the secondary 
instrumentalization is more open to reworking and contestation, whereas the primary 
instrumentation remains more fixed. Speaking of how the Minitel office computer system of 
the early 1980s was employed for leisure communication, he states that:  
[i]t was mainly nonprofessionals (or professionals not associated with the design and 
management of the systems) who pioneered these unexpected uses of the new 
technologies. And they succeeded because ordinary people wanted computers to 
serve personal goals and not just the official functions emphasized by experts. In the 
process they refuted widespread deterministic assumptions about the rationalizing 
implications of the computer and revealed its communicative potential. (Feenberg 
2002, 118) 
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Feenberg believes that users and producers can redirect technological developments in 
radically new directions by solely adjusting the design or secondary instrumentation of such 
technologies. Hence Feenberg describes how technology has these ‘integrative 
potentialities that can be enlisted to repair the damage it does’ (Feenberg 2002, 176). 
Fuchs (2016a) has shown how this conception fetishizes the notion of user participation. 
Hence Fuchs argues that: ‘Feenberg’s theory of technology is […] dualist because it does not 
thoroughly analyse the antagonisms between capitalist technologies and alternative 
technologies’ (Fuchs 2016a, 221). According to Fuchs, Feenberg 
ends up with a fetishism of technological struggles that does not see that alternatives 
and struggles are always potentials, but do not automatically and also not with 
necessity emerge because struggles can be contained by power asymmetries, 
ideologies, repression, violence (Fuchs 2016a, 220) 
I further argue that Feenberg reifies the primary orientation or the function of specific 
commodities, treating it as necessary and natural. He then fetishizes the idea of user 
influence over the design of specific technologies, such as through alternative uses of a 
given technology. 
 
4.3.3 How Anders is different 
Anders’ conception of technology is unifying rather than dichotomising. Anders doesn’t 
radically separate different aspects of the same technology, like Feenberg. As shown in 
section 3.3.4, Anders understands technological devices as tending to form a system. Their 
functioning further becomes integrated with what is external to them. Hence ‘”the world 
becomes a machine”’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 19). Because of this dialectic between the inner 
and outer of each appliance, there is no neutral layer of technology. All elements interact.  
In fact, technologies are influenced by, and feed back on, the social environment. In section 
3.3.4, I used citations from Anders’ relatively late exposition of his idea of technology 
forming a totality from We, Son’s of Eichmann (Anders [1964] 2015). In Anders’ earlier but 
still mature work, which is in fact his main oeuvre, The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I, (Anders 
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[1956] 2003), Anders has a slightly different explanation. In 1964, Anders speaks of 
technology qua machines, whereas in his earlier 1956 work he speaks of technology qua 
commodities.  
Anders’ 1956 piece on radio and television is called ‘The World as Phantom and Matrix’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 97-195). He uses the term matrix to refer to the structure of the 
technological environment he is describing. Anders makes the argument that the expansion 
of the world of commodities is the original motor for the expansion of machines. The fact 
that machines require an external environment to function mirrors the fact that 
commodities refer to one-another through the price system and necessitate the buying of 
other commodities. Hence he states: 
every commodity that is offered to us and that we buy as a “must have” contains, in 
turn, needs which become our needs. This represents the climax of the matrix 
phenomena (Anders [1956] 2003, 169) 
In a passage (Anders [1956] 2003, 167-169) of this chapter, Anders further evidences that he 
is discussing commodities and technology at the same time. He argues that ‘our needs are 
nothing other than the imprints of the needs of our commodities’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 169, 
my translation). He links this idea to technology by stating: ‘what we will need tomorrow is 
not written in the sky […] but on our fridge which we bought yesterday, and in our television 
which bought today’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 169, my translation). This shows how, following 
on from his dialectical conception, Anders doesn’t separate technology from the demands 
of the capitalist social environment within which it is produced. Hence, contrary to 
Feenberg, Anders does not see the main function of given technologies as independent 
from the economic system within which they were produced. 
 
4.3.4 How this is relevant to today 
In many ways Anders’ conception of techno-commodities militates against dualistic 
conceptions such as Feenberg’s. Feenberg’s dualistic conception is mirrored by Tristan 
Harris understanding that app design is the problem and that phone developers such as 
122 
Apple might welcome transformations to their technology that promote people using 
phones less. Harris asserts that ‘their business model not being about attention and data[, 
it] can actually move in this direction’ (Harris and Schüll 2019b, 13). He adds,  
Apple could do this in the next version of iOS […] You know you get 16 notifications a 
day, and if we split them up in these six different types that would actually reduce 
your looking at your phone by like 30 percent (Harris and Schüll 2019a, 6) 
Harris’ conception re-establishes Feenberg’s dualism. Harris dichotomises between 
hardware and software design. He assumes that hardware design is neutral while software 
design is moulded by economic imperatives and aimed at creating addiction within its users. 
However, I argue that smartphone hardware design is also not neutral.  
The original striving for mobile phone development was portability. The aim was to 
produce devices that were as small and lightweight as possible. However, modern phones 
have increasingly big colour screens. These privilege viewing images, rather than codex or 
portability. If Anders was alive today, he would highlight how the dominance of images in 
today’s communications is not unrelated to the demands of late capitalism. Coloured 
images easily captivate attention and communicate a lot of information including abstract 
information such as values proposed lifestyles, etc., in a short amount of time, and often 
without viewers realising it. Consequently, they are ideal for consumerist societies driven by 
advertising. They can furthermore be consumed continuously. The shift to operating 
technology through touchscreens accommodates this function. Indeed this feature comes at 
the expense of others. Touchscreens free up space for hosting large, coloured images but 
they are not as good for typing. A touchscreen cannot be operated without looking at it. 
These elements arguably reduce portability, while further increasing users’ time viewing 
adverts. Hence the structure and interface of modern technology is not neutral and 




With reference to section 3.3.4, I have argued that Anders’ notion of technology is anti-
dualistic because Anders conceptualises technology as forming a system, or matrix. This 
conception is not solely dependent on an understanding of how an expansionary logic is 
intrinsic to technology, as I will show it is for Heidegger and Ellul (see section 4.5.3). Anders 
thinks of technological systems in the context of capitalist consumerist economies. The 
demands of these systems deeply structure technological appliances. They influence their 
function and increasing orientation towards other technologies. Hence Anders does not 
dichotomise between different levels of technology, as Feenberg does. 
This unifying conception is useful for understanding how, not only the software design of 
apps but also the very form of modern technological hardware is not neutral. It responds to 
a drive within capitalist economies towards consumerism and surveillance. Large, coloured 
images are useful supports for captivating user attention to convey advertising, shopping 
online and generating user data. Hence smartphone hardware design is not unrelated to the 
business models that influence software design. Feenberg’s and Harris’ understanding 





In this section, I look in more detail at how technological systems can reproduce systems 
of domination. In section 4.4.2, I discuss Baudrillard’s theory of postmodernity and 
domination. I show that Baudrillard focuses on how technologies can re-produce cybernetic 
and semiotic systems that benefit the ruling classes. I argue that this overlooks the concrete 
functioning of technologies. It produces an esoteric theory of domination which asserts that 
domination is based on ideology alone. In section 4.4.3, I show how Anders’ theory similarly 
makes a detailed analysis of the structure of modern media, arguing that it complicates 
humans’ perception of reality by making what is absent present and vice-versa. However, 
Anders does not simply assert that modern media make reality more virtual. For Anders, 
124 
they also contain a reductive and separating tendency. Anders showed how the latter could 
lead to desensitising humans to violent acts, facilitating domination. In section 4.4.4, I show 
that Anders’ subtle understanding of how media can be a factor in re-producing domination 
helps us avoid exaggerated claims regarding the manipulative power of software and 
algorithms. 
 
4.4.2 Other theorists: Baudrillard 
Baudrillard’s conception of technological domination is intimately bound with 
cybernetics and semiotics. Baudrillard focuses on how the increasing dominance of ICTs 
means that the ruling class can manipulate and structure systems of meaning to favour their 
own interest. Hence he states: 
the simulation model of a differential aristocratic code still acts as a powerful factor 
of integration and control, as participation of the same rule of the game. [A 
community] fused together by the same rules of the game and the same system of 
signs is collectively beyond economic value […] this is the keystone of domination. 
(Baudrillard [1972] 1981, 119) 
Hence, for Baudrillard, domination is enacted through cybernetics and semiotics, making it 
similar to ideology. Kellner has further argued that: 
For Baudrillard, modern societies are organized around the production and 
consumption of commodities, while postmodern societies are organized around 
simulation and the play of images and signs, denoting a situation in which codes, 
models, and signs are the organizing principle of a new social order where simulation 
rules (Kellner 2003, 320) 
This shows how Baudrillard’s concept of domination is ethereal. For instance, there is no 
deep analysis of how weaponry technology facilitates domination, as in Anders.  
Baudrillard’s work is arguably aimed at being provocative more than at grasping real 
processes. Anders criticises the impoverished one-sided nature of the world delivered by 
the radio and the television. In contrast, according to Kellner’s interpretation, Baudrillard 
argues that: 
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The realm of the hyperreal (media simulations of reality, Disneyland and amusement 
parks, malls and consumer fantasylands, TV sports, and other excursions into ideal 
worlds) is more real than real, so that the models, images and codes of the hyperreal 
come to control thought and behaviour (Kellner 2003, 321) 
I argue that this places too much importance on ideology and effectively makes ideology 
infuse all the other categories involved in my thesis: the human, technology, domination 
and alienation. This means that Baudrillard’s theory also ends up being one-sidedly based 
on structures of meaning. It thus overlooks the concrete structure of ICTs understood their 
mode of operation and the set of affordances they offer, which in some cases can facilitate 
domination. 
 
4.4.3 How Anders is different 
In section 3.4.4, I outlined Anders’ understanding of technological weaponry and 
surveillance. I linked it to Anders’ conception of technological domination. Here, however, I 
take the opportunity to outline how Anders’ analysis of radio and television also suggests 
that other less threatening technologies can be factors in facilitating domination. For 
instance, as I show in chapters 6-8, in modern times, the video feed and audio link are 
features of military drone technologies. Anders’ analysis shows how the radio and television 
split individuals’ perception, thereby producing a reductive understanding of what is far and 
an impoverished experience of what is near. This forms a foundation for understanding 
some of the negative effects that can be associated with ICTs. 
In his critical analysis of radio and television, Anders shows how ICTs complicate human 
perception of the world. In some respects, ICTs reproduce a deceitful, phantom-like version 
of reality, which impoverishes human understanding of the latter. For Anders,  
broadcast events are at the same time present and absent, at the same time real and 
apparent, they are here and at the same time they are not: because they are 
phantoms (Anders [1956] 2003, 126, my translation) 
Here Anders follows Heidegger’s lead who spoke of how: “With the ‘radio’, for example, 
Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance 
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of the ‘world’” (Heidegger [1927] 1967, 140). However, Anders development of this theme 
is compatible with a Marxian understanding of the subject losing control over the object. 
For Anders, the separation effected by the radio means that humans are no longer able to 
act effectively within the world and ‘the relation between man and world becomes 
unilateral’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 124, my translation). Anders uses the strong expression 
‘mutilated relation’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 125, my translation) to convey this situation.  
The effect is one of impoverishment. Hence Anders argues that ‘[r]epresentation and 
represented object on television are synchronous. Synchronicity is the atrophied form of 
presence’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 126, my translation). Anders’ use of the term ‘atrophied’, 
conveys the sense that transmitted images do not provoke rich emotional responses. In the 
military drone case study (chapter 6-8), I detail how drone operators are made to kill 
humans on the basis of this atrophied perception. This highlights the link between the 
splitting of presence and absence through ICTs and domination. I show that military drone 
operatives’ very removal from the battlefield makes it easier for them to kill, while also 
making their own experience of the war, in some respects, reduced. This creates feelings of 
guilt which make them suffer mentally. 
My interpretation of how Anders’ notion of presence-absence can be linked to 
domination makes a stronger claim on this topic than the one that can be found in Babich 
(2019). Babich (2019) points out how ‘[p]henomenologically, Anders observes, music can be 
acoustically located in space […] directionally and in terms of distance’ (Babich 2019, 62). In 
contrast, according to Babich’s interpretation of Anders “‘real presence’ is annihilated by 
the radio’ (Babich 2019, 62). Hence Babich speaks of how modern ICTs can produce a 
‘schizo-topic’ (Babich 2019, 62) environment, which is split between where the sound is 
being broadcast and where the sound is being played originally. Babich ties this analysis to 
an understanding of how mediated reality has become more uncertain. She does not tie this 
process of fragmentation to domination. She does not look at how the reductive, 
impoverishing aspect of this process, can make acts of domination easier. I argue that this is 
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what Anders’ work highlights, especially with his discussion of televised images of nuclear 
explosions. 
 
4.4.4 How this is relevant to today 
Hence Anders’ work reveals a subtle understanding of how the very structure of media 
can produce a reduced impoverished experience of the world. In contrast, modern theorists 
such as Tristan Harris lay enormous focus on the idea that software interfaces dominate 
modern humans through manipulating their emotions and reactions. Hence Tristan states 
that companies use: 
AI to predict what’s gonna perfectly addict you, or hook you, or manipulate you, or 
allow advertisers to test 60,000 variations of text or colors to figure out what’s the 
perfect manipulation of your mind. This is a totally new species of power and 
influence. (Orlowski 2020, 46) 
Harris’ view overemphasises the extent to which humans are manipulated by the 
functioning of software and algorithms. This leads into a crude form of technological 
determinism. For instance, Harris seems to endorse the view that ethnic violence against 
the Rohingya people in Myanmar was principally caused by Facebook’s algorithm suggesting 
radicalising content (Orlowski 2020, 86). This denies other socio-economic and historical 
factors leading to the persecution of the Rohingya people. 
In contrast, Anders’ analysis reveals a more subtle form of domination, which is less 
based on direct and purposeful manipulation. The processes of domination Anders reveals 
are based on the very functioning of the technology, which limits our capacity to control and 
experience the world directly, while making us act on the basis of a phantom-like version of 
it. Hence as I show in chapter 6, drone operators are able to kill humans as though they 
were mere silhouettes and not feel immediately responsible for these acts. At the same 
time, as discussed in the previous section 4.3.3, Anders does not view technology as 
operating in a vacuum. Rather he sees it as fusing with other systems of power which also 




I have argued that Baudrillard produces an excessively ethereal conception of 
domination. For Baudrillard, domination and power are driven by signs and meaning. Hence 
domination resembles ideology. In contrast, I have shown that Anders focusses on how the 
structure of ICTs can be a factor in facilitating domination. Anders has a subtle analysis of 
how media fragments human perception and means that humans exist in a reduced 
emotional environment whereby they can conduct acts of violence as though they were not 
responsible. 
However, I argue that analyses of these negative effects should look at how they also 
interact with other factors, such socio-economic and historical ones. They should not assert 
that social media interfaces or algorithms can, by themselves, explain human violent 






In this section, I pick up some of the themes I introduced in section 4.3.3 regarding the 
interaction between technological and economic systems in Anders’ philosophy. I use these 
to make an important distinction between Ellul’s and Anders’ work. In section 4.5.2, I look at 
how, on the surface, both Ellul and Anders’ work portrays technology as autonomous or the 
subject. Both theorists argue that technology is an increasingly important frame through 
which other spheres of life are mediated and that humans are reduced to mere objects in 
the face of this process. However, in section 4.5.3, I argue that Ellul literally believes that 
technology has superseded the capitalist economy. In contrast, Anders argues that 
technologies embody and carry forward the demands of capitalist economies. Hence, 
Anders has a conception of how media consumerism is integrated into the capitalist system 
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of production. Arguably, this conception is compatible with later theorists of ‘audience 
labour’, such as Smythe (1977). The latter linked consumption of media even more explicitly 
to value creation within capitalist economies. In section 4.5.4, I show how Anders’ 
conception of technology fusing with the economic system is useful for showing how use of 
modern technologies is not simply the result of technological addiction, as argued by Harris. 
Technologies such as smartphones have become part of the essential infrastructure 
individuals must engage with in modern societies. 
 
4.5.2 Other theorists: Ellul 
Ellul is one of the theorists whose work resembles Anders’ the most on the topic of 
alienation and technology. Similarly to Anders, Ellul also takes inspiration from Marx and 
Marxist theory while at the same time attempting to update it. For instance, Ellul refers to 
Lukács’ concept of reification applying it to technology. He states: 
Man is progressively eliminated as a subject (apt to make decisions autonomously 
and singularly), by technical growth which imposes on him modes of life, attitudes, 
and calculated rules, more and more rigorous. Man is subjected to a progressive 
"reification" by this invasion of objects. […] The Marxist “theory of goods for 
explaining this reification was correct a century ago. It is now only a detail. (Ellul in 
Lovekin 1991, 89) 
Moreover, Ellul produces a concept of technological alienation, which is similar to Anders’. 
Accordingly, he states 
The very grandeur of means produces the situation of alienation in our society when 
the meaning we can attach to life and action is no longer commensurate with these 
means. At this point man is effectively alienated in his own means and his own 
power. (Ellul 1976, 28-29) 
Here Ellul, similarly to Anders, connects the idea of the power of technology as exceeding 
human sentiments to alienation. 
At first glance, both Ellul and Anders seem to give the same weight to technology in their 
analyses. For Ellul, technology has become the dominant structure with which humans have 
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to interact. He states: ‘the political world is today defined through its relation to the 
technological society’ (Ellul 1962, 395). Hence, for Ellul,  
in any sphere whatever, there are nothing but technical problems. We conceive all 
problems in their technical aspect, and think that solutions to them can only appear 
by means of further perfecting techniques (Ellul 1962, 414)  
This logic is similar to that of Anders in his outlining of a dialectic of the machine where the 
‘world becomes a machine’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 19). 
Moreover, there seems to be a common conception of technological alienation with Ellul 
and Anders where technology becomes autonomous (Ellul) or the subject (Anders). On the 
surface, Ellul’s concept of how: ‘Technique has become autonomous; it has fashioned an 
omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which has renounced all tradition’ (Ellul 
[1954] 1964, 14) resembles Anders statement that ‘technology has actually become the 
subject of history, alongside of which we are merely “co-historical”’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1). 
For Anders, humans become ‘mere parts in a machine, raw material’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 
23). Similarly, Ellul states that: ‘When Technique displays any interest in man, it does so by 
converting him into a material object’ (Ellul 1962, 401).  
However, I show that there are some significant differences between Ellul and Anders, 
despite their similar alarmist style of writing. Namely, Ellul asserts that: ‘It is useless to rail 
against capitalism. Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did’ (Ellul [1954] 1964, 
5). He further argues that: ‘We are here in the presence of a new alienation that has nothing 
to do with capitalism’ (Ellul 1967a, 79). In contrast, Anders’ mature work conceptualises 
machines as participating in the production and consumption of commodities. He therefore 
sees technological alienation as linked to economic alienation. 
 
4.5.3 How Anders is different 
While both theorists’ conceptualisation of alienation relies on the idea of an inversion 
between humans and technology, Anders’ conceptualisation of this inversion doesn’t lose 
sight of capitalist economic processes. For instance, in his 1956 work Anders states that: 
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Today’s fundamental neutralising force is naturally not of a political nature. It is of an 
economic nature and concerns the commodity-character of all phenomena. (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 117) 
For Anders, it is first and foremost ‘the commodity character [which] produces, as a is well-
known, alienation’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 117, my translation). Thus technological forms 
embody this commodity character and extend the alienation arising from this form. For 
instance, Anders states that the television or radio ‘transmission is a commodity’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 117, my translation). In his late work, he further details how 
it is in the interest of production to dispatch a product B as rapidly as possible after 
product A, which can only be done if product A is made in such a way that it is 
consumed as soon as it is used, that is, that it is liquidated as soon as it is supplied. 
This principle has encountered its most perfect realization (up until now) in radio and 
television. (Anders [1980] 2011, 178) 
 Hence, for Anders, the constant stream of television and radio programmes constitute ideal 
commodities that can ‘reduce as much as possible the span of time between the production 
and the liquidation of the product’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 32). He also specifies how: 
‘Weapons also belong to this class of ideal objects, of those objects that must be consumed 
with their (first) use’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 29). Hence Anders understands technological 
forms as embodying and giving a material manifestation to the logic of commodities. Their 
very structure feeds back into the logic of consumerism and capitalist production, as 
television images can be consumed relentlessly and immediately. 
The link between technical systems and capitalist production is something that 
contemporary interpretations of Anders have not highlighted. I argue that the resultant 
reading portrays Anders as concerned with technological systems to the exclusion all else. 
For instance, Nosthoff and Maschewski argue that Anders is an ‘an interpreter of an all-
encompassing process of cybernetization’ (Nosthoff and Maschewski 2019, 76), despite 
Anders only mentioning cybernetics twice in vol. I (Anders [1956] 2003) and zero times in 
vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011) of his magnum opus. They further state that, for Anders, the 
universe is ‘de facto and unchangeably always-already technological’ (Nosthoff and 
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Maschewski 2019, 85). In contrast, the passages I have highlighted suggests that Anders 
thought that technologies produced under capitalism were always-already commodities. 
Indeed Anders’ returned to this 1956 conception in his late work. Here Anders highlights 
how: ‘all objects of all types have been infected by all the objects of the current dominant 
type, that is, of the commodity type’ (Anders [1980] 2010, 109). He further states that ‘the 
universe of commodities […] has achieved dominance’ (Anders [1980] 2010, 110) and refers 
to ‘the abundance of the objects that have become assimilated to it, that is, to the 
universalization of its principle’ (Anders [1980] 2010, 110). This evidences how there is no 
technological a priori in Anders’ work, as there is in Heidegger’s. Instead technologies 
respond to, and perpetuate, the demands of the capitalist system. Machines are ‘in 
advance’ (Anders [1980] 2010, 109) commodities, rather than the other way around. 
Dawsey’s (2019) most recent work has stressed Anders’ engagement with Marxism. 
However, Dawsey also, to some extent repeats, Nosthoff and Maschewski’s interpretation 
of Anders’ conception of machines forming a system. Dawsey states:  
Rapid, ceaseless technological innovation Anders explains, implausibly, not by 
competition or Marx’s dynamic of absolute and relative surplus-value but by an 
inherent ‘pressure to expand’ (Expansionsdrang) in machines (see Anders, 1964). 
(Dawsey 2019, 50) 
Such readings of Anders disregard Anders’ mature turn towards Marxism. Anders did not 
conceive of technological systems as being independent from capitalist economic dynamics. 
Anders understands technology produced under capitalism as a technical realisation of the 
commodity-form. 
Anders’ analysis is not as squarely based on an economic understanding of ‘audience 
labour’ as Dallas Smythe’s (1977) conception. Nevertheless, Anders does argue that modern 
consumers can be understood as an ‘unremunerated domiciled workers who cooperate in 
the production of mass man’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 99, my translation, italics in original). 
According to Anders, their work activity is the ‘consumption of the commodities of mass 
production’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 101, my translation) and the final product is ‘the 
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transformation of themselves into humans of mass production’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 101, 
my translation). This is because ‘(in a non-materialist sense) man “is what he eats”’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 100, my translation). Humans adapt their lifestyles and very being to 
consumerism. Thus, for Anders, modern man consumes ‘a maximum of leisure products so 
as to cooperate with the production of ‘mass humans’’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 101, my 
translation). 
Anders concludes that consumption is ‘camouflaged labour’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 126). 
He asserts that 
The output that is demanded of us, is demanded of us in the form of domestic 
consumption; and this means: in the form of domestic labor. (Anders [1980] 2011, 
126) 
While Anders does not develop the connection of this assessment with economic value, he 
does think of the impact of it in terms of alienation. He shows how the relation between 
consumers and their activity is inverted. He states: 
This process is at its most paradoxical when the domiciled worker, instead of being 
paid for his collaboration, has to pay it himself; that is, he must pay for the means of 
production (the device and, in many countries, the programmes) through the use 
which he lets himself be transformed into a mass man. Therefore, he pays to sell 
himself. (Anders [1956] 2003, 101, my translation) 
Consumers actively transform their consumption into objective activity that benefits 
production. For Anders, this standardised activity itself has ‘become a commodity’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 101, my translation) for which they themselves have to pay. This shows how 
the subject’s position is that of an objective source of value and standardised activity. 
 
4.5.4 How this is relevant to today 
Addiction could be viewed as a form of alienation, as individuals behave in ways that they 
would prefer not to. They further do this without direct forms of external coercion.  
 Harris fuses his understanding of algorithmic manipulation with the notion that 
technology is designed to be addictive. He states, ‘I [the developer] wanna dig down deeper 
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into the brain stem and implant, inside of you, an unconscious habit so that you are being 
programmed at a deeper level. You don’t even realize it’ (Orlowski 2020, 28). Harris draws 
the conclusion that, 
technology exceeds and overwhelms human weaknesses. This point being crossed is 
at the root of addiction, polarization, radicalization, outrage-ification, vanity-fication, 
the entire thing. This is overpowering human nature, and this is checkmate on 
humanity. (Orlowski 2020, 55) 
On the surface, this understanding seems compatible with Anders’ notion of technological 
alienation. Some contemporary theorists argue that Anders also makes this type of 
argument. For instance, Bernsteiner argues that Anders shows how ‘cars transform their 
drivers into ruthless car racing addicts’ (Bersteiner 2019, 127).  
In contrast, I argue that Anders’ view does not rely on the notion of addiction. Anders 
recognises that the use of technology is not due to ‘human weaknesses’ but to socio-
economic factors, which make the use of certain technologies necessary. Hence Anders 
states:  
if a madman wanted to attempt the experiment of becoming independent even of 
only one of these gadgets or of the forces that constitute our world, for instance 
electricity, he would rapidly perish. (Anders [1956] 2003, 169, my translation)  
Anders emphasises how techno-commodities form a system that mirrors economic 
relations, and with which individuals must engage in order to survive. Anders never argues 
that, given his diagnosis of a techno-commodified society, people should individually choose 
to use less technology. Indeed, he reminds us that  
[w]hatever we choose to do or renounce, this private strike does nothing to change 
the fact that by now we live in a world for which ‘the world’ and the experience of 
the world have no value compared to the phantom of the world and the 
consumption of these phantoms (Anders [1956] 2003, 11) 
In fact, Anders himself never engaged in ‘private strike[s]’ consisting in individually 
abstaining from using technology for political reasons. 
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In The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011), Anders further argues that 
workers listen to the radio passively when they get home because their work is tiring. He 
further states: 
During the period when I worked at the factory, I was no exception. […] I, too, lived at 
the time in the company of that radio. (Anders [1980] 2011, 61) 
If Anders were alive today, he would certainly not exclude the possibility of using more 
technology, if this is required to change the status quo. The aim of his theory is a deep 
transformation of the technical infrastructure of society. He would not consider it a great 
achievement, as Harris does, to get phone users to look at their phones 30% less (Harris and 
Schüll 2019a, 6). Hence I argue that Anders’ theory is useful in highlighting how Harris’ view 
over-emphasises the addictive-power of modern technological devices, while not going far 
enough in his demands for transforming technology. 
 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
I have shown how, while appearing on the surface very similar, Anders’ theory of 
technological alienation is different to Ellul’s. While Ellul thinks of technological alienation as 
something separate from the capitalist economy, Anders’ thinks of technology in relation to 
the latter. His theory of radio listening and television watching as a form of labour, in some 
respects, anticipates theories of audience labour which tied this activity more explicitly to 
value creation and profit. I argue that modern interpretations of Anders, while 
acknowledging the presence of exaggerations and provocative statements in Anders’ work, 
have taken Anders’ assertion that technology is the subject of history too literally. They thus 
fail to highlight how Anders’ work connects technology to the commodity-form. 
Anders’ theory of technological alienation is useful in countering modern critical 
conceptions of technology that over-emphasise the addictive nature of modern app designs. 
Apps may be designed to foster habits in users. But treating this as the principal factor that 
explains user engagement with such apps misses the fact that the social environment is 
structured in such a way as to make use of certain apps and smartphone technology, for 
136 
instance, necessary. Hence technology is not independently all-powerful. It is connected to, 





In this section, I look at ideology. In section 4.6.2, I focus on Anders’ relation to the 
Frankfurt school. I show that despite his sometimes-conflictual relation to members of the 
Frankfurt School such as Adorno, their theories also provided foundations for Anders’ work. 
However, Anders’ theory is also different. It attempts to almost mechanically describe why 
the very functioning of ICTs is a factor in reproducing ideology in advanced capitalist 
societies. Anders’ work offers a subtle explanation of how ICTs can distort our 
understanding of the world by making subjective judgements of the world pass as objective 
images. In section 4.6.4, I show how this is useful in avoiding conceptions which over-
emphasise the power of algorithms. Indeed Harris (in Orlowski 2020) argues that the 
modern prevalence of conspiracy theories can principally be explained by recommendation 
algorithms. By offering a detailed, phenomenological analysis of how ICTs have an impact on 
human perception of the world, Anders can help us avoid such totalising conceptions. We 
can integrate Anders’ analysis into other socio-economic and psychological processes. 
 
4.6.2 Other theorists: Frankfurt School 
Anders had a conflictual yet, in some respects, close relationship with some members of 
the Frankfurt School. As stated in chapter 1, Anders was on bad terms with Adorno, who 
rejected his habilitation thesis at the University of Frankfurt am Maim. This dashed Anders’ 
hopes of joining the Institute of Social Research, home to the Frankfurt School. Anders held 
a long-term grudge against Adorno, whose intellectual style he criticised for not being 
sufficiently politically engaged. Hence in a 1958 letter to his ex-wife, Hannah Arendt, Anders 
told her that: 
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Yesterday I was confronted with a nauseous and spectral past. At a Mahler concert, I 
was accosted by a bald old man with bulging eyes: Adorno, for whom I had suddenly 
become “dear Anders”. He’s even more of a dismal figure than before, with the agility 
of an old hand kisser; with age, he’s become aggressive against the defenceless. 
Nothing is more disgusting than aggressiveness united with cowardliness (he has not 
endorsed a single one of the declarations against the atomic) (Arendt and Anders 
2017, 50, my translation) 
This excerpt shows how Anders had considerable spite for Adorno and was bitter about his 
past relation with him. Yet Anders was also considerably influenced by the Frankfurt School, 
including Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. 
One influence is Horkheimer’s and Adrono’s critique of positivism and the culture 
industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 2002). These 
theorists show how an interplay between universal and particular is connected to the 
production of ideology within the culture industry. Hence they state: 
The conspicuous unity of macrocosm and microcosm confronts human beings with a 
model of their culture: the false identity of universal and particular (Horkheimer and 
Adorno [1944] 2002, 95) 
This false unity of universal and particular is also mirrored by a blurring of the inner and 
outer which characterises the radio and the television. Hence Horkheimer and Adorno 
further state: 
The more densely and completely its techniques duplicate empirical objects, the 
more easily it creates the illusion that the world outside is a seamless extension of 
the one which has been revealed in the cinema (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 
2002, 99) 
This quote shows how Horkheimer and Adorno tie the production of illusions and ideology 
to audio-visual material presented to viewers in the cinema.   
Anders picks up on this theme when he gives the example of how planetariums ‘creat[e] 
the illusion of being the starry sky’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 157). The planetarium is an 
instrument that appears 
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disguised as the “world”. It’s a tool in the shape of a microcosmic model that passes 
itself off as the world itself. (Anders [1956] 2003, 157, my translation) 
Hence Anders thought about how the very structure of instruments could create illusions. 
Conversely, Horkheimer and Adorno assert that the adverse effects accompanying 
industrialisation, such as standardisation, ‘should not be attributed to the internal laws of 
technology itself but to its function within the economy today’ (Horkheimer and Adorno 
[1944] 2002, 95). Hence there is not as much emphasis on the structure and set of 
affordances of modern ICTs.  
Next, I show how Anders went beyond Horkheimer and Adorno’s influence by linking the 
production of ideology to the very structure of this media. 
 
4.6.3 How Anders is different 
In his essay ‘The World as Phantom and Matrix’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 97-195), Anders 
makes an analysis of how the reality that is shown to us through the television can be 
deceptive. For Anders, with information that is conveyed through print or oral 
communication what is communicated is a ‘“a matter of fact” which is detached from this 
original object [the event]’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 145, my translation). Such pieces of news 
‘pre-suppose a division’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 145, my translation); they are ‘divided in two 
parts, S (subject) and p (predicate)’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 145, my translation). Anders 
favours this type of delivery of information because it means that what the reader or 
interlocutor receives is not an ‘incomplete surrogate; but something about the object’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 149, my translation). In contrast, for Anders the radio and the 
television do not tell us something about the thing. Through being able to transmit us 
sounds or images of real explosions, for instance, they present us not with an idea about the 
latter but with ersatz versions of them. Hence he states: 
If we listen to a radio broadcast relaying a scene of war or a parliamentary session, 
we do not only hear news about the explosions or the speakers, but we hear the 
explosions and the speakers themselves. (Anders [1956] 2003, 124, my translation) 
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For Anders, with the television and radio, viewers receive the fact itself with a phantom-like 
quality. Hence Anders states that the ‘transportability which until now only concerned 
“matters of fact” has now contaminated the object itself’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 149, my 
translation).  
Anders’ theory thus emphasises the passivation argument contained in Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s work, which is that technology ‘automat[es] mental processes, turning them into 
blind sequences’ (Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 2002, 149). For Anders, 
The fact that events — these themselves and not just news about them —, that 
football matches, church services, atomic explosions visit us […] is the truly 
revolutionary transformation of brought about by the radio and television (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 107, my translation) 
Anders thought that viewing an atomic explosion in one’s living room subtly changes one’s 
perspective on it. He argues that events therefore reach us ‘ideologically “pre-cut”’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 185, my translation). Anders highlights how the ‘small format of the images 
that appear on the screen […] transforms any world event into a scene populated by 
playthings’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 144, my translation). Nuclear explosions can be seen as an 
unexceptional event. The main distinguishing feature from other theorists is that Anders 
shows in detail how the very workings of each appliance create images of the world which 
are ideologically pre-formatted. 
 
4.6.4 How this is relevant to today 
All the speakers on the programme The Social Dilemma (Orlowski 2020) attribute the 
perpetuation of fake news to algorithms. They do not have a structural account of how 
media such as internet video feeds can produce deceptive or reductive images of reality. For 
instance, Harris personifies algorithms stating that their ‘job is to figure out what to show 
you’ (Orlowski 2020, 22). He fails to instead treat them as a blind mechanism designed by 
humans. Diresta, another speaker on the programme, explains: 
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So, if a user was, for example, anti-vaccine or believed in chemtrails or had indicated 
to Facebook’s algorithms in some way that they were prone to belief in conspiracy 
theories, Facebook’s recommendation engine would serve them Pizzagate groups. 
(Orlowski 2020, 61) 
By personifying algorithms (‘indicated to Facebook’s algorithms’), this explanation overly 
mystifies what is essentially a recommendation of content on the basis of what other users, 
with similar watch histories, have viewed. This perspective ends up giving too much 
importance to the idea of algorithmic manipulation. It does not highlight socio-economic 
and environmental factors as Anders’ theory does. Participants in the programme 
consequently simply blame ‘algorithms and manipulative politicians’ (Orlowski 2020, 69). 
 
4.6.5 Conclusion 
Anders had a conflictual relationship with Adorno especially. Nevertheless, Anders 
maintained contacts with members of the Frankfurt School after emigrating to the US and 
exchanged intellectually with them. Horkheimer and Adorno’s criticism of the culture 
industry is likely to have influenced Anders’ thought. However, Anders’ point of departure is 
that he attempted to explain processes such as the collapsing of the difference between 
particular and universal, described by Horkheimer and Adorno, through analysing the very 
functioning of ICTs. 
I argue that Anders’ analysis offers a sophisticated understanding of how the structure of 
modern media can produce warped and deceptive images of reality. This is useful in not 
over-emphasising what is now the common conception that algorithms can very effectively 
manipulate social media users, strengthening problematic worldviews through mere 
content suggestions. This understanding denies more subtle environmental factors, which 
mean that social media users exist in an impoverished, and potentially isolated, reality that 
makes them prone to reductive understandings. 
To conclude, it is possible to criticise Anders’ theory of how media such as the radio and 
the television necessarily convey an ideological image of the world. This understanding 
seems exaggerated and too absolute. However, I argue that Anders himself did not have an 
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absolutist view. For instance, he praised the television (referring to the series miniseries 
Holocaust which appeared in 1979 on German television) as means to convey the horrors of 
the Holocaust through narratives that humanised victims (Anders [1997] 2014). This shows 
how Anders, similarly to Adorno (Fuchs 2016b, 81), did not argue that one should not 
engage with ICTs. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have compared Anders’ understanding of the human, technology, 
domination, alienation and ideology to that of other critical theorists of technology. I have 
focussed particularly on French theorists Ellul and Baudrillard, because they share significant 
similarities with Anders. These are perhaps the result of common influences that Anders 
received during his time in Paris from 1933 to 1936. I have equally contrasted Anders’ 
theories to contemporary theorists who are influenced by these thinkers, such Feenberg, 
Winner and Haraway. This has allowed me to refine some points regarding Anders’ theory, 
while showing that it is still relevant and can be fruitfully applied to the digital era. Finally, I 
have shown how Anders was influenced by members of the Frankfurt School with whom he 
maintained complicated relations throughout his life. 
In section 4.2, I showed that Anders conceives the relation between humans and 
technology as one of mutual influence, but not fusion. Anders argued that humans must 
make the mental effort of enlarging their human faculties to better control technology. In 
section 4.3, I showed how Anders views technology as unifying and characterised by a 
dialectic of inner and outer. Systems of technology consequently respond to, and 
incorporate, the demands of the capitalist system of commodity production. Hence Anders’ 
understanding is anti-dualistic. It highlights how neither technology’s primary nor its 
secondary orientations are neutral. In section 4.4, I showed how Anders’ theory argues that 
there is a reductive dimension to technologies such as the radio and the television, as these 
convey a world which is neither present nor absent. I showed how this could facilitate 
domination. In section 4.5, I argued that Anders understands technological alienation as an 
142 
inversion between subject and object, where technology becomes the subject. However, I 
have argued that the expression ‘subject of history’ should not be taken too literally. Anders 
shows how technological appliances constitute ideal commodities, and hence are linked to 
economic alienation. Hence I argued against contemporary interpretations of Anders who 
portray his theory as solely focussing on a machine logic. I detailed the notion of techno-
commodities to make this point. I further argued that, in some respects, Anders can be said 
to anticipate the work of ‘audience commodity’ theorists such as Smythe (1977). In section 
4.6, I showed how Anders has a subtle understanding of how media such as the radio and 
the television can distort reality. In contrast, to members of the Frankfurt School he 
explicitly tied this to the structure of ICTs rather than to the content they conveyed. 
 It is well known that Anders’ theories of technology can seem overly pessimistic and 
defeatist. But I have attempted to show that, to a significant, this is simply a surface 
appearance which is due to Anders’ style of writing. Anders defiantly adopted the label of 
‘spreader of panic’ (Anders [1987] 2008, 84) which was used against him. This fit with his 
philosophical method of exaggeration [gelegenheitsphilosophisch] (Anders [1956] 2003, 86). 
By contrasting Anders’ theory to modern discourses surrounding the alienating dimension of 
smartphone technology and social media I have shown how, on the contrary, Anders’ work 
can be used to produce more moderate and less technologically determinist understandings 
of the negative effects of modern ICTs. 
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5. Methodology for Applying Günther Anders’ Theories to Two 
Contemporary Case Studies: Military Drones and Dating Apps 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The task of this chapter is to set out a methodology for applying Anders’ critical theory of 
technology to the digital era. In order to do this, I outline three steps. 
Firstly, in section 5.2, I select as case studies technologies that Anders would have been 
interested in. The technologies I have chosen are military drones and dating apps. In section 
5.2.1, I briefly describe these pieces of technology, showing how they are relevant to the 
nexus Anders’ highlighted between technology and human sentiments. In section 5.2.2, I 
outline how the human sentiments they intersect, namely aggression and love, are 
interrelated. I do this through Freudian drive theory. Secondly, in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 I 
formulate research questions based on Anders’ theory about military drones and dating 
apps, respectively. To do this, I look back at chapter 3, which focussed on Günther Anders’ 
theory. I take the themes that I highlighted in that chapter and apply them to the case 
studies in order to formulate research questions. Thirdly, in sections 5.4 and 5.5, I set about 
designing a research strategy for each of my case studies.  
Hence, for the military drone case study, first, in section 5.4.1, I explain why I will opt for 
a qualitative ‘lurking’ approach based on an analysis of pre-existing interviews and writings 
involving drone operators. Then, in section 5.4.2, I discuss ethical considerations to 
conducting this study. Subsequently, in 5.4.3, I refer to the research material that is 
contained in Table A in Appendix A. I include both critical and non-critical accounts in this 
source material. I discuss how I can apply critical discourse analysis (CDA) to evaluate both 
critical and non-critical accounts. In section 5.4.4, I will outline specific tools I adapt from 
CDA for the purpose of examining whether the discourses surrounding military drones 
illustrate Anders’ theories. I show how I can use these tools to analyse the themes of 
domination, alienation and ideology. 
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For the dating app case study, first, in section 5.5.1, I discuss the general approach I will 
adopt. I opt for a qualitative method, conducting semi-structured interviews. Then in 
section 5.5.2 I discuss ethical considerations related to this study. Subsequently, in section 
5.5.3, I outline what population samples I will include in my study and why. Then in the 
same subsection I outline how I will recruit participants for the study. In section 5.5.4, I 
discuss how I will formulate a semi-structured questionnaire on the basis of the research 
questions I have outlined in section 5.3.2. In section 5.5.5, I will discuss specific elements of 
CDA I will use to analyse domination, alienation and ideology in the context of dating apps. 
 
5.2 Selecting the case studies 
 
5.2.1 Presentation of military drone and dating app technology 
Chamayou characterises military drones as different to the ‘flying torpedoes’ (Chamayou 
2013, 27) used during the Second World War. He specifies that: ‘The drone is not a 
projectile, but a projectile-carrying machine’ (Chamayou 2013, 27). Unmanned 
reconnaissance drones were first used in the Vietnam War by the U.S. but research and 
development into them was dropped in the 1970s. It was taken up by the Israel Defense 
Forces, who developed drone cameras for battlefield observation. Considering their 
efficacy, the U.S. military subsequently re-adopted them. It first had a drone fire a missile at 
a target on 16 February 2001 (Chamayou 2013, 29). Military drones were subsequently used 
in the war in Afghanistan before the end of that year. Hence the modern drone equipped 
with missiles grew out what were initially observational aircraft equipped with cameras. 
Although these unmanned aircraft cannot achieve the fast speeds of fighter jets, they are 
able to stay in the air for far longer, at high altitudes. This, coupled with the powerful 
cameras they have on board, means that they can circle around specific areas to conduct 
surveillance. The fact that they carry laser guided missiles with a blast radius of 15 metres 
further allows them to target single individuals or groups of individuals. These are called 
Hellfire missiles and can also be fired from the ground and other types of aircraft. Finally, 
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drones can be piloted from an unprecedented distance. For instance, a wireless 
communication network allows the signals for the controls of drones flying over Afghanistan 
to be bounced off a satellite and sent to a military base in Germany (Scahill 2015). Here they 
are linked to the US through a transatlantic cable. This means that drones flying in the 
Middle East can be operated from cities like Las Vegas. 
Hence military drones represent the culmination of a historical drive to produce 
increasingly long-range weapons that mechanise killing. Landmines and booby traps are 
examples of early autonomous weapons. Similarly, to drones, the person laying a landmine 
is not present when it detonates. Moreover, bombs dropped by an airplane equally distance 
the attackers’ action of setting up or releasing the weapon from the effect of the weapon 
and the devastation it causes. In turn, modern Apache helicopters similarly use a monitor 
screen to aim weapons. However, drones have reached a tipping point. Drone operators are 
now radically distanced from the theatre of war they operate in. They are completely out of 
harm’s way. In contrast, an accidental explosion could kill or maim a bomb layer, for 
instance. 
Anders’ theory allows us to acknowledge the continuity of drones with other weapons, 
while still assessing the way in which drones crystallise and render even more problematic 
the effect killing from a distance has on human feelings of responsibility and compassion. 
Drones combine different aspects of previous technologies. They therefore group together 
different, apparently contradictory characteristics. Drone operators sit a great distance 
away from their targets and are part of a team of a dozen or so people directing the 
operation (U.S. Military 2013b) (B.6). They nevertheless gain more information about the 
effects of strikes (via a video feed and audio link with ground troops) than someone who is 
similarly acting through a team to, for instance, fire a mortar or load a bomb onto an 
aircraft. Indeed, drones stay over their target immediately after a strike to gather 
information. Though quantitatively abundant, this information is one-dimensional: it 
contains mono-chromatic (infrared or black and white), digital images which are taken from 
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above. On these images, humans appear as ‘silhouettes’ (Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 
2015, 3 min 15 sec) (A.11).  
Hence, drone operators have, in some regards, an informationally rich experience of 
killing. However, this is not in a format which humans are used to interpreting. The distorted 
nature of the images drone operators receive means that they do not directly trigger the 
human emotions which are normally associated with killing: for instance, a combination of 
fear, hatred, glee, disgust and compassion. Drone operators can see exactly how many 
people they have killed, and the precise moment that they die, as their body turns cold on 
the infrared video feed, where the colour white correlates with heat. However, they do not 
see a face or smell burning flesh. They perceive what they are doing rationally but they 
don't have enough environmental information to produce the emotional reactions one 
might expect from someone directly witnessing a killing. This structural aspect of the 
technology is accounted for by Anders’ analysis of the televised images of his time. Anders 
speaks of the 'ontological ambiguity [of] transmitted events' (Anders [1956] 2003, 126, my 
translation). I argue that his notion of presence-absence (discussed in section 4.4.3) 
captures the divided and contradictory experience of drone operators surveilling and killing 
from a distance. 
At first glance, one could be forgiven for thinking that the nuclear bomb, radio and 
television are the main focus of Anders' work. Anders highlighted how many of the people 
responsible for the production of nuclear weapons would only go on to perceive nuclear 
explosions through televised images. These, by virtue of their small format, minimised their 
significance. Military drones illustrate Anders' theory because they fuse together the aspect 
of watching destruction through a screen and carrying out this destruction in a distanced, 
apparently emotionally detached manner. However, I show that Anders was not only 
interested in how technology impacted human sentiments in war, but also in the sphere of 
love. Hence looking at dating apps and not just military drones is justified. Anders’ account 
of the radio mentions how the latter comes to act as a ‘mechanical chaperone’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 108, my translation) in the romantic encounters of couples. Anders further 
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speaks of how the television disrupts the custom of families talking and facing each other at 
meals (Anders [1956] 2003, 103). Hence Anders’ work anticipates modern understandings 
that study the ‘death of proximity’ (Miller 2021, 8) in relation to smartphone use. 
Anders’ interest in love and sexuality is further demonstrated by his book called Lieben 
gestern: Notizen zur Geschichte des Fühlens [Being in love, yesterday: notes on the history of 
sentiments] (Anders 1984a), which contains observations written in the 1940s. In the 
introduction written in 1984, Anders reiterates a call for the production of a ‘history of 
sentiments’ (Anders [1984] 2004, 10). He asks: Why is there a history of philosophy but not 
one of human emotions? Anders also made this call in Die Anquiertheit des Menschen, vol. I, 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 254, 255-259). Here Anders' argued that  
the performances of our heart, our inhibitions, our anxieties, our solicitude, our 
remorse develop in inverse proportion to the significance of our actions. (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 255, my translation) 
This mention of performances of the heart evidences Anders’ interest in how technology 
framed loving emotions. Anders feared that technologically mediated actions including in 
the sphere of love had become out of proportion with existing capacities for feeling. Thus 
Anders often comments on how technology mediates sexuality in his major work The 
Obsolescence of Man, vol. I and II (Anders [1956] 2003, [1980] 2011). 
There is growing research (Liu 2016; Chan 2018a, 2018b; and Wang 2018; Berström 
2019) in how dating apps influence sexual and romantic behaviour within society, making 
them a good technology to study through the lens of Anders. My argument highlights how 
dating apps eliminate the spontaneous eye contact that often characterises in-person 
chance encounters. This has implications for the types of emotions humans feel while 
interacting with one-another in a sexual and romantic setting. In chapters 9 and 10, I discuss 
how dating app use thus tends to replace the intuitive and emotional experiences 
commonly associated with the initiation of sexual and romantic relations. Now, these 
feelings are often tied to competitive and individualistic calculations, favouring the direct 
expression of personal desires. 
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Dating apps have soared in popularity over the course of the last ten years. Previously 
stigmatised, they have now become a common-sense approach to establishing sexual and 
romantic connections for tens of millions of people (Iqbal 2018). In their basic structure, 
dating apps combine the participative dimension of the Web 2.0 and its affordances for 
instant communication, with the capacity of modern smartphones to employ geo-
localisation and access the internet from anywhere. On dating apps, users curate a profile 
by uploading images (typically of themselves) and writing a brief self-description, or a ‘short 
bio’ (Preston 2021). They also sometimes fill out personal information such as their age, 
height, education level, whether they drink, smoke, take drugs and/or exercise regularly. 
They can then text message each other on the interface through one-to-one chats. Most 
dating apps only allow users who have mutually approved each other’s profiles to 
communicate through direct messages (Preston 2021). Similarly to military drones, dating 
apps represent evolutions of technologies that Anders was already interested in. They are 
arguably an evolution and fusion of the radio, the television and the wiretap, which Anders 
discussed in The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011, 145-173). This is because 
they are technologies that connect big groups of people together, allowing for synchronous 
exchanges. Moreover, the latter are recorded, as the data of the exchanges between users 
is stored by dating app companies.  
Dating apps have slight variations in how they present profiles to other users, though all 
of them primarily base this on geographical proximity. For some of the earliest apps, such as 
Tinder, profile pictures are shown as though they are playing ‘cards’ (Preston 2021). Users 
then ‘swipe right’ (Preston 2021) with their finger on the screen over the profile to express 
the wish to exchange direct messages with the person on the other end of the profile. 
Alternatively, they swipe left to reject the profile. This means that they do not wish to 
communicate further with the person it represents. Once these motions have been 
completed a new profile appears on the screen. This process is repeated iteratively. Only 
users who mutually swipe right on each other’s profiles, or ‘match’ (Tinder.com 2021), can 
communicate through direct messages. These communications appear in a different section 
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of the app. They appear in a list form, meaning that users typically communicate with 
multiple other users while using the app. The last person to respond to a message is figured 
at the top of the list. Some but not all dating apps allow users to send photographs within 
these chats (Wolfe 2020). 
This is the most basic structure of dating apps but some have slight variations. The first 
successful platform of this kind was, Grindr, which caters to the gay community and was 
first launched in 2009 (Grindr 2021). Despite marketing itself as a ‘social networking app’ 
(Grindr 2021), it is more accurately described as a hook-up platform (Albury et al. 2017, 4). 
Hook-ups are transient sexual encounters that are often directly sexual and feature minimal 
emotional involvement between partners. On Grindr, users’ profiles appear in a grid-like 
format, the structure of which is based on geographical proximity and level of engagement 
with the app (Grindr 2021). Users can directly chat to others without the need to ‘match’ 
(Preston 2021).  
In contrast, in a heterosexual context, Bumble, another dating app, only allows women to 
message first (Wolfe 2020), meaning that a match will disappear if a female user does not 
initiate a text conversation. This superficial interface design feature is meant to discourage 
unwanted sexually crude advances. Similarly, in their PR, dating apps such as Hinge argue 
that the action of swiping makes other platforms superficial (Hinge 2020). Hinge is 
accordingly structured so that users do not swipe to solicit or reject other users. Instead, it is 
based on users approving and commenting on their pictures or written prompts. Hinge’s PR 
argues that this means that it encourages more caring and deep interactions among users. 
However, arguably, it is the basic structure of dating apps, including the fact that they are 
image-based and operated through screens on individually handheld devices, which 
contributes to organising seduction along individualistic lines. In section 9.5, I clarify how 
apparently diverse dating apps, sometimes with supposedly radically different interface 
designs, are based on the same business model. The latter relies on data collection and 
continued user engagement.  
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Consequently, I choose to consider all dating apps because I argue that their individual 
differences in design are relatively superficial. They are all fundamentally image and geo-
localisation-based applications supported by smartphones. Insisting too much on individual 
differences in interface design risks fragmenting the data and obscuring general trends. This 
would equally play into dating app companies’ PR, in which each tends to trumpet itself as 
different. I would thus fail to recognize that these differences in interface exist primarily for 
purposes of market segmentation (Liu 2016). Different branding ties in with different 
superficial elements of design. These are meant to appeal to, and capture, different 
segments of the population rather than encourage radically different uses. 
Unlike other SNSs, there are strong incentives for especially heterosexual male users to 
pay for dating apps to increase their chances of obtaining in-person meetings. One factor 
behind this is the disproportionate number of heterosexual men compared to heterosexual 
women who use these applications (see section 5.3). Dating apps thus partly monetise their 
services by placing limits on the number of right-swipes users can make, offering to ‘boost’ 
(Tinder.com 2021) users’ profiles so that their profile becomes more visible to other users, 
and enabling paying subscribers to see who ‘likes’ (Tinder.com 2021) them. At the time of 
writing, Hinge is one of the most expensive dating apps, costing £19.66 a month for its 
recommended plan (Beck 2021). This compares to Bumble’s recommended plan, which 
stands at £14.99 a month. In turn, Tinder charges £7.33 for a similar package. However, 
dating apps reportedly often adopt price discrimination selling strategies, charging different 
prices to over-thirties for instance (Beck 2021). These costs suggest that dating app 
companies would like consumers to consider their usage as equivalent to going out to a bar 
or coffee shop. 
 
5.2.2 The relation between military drones and dating apps and Anders’ theory 
Now I briefly explain how the case studies I have selected are connected. First, I discuss 
the interrelation between the drive for destruction (Thanatos) and life (Eros), which concern 
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the military drone and dating app case studies respectively. I then show that this link 
features in Anders’ work. 
A theory of the link between Thanatos and Eros can be traced back to Freud’s work. 
Marcuse argues that Freud highlights how aggressive and sexual drives both share ‘the 
effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli’ (Freud in 
Marcuse [1955] 1969, 38). In this sense, they are both drawn towards ‘the quiescence of the 
inorganic world’ (Freud in Marcuse [1955] 1969, 38). Freud calls this the ‘Nirvana principle’ 
(Freud in Marcuse [1955] 1969, 38). Marcuse argues that the Nirvana principle implies the 
‘terrifying convergence of pleasure and death’ (Marcuse [1955] 1969, 38) and that 
‘[s]exuality would thus ultimately obey the same principle as the death instinct’ (Marcuse 
[1955] 1969, 39).  
The idea of the interconnection of aggression and love is also found in Anders’ work. 
Anders came into contact with Marcuse when he moved to Los Angeles in 1939. He cites 
Marcuse’s work Eros and Civilisation (Marcuse [1955] 1969) in The Obsolescence of Man, 
vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011, 166). He then formulates the concept of ‘voluptis contritionis’ 
[pleasure of destruction] (Anders [1980] 2011, note 147, page 167) and the notion of ‘soft 
totalitarianism’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 167). These concepts demonstrate that for Anders, 
too, pleasure and domination can become interlinked. Anders was concerned about a 
situation where aggression could come to dominate love, while integrating aspects of it. 
Domination, violence and totalitarianism could thus become 'soft' (Anders [1980] 2011, 
167). Accordingly, Anders describes how: 
the ideal situation of the conformist system will be realized only by way of a 
totalitarianism of enjoyment, that is, only when a situation is created in which the 
appearance or the “feeling” of acts of enjoyment is conferred upon all our activities. 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 124)  
This shows how Anders feared that practices of enjoyment such as sexuality and romance 
could become integrated within systems of social control. 
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I argue that analysing how technology mediates the expression of primary drives for 
destruction and love is related to the question of human sentiments that Anders 
highlighted. Hence in this section I have detailed why applying Anders’ theory to these two 
seemingly opposed technologies is justified. 
 
5.3 Research questions 
In this section, I derive research questions by elaborating Anders’ theory and applying it 
to my two case studies. But first I explain why I mainly focus on the themes of domination, 
alienation and ideology for the case study chapters. 
How the human interacts with technology is the main theme of Anders’ work. However, 
Anders focuses on how this interaction produces negative effects such as domination, 
alienation and ideology. Anders argues that, in modern times, domination, alienation and 
ideology are not simply driven, respectively, by brute force, abstract economic laws or 
misleading rhetoric. Anders’ main thesis is that these outcomes are also reproduced 
through human use of technological forms, whose specific design reflects the economic and 
social demands of the system that produced them. Hence I do not produce a research 
question about the themes of the human and technology, as these themes are involved in 
each of the subsequent categories.  
I now turn to developing a research question for domination, alienation and ideology. 
 
5.3.1 Military drones 
With regard to domination, in section 3.4.4, I discussed how Anders’ understanding of 
domination became increasingly connected to technology. This was catalysed by Anders’ 
experience of the Second World War. At this time, Anders was confronted with industrial 
warfare. The latter meant that tens of thousands of civilians in the same city could die in 
one day. Anders’ focus shifted onto how technological weapons automated killing by 
creating a division of labour whereby huge devastation could be unleashed at the push of a 
button, without it being clear who was responsible. This made killing easy. 
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Hence I ask: In what measure drone operators can become de-sensitised to killing 
someone from such a great distance while watching this happen through a video feed? One 
research question that can be derived from this reasoning is RQ1.1: What is the impact of 
the operation of military drones from a distance on operators’ psychological and emotional 
willingness to kill humans?  
 
With regard to alienation, in section 3.5.4, I showed how Anders’ conception of 
alienation culminated into one that examined the discrepancy between the immense effects 
we can produce through technology and our limited human faculties of comprehension. The 
material manifestation of this fact was that war criminals such as Adolf Eichmann could 
argue that they were not responsible for their actions, as they were simply following orders. 
They argued that they had accomplished a specific task within a larger operation that was 
not their responsibility. For Anders, this implied that, in the age of industrial killing, humans 
could no longer fully identify with their own actions.  
Applying this idea to drones encourages us to investigate how drone operators relate to 
the drone strikes they have executed. Hence I derive research question is RQ1.2.: What is 
the impact of military drone operators’ work on their personal lives, their feelings of shame 
and guilt and their mental health? 
 
With regard to ideology, in section 3.6.4, I showed how Anders’ mature conception of 
ideology is one where the technology, to some extent, automates the production of 
ideology. It does this through distorting human perception of the world. Consequently, in 
operating technology, individuals automatically adopt distorted, ideological ways of thinking 
that are tied to its functioning. 
In the context of military drones Anders’ theory suggests that the ideology that 
surrounds drones is automatically produced by their use. There is a positivist ideology that is 
tied to drones which presents drone strikes as mathematically precise ‘surgical strikes’. 
However, it seems contradictory to say that lethal explosions against unknown enemies can 
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ever be precise. Therefore a research question is RQ1.3: In what respects do drone 
operators believe or not believe in the ideology of “surgical strikes”? 
 
In Table 5.3.1 below, I have summarised the research questions I have formulated. RQ1 
means that this is a research question (RQ) with regard to the first case study on military 
drones. The second number refers to the theme that the research question refers to, with 
domination being equivalent to 1, alienation to 2 and ideology to 3. 
Domination  
RQ1.1: What is the impact of the 
operation of military drones from a 
distance on operators’ psychological and 
emotional willingness to kill humans? 
Alienation 
RQ1.2: What is the impact of military 
drone operator’s work on their personal 
lives, their feelings of shame and guilt, and 
their mental health? 
Ideology 
RQ1.3: In what respects do military drone 
operators believe or not believe in the 
ideology of ‘surgical strikes’? 
 
Table 5.3.1: Military drone research questions 
 
5.3.2 Dating apps 
Following on from the research questions I have formulated in regard to military drones, I 
now do the same work for dating apps. Just like I have done for drones, I omit the themes of 
the human and technology from chapters on dating apps. However, I expand the theme of 
alienation because dating apps could involve multiple forms of the latter.  
 
Regarding domination, I discussed how Anders’ mature conception moved toward 
conceptualising domination as increasingly closely tied to technology. In section 3.3.4, I 
showed how Anders argued that technological appliances could condition human behaviour 
because they came with ‘their own determinate structure and function’ (Anders [1956] 
2003, 98 my translation). They thus reduced humans to ‘machine parts’ (Anders [1964] 
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2015, 18). Similarly, dating apps offer affordances for specific usage patterns, such as liking 
many profiles at once and flirting with many other users at the same time. Hence I 
formulate the first half of research question RQ2.1: How does the design of dating apps 
influence user behaviour? 
In section 3.4.4 I showed how, for Anders, technology automates surveillance and 
therefore confers the power to blackmail (Anders [1980] 2011, 155) on the possessors of 
technology. This is relevant to dating apps. Tinder, one of the most popular dating apps, 
states in its privacy policy that: ‘If you chat with other Tinder users, you provide us the 
content of your chats’ (Tinder 2017). This means that companies have control over users’ 
private conversations. I consequently formulate the second half of RQ2.1: How does the 
knowledge or the lack of knowledge about the circumstance that all communication and 
activity on dating apps is recorded and can be shared with companies and the police impact 
the everyday behaviour of users? 
 
For this case study, alienation can be sub-divided into three types: alienation from 
others, from oneself (or one’s values) and from one’s physical being. 
Regarding the theme of alienation from others, Anders described how technology tends 
to increasingly mediate human relations, making the latter more abstract and less direct. 
Human interactions are thus sensorially reduced. Hence one research question relating to 
dating apps is: How does the use of dating apps impact users’ feelings of connectedness and 
isolation? 
In regard to alienation from oneself, in section 3.5.4, I showed that Anders’ mature 
conception of alienation is one where the increasing use of technology in human activity 
makes human actions more mechanical, as individuals must follow the rhythm of the 
machines they use. Dating apps encourage users to play a ‘numbers’ game,' (L, male, age: 
28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) messaging many people at the same time. This may 
make users feel like they are acting mechanically or in an inauthentic manner that doesn’t 
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correspond to their personality. Hence I ask: How do dating apps influence users’ behaviour 
and identity? 
Moreover, in section 3.5.4 I showed that Anders thought that media images could 
acquire a higher ontological status than people themselves. Individuals consequently feel 
pressure to conform to their media images. Hence one research question is how does the 
use of dating apps impact users’ perception of beauty standards and feelings of happiness 
and sadness? 
In Table 5.3.2, I have summed these questions into one question (see RQ2.2). 
 
In regard to ideology, in section 3.6.4, I discussed how Anders theorised that, to some 
degree, ideology in the sense of narratives is no longer necessary. This is because the 
technological world with which we interact produces ideological perceptions independently, 
without the need for the intentional production of ideological narratives. 
There are ideological notions that are tied to dating apps. One is the idea of finding the 
‘perfect match’ through powerful algorithms. This means forming a romantic relation with 
someone solely on the basis of compatibility, which in turn implies that love can be 
calculated. However, there is an alternative understanding of romantic relations. This is that 
partners who are on the surface not compatible may fall in love. Hence love is about a 
narrative and active fusion, not pre-established compatibility. Hence I can formulate RQ2.3: 
in what respects do users believe in or do not believe in the ability of dating app algorithms 
to create a “perfect match” of individuals? 
Domination 
RQ2.1: How does the design and structure 
of dating apps influence user behaviour and 
how does the knowledge or the lack of 
knowledge about the circumstance that all 
communication and activity on dating apps 
is recorded and can be shared with 
companies and the police impact the 
everyday behaviour of users? 
Psychological and subjective alienation 
RQ2.2: How does the use of dating apps 
impact users’ feeling of connectedness and 
isolation, their identity, their feeling of 
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happiness and sadness and their perception 
of beauty standards? 
Ideology 
RQ2.3: In what respects do users believe in 
or do not believe in the ability of dating app 
algorithms to create a “perfect match” of 
individuals? 
 
Table 5.3.2: Dating app research questions 
 
5.4 Outline for the military drone case study 
First, in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, I discuss the general research strategy for the military 
drone case study. Secondly, in section 5.4.3, I refer to Appendix A outlining all the tokens of 
discourse that I will analyse. Thirdly, in sections 5.4.4 and 5.4.5, I discuss in more detail the 
framework that I would like to use to analyse the material. 
 
5.4.1 Analysing pre-existing written and oral material on military drones 
Firstly, I discuss why I will not be conducting face-to-face interviews with drone operators 
and present the material that I would like to analyse. Secondly, I discuss the general 
research approach that I will adopt to analyse this material. 
There are legal restrictions on what information drone operators can divulge about their 
military role. The Standard Form 312 (SF312), which is the U.S. military’s non-disclosure 
agreement, prohibits military personnel from 'unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized 
retention, or negligent handling of classified information' (ODNI 2013, 3). Hence details of 
most operations including specific technological capabilities cannot be divulged by current 
or ex-drone operators. This is especially true since many drone missions are officially 
headed by the CIA and are therefore classified (Himes 2015, 163). 
Consequently, interviewing drone operators directly runs the risk of breaking the law. 
However, there is a significant amount of material publicly available online that can be 
analysed for the purposes of this case study. This material includes video footage form 
drone and Apache helicopter attacks published on websites such as YouTube and Liveleak. 
In section 6.2, I explain why I use videos from Apache helicopter attacks to gauge what the 
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commands to kill are for airmen, and the attitude of gunners as they kill through a monitor 
screen. I further analyse the comments underneath these videos to triangulate (Wodak and 
Meyer 2001, 30) among various discourse tokens. In addition, I look official U.S. Air Force 
recruitment videos (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a (B.1), 2019b (B.2), 
2019c (B.3)), which feature interviews with drone operators; spoken word poetry performed 
by an ex-drone operator (Wilkie 2015 (A.1-A.6); McGregor 2015); an independent low-
budget documentary (Engman 2018 (A.17)) where drone operator Brandon Bryant is 
interviewed at length; and blog posts by two separate others. Some of these blogs are 
posted on a website called Red Hand Project (Westmoreland 2014a (A.20), 2014b (A.21)). 
This was set up by ex-drone operators to speak out against the US drone programme. 
Finally, there are some leaked US military documents relating to drone operations published 
by The Intercept (Scahill et al. 2015 (B.5-B.8)). 
Hence to conduct research on this project without breaking the law, I adopt a qualitative 
‘lurking’ approach (Bryman 2012, 657). This means that I do not seek to actively engage with 
military drone pilots. I simply observe the written, audio and visual material that is publicly 
available online. I do this without announcing my presence to current or ex-drone 
operators. This has the advantage that the data collected in this way is ‘given’ (Bryman 
2012, 657) and is therefore not influenced by the researcher. 
 
5.4.2 Ethics 
There are also ethical considerations when it comes to dealing with publicly available 
classified information. These documents could potentially contain sensitive information 
revealing the identity of individuals. Malicious actors could use this information with 
harmful intent (Thomas et al. 2017). 
The risk of this is extremely low with regard to the material I will use. This is because the 
leaked documents that I will use have been published on a reputable online journal for 
investigative journalism, The Intercept. Care has already been taken by the editors of this 
online journal to erase sensitive information on these documents by means of blacking out 
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certain areas of the latter. The same goes for information supplied by ex-military drone 
operators. These persons have already taken care to withhold sensitive information. 
Moreover, because these documents are already widely available, there is no risk of causing 
additional harm through the republication of these documents (Thomas et al. 2017). 
 
5.4.3 Using CDA for both official and civil society accounts 
In Appendix A, I outline and discuss the material I want to analyse. Here I turn to 
outlining how I wish to analyse it using a framework which I adapt from Reisgl and Wodak’s 
(Reisigl and Wodak 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2016) critical historical approach to conducting 
critical discourse analysis (CDA).  
CDA is primarily designed to analyse the ideological content of discourses. And indeed, 
some discourses surrounding the operation of drones are ideological. For instance, official 
statements from the RAF or U.S. Airforce are often based on the idea that drones are 
precise weapons that limit civilian casualties. This is connected to the notion that the more a 
weapon is precise, the more it is acceptable to use it. This is a positivistic ideology which 
says that the ethics of killing can be calculated and that a limited number of civilian 
casualties is acceptable. 
Other discourses surrounding drones are more critical. The discourse of drone operators 
who have spoken publicly about drones tends to be critical of the official position and 
attempts to get to the truth of the matter regarding drones. Hence it can be said to contain 
non-ideological elements. It is in general sincere and does not conceal hidden interests or 
agendas. 
But this is not always the case. Lynn Hill, the author of spoken word poetry about piloting 
drones, has adopted a slightly ambiguous stance regarding military drones. In some poems 
she speaks of committing ‘atrocities’ (Wilkie 2015, 4 min to 7 min 20 sec) (A.2) and of these 
haunting her. But in others she borrows the ideological language of war, speaking of killing 
for her country and protecting ‘my marine’ (Wilkie 2015, 17 min 30 sec to 19 min 45 sec) 
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(A.4). Hence Lynn Hill is an example of how some of the civil society discourses can contain 
both ideological and critical elements. 
The fact that ideological notions are present in both official and critical accounts means 
that I can use CDA to analyse all the discourse tokens that I have sampled. By looking at 
discourse through the lens of CDA, I am able to highlight false and ideological concepts in 
both official and civil society accounts. Moreover, a linguistic analysis of discourses helps me 
highlight what is implicitly conveyed by the speaker. Hence CDA helps achieve a goal of 
qualitative research, which is that of probing ‘beneath surface appearances’ (Bryman 2012, 
400). Anders’ theory identifies various ideologies linked to technology and weapons. Next, I 
explore ties between the ideological notions that emerge out of the research and Anders’ 
work. 
 
5.4.4 Using elements of CDA to investigate domination, alienation and ideology 
Now I present in more detail how I will deploy tools offered by CDA to analyse drones.  I 
do this for the three themes: domination, alienation and ideology. This is the structure my 
case study chapter will follow. Within that chapter, each section corresponding to one of 
these themes will be subdivided into an analysis of discourse tokens using CDA and then a 
supplementary analysis using Anders’ theory. The main elements I use from Reisigl and 
Wodak (2001) and Wodak and Meyer (2016) are a framework for analysing nominational 
strategies, argumentative strategies, topoi (i.e. conclusion rules) and mitigation strategies. 
In terms of domination, I look at referential and nominational strategies (Reisigl and 
Wodak 2001, 500) such as the words used to convey commands and the words used to 
designate targets and victims. These expressions shed light on how drone operators relate 
to their targets and civilians on the ground. Moreover, looking at topoi, which are the 
implied meanings of statements, and argumentative strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 74-
75) helps me shed light on arguments and justifications for killing. The same goes for 
studying logical fallacies used in argumentation. Studying mitigation strategies further helps 
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me analyse how drone operator discourse seek to minimise the severity of killing and their 
involvement in it. 
In terms of alienation, firstly, an analysis of nominational strategies is useful for 
uncovering strategies for mitigating responsibility used by drone pilots and US and UK 
armies. For instance, one essential question that the drone case study is concerned with is 
whether drone operators use ‘I’ or ‘we’ to speak of their experience of killing using drones. 
Conversely, do they switch between the two? Answering this helps me understand whether 
drone pilots identify with their own actions. Secondly, alienation understood as a process 
which separates and inverts subject and object (see sections 2.5 and 3.5) produces internal 
conflicts within individuals. Individuals may not be happy with their actions because they 
feel that these were not the result of their own conscious decision. Hence I pay close 
attention to contradictions and tensions in drone operators’ account of their experiences. 
In terms of ideology, I look at nominational strategies to see what kind of language 
official sources and drone operators use to describe drone strikes. For instance, do they use 
language that plays up the idea that drones are precise? I also use topoi and argumentative 
strategies in relation to statements describing drone attacks. Both these tools allow me to 
look at what is unsaid or implied by a given discourse. Finally, I triangulate (Wodak and 
Meyer 2001, 30) between various elements to determine whether certain discourses are 
misleading and ideological. For instance, I contrast the terms used in official language with 
the terms used informally by drone operators to describe attacks. 
 
5.5 Outline of the dating app case study 
In this section, first, in sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.3, I discuss the general qualitative interview 
approach I will adopt for the dating app case study. This is based on conducting anonymous 
semi-structured interviews with around 20 participants. Then, in section 5.5.4, I discuss the 
questionnaire schedule and its relation to the research questions. Finally, in section 5.5.5, I 
adapt elements of CDA I will use to analyse the resultant material. 
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5.5.1 Using interviews as a research method 
For the dating app case study, there are no laws that I risk potentially breaking by talking 
to dating app users. Hence I can speak with them directly and ask them about experiences 
and feelings they have had while using dating apps. This will help me gain information from 
users to address my research questions. 
I opt for a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. I therefore privilege interview 
depth rather than quantity of participants. The reason for this is that the topics I wish to 
approach, such as feelings of alienation, isolation and body-image, are sensitive. Hence 
discussing these topics requires a relatively long and relaxed conversational style. This is 
what will enable the participants to feel at ease enough to discuss personal matters. 
Accordingly, I seek to interview around 20 current or former dating app users. I opt for 
adopting a semi-structured anonymous interview approach, allowing interviews to last 40 
min to 1 hour. 
A vertical rather than a horizontal analysis of the resultant material will be most 
beneficial to draw out valuable insights. Therefore I will use CDA to conduct a relatively 
deep analysis of each interview. I choose this over a more quantitative approach such as 
coding (Bryman 2012, 298). I now turn to discussing ethical considerations. 
 
5.5.2 Ethics 
I have participants read an information sheet. This explains that the interviews are 
anonymous but that a recording is made for transcription purposes. This recording will be 
permanently deleted as soon as it has been transcribed. Participants will be notified when 
this process has been completed. I take care to anonymise conversations not only by taking 
away the name of the participants but also by removing potentially identifying pieces of 
information from the interview transcript. 
I record oral consent of the interviewees that I cannot meet face-to-face owing to the 
first 2020 coronavirus lockdown. They state they have read, understood and agree to the 
informed consent form. 
163 
I take care in handling recordings of conversations by storing these on a single device 
with no wireless connectivity.  
At the start of the interview, I make sure that participants are aware that they are free to 
decline to answer any question. I also look out for, and acknowledge, signs of discomfort 
that they may display during the interview. 
Following my ethics committee’s request, in order to avoid going against the terms of use 
of dating apps, I do not set up researcher profiles on the latter. This means that I cannot 
take screenshots of dating app interfaces to use as illustrations in this thesis. It also means 
that I will use my personal networks, snowballing (Bryman 2012, 424) and social media such 
as Reddit, Twitter and Instagram in order to recruit participants. I now discuss this process 
in more detail. 
 
5.5.3 Sampling and recruiting participants 
Data regarding the age of users on one of the main dating app websites, Tinder, suggests 
that in 2017, 83% of users were under 34 (Iqbal 2018). Moreover, the same study found that 
76% of users are based in urban settings. Finally, according to some reports, there are 
roughly twice as many men on Tinder as women, with 20% of males who are over 18 and 
10% of females who are over 18 using Tinder in the US (Iqbal 2018).  
I can only take these figures as indicative as I will conduct my study in the UK. But they 
show that, if I want to investigate general trends on dating apps, I should focus my study on 
relatively young people. Consequently, the age-range of the participants that I will seek to 
contact will be between 18 to 34 years of age. This follows the range looked at in other 
studies on dating apps (e.g. Strubel 2017; Albury 2017) and is designed to obtain the most 
representative sample. 
The main dating apps cater to both heterosexual and LGBT+ users. For instance, Tinder 
added a feature which allows users to choose from 37 different gender identities. Hence I 
will attempt to contact users of all genders and sexual orientations. Many studies in media 
and communication focus either on heterosexual users of dating apps or LGBT+ users to 
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zero in on the specificities of each group. However, I seek to, on the contrary, look at what 
unites all users. This fits with a Humanist-Marxist framework. For instance, Anders 
addressed ‘one humanity [because] what can affect all of us concerns all of us’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 288, italics in original, my translation). I consequently try to make my sample 
follow a similar distribution of sexual orientations and genders as the one that is likely to be 
found on dating apps today. I aim to get 66% male participants and 34% female participants. 
I also aim to include at least 10% of gay, bisexual or transgender participants. This reflects 
the likely distribution of these categories of users on dating apps (Iqbal 2018). 
The main dating apps are Tinder, Bumble, Hinge, Feeld, CoffeeMeetsBagel, OKCupid, 
Happn, Grindr and POF app. I accept participants from any of these dating apps, as my focus 
is on the general form of technology that is used. Anders’ theory encourages us to examine 
the structure of technological hardware in terms of affordances, as well as those of the 
software. Consequently, I focus on apps that are supported by the modern smartphone. I 
exclude online dating programmes that require a computer, as this is a significantly different 
type of technology with a separate structure and set of affordances. Conversely, I argue that 
the differences between individual software are limited enough to warrant a study that 
includes users of any of these apps. All are essentially software that allow users to text 
message one-another through connecting them on the basis of image-based profiles and 
geo-localisation. 
I now turn to discussing how I will recruit participants.  
As mentioned, I use my personal networks to recruit potential participants. I will ask 
people known to me if they know people that I do not know who use dating apps and might 
be willing to be interviewed. I look for people I do not know in order to avoid contaminating 
my research sample. This could happen if my participants know too many details about my 
research. 
In terms of searching for participants using social media, I use multiple approaches. On 
Reddit, I will send direct messages to all the accounts that have posted on 7 separate 
discussion pages, which are part of the Reddit community called r/Tinder. On Twitter and 
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Instagram, I will search for relevant hashtags such as #TinderLondon and send direct 
messages to the accounts that have posted relevant material on this hashtag. I will 
moreover ask acquaintances with many followers to put out invitations to participate 
through their IG stories, i.e. disappearing public messages. 
In terms of using snowballing, each time that I find a new participant I ask them whether 
they know anyone that may be interested in participating. 
In terms of the set-up of the interviews, owing to the coronavirus outbreak and the 
lockdown measures imposed by the UK government on 23 March 2020, which outlaw non-
essential face-to-face contacts with individuals who do not live together, I start conducting 
these interviews over Skype. However, I had already conducted 4 face-to-face interviews 
prior to the lockdown. 
 
5.5.4 Formulating a semi-structured interview 
With regard to the order in which I deal with the main themes of this thesis, I invert the 
order of how these themes are approached in the questionnaire. Hence I put the questions 
concerning ideology first. Then I turn to the questions on alienation. Finally, I ask the 
questions concerning domination. This is because some questions are weightier than others. 
The questions concerning domination are more likely to produce negative responses 
because they are about data collection and surveillance. In contrast, the questions 
concerning ideology seem more general and light-hearted, because they simply ask 
participants about their general experience on dating apps. The questions about alienation, 
which I place in the middle, are likely to provoke nuanced responses that may contain both 
positive and negative aspects. Hence it is best to start with the seemingly more 
inconsequential questions and arrive at the ones that could provoke stronger reactions at 
the end. 
This follows an approach which I adopt throughout the questionnaire, which is that of 
building up to vital questions by first asking background questions and speaking about other 
examples relating to social media. I also ask participants if they have examples about 
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someone they know, before asking them about their own experiences. The main benefit of 
this is that participants won’t feel that the researcher is pressuring them to respond in a 
particular way. They will answer more freely and perhaps say things in response to some 
apparently light-hearted questions that already give an indication of what they think about 
the seemingly weightier questions. This encourages them to be honest in replying to these 
slightly more delicate questions that follow, such as the ones concerning body-image. 
However, they may also potentially contradict themselves. This could be beneficial as I can 
then use CDA to analyse the tensions in the respondent's answers. In particular, I can 
triangulate (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 30) between conflicting remarks and other details to 
interpret my findings.  
In formulating questions, I make sure that I leave respondents the chance to answer in at 
least two different ways to my questions. I ask follow-up questions that take into 
consideration the opinion the respondent has expressed. This is beneficial because the 
respondent might react against this follow up question and give a more nuanced and 
detailed position. For instance, if they say dating apps have a neutral or potentially positive 
impact on body-image, I ask them whether dating apps are a platform to take ownership of 
body-types that may diverge from the standard ideal. The respondent may then either say 
that this is going too far and that this is not the case, or they might confirm this idea. 
Finally, I ask respondents to talk about concrete examples. This can serve as more 
objective evidence of certain dynamics that emerge in relation to dating apps. I can use CDA 
to analyse what is implied by the way a participant are recounting events. But the more 
objective information conveyed by the example itself can also be useful for triangulating 
between various elements the participant has spoken about throughout the interview. 
In Table 5.5.4 below I link the research question to the main questions from the 
questionnaire that will help me answer them. 
Domination 
RQ2.1: How does the design 
and structure of dating apps 
influence user behaviour and 
how does the knowledge or 
(2.1) In general, do you 
think it is rather easy 
or rather difficult to 
find someone on 
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the lack of knowledge about 
the circumstance that all 
communication and activity 
on dating apps is recorded 
and can be shared with 
companies and the police 
impact the everyday 
behaviour of users? 
Tinder who matches 
what you are looking 
for? In what respects?  
(2.2) Is it rather time-
consuming or not so 
time-consuming to find 
an interesting “match” 
on Tinder? 
(3.1.5) The media 
often say that [chosen 
dating app] is primarily 
a platform for quick 
sex and one-night 
stands. Do you think 
this is rather true or 
false? Why? Do you 
think that’s a good or a 
bad thing? 
(3.1.6) How would you 
characterise your 
behaviour on dating 
apps? 
 
(4.10) Did you know 
that [chosen dating 
app] stores lots of data 
about you for a long 
time? Has this in any 
way impacted your 
behaviour on the 
platform? Are there 
things you have 
deliberately not talked 
about on the platform 
that you would talk 
about in a face-to-face 
conversation? If so, can 
you say more about it? 
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Psychological and subjective 
alienation 
RQ2.2: How does the use of 
dating apps impact users’ 
feeling of connectedness and 
isolation, their identity, their 
feeling of happiness and 
sadness and their perception 
of beauty standards? 
(3.1.4) And what about 
you, have you ever had 
experiences on 
[chosen dating app] 
that created negative 
feelings such as 
disappointment or 
isolation? If yes, can 
you talk more about it 
and give a concrete 
example?; 
(3.2.5) Have you ever 
been confronted with 
unrealistic 
expectations with 
regard to standards of 
beauty on dating apps? 
Has this ever made you 
feel negative about 
yourself?; 
(3.1.5) The media 
often say that [chosen 
dating app] is primarily 
a platform for quick 
sex and one-night 
stands. Do you think 
this is rather true or 
false? Why? Do you 
think that’s a good or a 
bad thing?  
(3.1.7) Are you happy 
with [your behaviour 
on dating apps] do you 
see it as fitting with 
your personality? 
Ideology 
RQ2.3: In what respects do 
users believe in or do not 
believe in the ability of 
dating app algorithms to 
create a “perfect match” of 
individuals? 
(2.8) Do you think that 
the algorithm or the 
interface used on 
[chosen dating app] 
are effective at 
matching individuals? 




Table 5.5.4: Dating app research questions and questionnaire 
 
5.5.5 Elements of CDA I will use 
Similarly to the military drone case study, I structure my analysis of dating apps according 
to the three themes: domination, alienation and ideology. 
In terms of domination, I look at nomination, predication and mitigation strategies used 
to describe negative experiences on dating apps. Hence a CDA analysis of the interviews will 
benefit from a relatively precise transcription that includes pauses and unfinished 
sentences. These are elements that could be analysed by the above CDA tools. I also look at 
topoi employed to describe normal use of dating apps, paying particular attention to how 
users speak about interacting with other users. 
In terms of alienation, firstly I look for topoi relating to machines, the human, isolation 
and disconnection. Secondly, I look for sentences that include a personal pronoun and 
adjectives relating to the human body. This helps me answer the body-image side of the 
question on alienation. Thirdly I pay particular attention to conflicts within a person’s 
identity. For instance, I look at contradictions that highlight distinctions between a person’s 
will and behaviour and speech acts such as questions addressed at oneself. This fits with the 
idea of alienation I have derived in section 3.5.4 on Anders, which looked at Promethean 
shame. 
In terms of ideologies, I will pay particular attention to logical fallacies and contradictions 
within the discourses of participants. The presence of logical fallacies suggests that certain 
ideas may be ideological. Contradictions in users’ narratives may indicate that a particular 
belief is not their own but is ideological. This would be suggested by the fact that they 
express an opinion somewhere else which contradicts this belief. I also pay attention to 
nominational strategies and topoi to understand the ideological content of a particular 
170 




To conclude, in this chapter I have presented a methodology for applying Anders’ 
theories to the digital era. In section 5.2.1, I have selected two case studies, military drones 
and dating apps. These represent instances where actions that are related to two 
dialectically related primary human drives are carried out using digital technologies. Indeed, 
as shown in 3.5.4, Anders’ work encourages us to ask how technology impacts humans at 
the level of emotions and sentiments. In the case of drones, the instinct in question is the 
drive for destruction and violence (Thanatos). In the case of dating apps, it is the life instinct, 
which is connected to sexuality and love relations (Eros). Hence these case studies concern 
the relation between technology and human emotions and sentiments. Consequently, they 
can help us assess whether Anders was right to argue that modern technologies could give 
rise to domination, alienation and ideology. 
In order to do this, I have first elaborated research questions by basing myself on section 
3 of this thesis, which showed that Anders’ became more closely tied to humanist Marxism 
towards the end of his life. I did this for the military drone case study in 5.3.1 and the dating 
apps case study 5.3.2. Subsequently, I outlined my methodology for the military drone case 
study in 5.4. Here, in section 5.4.1, I firstly discussed why I will adopt a qualitative research 
method by ‘lurking’ around written and oral material, such as spoken word poetry, blogs, 
articles and interviews involving current and ex-military drone pilots that is available on the 
internet. Then, in section 5.4.2, concerning ethics, I showed how this material is publicly 
available and so does not put the project at risk of breaking any laws or doing harm by 
disseminating military secrets. Secondly, in section 5.4.4, I presented the source material 
that I have collected in Appendix A by differentiating it into discourses present in civil 
society and official discourses. Finally in sections 5.4.4 and 5.4.5, I specified the framework 
that I will use to analyse these discourses, which I adapt from critical discourse analysis. 
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Then in section 5.5, I outlined the methodology for conducting the dating app case study. 
First in sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, I discussed using semi-structured interviews as a research 
method for gaining information that relates to the research questions and related ethical 
considerations. Then, in section 5.5.3, I discussed my aim of finding a research sample that 
represents the user base of dating apps. In section 5.5.4, I discussed how to formulate the 
question schedule. In section 5.5.5, I outlined the elements of CDA I will adapt to help me 
analyse the collected data. 
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6. Domination: Killing Made Easy Through Military Drone Use 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The research question that I formulated in chapter 5 for the section on domination of the 
drone case study is RQ1.1: What is the impact of the operation of military drones from a 
distance on operators’ psychological and emotional willingness to kill humans?  
In the present chapter, I investigate this question by, in section 6.2, outlining why I use 
video feeds from Apache helicopters as stand-ins for those of military drones. In section 6.3, 
I then outline the protocol airmen must follow leading up to strikes. I subsequently look at 
the commands to kill they use, including those employed by drone operators. I conduct a 
CDA analysis of the commands, looking at nomination, predication, perspectivisation and 
mitigation discursive strategies (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). Finally, in section 6.4, I look at 
how attacks are described by operators. I triangulate (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 30) this 
analysis these with comments on YouTube. Then in section 6.5, I look at the nomination 
strategies drone operators use to describe attacks and designate their enemies and civilians. 
I compare these to expressions used by soldiers on the ground. 
I argue that the expressions used both re-enforce and reflect a distancing effect drone 
technology has. The latter allows drone operators to avoid feeling personally involved or 
empathetic in relation to the violence they are enacting. However, paradoxically, the 
distance and apparent detachment promoted by drones also creates space for the 
projection of un-modulated, primitive forms of aggression by drone operators onto their 
targets, whom they reductively come to see as ‘bad guys’ (U.S. Air Force and Space Force 
Recruiting 2019a [B.1]; Brandon Bryant in Power 2013 [A.11]; Westmoreland 2014b [A.20]). 
In making this argument, I go against a trend within media studies on drones that 
emphasises that drone operators are not distanced but immersed in the battlefield. I argue 
that such literature, gives into techno-fetishism by misleadingly exaggerating the quality of 
the video feed drone operators receive. I further argue that the audio link may immerse 
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drone operators in the situation of their allied troops, but it does not immerse them in the 
circumstances of the people they are shooting at. 
In section 6.6, I conclude by looking at the question of whether drone technology 
gamifies killing. I argue that there is a gamified dimension contained within drone killings 
but that this shouldn't be over-emphasised. Anders' theory of killing made too easy, or like 
job, which I discussed in section 3.4.4, is a better description of the facts. It sheds light on 
how commanding drones is also detrimental for the drone operator, who may become 
traumatised by the repetitive and potentially senseless nature of the killings s/he has helped 
occasion. 
 
6.2 Military drones and Apache helicopters 
With the exception of a partially censored transcript obtained through a Freedom of 
Information Act request by the Los Angeles Times (Cloud 2011) (B.20), I do not have access 
to the audio of communications between drone operators during strikes. Internet videos 
which contain sections of the video feed from drone cameras are always heavily edited and 
do not contain audio. Indeed they are most often released by official military entities. 
Consequently, I use audio-visual material from the video feed and radios of Apache 
helicopters, which is also published, and sometimes leaked, on the internet through 
websites such as YouTube and Liveleak. I employ the latter as stand-ins for drone audio. 
These video feeds are also used to aim weapons and guide missiles. They help me gauge 
what the commands to kill are, and what the attitude of military personnel is, when gunners 
and operators are looking at targets through a monitor. With drones, the cameras are 
further removed from the target, hence the footage less clear. I further discuss bandwidth 
limitations in section 6.4.2. In addition, drone operators are not in harm’s way, as is the case 
for personnel flying on Apache helicopters. Therefore, I argue that if I find that the effects 
which I am interested in, namely de-sensitisation and detachment, are present with Apache 
helicopter personnel, they are also likely to be present with drone operators. Given their 
structural characteristics, drone use can only amplify these desensitising effects. This is 
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confirmed by what little information we have through drone operative's conversations (see 
Cloud 2011) (B.20). 
 
6.3 Commands to kill from the air 
In theory, air and ground attacks must follow the same engagement protocol but, as I 
explain below, this protocol is followed in a more formulaic fashion from the air, with less 
variation in the different steps leading up to killings. 
According to an official US Marine training manual, the rules of engagement surrounding 
combat in Iraq and Afghanistan are defined by a handful of principles. Among these are 
‘military necessity’, meaning that the target must pose a threat to Allied troops or civilians, 
and ‘distinction’, requiring ‘that combatants be distinguished from noncombatants’ (United 
States Marine Corps 2017 ca., pp. 4, 5) (B.9). This implies that targets must demonstrate a 
‘hostile intent’ (United States Marine Corps 2017 ca., 21) (B.9) towards US, allied forces or 
civilians. In practice this means that, especially from the air, getting a 'positive identification' 
(Cloud 2011) (B.20). The latter often involves determining whether a person is carrying 
weapons, materials to lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or a radio. This becomes 
crucial for deciding whether that person can be shot at. Hence there are fixed steps that are 
followed when deciding whether to fire at someone from the air, which include identifying 
them as a threat and obtaining clearance to use weapons against them. The command to kill 
'clear to engage' (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 10 sec) (B.13) is always used from the air, 
whereas it is not always necessary when fighting breaks out on the ground and soldiers 
must immediately shoot to defend themselves.  
I use CDA (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to analyse these commands. The expression 
'positive identification' uses nomination and predication discursive strategies. It uses the 
verb 'identification' to denote the action of deciding to kill someone. This discursive device 
constitutes a nomination strategy which constructs the action as well-regulated. 
'Identification', moreover, has a topos (or related theme) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 74-75) of 
precise procedures, also implying that the action is well-managed. 'Positive' is an adjective 
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which gives a approving evaluative attribution to the process. This discursive device feeds 
into a discursive predication strategy which positively qualifies the action. 
The expression 'clear to engage' (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 10 sec) (B.13) uses 
nomination, predication and argumentation strategies (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). Using 
the categorisation device 'engage' it discursively constructs the action of bombing 
individuals as life-affirming, i.e. as similar to interacting socially, or engaging in a 
conversation, with someone. This is a nomination strategy that constructs the action of 
shooting as benign. The expression 'clear to' also discursively qualifies the action as 
authoritative, well managed and secure. It does this through evocations of, for instance, 
medical processes and structures. For instance, doctors also give screenings that 'clear' 
patients. The term 'clear' further contains the implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that 
the operator is not responsible—that s/he can have a clear conscience about his/her 
actions—because the decision has been taken by someone else who is higher up in a 
hierarchical structure. These linguistic devices feed into a predication strategy that also 
constructs the action as well-regulated. The topoi involved in this expression (e.g. that of 
medical or of other official procedures) also function as argumentation strategies. These 
employ the argumentum verecumdiam device (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 72), i.e. they say 
this is so because a figure of authority said so—e.g. this is a 'positive identification'. They try 
to convey the sense to the operator that the action s/he is undertaking is legitimate and 
righteous, while at the same time implying that s/he is distanced from this action and not 
directly responsible. The topos of medicine was also involved in an expression used during 
the Gulf War: that of 'surgical strikes' (Calhoun 2015, 57). The topos of being clear or 
surgical implies that the operation of drones precisely deals with unwanted elements, 
promoting security and well-being. This terminology buys into the idea that war operations 
can somehow be comparable to the actions of a surgeon cutting away cancerous tissue, for 
instance. 
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This linguistic qualification of the action of killing individuals through aerial strikes as 
related to the topos of authority and safeguarded, technical processes fits with Anders' 
theory that 
when an organisation is in function, the idea of the morality of an action is 
substituted by that of the goodness of the operation. If everything is “in order” in the 
organisation of an enterprise and the operation is clean, its effects also seem in order 
and clean (Anders [1956] 2003, 231, my translation) 
The topos of being precise and surgical is echoed by some YouTube commentators. For 
instance, a commentator, on a video showing dozens of individuals being killed over the 
course of 10-15 minutes, says: ‘Of most Apache fire teams , this one has been the most 
surgical ... [three heart emojis]’ (Raymond Cassiday 2020) (B.13.6). However, a war is not 
played out on a single individual, like the work of a surgeon, but on a particular group of 
humans, with its own complex cultural, political and economic dynamic. Hence this is not a 
fair comparison; it functions as an abstraction that covers up concrete processes. 
 
6.4 CDA analysis of conversational descriptions of attacks 
I argue that the distancing language used by Apache and drone operators both 
participates in, and reflects, a distancing effect the structure of the technology has on their 
consciousnesses. Indeed, the audio of the conversations of gunners during Apache 
helicopter attacks, which I obtained from YouTube videos, reveals little complex emotional 
engagement on their part. This is reflected in the nomination, predication, argumentation, 
perspectivisation and mitigation strategies they employ (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). It is 
additionally revealed in some of the comments on such videos. To illustrate these de-
sensitising effects, I look at the same video feed from an Apache helicopter, which was 
obtained from YouTube. An attack on around 20 individuals who appear to be armed is 
initiated after the command ‘clear to engage’ (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 10 sec) (B.13) is 
given.  
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Subsequent comments by the gunner use perspectivisation and mitigation discursive 
strategies. Hence following a killing using a Hellfire missile the gunner comments: ‘that was 
a blast just on one guy, he, um… he's no longer with us’ (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 12 min 27 
sec) (B.13). The gunner uses an ‘animating prosody’ (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) discursive 
device, which can be employed to express one’s perspective on an action, process or event. 
In this case, the low-pitched inflection on the second subclause expresses a lack of 
involvement on the part of the gunner. YouTube commentators glorify the sense of 
detachment with which the gunner kills, calling attention to this very sentence. Hence one 
commentator writes: '"He's uh, no longer with us." Classic bad-assery US owners of the 
night sky…’ (Kyle Komarek 2020). This flat tone is a common feature of most audio from 
Apache helicopter attacks. For instance, another YouTube commentator writes about the 
gunner on a different video that: 'Dude sounds like a dentist' (616e6f6e 2020 ca.) (B.15.1). 
This comment highlights how the gunner’s tone is similar to that of someone who is merely 
fulfilling a precise technical or medical task. The gunner's use of a flat animating prosody 
device for commands and communications necessary for the operation of video feed-
commanded weapons shows how this technology allows the gunner to employ a discursive 
strategy that distances him/her from the killing s/he is enacting. 
I argue that this mitigating discursive strategy participates in, and reflects, the fact that 
the very way in which Apache and drone operators perceive their enemies, through a video-
feed, which makes them appear as ‘silhouettes’ (Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015, 3 min 
15 sec) (A.11) on a screen rather than humans, allows these personnel to become detached 
from what they are doing, treating this as a technical task or a job. Hence drones are 
involved in a modern form of ‘Taylorization’ (Asaro 2013, 205) of killing. 
This is also reflected in some of the official terms used to describe the impact of bombs. 
The expressions ‘good missile’ (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 5 min 35 sec) (B.13), ‘good impact’ 
(AH64Apacheaction 2013, 10 min 40 sec) (B.13) and 'good effects' (AH64Apacheaction 2013, 
14 min 40 sec) (B.13) are used, for instance. The word 'effect' has a technical topos. It acts 
as a nomination strategy that constructs the process as a merely technical occurrence. The 
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word 'good' is an affirmative evaluative attribution. The expression further contains the 
implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that a technical process is running smoothly. 
Hence what is happening is good.  
This discursive device illustrates Anders’ theory that killing can be conducted like a job 
following a work ethic that replaced ‘moral consciousness’ [Gewissen] with ‘meticulousness’ 
[Gewissenhaftigkeit] (Anders [1956] 2003, 17). Consequently, each individual could feel like 
s/he was maintaining a pre-established technological apparatus rather than carrying out an 
atrocity. Thus Anders argued that:  
The extermination camp officer did not “act”, but, however horrible this may sound, 
he did his job. And since the aim and result of his work did not concern him, since his 
work in as much as it was work is considered “morally neutral”, he also accomplished 
an act that was “morally neutral”. (Anders [1956] 2003, 273, my translation) 
Sitting in a container box on military bases in the U.S. modern drone operation also 
resembles what Anders described as ‘the “office job” done by [Adolf Eichmann] and by 
other, less representative employees of extermination’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 32). Indeed an 
attitude of conscientious meticulousness is reflected in direct testimonies coming from 
drone operatives. Some have spoken of how drone technology allows them to have 
‘cognitive thought processes rather than emotional reactions’ (Mason 2013, 3 min 11 sec) 
(B.10). This shows how operating drones can effect the distancing Anders spoke about 
between the act and the sentiment (Anders [1956] 2003, 24), leading to the kind of absent-
mindedness that is characteristic of some forms of employment. Hence rather than thinking 
of drone operation as a video game as many critical media reports have done (Hessen Schei 
2015) (A.14), it is best to think about it as a job, just as Anders’ theory invites us to do. This 
allows us to consider the detrimental effect drone operation has on drone operators, as well 
as victims of strikes. 
Nevertheless, the effort to mask the reality of conducting aerial strikes using laser-guided 
missiles, both in the commands and descriptions that qualify these strikes, illustrates 
another insight offered by Anders’ mature work. In We, Sons of Eichmann (Anders [1964] 
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2015) Anders goes over and partially defends the argument that many Nazis were simply 
following orders. However, he refuses to completely absolve Nazis participating in crimes 
against humanity. For Anders, to consider this ‘process as a purely passive event would be 
mystification’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 13). This is because Nazi’s had to actively ‘“kill” their 
sense of taboo’ about killing’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 13). Indeed, I argue that the terminology 
used in the commanding of drones, on the whole, both reinforces and reflects the way 
military drones can normalise killing. It can thus be said to participate in the process of 
killing the human sense of taboo about killing that Anders spoke of. The affordances of 
military drones can partially replace this mental process. 
 
Figure 6.3: Ministry of Defence. 2015. “RAF Reaper Neutralises Taliban Bomb Factory,” 
November 25, 2015, sec. YouTube video, 1 min 20 sec. From the UK’s Ministry of Defence 
This is illustrated by another expression both officially and colloquially used to describe 
the impact of a missile. The expression ‘splash’ originates from an abbreviation used for 
describing the impact point of a torpedo and a ship (Jones [1973] 2007, 3). But it has been 
adopted by air force personnel in general, including on official documents relating to 
military drones, see Figure 1. I argue that the use of ‘splash’ to signify a drone strike which 
hit its target uses deictics (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) (i.e. relies on context-dependent 
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information to extrapolate meaning) as a perspectivisation device. This positions the 
speaker away from the scene of what is happening, allowing him/her to ironically and 
metaphorically refer to it. By referring to the event indirectly, it places the operator in the 
position of someone who is not involved in the event taking place. 
At the same time, ‘splash’ uses a metaphor as a nomination strategy, which also acts as a 
hyperbole that constitutes an intensification strategy. Indeed the expression suggests that 
the impact of a bomb on humans produces a similar effect to a bomb exploding underwater, 
as humans are disintegrated by the explosion. The expression conveys a cartoon dimension 
to the violence taking place on the screen. There is an ironic dimension to the colloquial use 
of this expression as described by Brandon Bryant. Bryant recounts his training instructor 
counting down his first missile impact and exclaiming: ‘Splash! You killed everyone’ (Power 
2013) (A.11). The expression ‘splash’ acts as a nomination strategy, which discursively 
constructs the process of killing as spectacular. It also contains a mitigation strategy based 
on a cartoon analogy, which minimises the importance of this action, at the same time. 
Paradoxically, the term ‘splash’ is not detached but expressive. It conveys the projection of 
un-modulated aggression towards enemies. I argue that the cartoonish, Hollywood 
character of this expression participates in drone operators’ efforts to kill their sense of 
taboo about killing. Visualising destruction on an infrared or black and white monitor screen 
facilitates this process, enabling operators to glorify and make jokes about it.  
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Table 6.3: Expressions used to designate targets and shoot at humans 
Table 6.3 outlines the linguistic strategies and devices present in the discourses used to 
give commands to drone operators. It shows how, on the one hand, operators use words 
that convey a sense of order, cleanliness and a surgical nature. On the other hand, they use 
hyperbolic irony to describe, while at the same time distancing themselves from, the violent 
consequences of their actions. On the whole, these two contradictory discursive strategies 
open up the possibility for drone operators to express unmodulated aggression towards 
their enemies, as they make ironic jokes about other people’s deaths. This reveals how the 
process of operating drones is devoid of complex emotions. But it is not entirely affectless. 
On the contrary, it opens up the space for the expression of primitive aggression. 
Drone operators such as Michael Haas worked for the programme from 2005 to 2011 
before speaking out. Michael Haas has described what it is like to kill people through 
drones, stating that viewing his video feed: 
I feel like… I’m in power… feel like, if I get these sons of bitches in the crosshairs right 
now, I can kill them. It’s like it was easy; it was too easy. You never know who you’re 
killing, because you never actually see a face; you just have silhouettes. And it’s easy 
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to have that detachment – that lack of empathy for human life. And it’s easy to really 
just think of them as something else. They’re not people, they’re just terrorists. 
(Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015, 3 min 15 sec) (A.11) 
Above I discussed the cool tone that characterises some Apache helicopter audio feeds. This 
testimony highlights how this form of detachment, paradoxically, also allows for drone 
operators to think and act aggressively. In some respects, this challenges the notion that 
drones privilege ‘cognitive thought processes’ over ‘emotional reactions’ (Mason 2013, 3 
min 11 sec) (B.10). Drones may be involved in the production of regressive, unsophisticated 
emotions rather than a total absence of emotions. 
This testimony gives glimpse into how drone operators relate to their targets in an 
equally reductive and regressive manner. I explore these referential strategies in the next 
section. 
 
6.5 Nomination and argumentation strategies 
Michael Haas’s account is a critical testimony, as he has publicly spoken out against the 
US drone programme. However, as I show below, the same tendency to refer to enemies by 
peculiar terms is manifest in other drone operator accounts who are less critical, such as 
Lynn Hill (see B.1-B.10), and the language of official documents. I argue that this highlights 
how the limited visual information drone operators receive about their enemies de-
sensitises them from the act of killing. This allows them to express un-modulated aggression 
towards perceived enemies.  
In making this argument, I go against the commonly accepted understanding of drone 
operators put forward by Gregory (2011). Gregory rejects the often-repeated claim that 
drone operators are de-sensitised and kill as though they were playing a ‘video game in 
which killing becomes casual’ (Gregory 2011, 188). In realty, drone operators are very much 
engaged in the battlefield through audio communications with troops on the ground. Hence 
Gregory quotes one operator as saying:  
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Those employing the system are very involved at a personal level in combat. You hear 
the AK-47 going off, the intensity of the voice on the radio calling for help. You’re 
looking at him, 18 inches away from him, trying everything in your capability to get 
that person out of trouble (McCloskey 2009 cited in Gregory 2011, 200).  
I argue that Gregory’s insight that drone operators form close bonds to troops on the 
ground through radio communications is valuable. However, his suggestion that the 
‘constant exposure to high-resolution images’ (Gregory 2011, 198) drone operators receive 
explains their immersion in the battlefield is misleading. Indeed, on the basis of Gregory’s 
argument, Maurer has further asserted that:  
they are only 18 inches away from the screen that shows the scene of violence; they 
see the killing right in front of them […] The video feeds the pilots are watching do 
not stage violence as a passive spectacle, but as a highly immersive one (Maurer 
2017, 146) 
However, the nomination strategies drone operators employ to designate their targets 
evidence how they do not witness the killing as though they were there, as suggested by 
Gregory (2011) and Maurer (2017). 
For instance, Michael Haas testifies that: ‘You never know who you’re killing, because 
you never actually see a face; you just have silhouettes’ (Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015, 
3 min 15 sec) (A.11). He states that this makes it easy to have ‘that detachment – that lack 
of empathy for human life’ (Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015, 3 min 15 sec) (A.11). 
'Silhouettes' is a nomination strategy that employs a metaphor to construct humans as 
shadows. This contains the implicature that they are insubstantial, and hence that their 
killing does not really register on the human psyche as significant. The fact that humans are 
viewed as faceless shadows goes to show that the camera on drones may be extremely 
technically advanced. However, this does not mean that drone operators experience the 
battlefield as though they were not 10 000 km away but only '18 inches away’. This is 
further highlighted by the fact that drone operators, in contrast to soldiers on the ground, 
often construct stereotypical, black and white images of their enemy. They can then project 
un-modulated aggression onto this image. 
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Lynn Hill is an ex-drone pilot who has written poetry about her experiences piloting 
drones. The latter does not constitute a political criticism of the US drone programme. 
However, the expressive nature of these poems offers a great insight into the psychology of 
operating drones. In ‘My Marine’, Hill describes perceiving enemy combatants as 'fighting 
slithered sticks' (Wilkie 2015, 18 min 30 sec) (A.4). She opposes these to the 'white hot 
squares' (Wilkie 2015, 18 min 30 sec) (A.4) that represent Marines on her video feed. 
Marines show up as bigger heat signatures because they carry a lot of equipment. Hill’s 
description favours the Marines. Using the metaphoric device that Marines are a square, 
positively constructs these social actors. The topos (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 74-75) of 
square is one of stability. The predication of square as 'white' and 'hot' also uses adjectives 
that positively qualify Marines (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). White and heat is commonly 
associated with light and goodness; black and cold with darkness. In contrast, the 
nomination strategy that uses a metaphoric device that constructs enemies as 'sticks', relies 
on a topos of weakness and withered-ness. 'Slithered' is linked to the predication verb 
slithering, which evokes the idea of snakes. 'Fighting', another predication verb, has the 
implicature that the enemies are aggressive. This shows how the way Hill perceives her 
enemies through a monitor screen offers affordances for her to construct a stereotypical 
negative image of them. 
I argue that a further reason that Lynn Hill projects a positive image on the Marines and a 
negative one on the other combatants is not due to her immersion in the video feed but 
rather her immersion in the auditory feed, as she directly speaks to marines on the ground 
through a radio signal. The current literature (Gregory 2011; Fairhead 2019; Maurer 2017; 
Pugliese 2016) has over-emphasised the importance of the video feed and left the effect of 
the audio feed relatively unexplored. For instance, Maurer speaks of a ‘scopic regime of 
total visual immersion’ (Maurer 2017, 147) producing a ‘high-definition reality effect’ 
(Maurer 2017, 147). But this conflicts with the account of drone operators, who say they see 
people as silhouettes. In contrast, Anders’ theory highlights the deep effect the audio feed 
could have. Anders states: 
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unlike the visible world, the auditory world can introduce itself into us […] it obliges 
us to participate. No one who listens to something is only where he or she is. […] 
[T]he person who hears it [is] simultaneously in two places at once: despite being 
“here”, he is always also “there” (Anders [1980] 2011, 171) 
Anders adds: 
Anyone, whether he wants to or not, who is found in the circuit of a particular 
acoustic world and hears it, since it is impossible not to hear it, finds himself trapped 
in the net of sound, he belongs to that world. (Anders [1980] 2011, 171) 
Anders’ theory on sound suggests that the audio feed is the truly captivating sensory input 
drone operators experience. Further investigations in this direction are needed. 
Gregory (2011) is thus right to point out that when a 
Predator pilot claimed that ‘I knew people down there’, it was not local people he 
claimed to ‘know’ […] One joint team reported that ‘the personal and almost daily 
interaction’ between ground forces and UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] operators, 
and ‘the strong personal relationships with the pilots and sensor operators’ 
successfully ‘compressed kill-chains’ (Gregory 2011, 200) 
This illustrates how the structure of drone audio links is fundamentally distorted. This is 
because drone operators communicate directly with troops on the ground, with whom they 
are linked through a radio. However, they do not have the same level of contact with 
civilians or enemies. They consequently empathise more with fellow allied forces, who the 
operators can speak to, and less with civilians on the ground, who the operators simply see 
as blobs on a screen. Hence Lynn Hill feels total empathy with marines. At the same time, 
she can project total aggression onto enemy fighters. Anders’ theory allows us to 
understand how drone operators can be immersed in the war, while experiencing it solely 
from the side of the soldiers on their side, whom they hear through radio communications. 
Drone technology could, in some respects, be immersive, while still distancing operators 
from the killing, which is only represented visually. The affordances of drones consequently 
favour disconnected, primitive forms of aggression to carry out the killings. Indeed the 
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above quote shows how operators actively attempt to expediate the killing authorisation 
process (‘kill-chains’). 
This is further highlighted by the use of stereotypical images of enemies within official 
military drone discourses, as well as within informal ones such as Hill’s poems. Drone 
recruitment videos and drone operators describe the people they are killing as ‘terrorists’ 
(Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015 [A.11]; U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a 
[B.1]) and ‘bad guys’ (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a [B.1]; Brandon Bryant 
in Power 2013 [A.11]; Westmoreland 2014b [A.20]). This expression uses ‘bad’ as a 
predicate that explicitly negatively qualifies the silhouettes the operators view. The 
expression ‘bad guys’ belongs to the topos of villains in cartoons. It thus constructs the 
enemy as a one-dimensional evil boogieman. I argue that operators hear the human voices 
of the Allied soldiers, but they only see insurgents as dark silhouettes on the screen. Hence 
it is easy to project the image of the ‘bad guy’ onto them.   
These stereotypical views contrast with accounts of soldiers on the ground. For instance, 
Ben Anderson interviews a US marine who describes a Taliban fighter as both a ‘warrior’ and 
‘just a kid’ (Anderson 2013, 25 min 13 sec) (A.18). The term warrior is a nomination strategy 
that employs a positive evaluative attribution alluding to the code of honour of fighters. It 
implies that even enemy combatants should be treated with dignity. The implicature of this 
expression is that the marine recognises the legitimacy of this dead combatant's choice to 
fight against the US invading troops. The expression 'just a kid' participates in a nomination 
strategy that employs a verbal-tee up to position the speaker in proximity to the killed 
combatant. Both expressions highlight how marines on the ground can, to some extent, 
identify and empathise with their enemies, the Taliban. Indeed Anderson further relates 
how 'a few soldiers admitted to admiring the Taliban, some for their tactical ability but 
mostly for their bravery' (Anderson 2011, 45) (A.19). After a weapon called 'flechettes', 
which are 'nail-filled rockets that shower thousands of small steel darts across a wide area' 
(Anderson 2011, 38) (A.19) is fired at the Taliban, Anderson relates a soldier commenting 
that: 'You wouldn't want to be the poor fucker under that' (Anderson 2011, 49). Anderson 
187 
specifies that the soldier is using 'tones of pity, rather than glee' (Anderson 2011, 38) (A.19). 
The expression ‘poor fucker’ uses a predication strategy based on the adjective poor to 
express pity. It uses a nomination strategy based on the use of explicit profanity ‘fucker’ to 
express proximity and familiarity with the enemy. 
 
6.6 Do military drones gamify killing? 
Arguably, the expression ‘bad guys’ reveals a gamifying dimension within drone killings. 
Nevertheless, I argue that this is not totally determining. Pugliese (2016) has commented on 
how the interfaces of drones and the world of casino gambling and gaming interact, 
speaking of a ‘drone casino mimesis’ (Pugliese 2016, 516). He has also pointed to how 
games are used as recruitment tools and hence also potentially help form gamers into drone 
operators. Hence, for Pugliese, drones mimic games and games mimic drones by integrating 
war and the military into their narratives. Pugliese calls attention to the expressions 
‘dismounts’ (Pugliese 2016, 502), to designate a targeted individual whose sim signal 
disappears as a result of the strike, and ‘squirter’ (Pugliese 2016, 502), to designate 
individuals fleeing after a strike. Dismounts uses a technical/mechanical topos as a 
metaphoric device. It hence effects a perspectivisation (Meyer and Wodak 20016, 33) 
strategy that distances the operator from the point of view of the targeted individual. 
Squirter contains the same topos of water, which I described with the expression ‘splash’. It 
similarly produces an ironic distancing perspectivisation and mitigating discursive strategies. 
On official documents, people killed by strikes are automatically either referred to as 
‘jackpots’ or ‘EKIA’ (see Figure 2) (Enemies Killed In Action). Strikes are further referred to as 
‘touchdowns’ (Begley 2015) a term which is connected to baseball matches. This gamifying 
dimension is further exhibited by operators describing how Hellfire shots were considered 
to be ‘trophies’ (Heller 2015, 04 min 08 sec) (A.15).  These are nomination and predication 
strategies that construct the process of killing through drones as a game and enemies as 
elements within this game. 
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Figure 6.4.1: terms referring to targets. Table by U.S. Military. 2013. “Operation Haymaker”. 
From The Intercept 
 
Figure 6.4.2: representation of people killed on official documents. Image by U.S. Military. 
2013. “Operation Haymaker”. From The Intercept 
Michael Haas further describes how children who appeared on screen were jokingly 
referred to as ‘fun-sized terrorists’ (Heller 2015, 2 min 19 sec) (A.15). This expression 
projects the identity of terrorists onto children. The expression further uses 'terrorist' as a 
nomination strategy that negatively constructs the victims of drone attacks. 'Fun-sized' 
enacts a predicative strategy that constructs the process of targeting children as light-
hearted. It thus also constitutes a mitigating strategy through using vague sentences and 
ironic distance, to make light of the idea of killing children. I argue that the comparison of 
strikes with the theme of games is not a sign that operating drones is like playing a video 
189 
game. Rather this is a perspectivisation (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) discursive strategy 
which uses the metaphor of games to distance the operator from the point of view of the 
targets of strikes. 
 Employing the referential strategy that constructs children as terrorists has led some 
operators to make use of non-sequitur argumentative strategies to attempt to justify the 
possibility of killing of children. For instance, Michael Haas relates the expressions 'cutting 
the grass before it grows too long' and 'pulling the weeds before they overrun the lawn' 
(Pilkington 2015) (A.12). These were used as rationalisation to gloss over the possibility of 
killing or having killed children. These non sequitur argumentations act as mitigation 
strategies (Meyer and Wodak 2016, 33) which use vague, non-sensical expressions to make 
light of the idea that children have died as a result of strikes. The context-dependent, deictic 
device further contributes toward a perspectivisation strategy that denotes the speaker’s 
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Table 6.4: Expressions used to speak of killed or soon to be killed humans 
 Table 6.4 outlines the terms used to describe enemy combatants. The terms used by 
drone operators use irony to produce caricatural images of enemies as evil or justify their 
killing. Soldiers on the ground, in contrast, use terms that express empathy for enemy 
combatants. On the whole, paradoxically it seems that they topos of order, the surgical and 
cleanliness outlined above plus ironic distance produced through jokes and references to 
games, offers affordances for black and white, unfiltered expressions of aggression towards 
the enemy. 
Hence I argue that the very structure of the drone interface contains a gamifying 
dimension. This is reflected in how the terminology that arises in the context of drones 
employs perspectivisation and mitigation discursive strategies, which aim to re-enforce the 
distance between the operator and the targeted individuals. However, overall, the 
operation of drones is not a light-hearted affair. The gamifying language used within drone 
operation might be better explained by drone operators’ attempt to kill their taboo about 
killing, using the affordances of drone technology. The latter allows them to construct 
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enemies as ‘bad guys’ (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a [B.1]; Brandon 
Bryant in Power 2013 [A.11]; Westmoreland 2014b [A.20]) and children as ‘terrorists’ 
(Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015 [A.11]; U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a 
[B.1]). Drone operation is detrimental to drone operators hence it cannot be termed a 
game. For instance, Lynn Hill relates post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms stating 
that: ‘I’ve been out of the military for 10 years; I’ve been living with the war inside of me all 
of this time’ (Wilkie 2015, 12 min 59 sec) (A.7) she further recounts how: 
When I see something fall to the ground, I can see that black and white image again, 
and I can taste it and I can hear it. And when I see striker tanks, when I see them 
going into the city, I know what that sounds like. (Wilkie 2015, 13 min) (A.7) 
On the basis of the discussion of the captivating power of audio feed in section 6.5, I argue 
that it is the synchronicity of the combined video feed and audio feed that is likely to 
produce ‘combat stress’ (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019b) (B.2) in drone 
operators. These relate stressful information to them as it unfolds on the ground in real 
time. Hence Anders’ understanding of killing becoming an onerous job, like factory work, 




In this section, I have analysed how drone technology facilitates killings and makes them, 
in some respects, easier to conduct. To answer RQ1.3, this increases operators’ 
psychological and emotional willingness to kill humans. The structure of drone technology, 
which allows operators to sit many thousands of kilometres away from their targets, helps 
drone operators feel detached from the effects of their actions. I first showed how this is 
reflected in the commands to kill that are used with military drones, which I analysed in 
section 6.3. The latter show that it is possible to operate drones in an apparently cold 
manner with less empathy for enemies. This contrasts with ground combat where soldiers 
act in the heat of the moment. Drones thus tend to transform killing into a merely technical 
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process. However, I also showed in 6.4 how this paradoxically then allows drone operators 
to project un-modulated aggression onto their enemies. Thus irony is used to describe 
killings, even though from the surface of the video-feed they appear to be ‘clinical’. I linked 
this to Anders’ idea of killing one’s taboo about killing. In section 6.5, I highlighted how the 
referential strategies operators use to designate their targets also testify to this effect. 
Operators tend to hold black and white views portraying their side as good and the enemies 
as evil. The stereotypical image of the ‘bad guy’ and ‘the terrorist’ is projected onto the 
enemy. This contrasts with accounts from soldiers on the ground where enemy combatants 
are described as ‘just a kid’. In section 6.6 I showed how, to some extent, drone operators 
can gamify the act of killing. However, I have argued that Anders’ notion of killing 
transformed into a job is the best conceptualisation of the repetitive and senseless aspect of 
drone killings. Operating drones is an onerous job, which is detrimental to drone operators’ 
mental health. It could be seen as a modern manifestation of the mentally punishing 
dimension of factory work. 
In making this argument, I go against accounts that over-emphasise the idea that drone 
technology immerses drone operators in the battlefield. These accounts uncritically go along 
with an over-estimation of the power of 'high-tech' devices. This type of perspective exists 
within media reports and society at large and is connected to an ideology of techno-
optimism/euphoria which excitedly gets caught up in, and amplifies, the novelty effect of 
new technologies. 
Next, I turn to examining how drone operators can both identify and dissociate 
themselves from the strikes they have participated in. I argue that in order to identify with 
strikes drone operators must make a concerted effort to overcome the desensitising effect 
produced by the structure of drone technology. 
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The research question that I formulated in section 5.3.1 for the theme of alienation is 
RQ1.2: What is the impact of military drone operators’ work on their personal lives, their 
feelings of shame and guilt, and their mental health? 
In this section, I look at how Promethean shame, Anders' mature conception of 
alienation, which I outlined in 3.5.4, applies to operating drones. Anders focussed on how 
the vast number of intermediary steps leading up to the dropping of a nuclear bomb 
allowed each participant to avoid responsibility. In an original way, he also outlined how 
televised images of nuclear explosions failed to convey the danger of nuclear weapons. 
Television viewers were confronted with a phantom-like image of the explosion, both 
present and absent, within the comfort of their homes. They consequently failed to 
accurately understand their relation to it. Below I show how the same logic applies to the 
video feed and general operation of military drones. 
In section 6.3.2, I look at how drone operators use nomination, predication, 
perspectivisation and mitigation strategies, notably switching from using 'I' to 'we' to 
describe their role in drone killings. They further employ argumentative strategies using 
fallacious syllogisms to argue that everyone is responsible. In section 6.3.3, I look at how 
some drone operators adopt distancing strategies in relation to their part in drone killings. 
They employ predication and perspectivisation strategies, which use allusions, metaphors 
and evocations (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33), to convey the sense that someone else is 
responsible. I argue that the structure of drone technology and the environment they 
operate favours this. In section 6.3.4, I look at how other drone operators react to their 
Promethean shame by, on the contrary, making the effort to enlarge the scope of their 
sentiments and empathise with their victims using new approaches. This is reflected in the 
intensification strategies they adopt, which employ hyperbole and exaggeration as 
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discursive strategies to express their part in the killings. In this, it is as though they were 
following Anders’ method of philosophical exaggeration [gelegenheitsphilosophisch] (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 86). 
 
7.2 Did I or we kill? 
Drones disaggregate the action of killing into many different steps. The operation of 
drones involves a room full of people who, in real time, survey and direct operations (see 
Figure 4). They conduct these activities alongside the two personnel directly commanding 
the aircraft. For instance, a role that is important to drone missions but not directly tied to 
the operation of the aircraft is that of the image 'analyst' and 'targeteer' (U.S. Military 
2013b, 8) (B.6). These personnel determine whether the aerial footage coming from the 
drone shows enemy combatants with 'hostile intent' (United States Marine Corps 2017 ca., 
21) (B.9), which generally means assessing whether they are carrying weapons, a radio or 
material to lay IEDs. Because analysts may be working in closer proximity to where the 
drone is flying, they may receive better image resolution than operators of the drone, who 
are generally stationed in a base in Las Vegas. Indeed, in such a scenario, analysts’ video 
feed would not face as many bandwidth limitations (see section 6.4.2). The presence of the 
image analyst means that drone operators may be called to fire on individuals without 
knowing why, or without themselves having confirmed that the people are enemies.  
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Figure 7.2: List of personnel indirectly involved in operation of drones. Image by U.S. Military. 
2013. “Operation Haymaker”. From The Intercept 
Even when we zoom into the role of the operators, the two people directly commanding 
the aircraft, the action of launching rockets is split up. The direct operation of a military 
drone involves a pilot who flies the aircraft and a sensor operator, who manoeuvres the 
cameras on the aircraft and directs the laser which guides the missiles (Westmoreland 
2014b). This means that, with each strike, even the action of deploying weapons is divided 
into two. The pilot releases the weapons, but the sensor operator must guide the weapon 
onto the target by aiming the laser. Hence, there could be genuine confusion when it comes 
to drone operators taking ownership of the killing that they helped carry out. This is not just 
because drone operators are given orders to kill, which they must legally follow. As Anders’ 
theory also suggests, it is also because the structure of the technology itself disassembles 
this action, making weapon release and weapon aiming fall on two different people. As I 
quoted Anders as saying in 3.4.4, this means that there are so many steps that ‘[u]ltimately 
it will have been no one’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 230). 
Given how disaggregated the act of killing is with drones, the question arises: do drone 
operators say that they have killed using ‘I’ or do they use ‘we’ to say that they have killed. 
196 
As Michael Haas, an ex- drone operator who has spoken out against the drone programme, 
explains: 
There’s so many of those shots where you depend on the word of others. But they 
don’t have to take the shot, they don’t have to bear that burden. I’m the one who 
has to bear that burden. The pilot’s the one who has to bear that burden. My mission 
controller is the one who has to bear that burden. So it’s easy for them to say, yeah, 
shoot him, yeah… that’s him, shoot it. But they don’t have to do the action and they 
don’t have to live with the repercussions if it turns out that that is not our guy and 
we just wast[ed]… we just made orphans out of all these children. You know, they 
don’t have to live with that. I do. (Michael Haas in Hessen Schei 2015, 3 min 15 sec, 
emphasis added) (A.11) 
The nomination strategy ‘shoot it’, i.e. the silhouette on the screen, illustrates my argument 
in the previous chapter about the dehumanisation of the enemy fostered by drones. At the 
end of this citation Michael Haas naturally shifts from ‘I’ to ‘we’ to describe the act of killing. 
This constitutes at a mitigation strategy, partially effected through a nominative strategy. 
The particle ‘we’ functions as a membership categorisation device (Meyer and Wodak 2016, 
33), which denotes the fact that drone operator is not acting alone but as part of a team 
which is governed by a strict military hierarchy. The switch from ‘I’ to ‘we’ employs 
hesitations and vague expressions in order to downplay the implication of what the 
operator is saying. This is that he indeed feels personally responsible for the killing and that 
he has to ‘bear that burden’. However, he engaged in the killing partly because he was 
following orders. 
Michael Haas’ testimony is aimed at highlighting the problematic dimension of drones. 
However, other drone operators employ these discursive strategies to truly attempt to 
avoid responsibility for their actions. Lynn Hill describes how when asked whether she has 
ever killed she would reply: ‘That’s a bad question’ (Wilkie 2015, 13 min to 15 min 20 sec) 
(A.5). Lynn uses a high level of abstraction to say that:  
I didn’t go to war alone—didn’t do it for you. We vote as a collective in this country. 
So when you send me, they are sending you. […] When I go to war, I take you with 
me over there (Wilkie 2015, 13 min to 15 min 20 sec) (A.5) 
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Here, Lynn Hill is, more forcefully than Michael Haas, employing perspectivisation devices 
that use the metaphor that 'I take you over there'. These make the listener imagine 
him/herself in her shoes. The expression participates in a mitigation strategy, which also 
relies on her using vague discursive devices, namely the switch from ‘I’ to ‘we’ to ‘you’. Lynn 
Hill further employs a syllogistic argumentative strategy to imply that everyone who voted 
(‘we vote as a collective’), is responsible for her actions. But there is a fallacy in this 
argumentation. Many people who voted, may have done so in the belief that they're vote 
would limit wars. They are moreover not directly responsible for how their senators voted 
with regard to wars. Finally, they did not actively join the military, as she did. Hence this is a 
fallacious hasty generalisation argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 72).  
Lynn Hill seems to exhibit a strong case of Promethean shame in this poem. She appears 
unwilling to accept her part of responsibility for the operation of drones. She does not 
identify with the actions she helped carry out. Indeed Anders defines promethean shame as 
a 
a reflexive act […] which fails because man experiences himself […] as something he 
"is not," but in an inescapable manner is condemned to be (Anders [1956] 2003, 70, 
my tranlsation). 
Lynn Hill does not believe that her actions are compatible with her own personality and self-
hood. However, she is condemned to acknowledge the fact that she did in fact carry out 
these actions. Hence she employs discursive strategies, such as perspectivisation strategies, 
mitigation strategies and argumentation strategies, to place the listener in her shoes, 
arguing that everyone is just as guilty as she is. Hence Hill states: ‘I’m gonna make you take 
ownership and not turn away’ (Wilkie 2015, 13 min to 15 min 20 sec) (A.5) for the role she 
played in the military. She thus ultimately denies full responsibility for, and identification 
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I didn’t go to war; 
didn’t do it for 
you; I take you 
with me over 
there 




I’m the one who 
has to bear that 
burden; we just 
wasted… ; I do  
Michael Haas 
(A.14) 
Table 7.2: The perspectivisation strategies adopted by drone operators to speak of their 
involvement in drone killings 
Table 7.2 shows how drone operators use expressions that convey both distance and 
closeness with their actions. It illustrates the ambiguous conflictual nature of drone 
operations on the psyche of drone operators. The latter do not always integrate these 
actions into their sense of self and personal responsibility. 
 
7.3 Strategies of dissociation 
I highlight how it is some of the structural affordances of drones that help drone 
operators adopt strategies of dissociation from the effects of their actions. In her poem 
Name, Hill speaks of how she was able to not feel guilt for what she was doing because she 
dissociated her identity in the military from her identity at home. She explains: 
I didn’t hear my first name for years. It was replaced by my rank and last name, 
stripping me of my gender and ethnicity – where Sergeant Hill could be anybody […] I 
was a sergeant and when sergeant was given an order, she followed. (Wilkie 2015, 4 
min to 7 min 20 sec) (A.2) 
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 However, Lynn explains how this kind of separation and non-identification with herself 
became untenable. She described how she moved to a new unit that didn’t follow military 
formalities. Hence she says: 
I was addressed by the unfamiliar first name that my daddy had given me at birth: 
Tamika’. I wanted to be sergeant at work and Lynn at home. When orders to fire were 
attached to Lynn, I had nothing to hide behind when I got home. No blue mask, no 
DOD seal, no insignia on my sleeve, nor the name sergeant to separate me from the 
atrocities I had committed. It was as if I had done them. When Lynn was given an 
order, she questioned. Now Lynn is a monster. My name is scarred, the holder of my 
reputation. And I can’t change it. (Wilkie 2015, 4 min to 7 min 20 sec) (A.2) 
In this poem Lynn Hill initially employs nomination strategies to construct the social actors 
in the process of operating drones as different from herself. She says that ‘Sergeant Hill 
could be anybody’. She uses synecdochic expressions such as ‘blue mask’, ‘DOD seal’ to 
construct the person operating drones as different to herself, which in contrast she relates 
to her name 'Tamika’. She further uses mitigation strategies using uncertain, subjunctive 
discursive devices. Hence she speaks of ‘atrocities’ she has committed. And then says: ‘It 
was as if I had done them’. This switch also acts as a vague expression device (Wodak and 
Meyer 2016, 33) that acts as a mitigation strategy that distances Lynn Hill from her actions. 
By the end of the poem Lynn Hill faces up to her part in the killings, but still speaks of herself 
in the third person saying: 'Lynn is a monster'; 'My name is scarred' (emphasis added). This 
form of indirect speech is a discursive device which participates in a mitigation and 
perspectivation strategy that distances her from the effects of her actions. 
The poem gives an insight into how Hill could use the apparently clean and orderly 
environment she was operating in, which allowed her to be called sergeant and wear a 
precise military uniform, to also distance herself from the responsibility of what she was 
doing. It is the structure of the technology itself that allows for this, as drone operators can 
work in civilian towns such as Las Vegas. Indeed Hill describes ‘sitting back here, chillin’ in 
Las Vegas’ (Wilkie 2015, 24 min 37 sec) (A.7). Operators consequently receive the 
impression that the activities they do are similar to those of white collar office workers. This 
200 
fits with Anders’ notion that, with the division of labour implied by the technical operation 
of bombing, tendentially ‘the product and the making of the product are dissociated’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 271, my translation). Consequently,  
the moral status of the product (for instance of asphyxiating gas or the hydrogen 
bomb) does not in any way cast its shadow on the moral status of the person who, by 
working, takes part in this production. (Anders [1956] 2003, 271, my translation)  
Indeed Lynn Hill speaks of her involvement in the drone programme as 'a good career move' 
(Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec) (A.1). She further plays on the notion of soft 
skills by speaking of 'soft kills' (Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec) (A.1). This time 
Lynn Hill adopts an oxymoronic discursive device, opposing routine and killing, as an 
intensification strategy that expresses her internal anguish and conflicted experience. This 
arises from her being both at war and in a civilian work context. 
Yet official US Air Force recruitment videos suggest that prospective drone operators play 
on this aspect of the technology to help them deal with what they call ‘combat stress’. 
Hence these videos suggest that new recruits find ways to deal with the impact of operating 
drones on their mental health by ‘compartmentalising’ their experience of the war. One 
featured drone operator stresses that: ‘You have to be able to compartmentalise that stuff 
and find a way to deal with combat stress’ (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019b) 
(B.2). Hence recruitment videos also emphasise that 
There is no other career field where you get to have an impact on the Air Force's 
mission and then get to go home and go for a hike or have dinner with your family. 
(U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019a) (B.1) 
Hence drone operators are actively encouraged to act as if their actions within the drone 
programme do not concern their personal lives. 
In doing this, it is as though the US army were encouraging their personnel to act in a way 
which Anders criticised in the Nazis. Anders discusses the fact that 
the same man could be an extermination camp administrator and at the same time a 
good family man. These two fragments of life no longer impeded one-another, 
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because by now they no longer had any contacts. This atrocious innocence of 
atrocious acts is no longer an isolated case. We are all the successors of these 
schizophrenics (Anders [1956] 2003, 256, my translation) 
Around 2011 there were media reports of drone operators getting PTSD (eg. Pilkington 
2015) (A.12). This is what prompted the US military to acknowledge the impact on mental 
health operating drones can have. PTSD had for a long time been associated with intense 
feelings of helplessness in the face of mortal danger. However, it has been argued more 
recently that PTSD can also be associated with what is called ‘moral injury’ (Molendijk et al. 
2018). It could be the result of an experience that strongly conflicted with the values and 
desires of someone, or the inability to properly rationalise the system of values one is 
operating under. She further explains that the drone programme: 
left me with one foot in the war and one foot out of the war and sometimes I didn’t 
care, and then I felt guilty that I didn’t care (Wilkie 2015, 8 min 30 sec) 
Indeed Lynn describes herself as a ‘cop out’ (Wilkie 2017, 24 min 30 sec) for not having been 
to Iraq and as feeling ‘guilty to be ok’ (Wilkie 2017, 26 min 24 sec) and not having been 
injured like many other combatants. 
 Gregory’s account of how drone operators suffer from PTSD because of ‘exposure to 
high-resolution images of real-time killing and the after-action inventory of body parts’ 
(Gregory 2011, 198) in some respects misses the mark. I accept that the real-time, 
synchronous element of drone piloting certainly contributes to ‘combat stress’ (U.S. Air 
Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019b) (B.2). However, the role of ‘high-resolution’ 
imagery has been over-emphasised. Indeed, in section 6.4, I show that the footage 
produced by drones does not produce shock in those who watch it but can become a form 
of entertainment. In contrast, I argue that the very division between home life and war life 
that drone operation fosters, which ends up demanding of drone operators that they act as 
though they were not themselves, is a significant factor in their mental distress. This 
situation fits with Anders' assertion that modern humans suffer an ‘artificially produced 
schizophrenia’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 131). For Anders, this means that they must ‘suffer a 
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schizophrenic life, a life dominated by a fracture which can never be mended between two 
contradictory forms of actions’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 273). 
In the next section, I discuss how some military drone operators became outspoken 
critics of the drone programme and hence adopted strategies of identification with their 
actions. I discuss how this strategy resembles Anders’ account of how the development of 
new sentiments is necessary to grasp the effects of new technologies. 
 
7.4 Strategies of identification 
I have highlighted how drone operators use many of the structural affordances of drones 
to dissociate themselves from the killings. But in this section, I discuss how some drone 
operators use other aspects of drone technology to imagine the effects of their actions and 
claim responsibility for them. 
As I highlighted in section 6.5, the relation of drone operators to the violence they are 
committing is ambiguous. They are present on the battlefield but in a dis-embodied, 
physically distanced manner. They do not make eye contact, see the expression, hear the 
voice of, or smell, the people they are attacking. Drone operators do not have the host of 
information that humans receive when someone is embodied and not just pixels on a 
screen. However, they receive other forms of precise information. For instance, this 
information relates to the heat signals of the people on their screen. They can use the latter 
to understand whether the person is dead, alive or 'bleeding out' (Bryant in Goodmand and 
Gonzalez 2013, 5 min 48 sec) (A.16). Drone operators perceive more of this information 
than traditional pilots dropping a bomb from a plane. This structural affordance means that, 
if they want to, drone operators can piece together the information to attempt to imagine 
what it must have been like for the person they attacked, or what a person on the ground 
would have witnessed. They can feel empathy through making a mental effort to expand 
their sentiments and imagination. 
This is illustrated by some of the drone operators that have become whistle-blowers such 
as Brandon Bryant and Cyan Westmoreland. In contrast to Hill, Brandon Bryant has 
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attempted to take full responsibility for his actions. Instead of using ‘we’ when describing 
his part in drone operations, he uses ‘I’. After 4 years working operating drones, Bryant 
decided to take ownership for the number of people he killed, describing how: 
I did it; I killed 13 people directly with missile strikes plus one child that I know of. 
And then, when I got out, they gave me a certificate that said that I had participated 
in 1626 enemies killed in action, plus 748 high value targets. So across the four and a 
half years that I did active mission work. 2300 people were killed during my mission. 
(Engman 2018, 2:31) (A.17) 
In this extract, the statistics act as hyperbolic discursive device, as it is hard to attribute that 
many killed human to a single name or particle 'I'. This device acts as an intensification 
discursive strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that emphasises the scale of responsibility 
the drone operator thinks that he should feel. Indeed, Bryan and Westmoreland describe 
how receiving this statistic made them feel an intense sense of un-ease. They felt that they 
had reached a tipping point, whereby they were no longer able to dissociate themselves 
from the killings. 
Indeed, Bryant says that although he was shaken by his first experience of killing, he 
continued working in the US drone programme. He states how in 2007 with ‘[m]y first shot, I 
killed three men’ (Engman 2018, 19 min 27 sec) (A.17). He goes on: ‘But I did it. I continued 
doing it from then until 2011’ (Engman 2018, 24 min 20 sec) (A.17). This shows how, up to a 
point, drone operators can set aside their moral issues about the operation of drones. But, 
at some point, they are confronted with the moral conflicts of what they have done. They 
feel the need to mentally process their actions. 
On exiting the drone programme, Bryant gave an interview to GQ magazine where he 
describes his first killing in almost poetic language. Although all Bryant saw of the people he 
played a part in killing were silhouettes, in his interview he described the scene as follows: 
‘blood is squirting out of his leg, and it’s hitting the ground’ (Power 2013) (A.11). This vivid 
description of blood squirting out acts as a hyperbolic device which, again, contributes to a 
discursive strategy of intensification. What Bryant is actually describing is the infrared 
imagery he saw which tracked the blood as a white heat signal. In this way, through 
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interpreting the imagery Bryant was able to construct his own mental image. Hence his 
post-festum mental processing of his first kill re-imagines in vivid detail the person he saw 
dying. This lyricism and intensifying discourse are not necessarily a sign of Bryant glorifying 
the killing. I argue that Bryant’s description of blood ’squirting out’ is a sign of his attempt to 
feel compassion for the person he killed. Four years after his first killing, he uses his 
imagination to fill in the gaps and represent the events in a way that a human in close 
proximity would have witnessed them. 
Bryant’s hyperbole fits with Anders’ philosophical method of exaggeration 
[gelegenheitsphilosophisch] (Anders [1956] 2003, pp. 23, 86, 221). Bryant’s effort at creating 
vivid images of the killing he helped carry out fits with mature Anders’ notion that ‘it is the 
range of our modern weapons which should determine the reach of our consciousness and 
the nature of our moral obligations’ (Anders [1992] 2013, 144, my translation). Just as 
Bryant uses his imagination to compensate for the limited nature of his experience of the 
killing, as he only sees the individuals he targets as black silhouettes on a screen, Anders 
argued that: ‘we must follow the moral imperative staying on par with that which we 
produce artificially through the artificial development of our imagination’ (Anders [1992] 
2013, 142, my translation). He further speaks of seeking to overcome the discrepancy 
between humans and the effects of their actions which they accomplish through technology 
by 'voluntarily expanding the bounds of our imagination and of our feelings' (Anders [1956] 
2003, 257). Drone operators such as Bryant are mentally processing their ghostly 
experiences of the war. This mental effort allows them to feel compassion for the people 
they witness as silhouettes through the screen of drone video-feeds.  
Hence Bryant hangs onto every minute detail of the killing, re-elaborating it four years 
later. The principal exact information he received of the latter is the time frame. He 
watched events as they unfolded in real time and was able to interpret the heat signature of 
the body on his screen. He ascertained the exact moment of death as the body turned cold. 
Hence he states: 
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It took him a long time to die. I just watched him. I watched him become the same 
color as the ground he was lying on. (Power 2013) (A.11) 
I argue that this description reflects Anders’ emphasis that images conveyed by the media 
are absent in the sense of material presence but, at the same time, they are synchronous in 
the sense of temporal presence. Hence Anders speaks of the television's role in 'bringing to 
us that which is merely simultaneous in such a way that it appears as genuine presence' 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 128). This synchronicity allows Bryant to intensely interpret the images 
he sees. It highlights Bryant’s attempt to expand his imagination and the scope of his 
sentiments to match the technologically conditioned distance between him and the effects 
of his actions. As was shown in section 7.3, without this level of interpretation, the images 
he perceives do not inspire human emotions that are normally associated with killing.  
Cyan Westmoreland underwent the same kind of mental process. Cyan describes that the 
experience that traumatised him was simply seeing flashing lights indicating that the 
communications system that he had helped put in place was working. This happened after 
his superiors announced that the communications system was now helping kill people. 
Hence he states: 
I will never forget when my boss proudly announced the fact that we were now 
killing bad guys. 
Truthfully, I was not prepared for those words… I wanted to believe that we were so 
far removed from what was happening there, that it was not my fault for what 
happened on the other end. But I couldn’t help imagining airstrikes as they went 
down in my head. Transfixed, I must have stared at those radios for over an hour, just 
staring. What was connected to those green blinking lights, I knew were the electrical 
extension of whatever happened on the ground. (Westmoreland 2014b) (A.20) 
Here Westmoreland speaks directly of how his imagination triggered the feeling that his 
actions did not sit well with his conscience and that he was responsible for them. Hence he 
speaks of being ‘transfixed’, an expression which relates to the topos of inner mental 
activity. He further uses metaphors such as ‘electrical extension’ to construct his actions as 
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connected to real events. These elements of imagination thus constitute an example of the 
effort Anders called for in his philosophy of technology. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this section, I have shown how the troubles of conscience that drone operators 
experience illustrate Anders’ conception of alienation, which he termed Promethean shame. 
Individuals become alienated from their own identity and their actions as they experience 
the war as both present and absent from their lives. To answer RQ1.2, this situation puts 
strain on operators’ personal life and mental health, producing feelings of shame and guilt. 
Hence, in section 6.3.2, I have outlined how drone operators have an ambiguous relation 
to their actions, arguing that this is in part down to the very structure of drone technology. 
Not only is the release of weapons divided between pilot and sensor operator, but many 
more agents follow and direct the operation of the drone, as they receive its video feed in 
real time. In section 6.3.3, I discussed how some drone operators make special use of these 
affordances offered by the technology to distance themselves from the actions they help 
carry out through drones. Indeed, drone technology allows them to lead a double life, part 
civilian and part military. However, I ultimately connected this split experience to the 
mental distress experienced drone operators. In section 6.3.4, I show how some operators 
use other affordances offered by the structure of the technology to overcome this 
ambiguous situation and take ownership for their actions. They use the information such as 
heat signature and time frame, which this technology accurately conveys, as a basis for 
imagining how a human would perceive what is happening on the ground directly. They 
make a mental effort to find new ways of empathising with their enemies and produce 
emotions that are appropriate to the operation of drones. In this, it is as if they were 
following Anders’ suggestion to enlarge the human spirit to catch up with the 
transformations to human life brought about by technology. 
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8. Ideology: Drone Footage Functioning as Propaganda 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The research question which I formulated in section 5.3.1 on the theme of ideology was 
RQ1.3: In what respects do military drone operators believe or not believe in the ideology of 
'surgical strikes'? This was based on the fact that, in section 3.6.4, I showed how Anders' 
mature theory puts forward the idea that ideology in the sense of a grand narrative devised 
by individual thinkers is obsolete. This is because ideology is inscribed within technology 
itself and is automatically reproduced by its functioning.  
In this chapter, I show that in some respects this idea is relevant to military drones. 
Hence I look at how the notion of 'precision strikes' grows out of the structure of the 
technology itself and is adopted by the public at large. Official U.S. military and RAF sources 
publish on the internet edited extracts from the video feed of drone and Apache helicopters 
as their operators attack and kill. Amateur accounts then further disseminate these videos. 
On platforms like YouTube and Liveleak, such videos make up a form of entertainment 
known as 'war porn' or 'drone porn'. Comments on these videos highlight how the infrared, 
black and white aerial footage produced through drones sanitises killing. It doesn't convey 
the age, backstories, facial expressions, cries or the smell of the victims. Viewers, who see 
only silhouettes, often glorify the killings shown, projecting racist tropes or the image of the 
terrorist onto the people killed. This process illustrates Anders’ idea surrounding the 
automation of ideology through media. For Anders, events viewed through the prism of 
certain media acquire a distorted form. They are ‘ideologically “pre-cut”’ (Anders [1956] 
2003, 185). This is relevant to the advent of drone porn, which reproduces a phantom-like, 
and hence distorted, image of war. To viewers, such videos appear as a video game. This 
directly reinforces the ideology that portrays the U.S. military as powerful and righteous. 
Hence in section 6.4.2, I look at the ideology of the surgical strike and show what aspects 
of drone strikes this ideology obscures. In section 6.4.3, I look at the notion of war porn and 
drone porn, examining how Baudrillard introduced the concept. In section 6.4.4, I look at 
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videos of drone and apache strikes and show how these elements of drone technology 
automatically produce ideology. The videos themselves are an ideological view of the 
enemy, which portrays him/her as cartoonish and minimises his/her death. 
 
8.2 Surgical strikes and precision killing 
The notion that bombs can be precise and surgical took on its present form in the Gulf 
War, with the advent of laser guided missile (Thussu 2003, 124). Military drones epitomise 
this type of weaponry. The main manufacturer of military drones for the US Air Force 
euphemistically describes bombs as ‘kinetic options’ and ‘precision weapons’ (General 
Atomic Aeronautical Systems 2017, 4) (B.11). The notion of precision when applied to 
military drones is connected to their affordance of accurately guiding a missile using a laser. 
However, just because a bomb is precise, and will explode where the laser is pointed, 
doesn’t mean that there are no other factors that could make this form of killing un-precise 
overall. Data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism shows that drone strikes have 
killed up to 16,901 people in four countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia) 
since records began in 2005 (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2020). This includes up 
to 2,200 civilians, among which 454 children. Given the opacity of drone operations, actual 
figures may be higher. If drones were really a ‘surgically’ precise weapons, there wouldn’t 
be as many civilian deaths. 
One reason behind the number of civilian deaths is signature strikes. US military drones 
target individuals on the basis of metadata and telephone surveillance. Leaked documents 
reveal that individuals are associated with the signal coming from their sim card (see Figure 
5). Speaking at a debate about privacy General Michael Hayden, a former NSA and CIA 
director, argued that 'metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you 
have enough metadata, you don’t really need content' (Cole et al. 2014, 17 min 59 sec). 
Alluding to the US drone programme and signature strikes, he added that: 'We kill people 
based on metadata' (Cole et al. 2014, 17 min 59 sec). If the data produced by this sim 
follows pre-established patterns of behaviour that are associated with insurgency, the 
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holder of the sim is deemed a target. In fact, the signal from the sim card is often used to 
aim the missile, as an alternative to using a laser to guide it onto the target (Begley 2015). 
The drone programme targets individuals based on patterns of behaviour such as calling 
known Taliban leaders and travelling to regions controlled by the Taliban. However, this 
could include patterns of behaviour exhibited by mediators or journalists. 
Drone operators have an inkling that this dynamic can be counter-productive, stating 
Obviously you're taking out a lot of targets and It looks good. But oftentimes, the bad 
side of a drone is the only thing that a person on the ground would see. 
(Westmoreland in Heller 2015, 50 sec) (A.15) 
Indeed the efficacy of drone missions has also been questioned by internal documents. 
Internal reports within the drone programme show how: ‘Kill operations significantly reduce 
the intelligence available from detainees and captured material’ (ISR Task Force 2013b, 8) 
(B.8). This makes future operations ‘take months to years instead of days to weeks’ (ISR Task 
Force 2013b, 8) (B.8). Figure 3 on a different report further shows how effects of such 
campaigns are considered ‘temporary’ (U.S. Military 2013b, 1) (B.6). 
And yet cultural production surrounding military drones in the West mostly portrays 
them as formidable, ultra-precise weapons. Eye in the Sky (Hood 2015), a film taking a 
critical look at drone technology in warfare and focussing heavily on the issue of whether 
probabilistic risk assessments can replace moral considerations ends up vastly over-
estimating the precision of drone intelligence gathering capabilities. The film portrays their 
video feeds as ultra-precise. This has prompted a backlash by drone operators, who have 
stated that the video feed of drones is not that clear. Westmoreland, the whistle-blower 
who was deployed as an engineer stationed in Afghanistan and tasked with setting up the 
telecommunication network through which drones operate, states about the film that 
the imagery is not as good as portrayed, not even remotely, and this has more to do 
with bandwidth limitations than anything. We do believe that people would be 
outraged if people actually saw what has been used up till now […] (Westmoreland 
2016) (A.24) 
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In her account for the Guardian Heather Linebaugh has argued that 
What the public needs to understand is that the video provided by a drone is not 
usually clear enough to detect someone carrying a weapon, even on a crystal-clear 
day with limited cloud and perfect light. This makes it incredibly difficult for the best 
analysts to identify if someone has weapons for sure. One example comes to mind: 
"The feed is so pixelated, what if it's a shovel, and not a weapon?" I felt this 
confusion constantly (Linebaugh 2013) (A.22) 
This sentiment is also echoed by Lynn Hill, despite her not being a whistle-blower. A line in 
her poem describes this type of stressful confusion: 
Is that the guy? Is that the guy?! […] Unclear details and shaky intel but still… I pull 
the trigger. (Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec) (A.1) 
This triangulation (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 30) reveals that military drones are precise in 
aiming a bomb at certain location on the earth, but they are not necessarily precise in 
determining who to aim at. Mistakes have been made with drone strikes killing 40 tribal 
elders in 2011 (BBC 2011b), right up to them killing 30 civilians in an attack in 2019 (Sediqi 
2019). In both cases, these civilians were simply mistaken for combatants. 
There is a perpetuation of the techno-fetishist myth that drones provide operators with 
ultra-precise imagery within the academic literature on drones. Both Gregory (2011) and 
Maurer (2017) describe in detail the high-resolution cameras on drones, implying that this 
means that the operator views crystal-clear images of the battlefield. Gregory speaks of 
‘high-resolution images via a multi-gigapixel sensor with a refresh rate of 15 frames per 
second’ (Gregory 2011, 193). Maurer describes the drone’s 
surveillance technology Argus-IS (again a telling name), which contains over one 
hundred cellphone-like cameras, they can quilt together a mega-stream of images 
into a large-scale mosaic and feed them into networks of ground stations. (Maurer 
2017, 144) 
This citation uses nomination, predication and intensification discursive strategies. The 
quotation of the acronym-bearing name ‘Argus-IS’ constructs the object as formidable. The 
discursive device of collocation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 83), employed through the use of 
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‘multi-gigapixel’, ‘surveillance technology’, ‘mega-stream’, ‘large-scale’ and ‘networks of 
ground stations’ qualifies the technology as awesome, contributing to an intensifying 
discursive strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). The hyperbolic image of quilting together 
a ‘mega-stream of images’ is a discursive device used as a strategy of intensification, to drive 
home the point that this technology is formidable.  
Hence both writers over-estimate the effects of technological progress and fallaciously 
equate the power of the cameras with the idea that operators receive ‘immersive’ (Maurer 
2017, 146; Gregory 2011, 198) high-resolution images on their screen. But Westmoreland 
explains why, owing to bandwidth limitations, this is not necessarily the case. There is a risk 
that a too easy acceptance of the idea of high-tech progress ends up falsifying analyses of 
military drones. This is a form of ideology which is in part tied to the structural affordances 
of the technology, which indeed is precise in terms of aiming bombs. It is further in part re-




























Table 8.2: Euphemistic and techno-euphoric expressions used to designate weapons 
Table 8.2 outlines techno-euphoric terms that celebrate the technological advance of 
weaponry. 
Anders identified the ideology which is connected to this type of terminology, which is 
employed in the field of high-tech. According to Anders, it amounts to a ‘Myth of Progress’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 54, italics in original, my translation) that is however not recognised as 
such. This consists in seeing ‘progress in every new step, whether it is an additional step in 
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the development of the decompression chamber or in systems of refrigeration’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 54). Anders adds that the people who believe in this myth ‘are calm, because 
we are going forward, and they are proud of the novelty’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 54). The idea 
that the supposed ‘high-resolution’ of drone imagery represents a hopeful step in the right 
direction, that may allow for increased operator compassion, arguably represents this form 
of ideology. This idea is latent in many media theory analyses of military drones that 
emphasise the visually immersive, rather than distancing, effect military drones have on the 
senses of the operators. If he were alive today, mature Anders would say that this idea is 
based on  
the superstition […] that identifies technological progress with social progress, and 
therefore political progress. (Anders [1980] 2011, 16) 
In the next two sections, I show that the imagery produced by drones puts the viewer in the 
position of a distanced voyeur of the scenes of violence. 
 
8.3 War porn and drone porn 
Ever since the Gulf War, aerial footage of war taken from bomber planes showing 
precision strikes have been broadcast on television. For instance, Thussu argues that during 
the Gulf War, 
the hi-tech, virtual presentation of war, cockpit videos of 'precision bombings' of Iraqi 
targets were supplied to television networks by the Pentagon, thus presenting a 
major conflict, responsible for huge destruction of life and property "as a painless 
Nintendo exercise, and the image of Americans as virtuous, clean warriors" (Said 
cited in Thussu 2003, 124) 
Later, Baudrillard wrote an article on what he called 'pornographie de guerre' [war porn] 
(Baudrillard 2004) which referred both to these early images and the sexualised images of 
torcher of Iraqi war prisoners in Abu Grhaib, which were taken on amateur cameras. 
Today, the expression 'war porn' is not solely associated with Baudrillard but has become 
a genre of video available on the internet from websites such as Liveleak.com and YouTube. 
Such videos gain millions of views. A big proportion of these videos are footage taken from 
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the video feed on drones and Apache helicopters as they attack. This video feed is used to 
aim weapons and hence it shows the killing of humans in as much detail as the gunner 
would see. Within 'war porn' there is entire category known as 'drone porn'. Sthal (2013) 
has highlighted how some of the most viewed videos of 'drone porn' have been released by 
official military institutions themselves. For instance, the video 'UAV Kills 6 Heavily Armed 
Criminals' (dividshub 2008) (B.17) was released in 2008. It has gained 2.7 million views. The 
YouTube account which released this and other similar videos is called 'dvidshub'. It is 
connected to the Defence Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS), a PR institution 
which acts as an interface between the U.S. military and the media. Other videos have been 
released by the UK’s RAF and Ministry of Defence accounts on YouTube and specify the 
copyright to such videos as belonging to The Crown (Ministry of Defence 2015a (B.18); 
Ministry of Defence 2015b (B.19)). 
I argue that the advent of 'drone porn', which is composed of footage that arises as a by-
product of the operation of drones, the footage which is used to operate drones and aim 
their weapons, illustrates Anders' notion that ideology has, in part, been automated and is 
now directly tied with the operation of machines. This is because the very format of the 
video feed used to aim weapons favours reductive, desensitised and black and white 
understandings of war. 
Most comments on such videos do not express horror or disgust, which are common 
human emotions in the face of such violence, regardless of who is being killed. Indeed the 
videos show humans being blown up and dismembered. Instead, these comments are light-
hearted. On one video, commentators react against the warning given in the title of the 
video that the footage is distressing. The title contains the words '(GRAPHIC WARNING)' 
(Alex Broadbent 2017). However, viewers speak about the fact that the footage shown is 
not distressing despite the extreme violence it contains, stating: 'I didn't find this video to be 
distressing at all' (daniel hannon ca. 2019) (B.16.1). Another states: 'I am not distressed at all 
except I should have added more butter to my popcorn' (lands8115 ca. 2019) (B.12.2). 
Another commentator adds about another video: ‘Not graphic. Quite satisfying actually’ 
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(Lori Girl  ca. 2017) (B.14.2). These comments use mitigating discursive strategies employing 
vague rationalisation of adding butter to popcorn and evocations implying that one is in a 
homely environment (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). This evidences how these videos have a 
sterilising effect on violence which makes the latter more easily digestible, allowing it to go 
unquestioned.  
This illustrates Anders’ idea that the world conveyed through the television loses its 
quality as an external world that we must seize hold of and control. For Anders, this means 
that ‘the pieces that constitute this kind of world have no other aim than that of being 
incorporated, devoured and assimilated’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 185). Consequently, the 
outside world ‘loses “its character as an object” (Anders [1956] 2003, 185). He states,  
we do not grasp the pill that slides down us without resistance; conversely we do 
grasp the piece of meat that we first need to chew. But the world “that penetrates” 
too easily resembles the pill. (Anders [1956] 2003, 186, my translation) 
For Anders, ‘it is this very absence of resistance of the transmitted world that stops us from 
seizing hold of it and interpreting it’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 186). Similarly, images of killing 
which are made easy to watch through their grainy, mono-chromatic, aerial-angled 
character mean that viewers do not pause to think and produce human emotion of 
compassion and empathy regarding the content of what is shown. Viewers watch these 
images as voyeurs. This comes close to mirroring Anders' statement that: 'the 
transformation of people of all ages into […] spies or voyeurs is repugnant' (Anders [1956] 
2003, 139, emphasis in original). 
Contemporary theorists have commented on drone footage and 'drone porn', stating 
that they produce a kind of ‘[h]umane warfare [which] offers the pleasure of a spectacle 
with the added thrill that it is real for someone but not the spectator' (Coker 2001, 150). 
Even the details viewers supposedly notice, do not shock them and are a source of glee and 
techno-fetishism. Hence one commentator writes: ‘I love seeing the [body] parts fly...just 
shows how destructive the weaponry is’ (T FP 2020). The sentence uses a mitigating 
discursive strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). It employs hyperbole (as it is not clear the 
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viewer is interpreting the imagery correctly and that what s/he is seeing are body parts) and 
verbs of feeling, stating that s/he ‘loves’ seeing this. This expresses a positive appreciation 
of the video and trivialises the violence it shows. I argue that this type of comment is made 
possible by the black and white character of the imagery and the angle at which it is shot. 
Coloured footage of the same scene from close up would probably not inspire this type of 
comment. Singer has concluded that: 'The public’s link to its wars transforms from 
connection into merely a kind of voyeurism' (Singer 2009, 841 of 1524 on ebook). Indeed as 
I will show in the next section many people comment on the fact that the images resemble 
those of a video game. 
 
8.4 Infrared footage of strikes on YouTube and the automation of propaganda 
Below, I conduct a discourse analysis of YouTube comments on videos that show killings 
through infrared imagery. The video feed is the same as the one used to aim weapons 
carried by Apache helicopters. 
There are three tropes that emerge from YouTube comments on such videos. The first is 
that commentators compare the images to a video game. They jokingly say that they didn’t 
realise this was a real video. For instance, one commentator playfully describes the death of 
one of the fighters as 'xxX-TLIBAN_ALLAHUAKBAR-Xxx left the game' (DoOnalD TrUmmP, ca. 
2019) (B.13.4). This comment uses a racist nomination strategy that uses the expression 
‘Allahu Akbar’ as a membership categorisation device. It promotes the direct association of 
the Taliban with the Muslim faith. It also enacts a predication strategy based on the 
implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that the Muslim faith is the essential descriptor of 
the targeted individuals. The commentator’s username’s reference to Donald Trump, 
constitutes an inter-textual (Fairclough 1992, 105) reference to other Islamophobic 
discourses existing in the US. The joking allusion to a video game constitutes a metaphoric 
and euphemistic device. It enacts a predication strategy aimed at qualifying the actions as 
light-hearted and benign. These euphemisms also constitute a mitigation strategy that 
modifies the deontic status of the scene (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). 
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Referring to the similarity of the footage with a popular video game, another's comment 
reads: 'When you notice this is not call of duty modern warfare' (Exotic Proxi ca. 2019) 
(B.13.3). Yet another ironically asks: 'Will this run on a 4gb ram pc??' (Max ibrahim ca. 2018) 
(B.15.5). Here the commentator is pretending that he has mistaken the footage for a video 
game which he wishes to play on his PC. Another jokes: ‘I would never buy this game 
because the hit marker is so glitchy’ (ltsj3v ca. 2017) (B.14.3). These comments primarily use 
a predication strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that uses metaphors and allusions to 
qualify the footage as resembling a video game. These comments are not so much aimed at 
mitigating the content of the footage. They rather use exaggeration to make the point that 
the footage closely resembles a video game. 
Another trope is that comments on the scenes of extreme violence ironically ask whether 
the animals visible in the video, which is shot in rural Afghanistan, are OK.  Hence one 
commentator states: 'The dogs survived! hooray!' (Charles P. ca. 2019) (B.15.3) Another 
says, 'I'm glad the animals made it to safety !' (IV IV ca. 2018) (B.15.4) Some do this while 
praising the gunner for his technical skills: 'I like the way the operator try not to kill animals' 
[3.4K likes] (Jean-Marie Asclépios #DBL_G1# #FDPH ca. 2018) (B.13.5). These comments 
dehumanise the people who have been killed by using the topos (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 
74-75) of human concern for animals. This participates in a predication strategy that uses 
allusion as a discursive device to convey the idea that the humans being killed are below the 
status of dogs. Hence the sentence also uses indirect speech and vague expressions as 
devices to carry out a mitigation discursive strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). By 
indirectly expressing the idea that the humans killed are below the status of dogs, these 
comments also make light of the killing. 
The infrared videos depict extreme violence whereby the bodies of people killed in the 
video are completely disfigured and disintegrated. The third trend among the 
commentators is to say that these human remains serve a good function as fertiliser for the 
fields. Hence one commentator states: 'Nothing better than Taliban compost to fertilize the 
local wildlife.' [658 likes] (diddle the poodle ca. 2020) (B.13.1). Another comments, 'Free 
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firtelized fields [sic]’ (eijmert ca. 2020) (B.13.2). These discourses employ the topos of crop 
production to positively qualify what is being shown as good and productive. Hence the 
discourse employs a predication strategy which further uses allusions, evocations and 
metonyms (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that qualify human remains as fertiliser. This is 
used to convey the idea that what is being shown is productive in the same way that 









Gaming terms Left the game; This game; 
the hit marker…glitchy; call 
of duty modern warfare; 













Non-sequitur The dogs survived hurray; 
animals made it to safety; 
try not to kill animals; 
Taliban compost; free 
fertilized fields 
Charles P. 





the poodle B.13.1; 
eijmert (B.13.1) 
Table 8.4: Racist and gaming expressions used to designate footage of drone and apache 
helicopter attacks, plus ironic bad logic to justify killings 
Table 8.4 outlines the racist expressions employed by YouTube commentators. It also 
shows how they use irony to minimise the death of the people on the footage. 
The footage of these attacks which ends up on YouTube makes a spectacle out of war. 
Because of its very structure as grainy footage that can be watched in domestic situations 
on mobile phones and laptops, it sanitises war transforming it into a kind of game or 
spectator sport which helps viewers vent out their inner frustrations. Hence some 
commentators state: ‘I watch this video whenever I'm mad’ (hctiB alliK ca. 2017) (B.13.1). 
Others similarly proclaim: ‘I watch this everytime [sic] there is a new terror attack’ 
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(TheSpanishInquisition ca. 2016) (B.14.4). The use of such footage as a form of 
entertainment, provoking light-hearted discussions of killing illustrates Anders’ theory that: 
‘the TV transforms all events into playthings’ and this produces a ‘serious lack of 
seriousness’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 143, my translation, emphasis in original). Commentators 
employ the visual characteristics of the footage (which is grainy, black and white, and taken 
from an aerial angle) to promote the idea that what is shown is benign and not much 
different from a video game. This illustrates Anders’ point that visual media can mean that   
events […] reach us ideologically "pre-cut", pre-interpreted and arranged (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 185 my translation) 
This footage is not neutral but shows killing in a way that encourages simplifying and 
falsifying projections of stereotypes and identities on the individuals who are killed. 
The tropes that are expressed in the comments form inter-texual (Fairclough 2013, 164) 
chains with other discourses, which are sites of traditional ideology production. Hence, in 
some respects, they highlight how the 'logic of automated society is interlocking and self-
reinforcing' (Andrejevic 2020, 21). However, as I have argued, such videos (because of their 
black and white—sometimes colour-inverted—character, their grainy-ness and the angle at 
which they are shot) are already ideological in so far as they resemble a 'shoot'em all' video 
game. Hence they also partially automate the production of ideology. Indeed, they illustrate 
Anders’ provocative argument that  
the contemporary interest groups, which seek to keep us in a state of “false 
consciousness”, can spare themselves the effort of supplying us with false theories or 
with artificially produced world views. And they can refrain from having to do so 
because the artificially produced world itself, especially the world of machines that 
surrounds us, presents itself as the world, that is, it so dazzles us and so effectively 
influences our consciousness that the production of special world views for the 
shaping of opinions is rendered superfluous. (Anders [1980] 2011, 131) 
The images show real things but the way in which they are shot and position in which the 
viewer discovers them, the position of someone consuming media on YouTube, for instance, 
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produces a highly distorted image of the war. Hence they are conducive to the kind of 
reductive, black and white world views expressed in the comments. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
In section 8.2 I showed how, to some extent, the notion of precision strikes grows out of 
drone technology itself. The latter is indeed effective at aiming missiles where a laser is 
pointed. However, I also argued that this understanding of precision is reductive given that 
these lasers can target the wrong people. In section 8.3, I followed on by presenting the 
phenomenon of drone porn, arguing that the video feed used to aim weapons on drones 
can become a form of propaganda which makes a spectacle out of war. Anders’ notion of 
the present-absent character of images and how televised images can fail to convey the 
significance of troubling events, such as nuclear explosions, is still relevant to this dynamic. 
Drone video feeds can be directly uploaded onto the internet and function as a form of 
entertainment, which transforms war into a spectacle. Battle scenes are apprehended one-
dimensionally, through vision alone and through only perceiving humans from above as 
black and white figures or silhouettes. I have shown how these images favour a distorted 
understanding of the reality of the war, which appears to viewers as a video game. This 
transforms them into voyeurs of war. In section 8.4, I further showed how viewers 
reproduce reductive understandings of their perceived enemies, venting their frustrations 
on the latter. Thus drone technology arguably partially automates the production of 
ideology. However, to answer RQ1.1, it is not so much drone operators that come to believe 
ideologies surrounding precision strikes and black and white understandings of the war. 
Rather, it is the ordinary people viewing this footage. 
In 1979, Anders wrote a preface to the fifth edition of Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen 
(Anders [1956] 1961). While reasserting the validity of his theses on how the mass media 
conditions human life, he also acknowledged that televised images could, in some 
circumstances, serve to disseminate ‘a realty, which without them, would remain unknown’ 
(Anders [1979] 2002, 13, my translation). The case of drone footage finding its way onto 
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YouTube and becoming a mere spectacle whereby viewers cheer on the killings of people 
who they do not know, but on whom they project the image of the terrorist, denies this 
uncharacteristically hopeful avenue that Anders acknowledged in 1979.   This footage does 
not make viewers pause to think about whether the extreme levels of violence effected by 
drone strikes may not be counter-productive in the long term and favour increasing 
radicalisation. On the contrary, it gives viewers the impression that Western militaries are 
all-powerful and that those killed are guilty, as they are simply viewed as enemies. Indeed 
drone strikes are seen as both technologically and ethically advanced, as they appear to be 
‘surgical’ (Raymond Cassiday 2020) (B.13.6). 
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9. Domination: Dating App Design, Individualistic Sex and Surveillance 
 
9.1 Introduction 
My research question for the domination section in the dating app case study was RQ2.1: 
How does the design and structure of dating apps influence user behaviour and how does 
the knowledge or the lack of knowledge about the circumstance that all communication and 
activity on dating apps is recorded and can be shared with companies and the police impact 
the everyday behaviour of users? 
The themes of user behaviour and surveillance tie into the debate over whether dating 
apps offer a predominantly emancipatory or regressive set of affordances. In academic 
research, dating apps have been presented both as instruments of sexual liberation and 
oppression. On the one hand, dating apps are shown to allow people, and especially 
women, greater sexual freedom. Hence Bergström argues that 
the discretion of online encounters is keenly felt by women, for whom it translates 
into an opening up of a horizon of possibilities. Sheltered from surrounding gazes 
they can now access a sexuality for itself more easily. (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §69, my 
translation) 
Thompson speaks of a space where women ‘have an almost unprecedented ability to search 
for and selectively respond to potential dates’ (Thompson 2018, 84). Chan equally discusses 
how dating app use helps ‘women’s reworking of the traditional sexual script that stresses 
sexual exclusivity’ (Chan 2018, 309). On the other hand, other research has highlighted the 
new forms of sexual harassment connected to dating app use. Shaw (2016) highlights 
female resistance to lewd comments online. Gillet (2018) analyses intimate intrusions online 
in the form of unwanted sexual images women often receive. Lauckner et al. (2019) analyse 
the practice of catfishing (deceiving users by creating false identities online). Finally, Illouz 
(2012) argues that with internet dating, 
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love circulates in a marketplace of unequal competing actors […] some people 
command greater capacity to define the terms in which they are loved than others. 
(Illouz 2012, 6) 
Her conception comes closest to my own argument, which highlights how the structure of 
dating apps incorporates aspects of dominant cultures relating to sex and romance, such as 
lad culture (see Lewis, Marine and Kenney 2018, Nichols 2018). They thus tend to organise 
sexuality and romance following competitive lines, offering affordances for individualistic 
expressions of sexuality and love. 
I take Bergström’s work as the best illustration of techno-euphoric conceptions that 
equate ‘technological progress with social progress’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 16). This is 
because she explicitly opposes Illouz’s conception. She presents an overall optimistic picture 
that links the advent of dating apps with progress in the domain of sexual liberation. 
Nevertheless, Bergström also discusses how 
On the internet as elsewhere, interactions take place within clearly defined social 
frames: they have as their principle feminine reserve and take place under the 
shadow of masculine violence (Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §33, my translation) 
This aspect of Bergström’s analysis enters into a tension with her claim that dating apps 
allow for a freer ‘emancipatory’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §7, my translation) sexuality for 
women. Indeed she speaks of the ‘ritualistic character’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §65, my 
translation) of feminine reserve on dating apps stating that female ‘prudence is a social 
expectation’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §62, my translation). It functions as a ‘permanent 
reminder that violence is always on the horizon of the possible’ (Bergström 2019, 5, §65, my 
translation). Hence she states that ‘violence perpetrated against women is present in the 
seduction game’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §65, my translation). 
In the following chapter, I argue that sexual violence exists within and outside dating app 
use. However, I employ Anders’ theory and the concept of a continuum of sexual violence 
(Kelly 1987), which understands smaller and more apparently insignificant daily aggressions 
as playing into and legitimating more serious forms of sexual violence, to argue that the 
structure of dating apps offers affordances, and even encourages, practices that feed into 
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objectifying and individualistic expressions of sexual desire. This can be linked to the 
'missing discourse of consent' (Thompson 2018, 80) analysed within dating app messages by 
feminist authors. It can further lead to serious instances of sexual harassment, as discussed 
by two of my female respondents. Therefore I understand regressive ‘social expectation[s]’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §62, my translation) to be embedded within the design of dating 
apps. They are not exclusively linked to external ‘social frames’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §33, 
my translation), as suggested by Bergström. 
Hence, in section 9.2, I discuss the practice of using online profiles as a form of deception 
and how dating apps present affordances for harassment and intimidation. In section 9.3, I 
conduct an Anders-inspired structural analysis of dating app functioning. I discuss how the 
set of affordances offered by dating apps means that users often form individual 
conceptions of their own desire and what they want to achieve through dating app use. 
Hence I look at the terms relating to commerce and finance (such as 'investment', 'return' 
and 'transactional') that users employ to describe their use of dating apps. I show how 
Anders was aware that modern ICTs could make individuals' feel less responsible for how 
they treated people. In section 9.4, I discuss sexually direct messages and photos, which 
feminist scholars have defined as 'intimate intrusions' (Gillett 2018, 212) and related to a 
'missing discourse of consent' (Thompson 2018, 80). I discuss how Anders was aware of the 
issue of how images and recordings could be used for purposes of sexual gratification and 
how these involved issues of consent. In section 9.5, I discuss how within this context, 
surveillance on dating apps is ambivalent. On the one hand, many users see it as necessary 
in order to combat sex crimes. On the other hand, it is an attack on privacy through which 
individuals could be subjected to blackmail and persecution. This illustrates Anders’ theory 
on ICTs and privacy. 
 
9.2 Catfishing 
Anders was interested by the way visual and audio media complicates notions of 
presence and reality. He called the images viewers perceived through the television ‘ghosts’ 
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(Anders [1956] 2003, 126, my translation), because the people they represented acquired a 
phantom-like reality within the homes of viewers. Similarly, referring to WhatsApp, another 
messaging service, one user spoke of how ‘the person feels less like a person on the [dating] 
app than they do on WhatsApp because WhatsApp is part of my real life’ (H, female, age: 
27). When prompted to expand on the expression ‘less of a person’ the user explains: ‘Em, 
it’s just a photo that’s sending me text’ (H, female, age: 27). The expression ‘real life’ further 
refers to the topos of online interactions being fake or virtual. The way ICTs can produce 
deceptive forms of reality was not lost on Anders. He highlighted how ‘in the processing of 
magnetic audio recording tapes there is no limit to cutting and editing and therefore, to 
falsification’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 162). Indeed the user’s expression ‘just a photo… sending 
me text’ contains the implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that the dating app profile 
may be misrepresentative of the person who is actually using it. 
In the below section, I show how dating app users can upload digitally modified, old or 
generally unrepresentative images and supply false information about height, weight, etc., 
to create false profiles. This process is known as catfishing. Generally, catfishing involves the 
creation of ideal profiles that have a too-good-to-be-true quality. These are aimed at 
enticing and misleading other users. In the most extreme cases, catfishers create a 
completely false online persona, the catfish, which other users interact with as though it 
were a real person. Thus some catfishers can be understood as con artists of the digital era, 
while others make more modest attempts to cheat the system to obtain more in-person 
meetings. Anders focussed on how falsification could make individuals vulnerable to 
baseless prosecutions and state violence. In contrast, I look at how falsification on dating 
apps is a moderate form of breach of consent aimed at deceiving and emotionally 
manipulating users. I discuss two of my respondent’s accounts of such deceptions to show 
how this can nevertheless pave the way for serious forms of harassment. 
In my sample of participants, more women than men I spoke to had experienced 
instances of deception on dating apps. Instances of deception discussed by men amounted 
to examples of online scams whereby fake profiles would direct users onto websites that 
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‘would then prompt you for banking details and things like that’ (K, male, age: 30). 
Alternatively, they related to the modest use of ‘profile enhancing software’ (L, male, age: 
28), essentially the Photoshopping of images used on profiles to render them more 
attractive. Women, on the other hand, spoke of deception being produced through lying 
about height. One user said: ‘if you say that you're 6’ and you're clearly not, like 5'5[,] it's 
just not cool that you lie about stuff like that’ (N, female, age: 30). Indeed, another user 
spoke of being deceived in this way and described her reaction as one of shock and intense 
discomfort. She stated:  
when I looked at him honestly I was just shocked and I just couldn’t continue the 
conversation or anything. I was just like: No I can’t talk to you. And, you know, if we 
chat like a friend of course it’s OK. But then he starts keeping on touching me and I 
was just like no no no. […] So afterwards I went back and I looked at his profile to see 
what he said. And he definitely cheated about his height in the profile. (O, female, 
age: 30) 
In this testimony, the participant adopts a perspectivisation and intensification discursive 
strategy to convey the distress she experienced in this situation. She uses free direct speech 
(‘No, I can’t talk to you’) to place the listener in her shoes to better convey the emotions she 
felt. She further uses utterances that convey feeling, such as ‘no no no’. The repetition of 
‘no’ participates in an animating prosody discursive device that intensifies the illocutionary 
force (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) of the expression of distress the user felt. 
This testimony highlights how deception on dating apps affects issues of consent. 
Thorough the continuum theory of sexual violence (Kelly 1987, 2012), these instances of 
deception can be considered a small form of breach of consent that could pave the way for 
more severe forms of the latter. Indeed another female user spoke of an instance of 
deception, or catfishing, saying ‘it was a really negative experience […] I felt so unsafe to the 
point where I thought he was gonna follow me home and like attack me or something’ (N, 
female, age: 30). 
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She explains: ‘So it was an example of catfishing, so I think the photos were just like 
really, really old. And also he just kind of lied on his profile’ about his height (N, female, age: 
30). She further explained: 
you go on this date, and you kind of feel like there is no chemistry. Well, I didn't feel 
like there was anything but I felt: I'm already here, we're already one drink in, so 
that's fine. I can always excuse myself after. So we started… (N, female, age: 30) 
The user employs deictics (‘you go on this date’) as a perspectivation strategy to place the 
listener in her shoes (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). She further employs free direct speech 
to convey nonchalant state of mind ('Already here… so that's fine'). However, she explains 
that, later, after she found an excuse to leave after one drink, her date insisted on walking 
her to the station. The user then explains: 
And then he said: Why don't you text me when you're done and then I can come 
over and then we can, like, have some fun. And then I said: I'm not interested, thank 
you. I'm just not interested. And then he just turned into like… he became quite 
aggressive. He started saying… This is in public in a tube station and I still felt unsafe. 
Oh you know, what the fuck is wrong with girls like you, like why would you appear to 
be enjoying yourself and then, you know, flirt with me and then you turn around and 
say that you're not interested. That's fucking bullshit. And so then I said: I'm sorry, 
I'm just not interested, so I'm gonna go. Please leave. And I was quite scared because 
I thought like: Is he gonna follow me? to the, like, tube I'm going on, and then follow 
me… like I don't know. As a woman you get quite scared. (N, female, age: 30) 
In this testimony the user similarly uses perspectivisation and intensification discursive 
strategies using free direct speech (‘Oh you know…girls like you’) and expressive speech acts 
(‘Is he gonna follow me?’) to convey to the listener the distress and surprise that she felt in 
this situation. For instance, she uses indirect speech acts in the form of questions instead of 
assertions to intensify the feeling of distress and disbelief she is describing. Hence she 
states: ‘Is he gonna follow me? to the, like, tube I'm going on, and then follow me?… like I 
don't know’ (N, female, age: 30). 
Her account demonstrates how deception on dating apps, in this case using old 
photographs that make the user appear much younger, can be followed by more serious 
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forms of harassment, intimidation and aggression. Her aggressor uses expletives and 
indirect speech acts such as questions instead of assertion (‘what is wrong…you’) as an 
intensification discursive strategy to produce intimidation (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). He 
uses nomination discursive strategy to negatively discursively construct the user. Hence he 
uses the sexist anthroponym ‘girls like you’. He further uses fallacious argumentative 
strategies such as argumentum ad hominen (the personal attack through the use of the 
sexist anthroponym) and non sequitur composition fallacy. Indeed the aggressor blames the 
user for his perception of her ‘appear[ing] to enjoy’ herself and ‘flirt[ing] with’ him, implying 
that this means that she owes him sex. 
Her aggressor employs the affordances of the dating app, which mean that she has 
invested time and energy to come to the meeting and hence is inclined to go along with the 
date because ‘we’re already here’ (N, female, age: 30), to then pressurise her. He further 
uses the fact that she is alone and has her contact details to put further pressure on her 
even after the meeting has ended. Indeed the user explains that he continued to bully her 
by ‘follow[ing] up with a very long text continuing to say all this stuff. And I had to block  
him, like block his number and everything’ (N, female, age: 30).  
In this chapter, my argument is not that the virtuality of dating app communications 
creates more affordances for instances of harassment and sexual violence to occur than 
other environments. Kavanaugh has shown how there are equally significant affordances for 
sexual violence to happen in a music club environment (Kavanaugh 2013), for instance. 
However, I do highlight the negative dimension of what Bergström has called the ‘dis-
embedding’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §7) dimension of dating apps, namely that they 
separate sexual and romantic encounters from broader forms of sociality. This means that 
users must often face their aggressors on their own without the help of friends, or other 
members of the music scene close by who could intervene — as related by Kanvanaugh 
(2013, 30). This highlights a problem within Bergström’s idea that this dis-embedding, 
atomising dimension of dating app use is sexually freeing and emancipatory. 
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Anders could not predict the advent of dating apps and the proliferation of online 
profiles as a means of communication. However, Anders’ theory already described the 
occurrence, during his life, of people spending time with televised images as though they 
were intimate friends. He thus called them television viewers' 'false intimate friends' 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 121) and 'phantom slaves' (Anders [1956] 2003, 121). He stated that, 
in these 'portable chums[,…] we no longer see substitutes for real people, but our real 
friends' (Anders [1956] 2003, 122). These descriptions highlight how Anders considered the 
effect created by televised images as deceptive. This applies to dating apps where profiles of 
users can similarly be deceptive, as users present an idealised or fake image of themselves. 
Anders' work in The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I and II, which focuses on the link between 
technology and commodities, explains what might drive people to do this. Here Anders 
states: 
it is correct to say that our world is, in advance, a universe of advertisements. It 
consists in things that offer themselves to us and solicit us. Advertising is a mode of 
existence of our world. (Anders [1980] 2011, 109) 
Anders perceived how there was a strong drive for all objects within advanced capitalist 
societies to become objects of consumption and hence to contain a soliciting, manipulative 
dimension. This is relevant to catfishers constructing false profiles promoting idealised 
images of themselves or others in order to lure unsuspecting users. Anders further speaks of 
how 
In addition to the “falsifications of commodities”, which everyone knows, today there 
are also corresponding falsifications of activity (which are strictly related to the 
falsifications of commodities). (Anders [1980] 2011, 114) 
The concept of ‘falsification of activity’ is relevant to catfishing on dating apps. Users 
interacting with fake profiles are conducting a form of false communication, as the person 
they think they are speaking to is not real. Those who fall prey to catfishers may flirt online 
with fake representations, further experiencing what are arguably falsified emotions, as 
they are based on a mere profile. They finally go to meet the person on the other end of the 
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profile for a date in a sexual or romantic setting on the false basis that they found their 
pictures attractive. Instead of finding themselves on a date, they suddenly find themselves 
in a predatory situation where the catfisher may attempt to bully them into having sex. 
Hence their activity of chatting/flirting and getting ready for the date has been falsified by 
the false character of the commodity, the catfish profile. What they were really doing was 
making themselves into an object for someone else's predatory form of sexual gratification. 
Next, I turn to how the general framework of dating apps also fosters a more general, 
though admittedly less extreme, individualistic dimension within dating app use. 
 
9.3 A ‘numbers' game’ in a ‘separate moral universe’ 
Bergström (2019) discusses how ‘on the internet social norms do not evaporate’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §13, my translation). She further states that ‘although online 
services change the conditions in which sexuality is exercised, interactions do not escape 
social regulation’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §3, my translation). For instance, flirtation scripts 
on dating apps ‘take place under the shadow of masculine violence’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 0, 
§33, my translation). For Bergström, this is one factor that explains ‘feminine reserve’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §33, my translation) on these platforms. Indeed ‘[b]y presenting 
themselves as forthcoming, women risk being perceived as unconditionally available’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §54). Hence Bergström explains: 
For women, [feminine reserve] not only implies presenting a modest public image 
and refusing explicit advances, it also consists, more broadly, in displaying 
temperance within interactions with men. Firstly, this means not making the first 
move. (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §44, my translation) 
Hence Bergström highlights how heterosexual men tend to be forward and enterprising on 
dating apps, while heterosexual women take on a more passive role. 
Below, I connect this dynamic not just to external social norms and the threat of male 
violence, as Bergström does, but also to the very structure of dating apps. This encompasses 
both the set of affordances offered by their interface, or software, and those offered by 
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smartphone hardware more generally, which is designed to connect physically distanced 
individuals. I highlight how specific affordances, embedded within the software design of 
dating apps, structure seduction as a competitive ‘numbers’ game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, 
female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) in which users invest ‘time and effort’ (R, male, age: 30). 
This plus users’ physical isolation encourages them to form individualistic goals at the 
outset, even before meeting their partners. Consequently, I show how some users of dating 
apps do not identify with their behaviour on the platforms. They speak of following ‘lower 
moral standards’ (E, male, age: 21) when using dating apps than they would in other 
circumstances. In the next section, I further detail how this may contribute towards the 
climate of a ‘missing discourse of consent’ (Thompson 2018, 80) that Thompson links to 
dating app use. 
Research has shown (Wang 2018; Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz 2018) that especially male 
users' engagement with dating apps is one based on the expectation of finding a sexual or 
romantic connection through their use. This contrasts with employing dating apps more 
broadly for ‘validation’ (H, female, age: 27), which may include simply using them to receive 
compliments or interest from other users. For instance, Wang has surveyed how gay male 
dating app users in China ‘game’ (Wang 2018, 187) the interface features of dating apps 
because this offers them a “'direct’, ‘efficient’ [and] ‘convenient’” (Wang 2018, 187) user 
experience. Indeed, one of my respondents spoke of Grindr, a gay hook-up app, as a ‘good 
channel’ (M, male, age: 30) to account for a 'physical need' (M, male, age: 30). The topos of 
functionality this user employed shows how especially male users of dating apps often seek 
directness and use dating apps with a pre-conceived goal in mind. 
When asked what his motivation for using dating apps was, one of my participants 
replied: ‘sex basically’ (L, male, age: 28). A few of my respondents further referred to the 
topos of functionality stating that their use of dating apps was an 'investment' (R, male, age: 
30; H, female, age: 27; C, male, age: 23). One stated that it was an 'investment of time and 
effort' (R, male, age: 30). He further explained: 'it becomes like a monetary kind of 
investment and return kind of play' (R, male, age: 30). Here the user employs a nomination 
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(‘time’, ‘effort’, ‘monetary’, ‘return’) and predication strategy (‘investment’), based on the 
metaphor of a monetary investment (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). These discursively 
construct his use of dating apps as an activity that is linked to his expectation of personal 
gain. This is obtained from their use in the form of sexual and romantic relations. The 
notions of time, effort monetary gain and games (‘play’) are connected to the topoi of 
numbers (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 79), competition and individual success. It is not clear 
whether the respondent considered dating apps a monetary investment because he paid for 
a subscription to access ‘boost’ (Tinder.com 2021) features on the interface, or not. 
Arguably the affordance to do this highlights a structural tendency embedded within their 
interface that transforms dating app use into a monetary investment or game. Indeed the 
topos of the expression ‘boost’ is connected to that of casino and slot machines. Anders 
described Japanese gambling pachinko parlours in The Obsolscence of Man, vol. II, stating: 
‘Anatomically, this pachinko [slot machine] belongs in any case to the same genus as her 
sisters in the factory, all drenched in oil’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 49). 
Another respondent detailed the general functioning of dating apps. He gave an insight 
into why time spent on them, regardless of whether a subscription has been paid or not, 
could be perceived as an 'investment' (R, male, age: 30) looking for a ‘return’ (R, male, age: 
30). He and others described dating apps as ‘a numbers’ game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, 
age: 26; A, male, age: 27), further referring to a topoi of numbers, gambling, competition 
and individual gain. The user explained: 
Well basically for men, I would say – maybe not for women, I don’t know – if you 
want to actually meet a girl, you have to have a lot of prospects. So you have to chat 
up lots of different girls. First of all, in order to have the matches, you have to spend 
a lot of time swiping or whatnot till you get the matches. And then you have to have 
lots of prospects lined up so that you can actually have bait (L, male, age: 28) 
Here the user refers to the action of swiping on dating app interfaces. Many dating app 
interfaces rely on this motion to allow users to positively or negatively judge profiles, 
depending on the direction of the swipe. Each profile (containing pictures and sometimes a 
short text) disappears and is iteratively replaced by another profile after each swiping 
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motion is complete. Users who have mutually swiped-right on each other's profiles are 
connected, or 'matched' (Preston 2021). This enables them to send direct messages to each 
other. The infinitely repetitive nature of this process highlights why dating app use can be 
perceived as a ‘numbers' game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) and 
an ‘investment in time and effort’ (R, male, age: 30). Swiping more times increases the 
likelihood of matches and meetings. Indeed user L refers to the topos of numbers (‘lots of’). 
He additionally refers to the topos of time, stating: 'you have to spend a lot of time swiping' 
(L, male, age: 28). The imperative verb tense (‘have to’) further refers to the topos of 
constraint and constitutes a predication strategy that constructs the action of swiping as 
similar to a job. This highlights how the functioning of dating apps means that their use is an 
'investment in time' (R, male, age: 30) where something is transactionally expected in 
return. 
The user further employs the term 'prospects' to designate other users of the app he has 
matched with. Prospects is a term borrowed from the topos of business and commerce. It 
refers to prospective buyers, customers or clients. Hence the user employs a nomination 
strategy that discursively constructs other users as buyers rather than potential sexual and 
romantic partners. This contributes toward a perspectivisation strategy (Wodak and Meyer 
2016, 33) that employs the metaphor of clients to expresses the respondent's distance from 
his potential partners. He further refers to the action of online flirting as one of 'lin[ing] up 
so that you can actually have bait' (L, male, age: 28). 'Bait' here refers to achieving an in-
person meeting and is related to the topos of fishing or entrapping animals. This expression 
participates in a predication and nomination strategy based on the implicature that the 
process of flirting on dating apps is analogous to hunting and the users’ potential partners 
are similar to prey. The expression ‘lined up’ participates in a nomination strategy that 
constructs the action of flirting as both strategic and based on comparing other users’ 
against one-another. This de-individualises his potential partners and constructs them as 
interchangeable. This respondent's description of dating app functioning gives an insight 
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into how these platforms offer a set of affordances that encourages users to act 
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Table 9.3.1: Dating app users’ discourse and the topoi of gaming, hunting and commerce 
Table 9.3.1 shows how users' discourses contain nomination and predication strategies 
and topoi. All these discursive strategies relate to the sphere of numbers, hunting, gaming, 
commerce and monetary investment and finance. These spheres share common 
characteristics, as commerce and financial investment can have a competitive predatory 
character. Moreover, numbers are involved in games and finance. Within the context of 
dating app use, the dominant common denominator uniting all these themes is that of 
competition and individualism. Indeed hunting involves prey, games set participants against 
one-another and finance involves betting against others. Hence the table shows how dating 
app users discourses highlight how the structure of dating apps promotes individualistic and 
competitive rationalisations and behaviour. 
This individualistic atmosphere can sometimes lead to a conflict of interests between 
users who are nevertheless flirtatiously interacting with one-another. Though different to a 
breach of consent, this individualistic dynamic illustrates how flirtations can, to some 
235 
extent, become one-sided rather than responsive to the other persons’ desires. Indeed 
another male respondent explained how, using dating apps, he felt:  
a bit of regret, regret and guilt, because I felt like my objectives and the other 
person's weren't the same for using the app. Like, some people I've met have wanted 
something a lot deeper and less transactional. […] but I just always saw them more 
as a tool to find something a bit more short term, to be honest. So yeah expectations 
is the only thing that I'd say was disappointing about using them. Different 
expectations. (A, male, age: 27) 
This user insists on how, on dating apps, his and his partners’ individual expectations 
differed and were hard to combine. He further employs the topos of commerce, indirectly 
describing his encounters as 'transactional'. Indeed many of my respondents (R, male, 30; N, 
female, 30; E, male, 21; A, male, 27; Q, male, 27) used this term to describe dating app 
encounters. The above user employs the euphemistic expression 'a bit more short-term' and 
the verbal tee-up 'to be honest'. This participates in a mitigation strategy that reduces the 
illocutionary and hence deontic status (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) of his communication 
of 'regret and guilt' for seeking 'transactional' encounters that may have stressed his 
partners emotionally. 
Another user equally spoke to the individualism present on dating apps by employing a 
topos of morality and responsibility. This user described how the set of affordances offered 
by dating apps influenced him to act in a self-interested fashion that did not fit with his 
‘moral standards’ in ‘real life’ (E, male, age: 21). Indeed he called dating apps a 'separate 
moral universe' (E, male, age: 21). I asked him: 
–How would you characterise your behaviour on the app? do you think that it’s 
authentic? does it fit with your personality? 
No, I don’t think… I think that I judge myself by a lower moral standard inside the app 
than outside of it. It’s almost kind of like a separate moral universe where people 
don’t expect very much of one-another and therefore you can get away with a lot 
more. Em, I think I… I don’t like to think that my behaviour on that app was 
representative of who I am as a person outside of it, but that’s probably a question 
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that I should think about a lot more but em… Yeah, I don’t think it’s… Sorry, repeat 
your question one more time. 
–I guess: are you happy with the way you’ve used dating apps? Do you think that this 
fits with your personality? 
Em, I am happy with it in that I think it gave me what I needed at the time. But I don’t 
think it fits with my personality in terms of who I am and how I treat people in real 
life. (E, male, age: 21) 
This user also employs the topos of need ('what I needed at the time') linked to the idea that 
dating apps are functional and cater to users’ individual need for sex and romance. He 
further employs the topos of individualism, stating 'people don't expect very much of one-
another'. He also speaks of being able to 'get away with a lot more'. The expression ‘get 
away’ participates a predication strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that constructs 
sexual and romantic interactions as zero-sum games, where one can gain at the expense of 
others. Finally, he refers to the topos of virtual and 'real life' identities being separate, 
stating: 'I don't like to think that my behaviour … was representative of who I am as a 
person outside of it' and ‘I don’t think it fits with … how I treat people in real life’. This 
litotes participates in a mitigation strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to reduce the 
illocutionary force of the user’s expression of moderate shame and avoidance of feelings of 
responsibility for the fact that he may have mistreated people on dating apps. In fact, he 
states: 'I judge myself by lower moral standards inside the app'. Moreover, he refers to this 
being different to 'how I treat people in real life', which he on the contrary identifies with 
stating that this is 'who I am'. When prompted, he asserts that his behaviour on dating apps 
did not fit with his personality. However, it is not clear whether he regrets this behaviour. 
Indeed he states that he is 'happy with it' because it fulfilled a personal need.  
In his open letter to Claus Eichmann, Anders states that individuals caught in a system of 
machines must: 
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“play the game” by working with the same perfection and the same solidity as 
[machines]; in short, [they must] become […] co-mechanical’ (Anders [1964] 2015, 
92, my translation) 
User L described how the very functioning of dating apps involve treating people like pawns 
in a ‘numbers' game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) aimed at 
achieving one's individual objectives. This is relevant to users E and A who relate 
participating in behaviour that may not be serious enough to constitute a form of 
domination but which they nevertheless regret or do not identify with. They do not see this 
behaviour as fitting with their personalities but consider it to be part of how dating apps 
work. These last two accounts highlight how technological domination and alienation 
overgrasp one-another. Promethean shame arises from a non-identification with one’s 
actions. This is enabled by technological affordances for separating off the latter from one’s 
everyday experience. This dissociating dynamic constitutes an affordance for technological 
domination. 
Indeed, the users' non-identification with their behaviour on dating apps is reminiscent 
of drone operators’ non-identification with their part in drone warfare, which they could 
equally consider to be part of a separate universe. For instance, recruitment videos actively 
tell operators to 'compartmentalize that stuff' (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 
2019b) (B.2) in order to manage 'combat stress' (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 
2019b) (B.2). The vague expression ‘that stuff’ refers to the violence operators have been 
involved in. ‘[C]ombat stress’ is a euphemistic term that designates trauma. Together, these 
expressions participate in a mitigation strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that aims to 
reduce the deontic status of operators’ concern for their experience of war. The verb 
‘compartmentalize’ enacts a nomination strategy that constructs this experience as 
separate from them. Drone operator Lynn Hill thus discusses 'compartmentaliz[ing] the war 
between your real life and your war life' (Reed 2013, 10min). Here Hill uses the expression 
'real life' that many dating app users employ (16 out of 18). This expression contains the 
implicature that actions mediated by dating apps or drones are virtual and do not fit into 
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users' or operators' personal lives. One of my respondents similarly described how dating 
apps are 'a slightly different part of your life which you can almost isolate, which might be 
just a reflection of how I like to compartmentalise things in my life' (Q, male, age: 27). The 
common use of the expression ‘compartmentalise’ highlights how, in both instances, the 
very structure of the technology offers affordances for individuals to act in ways that do not 
fit with their usual moral standards. This alienating, fragmenting dimension thus offers 
affordances for domination. 
According to Bergström, the design of dating apps ‘short-circuits’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, 
§69, my translation) users’ social entourage. This means that users’ friends are ‘deprived of 
control over their nascent sexual and romantic relations’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §69). In 
contrast, I argue that this separation is not ‘emancipatory’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §7, my 
translation) as maintained by Bergström. It is also atomizing and disempowering. It places 
initial interactions in an individualistic and competitive frame. This means that users 










regret and guilt; I judge myself; 
lower moral standards; separate 
moral universe; how I treat 
people; a question that I should 
think about a lot more 
 
E, male, age: 21; A, 
male, age: 27 
Topos of 
individualism 
people don’t expect very much 
from one another; my objectives 
and the other person's weren’t the 
same; different expectations; 
wanted something a lot deeper 
and less transactional 
 
E, male, age: 21; A, 
male, age: 27 
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Topos of online 
vs real life 
separate… universe; real life; my 
behaviour on the app…who I am 
outside it 
 
M, male, age: 30; G, 
male, age: 27; L, male, 
age: 28; S, female, age: 
29; H, female, age: 29; 
P, male, age: 31; D, 
female, age: 21; N, 
female, age: 30; Q, 
male, age: 27; K, male, 
age: 30; J, female, age: 
29; I, male, age: 29; E, 





who I am as person; my 
personality; how I treat people in 
real life 
 
E, male, age: 21; A, 
male, age: 27 
Table 9.3.2: Dating app users’ discourse and feelings of subjective identity and responsibility 
Table 9.3.2 shows how users of dating apps employ the topoi of morality, individualism, 
online vs real life and subjective identity. These topoi share in common an abstract 
ontological dimension. All are concerned with philosophical questions. For instance, 
individualism refers to a system of values. The topos of online vs real life questions the 
ontological status of online interactions. These are posited as virtual and therefore as not 
counting as much as 'real life', the person’s offline identity. The topos of offline subjective 
identity concerns one's own values and systems of beliefs. Together the deployment of 
these topoi shows that some users take stock of their individualistic behaviour on dating 
app. They perceive this behaviour as being at odds with their values, identity and beliefs. 
This shows how the structure of dating apps offers affordances for potentially dominating 
behaviour that does not fit with users’ moral standards, identity and beliefs. 
 
9.4 Dating app use and toxic gender scripts 
The climate of individualistic sexual desire just described means that many users employ 
directly sexual pick-up lines and send sexually explicit photos and requests. In keeping with 
many men’s desire for directness and functionality on dating apps, this may constitute an 
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attempt to ensure that the resultant interactions are sexual from the outset, perhaps to 
increase the chances of them leading to sex. For instance, one of my respondents described 
how: ‘Well, um, my line was… on dating apps, if a girl asked me what I'm doing... I'll say: You 
– if you're about tonight?’ (P, male, age: 31). The user employs a play on words to escalate 
the conversation, giving it an overtly sexual tone. The tag question 'if you're about tonight?' 
participates in a mitigation strategy to reduce the illocutionary force of the users' direct, and 
potentially unwanted, sexual advance.  
Thompson has highlighted how direct pick-up lines on dating apps could ‘also be read as 
sexual acts in themselves for the men, who seek gratification by sending explicit, and 
unasked for, sexual messages online’ (Thompson 2018, 80). Other feminist authors have 
highlighted how some direct sexual advances on dating apps constitute a form of ‘intimate 
intrusion’ (Gillett 2018, 212). Thompson analyses content on feminist call out web pages, 
where women post screenshots of sexist comments that they have received on dating apps. 
She argues that such advances feature a ‘“missing discourse of consent” […] as they 
included, amongst other things, demands or commands for (casual) sex, as well as threats of 
sexual violence’ (Thompson 2018, 80). Thompson comments that ‘these men show little to 
no interest in what the woman’s desires might be and whether she might even want to 
engage in such conversations’ (Thompson 2018, 81). Hence, in this section, I highlight how 
the structure of dating apps tends to reproduce toxic gender scripts. 
I argue that there is a continuum between the affordances dating apps offer as functional 
solutions to users’ individualistic desires and issues relating to consent. As noted in the 
previous section, often on dating apps especially male users play a ‘numbers' game’ (L, 
male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27), making advances to multiple other users 
at the same time. They frequently do this to obtain in-person meetings leading to sex. 
Indeed one of my respondents stated:  
I think that a lot people get a lot of inappropriate messages. Like a disproportionately 
high number of messages which were quite inappropriate. And it wasn't very 
enjoyable (N, female, age: 30) 
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Another user said: ‘I met guys who immediately want to go to another type of texting 
media, just because they want to get a photo of you' (O, female, age: 30). 
Anders was interested in the technological mediation of sexuality, exploring its darker 
side. In his 1958 essay 'The Obsolescence of Privacy' (Anders [1980] 2011, 145-174), Anders 
considers the market for secret audio recordings of sexual encounters, stating: 
The fact that people, and even young people, are surrounded by this kind of 
commodity; that they can purchase the most extreme indiscretion; that they can 
learn to take pleasure in the pleasure of others; that they enjoy sexuality indirectly 
by way of things and the defencelessness of those who are spied upon: all of these 
things are so repugnant that, in comparison, the most vulgar satisfactions are simply 
the quintessence of probity and purity. (Anders [1980] 2011, 158) 
Here Anders demonstrates an interest in the question of consent and how new forms of 
technology render individuals vulnerable to intimate violations. In connecting the question 
of sexual violations to technology, Anders gives the notion of intimate intrusions a systemic 
frame. Such violations are now not solely connected to individuals, who may be innocent 
'young people' (Anders [1980] 2011, 158), but to the system that commercialises sex and 
produces techno-commodities catering for individual sexual gratification at the expense of 
others. Through linking the notion of sexual intrusions to the structure of modern 
technology, Anders also shows how sexual intrusions are not just a question of individual 
wrongdoing. They can be founded on social and technological systems. 
This conception moves in the same direction as contemporary feminist authors who 
oppose the fact that 'male violence is widely considered to be individually motivated' 
(Walby 1990, 128). In contrast, Walby argues that 'male violence against women has all the 
characteristics one would expect of a social structure' (Walby 1990, 128). Walby states that 
'[m]ale violence against women includes rape, sexual assault, wife beating, workplace sexual 
harassment and child sexual abuse' (Walby 1990, 128). Walby argues against abstract 
definitions of violence (Walby, Towers and Francis 2014). For her, violence is always 
connected to physical assault. Nevertheless, her conception is one where acts of violence 
are not extraordinary occurrences. They are integrated into everyday sexual scripts, or 
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mores. Similarly, I argue that the ‘missing discourse of consent’ (Thompson 2018, 80) on 
dating apps described above reproduces a culture that can serve to legitimate instances of 
sexual harassment. 
Walby refers to Jackson’s work, which argues that rape ‘is not a manifestation of 
personal pathology, but of the undercurrent of hostility that runs through our sexual scripts’ 
(Jackson 1978, 35). Jackson further argues: 
Explanations for rape are not to be sought for within the individual psyche of the 
rapist or victim but within our accepted sexual mores, for it is these which condition 
interaction in rape settings and which provide vocabularies of motive for the rapist 
(Jackson 1978, 29) 
This conception is relevant to dating apps. Dating apps offer a set of affordances that is 
strongly influenced by hook-up and lad culture. These construct seduction as a competitive 
game. They arguably also represent a virtual version of speed dating, a practice which 
emerged within advanced capitalist systems where individuals had little time to socialise. 
These are dominant, highly competitive and individualistic cultures that pre-existed dating 
apps and which are connected to other media and power-structures. They have arguably 
become ingrained within the technological structure of dating apps.  
Indeed Jackson’s description of dominant sexual scripts from the late 1970s fits perfectly 
with the competitive element of dating app functioning and the notion of ‘feminine reserve’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §33, my translation) outlined in section 9.3. On dating apps, as 
elsewhere, men are not only ‘expected to take the lead but to establish dominance over the 
woman, to make her please him, and his ‘masculinity’ is threatened if he fails to do so’ 
(Jackson 1978, 31, italics in original). Thus especially male users employ the topos of 
monetary investment, games and hunting to describe their use of dating apps (R, male, age: 
30; L, male, age: 28; D, female, age: 21). These spheres are connected to hegemonic 
masculinities and perceptions of self-worth, which are based on ‘identities such as 
aggression, competition, domination and control’ (Nichols 2018, 75) but may also include 
‘strength, […] physicality, wit and heterosexuality’ (Nichols 2018, 75). In section 9.3, I 
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connected this dimension to the general functioning of dating apps. But there are also 
elements of superficial design that exacerbate this culture. 
 A likely sponsored magazine piece presenting Tinder states: 
You can see a full list of every profile that's liked you so that you can browse through 
and swipe either way on them while knowing they're interested in you. 
Top Picks is a more recent Gold feature, which shows you a daily selection of profiles 
selected specifically for you by the Tinder algorithm. (Preston 2021) 
This piece employs a nomination strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) based on metonyms 
(‘full list’; ‘every profile’; ‘selection’) that constructs other interested users as bountiful and 
at the disposal of the single (prospective) user it is addressing. It further employs a 
predication strategy based on the metaphor of ‘browsing’ and ‘select[ing]’ that constructs 
the process of initiating sexual and romantic connection as similar to shopping. The topos of 
‘browsing’ also contains the implicature that the user is in control. The extract further refers 
to ‘Top Picks’, profiles that it recommends to other users. Like with ‘selection’, this 
expression discursively constructs (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) some users as chosen 
(‘Picks’) for others, implying that they are at their disposal. It further discursively qualifies 
some profiles as being ‘Top’. This contains the implicature that users are on a hierarchy. 
Here, the piece is talking about special features for subscribers to its ‘Gold’ services. The 
topos of ‘Gold’ is also connected to that of high social standing and is equally employed by 
gambling slot machines. The general design of the app further contains affordances for 
quantifying and hierarchically ordering users. For instance, the number of likes each user 
has received are communicated to them through highly visible gold badges (Preston 2021). 
Users are further alerted to new messages through an attention-grabbing red dot on the 
interface (Preston 2021). When they tap on it, users see how many messages they have 
received. 
Dating apps are consequently described by some men as a 'confidence boost' (P, male, 
age: 31), with the term 'boost' further evoking the topos of games. Alternatively, they are 
seen as triggers for insecurities relating to not belonging to the 'alpha male group' (P, male, 
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age: 31) or ‘high-value males’ (L, male, age: 27) classification. This may arise if the user does 
not get a number of matches that he deems sufficient. The expression ‘alpha male’ refers to 
the topos of the dominant male among animals. This expression participates in a 
nomination strategy based on membership categorisation device (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 
33) that constructs the ideal human male as a dominant, aggressive provider who attracts 
many women. The expression ‘high-value males’ participates in a predication strategy that 
similarly discursively constructs humans as existing on a narrow hierarchy of high or lower 
value individuals. The competitive and quantifying affordances of dating apps are thus 
compatible with patriarchal sexual scripts centred on male dominance outlined by Jackson 
(1978).  
Contemporary work (Gillet 2018; Luckener et al. 2019) has shown how, on dating apps, 
deception, intimate intrusions and expectation for sex can pave the way for more serious 
forms of sexual aggressions. Among the female users I interviewed, two had direct 
experience of sexual harassment through dating apps and the remaining six were aware of 
the issue of security on the platforms. One user said: ‘I bumped into bad people through 
dating apps. For instance, some people were forcing you to have sex with them or doing 
something quite harassing in terms of stepping into my personal sphere’ (O, female, age: 
30). She further explained: 
I did meet up with somebody and they were forcing me to do something that I didn’t 
want. And I found it quite difficult to navigate through the scenario but it’s just 
because I was trying to be polite. (O, female, age: 30) 
The user employs a nomination strategy based on the verb 'forcing' to express the fact that 
she experienced an instance of coercion. The metaphor of navigation further conveys the 
difficulty of this situation. The account of this user highlights how dating app encounters 
involve the awkwardness of meeting someone new one-to-one. Users invest time, energy in 
coming to meetings. Hence the interviewee refers to 'trying to be polite', expressing the fact 
that users may go through with a meeting even if they have immediate second thoughts 
upon seeing the person. In reference to advances made by men, another user explains: ‘as a 
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woman you sometimes feel pressured. And you feel like: Oh you should just like go through 
with it’ (N, female, age: 30). This user employs modal particles ('Oh'; 'just') and free indirect 
speech as part of an intensification strategy that conveys the sense of resignation and 
pressure she feels in such situations. 
I argue that the functioning of dating apps, which offers affordances for directness — for 
instance, through supposedly connecting users on the basis of feelings of attraction — and 
presents itself as a competitive game, can foster expectations for sex in some users. This 
may make some less mindful of issues of consent. Tinder’s online magazine, Swipe Life 
(Tinder 2020b), acknowledges the danger of rape and sexual violence. However, it strikingly 
treats them in a flippant manner. An article on Tinder’s online magazine states: ‘you don’t 
get bonus points for pulling out after someone says no. […] Use your words not your dick to 
get consent’ (Jackson 2018). This statement uses deictics (‘you’, ‘your’), free direct speech 
(‘someone says no’) and explicit profanity (‘dick’; ‘pulling out’) to express the speakers’ 
chummy proximity to a prospective user committing rape. The statement further relates to 
the topos of games (‘bonus points’) to discursively qualify dating app encounters as light-
hearted and fun, even when sexual violence and rape is being discussed. The statement 
further employs litotes (‘you don’t get bonus points’) to mitigate the illocutionary force 
(Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) and deontic status of the warning it is giving to users to not to 
rape and sexually assault one-another. This statement highlights how dating app companies, 
and the gamified designs of their interfaces, are not neutral. They are imbued with lad 
culture (see Lewis, Marine and Kenney 2018, Nichols 2018).  
My understanding contrasts with Bergström’s (2019) view that dating app users are 
subject to external social pressures that are not tied to the very structure and design of 
these technologies. Bergström dichotomises between technological and social frames, 
stating that ‘though external control diminishes on the Internet, internalised control 
increases’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §70, my translation). This she explains through user’s 
adherence to social expectations urging them to self-regulate their usage of dating apps. 
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Instead, I argue that social control is exerted onto users through the very structure of dating 
apps, as well as through external social frames. 
Given the risk of sexual violence on dating apps, some users stated that they were happy 
for their online chats to be surveilled. For instance, some users stated: ‘from my perspective 
I don’t think it’s necessarily a bad thing. Because I bumped into bad people through dating 
apps’ (O, female, age: 30). Others said: ‘One-hundred, a hundred percent. Because it's a 
safety thing, because you don't know what kind of people are out there’ (P, male, age: 31). 
However, the same user later added:  
But yes, I don't know, it’s weird because it's a sort of an infringement on their privacy, 
innit. So I don't know. Where’s the like middle ground of safety and infringement 
for… I don't know. (P, male, age: 31) 
This user accurately expressed the conundrum of surveillance on dating apps. His statement 
is related to a topos of threat (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 77). This implies that questions of 
security legitimate surveillance. It frames the question of surveillance in terms of the 
desirability of finding a 'middle ground', implying that just measure and balance are 
desirable when it comes to surveilling for the purpose of security.  
Next, I turn to evaluating surveillance on dating apps through the lens of Anders’ theory. 
The latter suggests that, in some respects, surveillance on dating apps could also be 
understood as a form of intimate intrusion on users’ privacy, as it occurs in the sensitive 
sphere of sex and romance. This intrusion is tied to the structure and affordances of 
smartphone technology and dating apps, which directly store user chats and encourage 
individuals to reveal sensitive details on their profiles. 
 
9.5 Surveillance on dating apps: justified by questions of security and a culture of 
openness but also perpetuating systemic forms of intrusion 
Tinder’s privacy policy says that it stores users’ personal ‘sensitive information’ (Tinder 
2018b) including the pictures that they upload, their bios, the information that they upload 
such as age gender, sexual orientation, height, weight, level of physical activity, etc., and the 
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content of their chats. Hinge, another dating app, suggests that users also upload 
information relating to whether they smoke, drink, take soft drugs and/or hard drugs. On 
the surface, uploading this sensitive information on the app is presented as a way to better 
‘match’ individuals. However, it also means that users provide dating app companies with a 
host of sensitive personal information which can be transferred across borders and shared 
with unspecified authorities, third parties and separate companies (through mergers and 
acquisitions) (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). Dating app companies thus profit off this 
information, which can be employed for targeted advertising. The collection of sensitive 
data forms part of their business model. 
Tinder and Hinge have opposite branding, with Tinder apparently being more directed 
towards hook-ups and Hinge seemingly being more relationship orientated. However, both 
platforms are owned by the same conglomerate, Match Group. This means that their 
privacy policies are identical. Tinder and Hinge’s privacy policies state that they allow third 
parties to access user information to pursue their business interests. For instance, Tinder’s 
privacy policy says: ‘We keep your personal information only as long as we need it for 
legitimate business purposes (as laid out in Section 5) and as permitted by applicable law’ 
(Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). This privacy policy uses a predication strategy that employs the 
topos of business (‘legitimate business interests’) where ‘legitimate’ evokes the just and 
right, to discursively qualify practices surrounding privacy as just and natural. The privacy 
policy’s assertion that gathering sensitive data from users is a legitimate business practice 
illustrates Anders’ observation that ‘the experience of being a Peeping Tom is transformed 
into a marketable object’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 158). It also illustrates his prediction that the 
prohibition of surveillance devices would be said to ‘represent an interference with 
business’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 160). Here Anders accurately highlights how the fusion of 
economic factors with technological systems means that surveillance becomes a common-
sense practice. 
The above clause sends the reader to a different section, Section 5. The policy thus 
employs a tautological system of referencing as a mitigation strategy aimed at 
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accommodating vague language (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33). This means that it gives as 
little detail as possible regarding its operations. Indeed Section 5 broadly defines legitimate 
business purposes as: ‘Develop[ing], display[ing] and track[ing] content and advertising 
tailored to your interests on our services and other sites’ (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). 
Legitimate business interests also include fighting against 'wrongdoings' (Tinder 2018b; 
Hinge 2020) and 'prevent[ing], detect[ing] and fight[ing] fraud or other illegal or 
unauthorized activities' and ‘assist[ing] law enforcement’ (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). This 
clause exists in tension with the fact that Hinge, for instance, explicitly suggests users share 
their illegal drug use information on their platform. In terms of applicable laws and 
jurisdictions, Tinder and Hinge’s privacy policy states: ‘Sharing of information laid out in 
Section 6 sometimes involves cross-border data transfers, for instance to the United States 
of America and other jurisdictions’ (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). The privacy policy further 
states that:  
We may transfer your information if we are involved, whether in whole or in part, in 
a merger, sale, acquisition, divestiture, restructuring, reorganization, dissolution, 
bankruptcy or other change of ownership or control. (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020) 
It thus uses vague expressions such as ‘wrongdoings’, ‘unauthorised activities’, ‘only as long 
as we need it’, ‘other jurisdictions’ and ‘change of ownership and control’ as devices that 
participate in a mitigation strategy that attempts to reduce the illocutionary force and 
deontic status (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) of the information it is communicating. This is 
that users’ data is held with limited accountability. Dating app companies will share this 
data if it benefits their economic interest, even if it causes potential harm to users.  
For instance, when Grindr was acquired by a Chinese company the question of whether 
this gave access to the Chinese government to the sensitive information, including HIV 
status, of its users was raised (Aunspach 2020). Aunspach further highlights how: ‘South 
Korea (Hancocks and Suk, 2017) and Egypt (Raghavan, 2017) are just two countries that 
have relied on Grindr to identify and jail queer individuals’ (Aunspach 2020, 47). He also 
notes how: ‘In the case of Grindr, its collection of users’ sex practices, locations, and 
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serostatuses could make rich fodder for Chinese agents to coerce people who might not be 
openly queer into carrying out military and corporate espionage’ (Aunspach 2020). These 
practices fit with Anders’ early awareness that there are 
many ways such information can be used: in order to discredit a person, to ruin him 
socially, to ruin his career or to ruin him politically, to deprive him of his privacy, all of 
these things do not require, when all is said and done, any use of such information in 
a trial or courtroom. (Anders [1980] 2011, 159) 
The example of data collection leading to surveillance on dating apps further illustrates 
Anders’ thesis that ‘the means justify ends’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 237, my translation). The 
technology may not originally have been designed to surveil users, and the recording of data 
occurred as a serendipitous by-product. However, an ‘economic ontology’ (Anders [1956] 
2003, 175, my translation) fuses with systems of modern technology. This fosters the 
principle that: ‘“There must be nothing that is not used” [and:] “Make everything serve 
some use”’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 175, my translation). Therefore the surveillance 
affordances offered by ICTs are likely to get translated into surveillance practices. 
Anders was acutely aware of this dynamic. He highlighted that:  
every society that makes use of these devices, acquires—and even must acquire—
the habit of considering the person as totally deliverable, as someone whose delivery 
is permitted; [it] thus succumb[s] to the danger of sliding towards a totalitarianism 
that is also political. (Anders [1980] 2011, 151) 
The fact that data transfers occur because of a merger and acquisition, or a request by 
authorities (hence legal systems); the fact that there is an economic incentive to keep the 
data (profit); but also the technological system itself which automatically records 
conversations, as user chats must be stored on external servers for the system to work: 
these are all interconnected factors that contribute towards regimes of surveillance. 
When speaking about what could be seen as their intrusions into users’ private 
conversations, Tinder and Hinge communicate their data collection practices as follows: ‘Of 
course, we also process your chats with other users as well as the content you publish, as 
part of the operation of the services’ (Tinder 2018b; Hinge 2020). In this sentence the verbal 
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tee-up ‘Of course’ participates in a mitigation strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) through 
positioning the speaker as close to the reader. This reduces the illocutionary force of the 
communication that user private chats are surveilled. It also constitutes an expressive 
speech act, expressing a psychological state of sincerity (Searle [1979] 2005, 15). The aim is 
to convey to the reader that Tinder and Hinge sincerely believe the way they treat user data 
is natural and legitimate. It further serves to convey the sense that these companies work 
with users rather than against them. This indirect speech act (Dijk 1984, 126) thus aims at 
mitigating the illocutionary force and deontic status of what is in effect a warning the 
company is making that all uploaded user content is stored and used by the company to 
make profit. This data might also be shared with the authorities any country.  
The verbal tee-up ‘Of course’ further illustrates Anders’ idea that societies can become 
used to the notion of surveillance. It contributes towards a predication strategy that 
constructs the activity of surveillance as benign, common-sense and natural. The 
euphemistic expression ‘we process your chats’ constitutes a predication strategy which 
qualifies the action of surveilling and recording user interaction as necessary for the 
technical upkeep of dating apps. The statement further uses vague expressions such as ‘as 
part of the operation of the services’ as discursive devices that further play into a mitigation 
strategy that reduces the apparent significance of the treatment of user data, discursively 
constructing it as a technical necessity. However, this is not true because dating app 
companies could choose to encrypt private information sent between user and eliminate 
data when it is no longer needed. 
Bumble is a dating app company that is not owned by the Match Group conglomerate. 
Bumble’s privacy policy similarly uses omission as a mitigation (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) 
discursive strategy stating: ‘Bumble does not sell your data and has not sold your personal 
data in the previous 12 months’ (Bumble 2020). However, Bumble was founded in 2014, 
which leaves open the possibility that Bumble has sold personal data in the 5 years 
preceding the current privacy policy. The statement also uses the presupposition that selling 
is completely distinct from sharing information with third parties for the purposes of 
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advertising on site to imply that Bumble does not monetise the data. This is a predication 
strategy which constructs their data practices as neither profit-orientated nor potentially 
harmful to users. 
Most of my participants (12 out of 18) had shared sensitive information about illicit drug 
use in the chat of dating apps (C, male, age: 23; O, female, age: 30; I, male, age: 29; H, 
female, age: 26; N, female, age: 30; J, female, age: 29; Q, male, age: 27; G, male, age: 27; S, 
female, age: 29; L, male, age: 28; B, male, age: 27; P, male, age: 31). One participant had 
uploaded this information on her profile on Hinge using the provided feature. She later had 
second thoughts and took the information down (H, female, age: 27). Participants were 
informed of data privacy policies during the interview and most (10 out of 18) said that they 
would be more careful in future about sharing such information. This corroborates with 
other findings showing that SNS users are evenly split between those who accept targeted 
advertising and those who would prefer to not see targeted advertising (Allmer et al. 2014). 
However, when these users are informed of the full extent of data mining on SNS, a sizeable 
proportion switch to opposing these data collection practices. Thus Allmer et al. state: ‘We 
were able to observe a significant number of interviewees who switched to a negative 
perception of targeted advertising on social media’ (Allmer et al. 2014, 63). 
The fact that most users stated that they would be more careful going forward about 
what information they shared on dating apps illustrates Anders’ argument that: 
From the times of dictatorships we know that, from the moment when one considers 
that it is possible or even only not impossible that one is under surveillance, one 
feels and behaves differently than one did before, that is, in a more conformist way, 
when not in an absolutely conformist way. The unverifiable possibility of being under 
surveillance has a decisive capacity for moulding: it moulds the entire population. 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 156) 
Indeed many of my participants expressed the feeling that they did not like their data being 
used as set out by the privacy policy. Similarly to Sevignani’s findings that users consider 
privacy policies as a form of invasion and ‘selling my own self’ (Sevignani 2013, 737), some 
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of my participants spoke of the invasive nature of data collection practices on dating apps. 
For instance, one participant stated:  
It's very simple. If I go into a coffee shop to meet a person and I have a conversation, 
I don't believe there is any way shape or form imaginable where we will have a 
discussion about whether the coffeeshop owner should take and keep the 
conversations that I've been having with the other person. Like, there is no question; 
nobody would think that this is an okay question to ask. With the Internet, we are 
somehow asking ourselves this question. And like, no! The answer is still no. You are 
offering pretty much a place for people to talk. You are not offering a recording 
service for the KGB. (K, male, age: 29) 
Through employing the topos of KGB surveillance this user seems to express frustration at 
the economically and technologically conditioned fact that on dating apps ‘[t]he others 
[including the state] have become unavoidable’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 156). 
Nevertheless, some users spoke of accepting such surveillance. Employing the topos of 
security, one user stated that surveillance was justified because ‘it’s a safety thing’ (P, male, 
age: 31). He thus illustrated Anders’ argument that through security concerns 'something 
immoral, spying, is transformed into a guarantee of morality' (Anders [1980] 2011, 162, 
italics in original). The same user professed to having ‘nothing to hide’ (P, male, age: 31). 
This illustrates Anders’ argument that a cultural shift accompanies surveillance devices. 
Indeed, according to Anders, in the era of privacy 
the person who is ashamed is ashamed not because, or in any case not only because, 
his secret vices or transgressions are revealed, but because he is revealed. (Anders 
[1980] 2011, 160) 
In contrast, in the present era, the idea that one might feel shame because his inner self is 
revealed is considered to be  
a symptom of introversion (and therefore of “self- withdrawal”, in the sense of being 
“closed off”); […] this introversion is the sign of inhibition, of “repression”; and […] all 
inhibitions [are seen to] lead eventually to frustrated social adaptation, that is, to 
defective conformation (Anders [1980] 2011, 162) 
Hence for Anders the modern expression 
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But I have nothing to hide, proves that shame (in the sense of “having the need for 
shame”) is now identified with immorality, and shamelessness (in the sense of “not 
having the need for shame”) is identified with morality. (Anders [1980] 2011, 160, 
italics in original) 
Subsequently, asserting one’s reluctance to be surveilled is accompanied by suspicion. 
Consequently, Anders states that: ‘Every one of us has been assigned the domestic task of 
transforming ourselves, by way of the lack of shame, into collaborators in the destruction of 
our own privacy’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 166). 
Dating apps illustrate this cultural shift. On dating apps individuals are encouraged to 
present themselves in a coy manner as they would to a lover. However, whereas this was 
previously a private behaviour, now it occurs through images on public profiles. Dating app 
design moreover often actively encourages users to openly discuss their vices and sexual 
preferences, making this part of the process of setting up a profile and matching individuals 
(see Feeld in section 10.3). This illustrates Anders' provocative statements that: 'Our bodies 
have become universal property' (Anders [1980] 2011, 164) and '[s]exual relations have 
become universal property' (Anders [1980] 2011, 164) which he related to the openness 
with which individuals discussed sexual details and their bodies on commercial magazines. 
Together these elements catered to the demands of the soft totalitarian systems Anders 
described. This was to 'to abolish the border between “outside” and “inside”' (Anders 
[1980] 2011, 159). Indeed Anders notes that  
the totalitarian state will only be perfect if there is absolutely no “discretion” […] 
“privacy” or “intimacy” in the psychological sense. (Anders [1980] 2011, 153) 
Anders’ theory shows how the openness encouraged by apps and often depicted as a sign of 
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Table 9.5: Dating app privacy policies and the construction of surveillance as benign 
Table 9.5 shows the expressions used by privacy policies. On the one hand, it shows how 
dating app privacy policies employ a topos of law and order and security to justify and 
legitimate their data collection practices. On the other hand, the privacy policy employs a 
discursive mitigation strategy based on discursive devices such as vague and euphemistic 
expressions, verbal tee-ups and expressive speech acts. The latter convey a sense of 
closeness and trustworthiness to dating app users. These discursive strategies highlight how 
dating app privacy policies attempt to legitimate and minimise the processes of surveillance 
they enact. This section corroborates other research that has found that many SNSs’ privacy 
policies constitute an attempt at manipulating users’ perception of data collection practices. 
For instance, Sandoval states that  
These documents rather aim at creating the illusion that personalized advertising is 
beneficial for web 2.0 users. The language used obviously intends to approach users 
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in a personal way to create an atmosphere of friendship; but these documents 
ideologically mask the unequal power relation between owners, who design the 
terms of use in a way that allows them to generate profit out of users’ work and 
information, and users, who have to accept them. (Sandoval in Fuchs et al. 2013, 
163) 
I have shown the how the linguistic strategies dating app companies use participate in this 
strategy, while also highlighting how surveillance on dating app is connected to both 
technological and economic factors. 
 
9.6 Conclusion 
Bergström holds an optimistic and positive view of dating apps, which is representative 
of a broader techno-euphoric discourse that conflates technological advances with social 
progress. This thesis aims to respond to the latter through highlighting how Günther Anders’ 
work can help us analyse contemporary digital societies. In this chapter, I have followed the 
lead of other feminist analyses by looking at the question of deception and sexual 
harassment on dating apps. Bergström understands sexual violence on these platforms as 
principally the result of external sexist cultures. In contrast, I have conducted an Anders-
inspired structural analysis of dating apps. I have argued that their very functioning offers 
affordances for competitive and individualistic expressions of sexual desire that sometimes 
lead to intimate intrusions and sexual harassment. Anders was aware of how technological 
systems could lead to such functional and individualistic views of sex. His work helps 
highlight how intimate intrusions on dating apps are not just founded on individual malice 
but are also fostered by the technical structure of dating apps themselves, which mirrors 
external social frames. This fits with feminist views that, through the continuum theory of 
sexual violence, speak of social systems of male domination. I have applied this notion to 
technological structures. I argued dating apps are not a neutral tool that allows for female 
sexual emancipation. They are also imbued with lad culture. 
I have thus shown how especially male users of dating apps are encouraged to play a 
'numbers’ game' (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27), messaging many 
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different profiles at once. They consequently view others not as individuals but as 
'prospects' (L, male, age: 28) who might 'bait' (L, male, age: 28) their advances. They are also 
encouraged to form individualistic expectations and goals in relation to their use of dating 
apps. Hence they come to view dating apps as an 'investment' (R, male, age: 30) looking for 
a 'return' (R, male, age: 30), often in terms of 'transactional' (R, male, 30; N, female, 30; E, 
male, 21; A, male, 27; Q, male, 27) encounters. By offering affordances for speed and 
functionality, toxic gender scripts carry over into in-person encounters. Individuals meet 
away from their friends and with individual expectations in mind. Indeed, some of my 
female respondents relate encountering men who put pressure on them to have sex, 
treating this as something that was expected. Thus Anders’ theory has proved helpful in 
providing a non-deterministic answer to the question of how dating app design and 
structure influences user behaviour, showing how this influence can foster instances of 
intimate intrusions and sexual harassment. This occupied the first half of RQ2.1. 
Turning to a discussion of surveillance on dating apps, which answers the second half of 
RQ2.1, I have shown how users outwardly say that they do not directly perceive that dating 
app conversations are surveilled. They further employ a topos of security to justify similar 
surveillance. However, when they are made aware of the extent of surveillance on these 
platforms, they often assert that they might be more mindful about sharing sensitive 
information on dating apps in the future. This, on the one hand, highlights how many users 
deem this surveillance to be necessary and are willing to relinquish their privacy for the sake 
of security. However, on the other hand, I have discussed how surveillance of intimate 
conversations establishes the foundations for forms of totalitarian domination, which view 
the elimination of privacy as a natural and progressive process. Anders already described 
this process in his era, highlighting the expression I have nothing to hide. In contrast to the 
carefree attitude conveyed by the expression, I have shown that the collection and storage 
of sensitive information on dating apps renders individuals vulnerable to persecution. 
257 




My research question for the alienation section in the dating app case study was RQ2.2: 
How does the use of dating apps impact users’ feeling of connectedness and isolation, their 
identity, their feeling of happiness and sadness and their perception of beauty standards? 
Accordingly, I look at Anders' theory that ICTs can be a factor in reproducing alienation. I 
ask how this fits with a Marxian conception. I outline Anders’ argument that outside images 
delivered to television viewers and radio listeners recreated an impoverished virtual world 
in their homes. For Anders, the relation of viewers to this phantom-like universe was 
furthermore unilateral, as viewers had little control over the images they consumed. ICTs 
thus effected a division between subject and object, which denied humans' potential to act 
on their environment consciously and socially. I argue that this process of estrangement, 
outlined by Anders, mirrors early Marx's understanding of economic alienation as arising 
from the structuring of human activity through the prism of private property relations. As 
seen in section 2.5, this resulted in the workers' separation from the object of labour and 
his/her consequent alienation form his/her own life activity.  
I show how an Andersian-Marxian conception of alienation applies to dating apps. The 
way the interfaces of dating apps structure communication in the sphere of sex and 
romance mirrors and fuses with the principle of private property. Private property relations 
determined workers' alienation from the object of labour (raw materials, means of 
production and products). Similarly, dating apps, to some degree, separate users from other 
users, who they view in the first instance as profiles, the interface, which is not subject to 
their control, and their ensuing sexual and romantic communications, which are conditioned 
by this interface. The affordances presented by dating app technology respond to a profit 
motive. It thus favours speed of communication and quantity of separate interactions. This 
fragmentation of romantic communication often leads to short-term, ‘disposable’ (S, 
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female, age: 29; P, male, age: 31; J, female, age: 29) encounters, after which users go back 
to using the apps. The result is a standardisation of sexual and romantic encounters, whose 
narrative always begins in the same way, with dating apps. Subjective communication thus 
becomes more objective, resembling a mass commodity. This inversion of subject and 
object is further illustrated by the fact that objective profiles acquire a semblance of 
subjectivity, as they are treated as embodied persons for whom users can develop feelings 
of attraction. 
Hence, in section 10.2, I make preliminary remarks that explain in what respects dating 
apps offer a sensorily reduced and fragmented experience of sexual and romantic 
initiations. I argue against postmodern conceptions of digital embodiment. In section 10.3, I 
outline a theory based on Anders and Marx that outlines how dating apps alienate and 
standardise communication in the sphere of sex and romance. In section 10.4, I analyse 
users' discourses showing that they tend to characterise online communications as virtual 
and split off. In contrast, they characterise in-person interactions as sensorily unifying and 
intuitive. In section 10.5, I outline how some users report feeling ‘disposable’ within the 
sphere of dating app interactions. I link this to Anders' theory of obsolescence of humans 
and Marx's theory of alienation, whereby workers are reduced to appendages of machines. 
In section 10.6, I discuss consumerist uses of dating apps. I argue that these lead to 
impoverished satisfactions of sexual and romantic desires. This shows how standardisation 
on dating apps denies the full realisation of the potentials for human enjoyment. In section 
10.7, I discuss users' preference for in-person encounters, arguing that this highlights how 
dating apps can be understood to alienate humans from their preferred lifestyles, a 
measure which Eisenstein (1972, 67) uses to highlight the difference between human 
essence and existence within capitalism. 
 
10.2 Preliminary examples of the reduction and fragmentation of mental and 
physical attraction 
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Research has shown that, for some people, smell is more important than looks or voice 
when it comes to sparking feelings of attraction (Mahmut and Croy 2019). However, prior to 
meeting in person, the olfactory dimension is completely absent from the interface and 
functioning of dating apps. This exemplifies how dating app use means that individuals 
select potential partners they would like to go on a date with on the basis of reduced 
sensory information about the person. The principal sense that dating app use recruits is 
sight. Users employ their sense of sight to apprehend mostly still, two-dimensional images 
on a small smartphone screen. 
In narrowing down the breadth of sensory information they require for their operation, 
dating apps share a common element with military drones. They produce a sensorily 
reduced experience of the initial stages of forming a sexual or romantic relationship with 
someone. For instance, in the case of the practice of direct sex on dating apps, which I 
discuss in 10.7, users decide to meet others for sex primarily based on viewing small images 
of them. Similarly, drones produced a sensorily impoverished version of killing a person, 
where the person’s face, expression, smell, etc., was not included. In section 6.4, I 
connected the idea of impoverishment of sensory experience to Anders’ notion of presence-
absence. In this chapter, I develop this idea further. I show how it is connected to a Marxian 
understanding of alienation as arising from a separation and inversion of subject and object. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how dating app users often characterise dating app 
functioning as 'transactional' (R, male, 30; N, female, 30; E, male, 21; A, male, 27; Q, male, 
27). In this chapter, in section 10.5, I specify that the term was often opposed to what was 
described as the 'organic' (R, male, age: 30; N, female, age: 30; E, male, age: 21; B, male, 
age: 27; A, male, age: 27) nature of in-person encounters. The term organic is connected to 
the topos of unifying and free-flowing nature. This suggests that in-person encounters 
promote an oceanic feeling of unity whereas dating app encounters are partial and 
reductive. Arguably they thus favour behaviour based on mental rationalisations rather than 
both sensory and mental intuition. 
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A rationalistic as opposed to organic and intuitive logic is illustrated by 'elite' (N, female, 
age: 30; H, female, age:26; O, female, age: 30) dating apps such as The League, which some 
of my respondent used. These 'screened' (N, female, age: 30) users on the basis of their 
education level, encouraging users to also select each other on this basis. Hence The League 
website states that it helps users find partners that 'have a strong enough command of 
grammar [to] know not to end sentences with a preposition,' adding: 'Let us do the LinkedIn 
stalking for you' (The League 2021). The statement uses the topos of careers to imply that 
having a prestigious job and education is a crucial factor in finding a partner for its users. 
 
Figure 10.2: The League advert tells prospective users their 'time is valuable' and presents an 
ideal 'Harvard Law School' graduate who is 'Head of operations @ Google' as a potential 
match 
The League's focus on job and education level is a paradigmatic example of how mental 
and physical sensations are fragmented by dating app use. In contrast to the notion of love 
at first sight, which denotes the idea that mental and physical sensations dynamically 
interact, producing a unifying effect, dating app use is characterised by a staggering of 
rational (mental) attraction based on profiles (presenting users' appearance on pictures, 
age, height, job, education level, interests, sexuality, ethnicity, weight etc.) and intuitive, 
physical attraction based on in-person meetings. This advert highlights Illouz’s argument 
that:  
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Technologies of choice mark the demise of non-rational modes of partner selection, 
chiefly based on the body, in which emotions are put into play with very little 
knowledge or information about the other, and in which romantic partners are 
viewed as unique entities, not as units measured along highly cognized criteria and 
compared with each other. (Illouz 2012, 184) 
Despite this trend, all of my respondents conveyed the sense that it was only possible to 
judge feelings of attraction from in-person meetings. This was very weakly correlated to 
whether they got on well online. For instance, one user spoke about how: 
a lot of the time you think: Oh these conversations are going really well and you can't 
wait to meet them and you're almost always slightly disappointed because either 
there's no chemistry or they don't seem to… it's not what you were expecting, but in 
a negative way. (N, female, age: 30) 
This user employs hesitations as a mitigation strategy to reduce the illocutionary force of 
her communication of disappointment and emotional exhaustion due to disembodied 
functioning of dating apps. Asked: 'How do your feelings develop for someone you like that 
you've met off dating apps? Do you get very positive feelings online when you chat to them? 
Or do very positive feelings of attraction occur after you've met them in real life?' The same 
respondent answered decisively: 'Always the latter, so always when I actually meet them' 
(N, female, age: 30).  
This illustrates how the affordances of dating apps split initial feelings of attraction into 
at least two stages. Users first decide that they would like to meet a person based on their 
profile. They then decide whether there is ‘chemistry’ (N, female, age: 30) in an in-person 
encounter. This idea corroborates Illouz’s notion that  
Where traditional romantic imagination once was characterized by a mix of reality 
and imagination, based on the body and accumulated experience, the Internet splits 
imagination – as a set of self-generated subjective meanings – and the encounter 
with the other, by having them happen at different points in time. Knowledge of 
another is also many times split because the other is apprehended first as a self-
constructed psychological entity, then as a voice, and only later as a moving and 
acting body. (Illouz 2012, 229) 
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In fragmenting the action of meeting other users into different stages, dating apps share a 
common feature with drones. In section 7.2, I showed that the latter also separated the act 
of killing into the separate steps of identifying targets, pulling the trigger and aiming 
weapons. 
Anders’ theory shows how ICT induced fragmentation renders human activity more 
objective, as opposed to conscious and subjective. Hence Anders states:  
If one can speak of “subject” or “subjects”, these are merely constituted by his 
organs: in his eyes which hover over illustrations, his ears which listen to the football 
match, his jaw which chews gum — that is to say: his identity is so utterly 
disorganised, that to look for ‘his true self” would be equivalent to looking for 
something that does not exist. He is not therefore dispersed in a plurality of places 
on earth, but in a plurality of single functions.’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 132, my 
translation) 
This description mirrors the split between rationalistic and emotional faculties through 
dating app use.  
Anders' theory thus goes against postmodern conceptions that celebrate how ICTs 
produce a: 
polycentric experience [which] fits in with the neurological and psychological 
theories that argue that our psychological self is not a unity but ‘rather a 
problematically yoked-together bundle of partly autonomous systems’ (Dennett in 
Mul 2003, 260)  
This conception mistakes the fragmented existence of humans within digital capitalist 
societies with their essence, effectively celebrating the given.  
Anders had a negative take on the separating of sensory functions through ICTs. For 
Anders, this means that there is less scope for creative work as each sense is not allowed to 
work in concert with others. For instance, Anders speaks of a state of the self where:  
it is divided into two or more partial beings, or at least into two or more partial 
functions; in beings and functions that not only are not coordinated, but that cannot 
be coordinated. (Anders [1954] 2003, 131-132) 
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Uncoordinated activity was also a marker for Marx’s concept of alienation. Marx highlights 
how factory work 
does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of 
freedom, both in bodily and in intellectual activity (Marx [1867] 1990, 548) 
Here Marx speaks of physical and mental faculties together, implying that it is part of human 
essence for them to be united. Indeed, he bemoans the 'separation of the intellectual 
faculties of the production process from manual labour’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 548). 
My critical interpretation of the process of fragmentation on dating apps also runs 
counter to Lee's theory of the Informatic Person that 'highlights embodied relations to data 
not just at a discursive or sensory level, but at a material one, and suggests we consider 
what data is doing to our bodies in literal terms' (Lee 2021, 178). Accordingly, Lee considers 
how: 
the rise of dating apps (e.g., Tinder) leverages the locative media functions of an 
interface, pieces of information held in social media networks (i.e., circulation), and a 
matching algorithms (abstraction), to fulfil embodied experience of love, loneliness, 
and companionship. While the public discourse has tended to emphasise a moral 
panic around young people and casual sex, Timmermans and Courtois (2018) note a 
quarter of user seek long-term relationships, reflecting a desire for authentic and 
meaningful connections facilitated through digital technology. (Lee 2021, 177) 
Hence Lee argues that the digital mediation of romance does not reduce, or impoverish, 
users’ emotions. They apprehend digital data in an embodied way and realize their plans 
through this data. This is highlighted by the fact that they still seek meaningful, deep 
connections. In contrast, I argue that users' desire for authentic relationships does not alter 
the reductive and fragmenting affordances of dating apps, which are not a neutral form of 
digital mediation. Furthermore, while it is true that users are fully embodied while looking 
at their phones, it is no less true that their partners are not embodied with them, but only 
separately. This creates an obstacle for the development of sexual and romantic sentiments, 
which users must overcome. 
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Hence I argue that splitting and fragmentation of the individual online contributes 
towards a process of alienation understood as an separation and inversion of subject and 
object. The subject is separated from the object upon which s/he acts through the split 
effected by ICTs. In the next section, I graphically apply this understanding of alienation to 
dating apps. I show how consequently the activity of the subject becomes standardised. The 
living subject becomes an objective source of value and objective profiles acquire a 
semblance of subjectivity. They are treated as living subjects on whose basis users can fall in 
love. 
 
10.3 The standardisation of communication arising from a process of alienation 
For Anders, the absence of ‘living presence’ (Anders [1954] 2003, 125, my translation) 
disrupts the relation between the subject and the object. According to Anders, perceiving a 
spectral image of the object (or the world) conveyed by media means having less scope to 
act upon it. Hence Anders states that: ‘the voices of the world have a free access to us [but] 
we are deprived of rights with respect to it and have no voice in any of the events that are 
transmitted to us’ (Anders [1954] 2003, 125, my translation). This notion is similar to Marx's 
notion that the worker discovers the work process as something that exists and functions 
without him/her. It is discovered as a 'lifeless mechanism which is independent of the 
workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages' (Marx [1867] 1990, 548). 
Lukács later specified how the worker, but also individuals at large, come to be mere 
spectators of their own actions, stating:  
we are witnessing in all behaviour […] the structural analogue to the behaviour of the 
worker vis-a-vis the machine he serves and observes, and whose functions he 
controls while he contemplates it. (Lukács [1923] 1971, 98) 
Lukács' mention of contemplation mirrors Anders’ notion of radio listeners and television 
viewers living in a world of ghosts who have access to them but not the other way around. 
Anders also speaks of an inversion whereby objects acquire a living reality while real 
subjects are reduced to observers. For instance, Anders highlights how humans’ body: 
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is morphologically constant; […] from the point of view of machines: [it is] 
conservative, non-progressive; antiquated; non-modifiable, a dead weight in the 
ascendancy of machines […] the “living creature” [is] frozen and “lacking in 
freedom”; “dead things” are instead dynamic and “free”; because it, as a product of 
nature, being born from a woman, from flesh, is too obviously determined to 
participate with the changes of the world and its products. (Anders [1956] 2003, 41, 
my translation) 
Here, in speaking of ‘dead things’, Anders takes up a Marxist vocabulary which 
conceptualises fixed capital, i.e. machinery, as ‘dead labour’ (Marx [1867] 1990, 548). 
Arguably today mass media are more interactive. Audiences have more input into the 
content they consume. However, I argue that Anders is still relevant to this state of affairs 
because, although users can communicate dialogically, they cannot change the frame, the 
interface, through which they interact (see ‘interactive spectacle’ in Briziarelli 2017, 167). 
They are still, in some respects, spectators of the virtual ecosystem that conditions their 
interactions. What is more, this virtual ecosystem actively endeavours to transform them 
into spectators as its profits are based on users’ viewing adverts on the platforms, and thus 
gazing at its content (see Fuchs 2016a, 243-244). As discussed in section 4.4.3, this is not 
disconnected from the technological hardware that gets produced, which is designed to 
support such interfaces. 
Thus Anders is speaking about a form of alienation which is based on the Marxian notion 
of alienation as a separation and inversion of subject and object. He responds both to 
Marx's ([2010a] 1844, [2010b] 1844) conception of alienation from the object of labour and 
Marx's second conception of alienation, which concerns the worker’s consequent alienation 
from his/her own life activity. In this section, I analyse the first notion by discussing the 
separation between users and between users and ICTs. Second, I look at how the 
consequent alienated activity (in this case communications surrounding sex and romance) is 
characterised by standardisation. 
Below, I draw three diagrams that help to conceptualise a process of alienation arising 
from dating app use. I base this diagram on Mészáros’ discussion of alienation (Mészáros 
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1975, 104-108) as being produced by activity that is structured by private property relations. 
Taking inspiration from this and Anders' theory, I argue that the structuring of users’ activity 
by dating app interfaces contains an alienating dimension. 
 
Figure 10.3.1: Non-alienated interpersonal relations 
Figure 10.3.1 represents interpersonal relations that are free from external mediations. 
Some of this direct communication may be through eye-contact or body-language, for 
instance. This is why S1 and S2 are connected through a direct line marking mutual influence. 
In fact, each element in the triangle influences one-another. Intuitive body-language thus 
influences verbal communication and vice-versa. This form of interaction does not 
necessarily mean that no technology is employed, or that such communication occurs 
outside of given contexts. It simply implies that individuals have a significant degree of 
freedom within the general context in which they find themselves. For instance, S1 and S2 
contribute, and freely react, to the atmosphere of a physical locale, which they can easily 
leave, for instance. More subjects could be added to this graph by making it three-
dimensional. I have represented two subjects for the purpose of simplicity. 
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Figure 10.3.2: Structuring of interpersonal relations through dating app interfaces, involving 
specialised, alienated communication 
Conversely, Figure 10.3.2 represents a situation where the relation between S1 and S2 is 
mediated by the interface of dating apps. The original relation between S1, S2 and C is 
disrupted. Even if S1 and S2 were in the same geographical area, they would no longer be 
directly communicating through, for instance, body-language. Instead, their communication 
would be strongly influenced by the affordances of dating app interfaces, I, favouring short 
form written communication, or texting, and the viewing of people as profiles. Three 
observations highlight the alienating character of this situation. 
Firstly, there is no relation of direct mutual influence between users and the interface (I), 
or the types of communication it favours (C). Use of dating apps involves accepting privacy 
policy agreements that institute and protect the economic interests of dating app 
companies. Generally, but also in this instance, private property relations determine the fact 
that workers (or, in the case of dating apps, users) do not directly control the machinery 
(with dating apps, the interface) or the product (here, data and communication) they 
produce through it. Dating app users are thus separated from the object — understood as 
other users, whom they view as profiles, the technology, over which they have no direct 
control, and the initiation of their sexual or romantic relations, which occurs within the 
frame of dating apps. Because it follows these constraints, S1 and S2 are linked to I and C 
268 
through unidirectional lines. This marks a relation of use-time extraction, rather than 
creative mutual influence. 
Secondly, and following on from this, the process which conditions communications 
escapes users' direct control. User activity is monitored by developers and employed to fine-
tune dating app affordances. This ensures that these encourage behaviour that is aligned 
with the profit motive of dating app enterprises, involving continued use, data collection 
and advertising. This instance corresponds to Marx's derivation of active alienation from 
alienation from the object (Marx [1844b] 2010). Active alienation is thus produced by the 
estranged relation to technology. This is highlighted by Anders' statement that:  
Just as the Marxist definition is still valid, which says that as non-owners of our 
means of production we are not free, it is also true, on the other hand, that today 
this definition does not go far enough. More precisely: it is only valid for one-third of 
our current non-freedom. To describe it completely, we have to complete it with two 
additional features: first, we must add that today we are also excluded from the co-
determination of the effects of our products, which, in certain circumstances, would 
also be valid if we were the owners of our means of production; and second, we have 
to add that the pleasure we obtain from the products, insofar as it performs a service 
function, in the last instance belongs to those who are served by means of that 
pleasure and therefore it is not our property, either. (Anders [1980] 2011, 119) 
Hence Anders states that not only means of production but also products, especially 
technological ones, condition human activity. This statement's inclusion of the concept of 
pleasure and of pleasurable activity as being potentially exploited and alienated seems 
particularly relevant to dating apps. The latter enable flirtatious communications and sexual 
and romantic relations but only through the prism of a specific technological structure that 
is strongly moulded by a profit motive. 
Third, the interface of dating apps further interacts, and follows patterns, of other social 
media platforms. They are compatible with other platforms where users further produce 
and curate an online presence. For instance, as I described in 10.2, the dating app The 
League mentions users' LinkedIn page. Moreover, dating apps such as Tinder, Hinge and 
Bumble allow users to link their Facebook and Instagram pages. This creates a virtual 
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ecosystem where communications are increasingly founded on image-based profiles with 
minimal text. Both the fact that users interact as profiles and the fact that this form of 
interaction becomes increasingly standard online produces a generalised effect of 
standardisation in the presentation of the individual online. Hence I, C, EP and VE are 
connected by bi-directional lines that mark mutual influence. The graph thus illustrates how 
there is tendency for objective platforms have influence over subjective communication, 
while real subjects’ (users’) control is limited. These three elements thus mark a separation 
and inversion of subject and object. 
 
Figure 10.3.6:  Process of alienation and structuring of communication 
Figure 10.3.6 represent the process of narrowing down and standardisation of 
communication. Real subjects feed into this circuit as communication occurs thanks to their 
actions and the interface functions thanks to the content they upload and the work of 
developers. However, the circuit happens outside of their control, as they do not have direct 
control over the interface. Hence it is as though they were producing an alien object 
through their activities. The latter sets the conditions within which they act subsequently. 
Dating app affordances favour speed and hence privilege images over long text or sound. 
Written communications are constrained by the inefficiency of typing on a smartphone and 
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therefore tend to be reduced to a few sentences. This limits the scope of what can be 
discussed. As I show below, consequently many different users present themselves 
following the same format and using the same tropes. Many profiles come to resemble one-
another, and users become interchangeable and easily replaced, or 'disposable' (S, female, 
age: 29; P, male, age: 31; J, female, age: 29). As the recipe for communications becomes 
standardised, it is almost as though it did not require users' subjective input to take place. 
Standardised chat up lines and bios are used. All that is needed is users' use time. This effect 
is analogous to the workers' work presenting itself as a fixed and ‘objectively calculable 
work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and established reality’ (Lukács [1923] 1971, 
88). Hence subjective communication acquires an increasingly objective quality.  
This process of standardisation is highlighted by a recent Tinder advert that highlights the 
supposed creativity of its users by showcasing their bios, the short text accompanying their 
profiles. The video hosting the advert is entitled: 'We Made a Song Inspired by Tinder bios' 
(Tinder 2020). This caption uses a predication strategy that constructs the act of producing a 
bio as inspirational, creative and craft-like. Some of these, are presented as daring 
statements such as the one featured in featured in Figure 10.3.3. 
  
Figure 10.3.3: An official promotional video from Tinder promoting a song 'inspired by Tinder 
bios'. From Tinder. 2021c. We Made A Song Inspired By Tinder Bios | Tinder. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uhRU7tKLd6c 
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The statement makes direct reference to sexual practices and uses a pun and metaphor to 
also make a point about the user's support for environmental causes. However, an exact 
search for this sentence on Google yields over 4000 matches, evidencing how the sentence 
is also printed on t-shirts for sale (see Figure 10.3.4). 
  
Figure 10.3.4: Google search checking for the originality of a user’s Tinder bio 
This evidences how ready-made phrases circulate on dating apps in guise of daring 
presentations of the person. At the same time, this statement highlights the culture of 
speed and directness on dating apps, which I discussed in section 9.3, as users list desired 
sexual practices even before they interact. For instance, one dating app, Feeld, is specifically 
designed to match users on the basis of their sexual preferences. As one journalist 
interviewing the Feeld CEO states, on Feeld: 
“there’s a ‘desires’ section in your bio for interests beyond your book club. You can 
type anything, with common entries being ‘threesomes’, ‘sexting’, ‘dominant’, 
‘submissive’, ‘kink’, ‘friendships’, ‘group’ and […] ‘FWB’ (friends with benefits)” 
(Bergum 2021) 
The app interface creates affordances for sexual preferences to be communicated up front, 
through suggesting ‘common entries’ to choose from. Feeld professes to be ‘[o]ne of the 
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largest open-minded communities worldwide’ (Feeld 2021) and to allow users to choose 
from ‘20+ sexualities and gender identities’ (Feeld 2021). However, I argue that this 
apparent liberalism masks a process of technological alienation.  
The very structure of the technology risks reinstating rigid codes in the sphere of 
sexuality under the guise of progressivism. Users are encouraged to outline a preconceived 
idea of what type of sex they are seeking even before they interact with their partners. This 
potentially limits dynamic sexual and romantic communication and self-discovery, favouring 
transactional interactions. It also illustrates the culture Anders described (see section 9.5) 
that tends to abolish the private sphere, as users are encouraged to make public their sexual 
preferences and conform to specific labels. Hence, despite the app founder’s best 
intentions, rather than helping users ‘explore dating beyond the norm’, Feeld risks re-
instating a new norm. Rather than ‘normalising sexual desire’ (Feeld 2021), Feeld risks 
standardising the latter.  
Feeld mirrors a neoliberal ideology. The platform emphasises more choice rather than 
the freedom to modify the parameters offering these choices. Like other SNSs, it ultimately 
treats individuals as mere ‘prosumers’ (Fuchs 2016a, 244) of culture, seeing in every one of 
their idiosyncrasies an opportunity for profit. Feeld illustrates Anders’ argument that ‘the 
epoch of the reproduction is the fundamentally non-revolutionary epoch’ (Anders [1980] 
2011, 59). However, Anders also states that the 
permanent revolution, that of technology, which is neutral with respect to the 
system, that is, it has established its dictatorship equally everywhere, and also 
remains constant even after sudden political changes, as if nothing had happened, 
that is, it continues its feverish pace of development. (Anders  [1980] 2011, 72) 
Thus it does not matter if Feeld is an outwardly progressive company. The fact that it uses 
technologies forged under capitalism, which are not substantially different to the ones used 
by other dating app companies, means that it is likely to reproduce capitalist forms of 
alienation. Paradoxically, the apparent openness and variety in sexuality on Feeld feeds into 
273 
the general process of standardisation of sexual and romantic communication on dating 
apps.  
For instance, the dating app Hinge also uses stereotyped openers and prompts to 
encourage users to flirt. It proposes the same prompts to all users worldwide, 
demonstrating a lack of concern for cultural specificities. 
 
Figure 10.3.5: Hinge prompts and responses. From Hernandez, Eddie. 2020. “Best Hinge 
Prompts, Answers To Use On Your Dating Profile.” March 6, 2020. https://eddie-
hernandez.com/best-hinge-questions/ 
On Figure 10.3.5, the first line represents one out of a selection of prompts that the Hinge 
app requires users to respond to. The second line is the user's response. It was published on 
the website of an 'online dating consultant' (Hernandez 2020) who helps users respond to 
such prompts. The use of a coach to create a profile further shows how dating app profiles 
may be unrepresentative of each individual's personality and values. Instead, profiles are 
primarily aimed at ‘filtering’ (A, male, age: 27; L, male, age: 28; K, male, age: 30; B, male, 
age: 27) and ‘bait[ing]’ (L, male, age: 27) prospective partners. 
In following a narrow format, all conversations tend to resemble one-another. One user 
spoke directly to the ‘disinterested’ and ‘superficial’ effect this has on the ensuing 
conversations. She stated:  
I think it was just a not very healthy way of interacting with people, because it means 
that you're not really invested in any of these people that you're talking to. You 
actually end up with a very high level of indifference to just these relationships that 
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you're forming. Em and that makes it again quite a superficial, like really superficial 
conversations which are about nothing really. It's either about nothing, or two 
parties trying to impress each other with would be banter or: I've done this, I've 
done this too… you know trying to like do one-upmanship sometimes. So I think that 
that’s not negative but I think that it makes you quite jaded in terms of speaking to 
people or interacting with people. (N, female, age: 30) 
This user employs a nomination strategy that constructs the users she interacts with as 
numerous and interchangeable. She calls them ‘any of these people’ through a negative 
sentence construction (‘not really invested in’). The topos of lack of investment is connected 
to apathy. She also employs a nomination strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) discursively 
qualifies the conversations as valueless describing them as being ‘about nothing’. She 
employs the topos of indifference in relation to interactions with strangers on the internet. 
Indeed she doesn’t qualify the interactions as outright ‘negative’ but prefers to qualify them 
as ‘superficial’, ‘not very healthy’ and as tied to feeling ‘jaded’.  
Anders was preoccupied with the standardisation of sexual and romantic communication 
during his time. This is evidenced by his observation that lovers turn on the radio because it 
'offers that pre-masticated sexual excitation that, in reality, you should generate through 
your proximity' (Anders [1984] 2004, 129, my translation). Anders also criticised the practice 
of lovers sending vocal messages with stereotyped background music, stating: 
When a lover recites a similar love letter for illiterates, he does so to a pre-recorded 
musical piece, because "nothing but his own voice" would be considered too meagre 
a gift. When it reaches its destination, the one that needs to talk or persuade, in 
some respects a wedding matron made thing, is this third voice (Anders [1956] 2003, 
105 my translation) 
This passage shows how Anders was sensitive to the trend of standardising sexual and 
romantic communications, seeing it as evidence that human potentialities were not fully 
realised during interactions. Human creativity was replaced by machine functions. 
I argue that therefore the processes of standardisation linked to dating app use does not 
just produce disenchantment as suggested by the concept of McDonaldization (Ritzer 2019). 
It limits the scope for creative communication and hence the scope for the conscious and 
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social fulfilment of human potentialities. It is consequently properly a process of alienation. 
Anders spoke to the fact that this process resulted in a distancing of human essence, 
particularly with regard to its self-consciousness and self-determining character.  
Anders, in a statement that could almost be understood to refer to dating app users 
establishing feelings of attraction for one-another on the basis of virtual profiles, states that 
'there is nothing that accomplishes alienation so definitively than us continuing to pass the 
day under the guidance of these pseudo-friends' (Anders [1956] 2003, 122, my translation). 
This is because the: 
supposition that we, beings that are exclusively fed with surrogates, modules and 
ghosts, are still individuals endowed with our own personality, and that it is therefore 
still possible to prevent us from being or finding "ourselves", is too optimistic. 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 122, my translation) 
Anders’ analysis fits with a Marxian interpretation of alienation. It highlights the fact that 
communication taking place through the prism of modern mass media risks splitting, 
fragmenting and standardising human interactions. This means that this form of 
communication no longer affords a full realisation of human essence. In the case of dating 
apps, it acts against the creativity inherent to the formation of sexual and romantic 
relations.  
Next, I highlight how this process of standardisation has ramification for users’ 
presentation of self. 
 
10.4 Beauty standards and users’ presentation of self 
RQ2.2 touched on the issue of how use of dating apps affects users’ perception of beauty 
standards. Hence my questionnaire included the question: (3.2.5) Have you ever been 
confronted with unrealistic expectations with regard to standards of beauty on dating apps? 
Has this ever made you feel negative about yourself? This question is relevant to the notion 
that users’ presentation of self on dating apps is standardised, as it is encouraged to adhere 
to a rigid structure linked to the affordances of the technology. 
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The answer to this question given by my interviewees was not clear-cut. On the one 
hand, many interviewees expressed the opinion that dating apps were not as bad as other 
types of media for fostering negative body-image in users. For instance, one user stated that 
Tinder, for instance, is ‘probably a much more honest lens because the media is an echo 
chamber whereas Tinder is very direct’ (I, male, age: 30). The topos of echo chamber implies 
that traditional media narrowly re-enforce specific types of beauty ideals. The same user 
stated that, in contrast, Grindr is ‘a jungle’ (I, male, age: 30). The topos of jungle is 
connected to being free and feral like an animal. The respondent used this topos to convey 
the sense that Grindr contains a liberating dimension. He argued that any body type is 
accepted on this platform, including ones that do not conform to the standard ideal of 
beauty. Another user emphasised how there are a lot of ‘unattractive people who use 
Tinder as well and that helps to, I don’t know, make it more humane, I guess’ (E, male, age: 
21). By referring to the topos of humanity, this user implies that Tinder and other similar 
platforms create space for a range of different body types.  
However, there were also responses that contradicted this impression. For instance, E 
described how dating apps also respond to a 
ruthless law of the market in which thousands of bodies are pressed into. There is a 
very savage adherence to the mean, in that case. And I think that that mean is: if 
you’re a man, being over six foot and quite muscle-y. (E, male, age: 21) 
The topos of a ‘ruthless law of the market’ and ‘savage[ry]’ underlines the competitive and 
individualistic aspect of dating apps that I have discussed in section 9.3. The user explained 
his dislike for the fact that many female users of dating apps specify that they are not 
interested in men that are under 6’. Indeed another user spoke of feeling ‘small’ (C, male, 
age: 23) because ‘I'm 5’10. So every second profile was [asking for partners who were] 6 
foot or more’ (C, male, age: 23). He moreover referred to a friend of a similar height to him 
also becoming more concerned with his divergence from this ideal image of male beauty 
that is demanded by other users on dating apps. He recounted about his friend that: 
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he's about the same height as me. And he had never really thought about it. But now 
I hear him talking about it. And yeah, I don't know if it's because he's been using 
more dating apps, or because I said to him that… Yeah, he’s certainly mentioned it 
more than… Well the first time I mentioned it he said that he’d never thought about 
it. (C, male, age: 23)  
The respondent uses the verbal tee up ‘certainly’ and ‘well’ as an intensification strategy to 
highlight the likelihood that his friend’s new concern with height was linked to his dating 
app use. This illustrates how dating apps provide space for everyday humans to set up a 
profile and interact with each other. However, the competitive and individualistic aspect of 
dating app design, which offers affordances for users to set out their desires and 
expectations one-sidedly on their profiles even before interacting with other users, tends to 
make use of dating apps reinforce existing beauty standards, as there is initially less space 
for dynamic interaction between users. Indeed pre-formatted profiles are matched by the 
algorithm on the basis of right-swipes that occurred at different times and in different 
physical locales. This finding corroborates Zuboff’s notion of ‘self-objectification associated 
with social comparison’ on SNSs, where ‘first we present ourselves as data objects for 
inspection, and then we experience ourselves as the “it” that others see’ (Zuboff 2019, 464). 
A female user summed up the bottom-line situation on dating apps by stating: ‘definitely 
everyone is trying to look attractive, because they’re trying to attract people’ (D, female, 
age: 21). The same user spoke of her thought process in constructing her profiles as being 
based on pictures that ‘had got quite a lot of likes on Instagram’ (D, female, age: 21). This 
would make her think that ‘[t]hat would be a good photo to use’ (D, female, age: 21). Hence 
users select photos which have gotten the most likes, i.e. approval by users of other social 
media. This illustrates the notion of an alienated digital ecosystem I introduced above, 
whereby a general logic of quantified popularity influences most social media platforms. 
However, approval seeking behaviour is also reinforced by the internal set of affordances 
offered by dating apps. Hence another user equally described how: 
the images I initially chose were quite conservative, putting one in formal attire, one 
doing sports, one with friends or something like that. And then I started changing 
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that. So, once I'd been using it a bit more, I don't know why—maybe it's because of 
sort of subconsciously looking at other profiles—but I selected more images with less 
clothing. So like I started putting up like shirtless pictures and stuff, and I actually got 
more matches doing that than not. So I continued with that, to be honest. (A, male, 
age: 27) 
The repetition of filler words ‘so’ and ‘like’ coupled with the verbal tee-up ‘to be honest’ 
participate in a mitigation strategy aimed at reducing the illocutionary force (Wodak and 
Meyer 2016, 33) of the users’ communication that he succumbed to the ‘numbers’ game’ (L, 
male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) dynamic of dating apps in his 
presentation of self. He employed photos which would captivate the most attention, rather 
than the one he initially spontaneously selected. 
This shows how the standard structure of dating apps, which is designed along 
competitive lines, predominates over and negates the affordances for the free expression of 
each users’ individuality, which it also contains. To attract other users, individuals present 
themselves on the basis of external judgements about what self-representations are 
desirable. There are also specific affordances that automate this process. For instance, as 
described on one magazine article, on Tinder, a feature called Smart Photos: 
will continually assess how favourably people have responded to each of your profile 
photos, and automatically order them so that your most popular photo appears first - 
taking out all the guesswork as to which photo you look best in. (Preston 2021) 
This statement employs deictics (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) (‘you’) to enact 
perspectivation strategy that expresses proximity with users. It thus constructs the act of 
appealing to the greatest number on dating apps as common sense and logical. It thus 
evidences how the presentation of users’ profiles may often fail to meaningfully reflect the 
individual. Instead it may primarily respond to external constraints. 
This highlights how there is an unfree dimension in the presentation of dating app users’ 
personality on these platforms. For instance, various users reported following precise, 
standardised parameters for presenting their profiles on dating apps, which they learnt from 
friends who were more experienced users. For instance, user D states: ‘there seemed to be 
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quite a lot of strict rules about what photos work and what photos don’t’ (D, female, age: 
21). She explains: 
So for girls it's like: don't just put photos that are selfies. Like, you definitely have to 
put photos that other people have taken of you. You can't be wearing make up in 
every single photo. What other thing? Oh, yeah, you can't just have photos of only 
like your face. You have to have one photo where people can view your entire body. 
Like, you should be like smiling in some of them. That kind of thing. (D, female, age: 
21) 
Another user similarly stated that: ‘You always have a selfie and then a photo with other 
people. And then maybe one where you're in a different situation. So like on holiday or 
whatever’ (N, female, age: 30). The imperative tense (‘you can’t’; ‘have to’) employed by 
respondent D participates in a predication strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that 
constructs following the above rules as an obligation. The implicature is that this is 
something that must be done for the apps to work. These respondents show how users of 
dating apps must, on the one-hand, put forward a positive image of themselves and, on the 
other hand, put their bodies on show for other users to assess in terms of attractiveness. 
This evidences how dating apps offer affordances for flirtation to be structured like a beauty 
and popularity contest. 
It moreover highlights Anders’ idea that modern forms of apparent creativity actually 
contribute towards mass production. Anders’ observes that, caught in the web of modern 
technology, we: 
misinterpret the assigned character of our creative acts […] causing us not to 
recognize that our contributions only represent intermediate phases in the process 
of production and distribution as a whole (Anders [1980] 2011, 128) 
Indeed dating app users act as prosumers (Fuchs 2016a, 244) because through uploading 
captivating images that fit the requirements of dating apps they provide the content that 
others view on these platforms. They thus, in some respects, partly produce the platform. 
However, this production is unfree because it follows rigid parameters. Accordingly, I argue 
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that dating apps alienate users in limiting their creative control over communication in the 
sphere of sex and romance, which they end up impoverishing and standardising. 
Arguably, this dynamic fosters the ‘staged’ aspect of dating apps that most respondents 
reported (16 out of 18). For instance, speaking of himself, one user suggested that: ‘I mean, 
I definitely would have had a picture of me at a festival and I haven't been to a festival for 
years now’ (B, male, age: 27). This illustrates Anders’ idea that the ‘conversion of our lives 
into images is a technique of illusionism, since it gives us and must give us the illusion that 
we are viewing reality’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 177, italics in original). It shows how there is a 
difference between appearance and essence on dating apps. Users produce their own 
fetishized personal presentations, which often conform to dominant cultures. This is 
because their personal presentations happen through a standardised medium, the online 
dating app profile. This illustrates Anders’ argument that: 
Because most products are commodities that are mass-produced, they transform 
those who use them in the same way they are produced, and thus homogenize them, 
and therefore turn them into masses. The mass commodity produces standardized 
mass style. (Anders [1980] 2011, 181) 
Similarly, the very structure of dating app technology creates pressures for users to appeal 
to the greatest number. Individuals feel that they must adhere to a standard ideal even 
when they are seeking sexual and romantic partners that, one would hope, appreciate them 
for who they are. In the conclusion, however, I comment on practices of resistance some 
users put up against this pressure. 
Next, I discuss how the interactions that standardised presentations of self foster appear 
to users as less rich and meaningful than the ones that are favoured by spontaneous in-
person encounters. 
 
10.5 Users' discourses denoting one-dimensional communications and 
homogenisation 
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Many users spoke about the intuitive, organic and immediate nature of chance 
encounters. They opposed this to the deceptive character of online interactions. Describing 
how chance encounters compare to dating app meetings, one of my respondents stated 
that: 
I mean, it’s a lot more fulfilling, I guess. Because it’s less transactional. It’s more kind 
of like organic and emotional. There’s more of an adrenaline [rush] […] 
–And do you have a preference between that or using dating apps? 
Yeah, I mean, I definitely prefer, hands down, the chance encounters… because it’s 
like a full… it’s a full-body experience, it’s a full mental, physical… It’s a much more 
satisfactory kind of experience (R, male, age: 30) 
Here the user employs the topos of wholesome nature, implying that what is ‘organic’ is 
richer, freer and more ‘fulfilling’ than what is business-like and ‘transactional’. The user 
further employs the topos of human nature being both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’. This echoes 
the passage, cited in section 10.2, where Marx argues that these faculties should be united. 
Hence he speaks of a 'full mental, physical…[experience]' and a ‘full-body experience’ which 
is ‘emotional’ and much more ‘satisfactory’. The respondent further uses a strategy of 
intensification, to underline the sincerity of his expressive speech act (Searle [1979] 2005, 
15). He thus uses modal particles, verbs of feeling and metaphors: ‘I definitely prefer, hands 
down’. He further characterises in-person encounters as an ‘adrenaline [rush]’ to convey 
their pleasure and intensity. 
Another user spoke of the intuitive nature of in-person meetings as opposed to the 
virtual nature of online interactions on dating apps, stating: 
I think that in my case the online was almost like a premise for meeting. Like, if you 
didn't have the online part, you wouldn't meet. And then…because I think that online 
is still a very virtual thing, you need to actually meet somebody to know the look and 
feel and actually like the vibe and if you actually get along. (J, female, age: 29) 
This interviewee uses the topos of online interactions being ‘virtual’ and hence less real to 
express the feeling that it is difficult or impossible to establish feelings of attraction for 
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someone one has not met in person. The user further employs the topos of a distinction 
between virtual as being one-dimensional and in person interactions being rich, unifying and 
multi-faceted. She therefore speaks of a 'look and feel' and 'vibe' in relation to the latter. 
The expression vibe refers to the concept of vibration, or energy, exuded by someone’s 
entire physical being. The expression contains the implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) 
that physical and mental sensations are unified. 
Another user spoke of finding it hard to relate to someone emotionally over text stating 
that what was important in forming feelings of attraction was:   
body language that type of thing… I obviously built a connection through that, where 
I find it difficult generally to relate emotionally over text anyway. So I think that was 
the difference, just having that body language. (A, male, age: 27) 
This user also employs the topos of the look and feel of somebody conveying the sense that 
body-language was a crucial way for him to feel attracted to someone. The topos of body-
language is linked to implicit communication joining physical gestures with mental 
intuitions. It is seen as uncontrolled and spontaneous and thus less prone to being 
deceptive. Through a reverse logic, these users indirectly mirror Anders' notion of alienation 
as being produced by the separation of human faculties, which in turn mirrors Marx's notion 
of alienation involving a fragmentation of various aspects of physical and mental labour.  
Other users referred to the staggered dimension of dating app use by describing the 
process of getting to know someone through dating apps as uncertain, misleading and 
sclerotic. One user opposed this to the 'immediate' sensation he attributed to in-person 
encounters. He stated: 
I think that like, you know, if you've met someone in person, there's like an 
immediate attraction and feeling, in my opinion. I mean, it's very hard. It's very easy 
sorry to get carried away through an app where you kind of feel like you're 
developing this relationship with someone despite not even meeting them. I think 
the immediacy you get from meeting someone face-to-face at a gig or whatever the 
circumstances is, you kind of understand immediately how you feel or, maybe not 
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completely, but you know, you have that level of attraction for someone that it feels 
worth pursuing. (B, male, age: 27) 
Here the interviewee uses deictics (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to place the listener in his 
position. This participates in a perspectivisation strategy which is aimed at conveying the 
sense that interactions on apps are deceptive and that it is easy for anyone to get ‘carried 
away’. In contrast, in-person interactions confer ‘immedia[te]’ knowledge over one’s 
feelings. The topos of ‘immediacy’ is unifying. It implies that feelings are related to all the 
senses, both mental and physical faculties, not sight alone. In-person interactions thus 
present a well-rounded picture of the person. 
Discursive 
device 
Discursive device Citation Users 
Nomination 
strategies 
Tropes related to the human 
body and denoting a unifying 
dimension 
full body experience; full 
mental, physical…; body 
language; organic and 
emotional; adrenaline 
[rush]; look and feel; 
vibe; chemistry 
S, female, 
age: 29; N, 
female, age: 
30; K, male, 
age: 30; I, 
male, age: 
29; P, male, 
age: 31; A, 
male, age: 27 
Tropes related to a sense of 
agency; the subject is acting on 
a definite object (the other 
person; in-person 
communication), not an 
uncertain one (highly mediated 
communication occurring 
through a smartphone) 
 
immediate attraction and 
feeling; immediacy; that 
level of attraction…worth 
pursuing; build a 
connection 
B, male, age: 
27; R, male, 
age: 30; N, 
female, age: 
30 




qualifying in person 
interactions as more fulfilling 
more fulfilling; much 
more satisfactory kind of 
experience 
R, male, age: 
30 
Table 10.4.1: Users discourses comparing dating app encounters to in-person encounters 
Table 10.4.1 highlights the discursive strategies that users adopt to talk about in-person 
sexual and romantic encounters. Some employed tropes that related to the human body 
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and that also implied a sense of unity. For instance, 'body language' denotes a form of 
communication that occurs through use of the entire body. Another user speaks of a ‘full 
body experience’, implying that with in-person encounters perception of the other person 
and resulting sensations occurs with the entire body. He further speaks of these interactions 
being organic (topos of the organic whole) and emotional (topos of mental faculties). The 
users also consequently characterise the ensuing feelings of attraction as immediate and as 
giving rise to the agential activity of 'building a connection'. This conveys a sense of unity 




Discursive device Citation Users 
Nomination 
strategies 
Tropes denoting the 
superficiality of in-app 
communications 
really superficial 
conversations which are 
about nothing really; would 





Adjectives and evaluative 
attributions 
Transactional; virtual (world); 
not a very healthy way; not 
really invested; high level of 
indifference; quite jaded 
R, male, 30; 
N, female, 
30; E, male, 
21; A, male, 
27; Q, male, 
27; J, female, 
age: 29; M, 
male, age: 
30; B, male, 
age: 27; O, 
female, 30 
Table 10.4.2: Users’ discourses characterising dating app encounters 
In contrast, table 10.4.2 highlights the nomination and discursive strategies some users 
employed to describe communications on dating app platforms. Users speak of a 
transactional, competitive and individualistic character of communications. They speak of 
disinterestedness for their partners and of this form of communication not being ‘healthy’ 
(N, female, age: 30). These aspects show that many users dislike the fragmented and 
standardised character of communications on dating apps. 
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Next, I show how this situation can result in users feeling interchangeable and 
'disposable'. 
 
10.6 Feeling 'disposable' 
As discussed so far, the mediation of sexual and romantic interactions through the prism 
of dating apps contains a tendency for communications to become fragmented, as physical 
and mental sensations are separated. There is also a tendency for them to become 
standardised, with conversations losing meaning. In this section, I outline how some users 
feel 'disposable' (S, female, age: 29; P, male, age: 31; J, female, age: 29) as a result, as users 
become interchangeable objects of others’ individualistic desire. 
For instance, one user sated: 
I can characterise relationships that come about via dating apps as short-lived and 
disposable (S, female, age: 29) 
Here the user employs the topos that dating apps favour quick sexual and romantic 
relationships that are 'short-lived'. The user suggests that dating apps favour uncommitted 
sexual and romantic relationships. 
Another respondent spoke to this idea. The user connected the notion of disposability to 
the topos of individual convenience. He stated: 
Oh, no, it's the convenience and the just the, the disposable-ness of it. Yeah, you 
know, people are disposable now, whether you know them or not, or wherever you 
met him on a dating app. It's just a conversation. (P, male, age: 31) 
This user employs an implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) stating ('people are 
disposable now') to imply that with the advent of modern ICTs all interactions are 'just a 
conversation'. This implies that human relations mediated by modern ICTs within the virtual 
ecosystem are non-committal. 
Another said: 
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some people, I think, when they use dating apps, they are just: Ok, I'm interested in 
it for a short-term thing. And it has a very disposable aspect in mind. I think those 
people are more likely to just ghost people if this doesn't go well. (J, female, age: 29) 
The user employs free direct speech ('Ok I'm interested in a short-term thing') as a 
perspectivation strategy that highlights the notion of individual gain on dating apps. 
She further employs anthropomorphic images stating 'it [the app] has a very disposable 
aspect in mind' to argue that users' feelings of disposability is tied to the very functioning of 
dating apps. The user further connects the notion of disposability to that of 'ghost[ing]'.  
Ghosting is an expression that has become popular in the latter part of the 2010s. It 
refers to the practice of breaking off communications abruptly with a friend, lover or 
acquaintance without any apparent justification or warning and ignoring all subsequent 
attempts by the person to re-establish contact. Ghosting applies to online communications, 
where individuals can both reach out to and ignore each other more easily. Ghosting is 
connected to the feeling of disposability some dating app users experience, as the practice 
of ghosting denotes a lack of care for the person who is ghosted as no 'closure whatsoever' 
(B, male, age: 27) is provided to them, even where romantic feelings and sex is involved. 
Users were generally unhappy with the disposable character of dating app interactions 
and the practice of ghosting, reporting 'bleak' (B, male, age: 27) and 'lonely' (B, male, age: 
27) feelings in connection to it. However, I argue that the abruptness of ghosting is 
legitimated and institutionalised by the very functioning of the app, where users have '100 
chats on the go' (P, male, age: 31). P's hyperbole (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) underlines 
the frenetic speed of dating app functioning, with which users struggle to keep up.  
The difference between ghosting and breaking up with someone, even in a sudden 
manner, is its integration into a practice of sampling and disposing of other users. Bergström 
has positively characterised this process as that of 'experienc[ing]/trial[ing]' [éprouvent] 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §16, my translation) other users. However, I argue that the latter 
implies little regard for their feelings, or the common courtesies normally expected by 
individuals. Users are thus treated as though they were products and not humans. In fact, 
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the expression ‘disposable’ contains the implicature (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that 
humans are like trash.  
Anders argued that, in a world where products were designed to have a limited lifespan 
so as to favour increased consumption and production, it was natural for modern 
consumers' disregard for products to transform into a disregard for people. Hence he states: 
Since we live in a world that consists exclusively of things that are not only 
replaceable, but must be replaced […], it is not only plausible, but simply inevitable 
[…] that we should cultivate a lack of attentiveness and respect in handling things, in 
our activity, in our habits and our physiognomy. And not only with regard to things. 
[…] Humanity, which treats the world as a world to use and then throw in the trash, 
also treats its own kind as humanity to use and then throw in the trash. (Anders 
[1980] 2011, 25) 
This shows how, for Anders, capitalist consumerism is connected to the deterioration of 
interpersonal relations and their transformation into individual relations of consumption. 
This results in a process of alienation whereby humans are no longer treated as humans but 
as objects of consumption. This applies to the world of dating apps where users seem 
replaceable and ‘disposable’. This is reflected in their very functioning where each swipe or 
like literally results in a new profile appearing on the screen. 
This section has introduced the notion that dating app use could be tied with a 
consumeristic attitude with regard to sex and user interactions. I further explore this next. 
 
10.7 Consumeristic sex and feelings of disconnection 
In section 9.3, I discussed the individualistic dimension of dating app use, linking it to 
interface functioning and the fact that it is structured like a competitive game. I primarily 
discussed the effect that this could have on how users treat each other rather than on each 
user’s individual psychological state. However, I touched on the fact that some users feel 
'regret and guilt' (A, male, age: 27) for their own behaviour on dating apps. Others further 
feel that this does not reflect who they are. Hence one user stated: 'I don't like to think that 
my behaviour on that app was representative of who I am as a person outside of it', adding 
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'I don't think [the way I've used dating apps] fits with my personality' (E, male, age: 21). 
Below, I expand on this thread by showing how the consumeristic, repetitive functioning of 
dating apps can sometimes lead users to behave in ways that are disconnected from their 
identity. 
One user spoke of the practice of direct sex on the gay hook-up app Grindr. Despite being 
more accurately described as a hook-up rather than a dating app, Grindr is also the first 
successful app of its kind: image-dominated smartphone applications connecting users 
through geo-localisation. It spawned the concept for later dating apps such as Tinder, 
Bumble, Hinge, CoffeeMeetsBagle, Feeld etc. Hence it arguably brings into focus essential 
dynamics relating to this form of technology.  
The specificity of user practices on Grindr is that users typically decide to have sex before 
they meet in person, asking in the chat of the app ‘Sex? Yes? No?' (M, male, age: 30). 
Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz (2018) have shown how this can sometimes lead to tensions upon 
meeting someone face-to-face, with some uploading misleading photographs so as to 
exploit: 
the notion of commitment and expectations that increase the resistance to 
terminating connection at this phase of interaction [upon arrival at someone’s 
home]. It is possible that the man was seeking to strategically exploit this resistance 
in using an old photograph, expecting that Travis would follow through on his 
commitment to hook-up (Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz 2018, 2480) 
When I asked one of my respondents whether this practice could lead users to sleep with 
people they would not have otherwise slept with, he replied: 
Ehm, I think it’s very likely. 
–Can you explain a bit more why perhaps? 
I mean for me I used Grindr before. You just have that desire all of a sudden, you 
need something, someone. And then you just go and see who is available. Like, 
literally who is here. And you just go there. And when you’re finished, it just feels like 
you’ve got no connection with that guy. But it satisfies your physical need and then 
you just go away. In many cases, you wouldn’t talk to that guy again. You just finish 
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that one off and then you talk to the next. Even, when it’s the next time and you’re in 
need, he might be there nearby, but you wouldn’t try him out again. 
– That’s interesting. So do you think that, in a sense, you have sex with someone just 
because that’s what you’re there to do, and it doesn’t really matter whether you 
have a connection with that person or not? 
Yeah, I think that’s right. It’s not right. But that happened to me. And it's just very 
physical the whole thing.  
– So are you neutral about that kind of thing? You said that as long as you practice 
safe sex, it’s fine. Or do you think that there’s perhaps a more negative aspect to it? 
Morally it could be quite negative. Because sometimes, even if I did that – I fulfilled 
the physical need… But then afterwards I would find it slightly weird. Like, What have 
I done? What have I just done? And then that might last for maybe a couple of days 
and then it might happen again, who knowns. (M, male, age: 30) 
The user employs both nomination and predication strategies to define his motivation for 
engaging in this form of activity as a ‘physical need’. By stating that his desire is both a 
‘need’ and qualifying it as a ‘physical need’ the user is conveying the sense that engaging in 
this practice is a question of necessity. Indeed he further uses the expressions ‘next time’, 
‘the next’ and 'in need'. Together these expressions participate in a nomination strategy 
that constructs app use as a consumption cycle that is similar to that of addiction, where a 
craving is fixed and iterative. 
The respondent also employs nomination strategies to construct actors and processes 
relating to direct sex on Grindr as individualistic and consumeristic. Hence he states ‘you 
need something, someone’. The anthroponym 'something' participates in a nomination 
strategy that constructs his prospective sexual partners as objects of his sexual gratification. 
He also refers to them as ‘the next’, which constructs the process of meeting them as a 
chain of consumption. He specifies he wouldn’t ‘try him out again’. This constructs the 
action of sleeping with someone as a form of consumeristic sampling of a product. The user 
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further highlights the individualistic quality of the encounters when he relates feeling 'no 
connection with that guy'. 
The user employs expressive speech acts and strategies of intensification and mitigation 
(Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to equally underline the consumeristic way in which he had 
sex with his partners. Hence he uses augmentatives (‘literally’; ‘just’) to intensify the 
illocutionary force of his expression of feelings of need and, later, disconnection. Hence he 
states: ‘literally who is here’ and ‘it just feels like you have no connection with that guy’. He 
further uses direct free speech as perspectivisations strategy to place the listener in his 
shoes and convey to him/her his feelings of confusion by saying: ‘What have I done? What 
have I just done?’  This use of free direct speech conveys his confusion and disorientation 
with regard to his actions. He thus arguably illustrates Anders’ notion of Promethean shame, 
which is a ‘relation with one-self that fails’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 68, my translation). 
However, he also mitigates the illocutionary force (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) of his 
communication of confusion and regret, by using diminutives such as ‘slightly’ and questions 
rather than assertions ‘who knows’. The fluctuating rhythm of the user's narrative thus also 
points towards the cyclical and consumeristic nature of his usage practices. 
He further employs a perspectivisation strategy based on the use of passive sentence 'it's 
not right. But that happened to me' to express his distance with regard to his own actions 
on Grindr. He employs a predication strategy to characterise the experience of ‘fulfil[ling]’ 
his ‘need’ as being purely ‘physical’. This suggests that the experience is reduced because 
the fulfilment is not also mental. In fact, the user characterises his post-coital feelings as 
‘weird’. This evaluative attribution of his feelings in relation to his actions suggest he views 
them as not quite right. In fact, the user states regarding his usage practice that: 'Morally it 
could be quite negative'. However, the topos of morality which the user employs makes it 
unclear whether the respondent thinks that his actions are negative for him or in the eyes of 
society. The modal particle 'quite' and subjunctive 'could' act as mitigation strategies 
(Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to nuance the expression of the user's feeling of unease 
provoked by his usage practices. His communication that 'it might happen again, who 
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knows' suggest that they are simply part of a consumeristic cycle for this user, about which 
he is ambivalent. Indeed the tag question ‘who knows’ is an indirect speech act (Wodak and 
Meyer 2016, 33) (a question instead of an answer) that indicates that the respondent is also 
defiant with regard to his usage practices. 
Anders was interested in the alienating side of consumerism whereby the object of desire 
is obtained immediately. In The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I (Anders [1956] 2003), he speaks 
about immediate gratification as not allowing individuals to develop their desires and self-
consciousness. In The Obsolescence of Man, vol. II (Anders [1980] 2011), Anders elaborates 
this theme further connecting it with technology. He describes: 
the utopian ideal of our existence is the Land of Cockaigne, that is, an existence in 
which satiety magically treads on the heels of desire without the need to overcome 
or traverse any distance. Our technology does not aspire to anything else but the 
approach towards this Cockaigne goal. […] The expression of impatience, Let’s get it 
over with, is the slogan of our modern life. (Anders [1980] 2011, 247) 
Emphasising the iterative dimension of consumption, he adds that: 
In the happiness of work and the hunt, time flies, “instantly”, that is, it is de-
temporalized, despite the fact that it objectively passes according to the clock. On 
the other hand, time can also be annihilated when it is filled with an occupation so 
monotonous that the approach towards the goal (due to the fact that every step 
along the road towards it is always equal) is no longer perceptible. (Anders [1980] 
2011, 246) 
This can explain why the user M receives what he perceives as merely physical and 
temporary fulfilment, but not an emotional one. Indeed the user’s actions are iterative as he 
speaks of ‘the next’, ‘a couple of days’ and how ‘it might happen again’. 
Dating apps offer affordances for immediacy by effectively allowing strangers to agree to 
have sex even before meeting. The risk of embarrassment is minimised in the event 
advances are declined because these are made online. Anders’ theory suggests that this 
mode of use, which may appear desirable at first, is actually a factor in the merely partially 
fulfilling quality of some of the ensuing interactions. Anders states:  
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we should pity whoever is able, at the slightest sexual whim, to immediately slide 
their hands into the spaghetti bowl. They are depriving themselves of everything: of 
anticipating the slow materialisation of the inn; of appreciating the menu; the wait; 
the table and the candid tablecloth; the fragrance of the food; the hors d'oeuvre; the 
desert (Anders [1984] 2004, 125-124, my translation) 
Marx, too, paid attention to the way human needs were met through consumption, arguing 
that not all forms of satisfactions of needs are equal. Hence he famously stated that 
Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and 
fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, 
nail and tooth. (Marx [1957] 2010, 29) 
Marx's conception also shows how unsophisticated modes of consumption are alienating 
because they do not strive towards the conscious realisation of human potentialities and 
the free play of human faculties. They remain one-dimensional, as in the case of some users’ 
purely 'physical' fulfilment.  
The idea that there are different 'mode[s] of enjoyment' (Marx [1844b] 2010, 306) of 
objects of consumption gives an insight into Marx's conception of consumerism. For 
instance, Marx states: 'The worker's crude need is a far greater source of gain than the 
refined need of the rich’ (Marx [1844b] 2010, 311). This reveals how, following Marx, one 
can define modern consumerism not as consumption in general (as consumption of oxygen 
is necessary for life, for instance) but as consumption that serves as its primary aim the 
accumulation of profit (though this is likely concealed) and whose form is strongly moulded 
by this fact. 
Anders, along with many others, identified how sex could come to serve the purpose of 
commodity production stating that the: 
sexual taboo […] has been superseded not only by the production of the birth control 
pill, but also by the manufacture and public sale of pornographic images, films and 
gadgets, not to speak of public displays of sexual acts, common everywhere for the 
last ten years; in short: the producers of these commodities have changed the 
function of the sexual impulse by transforming it into a demand for commodities 
and, thus, eo ipso, into something that must be accepted (since it would be an 
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unpardonable waste not to use as a commodity something that can be used as a 
commodity) (Anders [1980] 2011, 218) 
Here Anders shows that his understanding is one where sex, and the culture surrounding it, 
has been co-opted for commercial purposes. Arguably, dating apps represent a step further 
in the process of the transformation of sexual mores that Anders first described. Dating app 
companies benefit financially from a situation where users integrate dating app use into a 
long-term lifestyle, hence from a situation where sexual and romantic encounters are brief, 
transitory and iterative. 
The repetitive dimension of dating app use fits with the account of another user. Asked 
whether dating app use was ever accompanied by feelings of isolation and disappointment, 
the user replied: 
I think it’s more about actually when you meet with these people and you think, 
actually, we met through this certain way, that you don’t think that, actually, it’s a 
very genuine connection, and actually you think that this could happen a million 
times, and you feel isolated because of that, rather than before meeting that person. 
–Wow, that is the opposite of what I would have imagined. So you’re tying this 
feeling of isolation to the fact that this could happen so easily? 
I think it’s so easy. And, for example, when I first met my boyfriend because he’s 
always not here and got some personal reason. And so he kept on pushing me away. 
And then I was like: Oh but I like him so much. But then I was like: Oh stop for a 
second. I met him through this way and I could meet many other people through the 
same way. Then why do I need to care about this person so much because we only 
met once. And then that’s how I built the isolation. It’s by trying to meet with more 
and more people, thinking that every new swipe that I’m making will lead to 
something that is exactly the same. And isolation and disconnection actually comes 
from there… because there is a lack of trust when me and my boyfriend started to 
develop a relationship later. (O, female, age: 30) 
Similarly to M, this user also speaks of an iterative dimension to app use (‘every new 
swipe’), which she also conveys using predication strategies (‘more and more people’), 
which further refers to the topos of numbers (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 79). She further 
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employs expressive speech acts, which employ free direct speech, (‘this could happen a 
million times’) and the repetition of the filler word 'actually' to convey the sense that she is 
confused and feels detached and disenchanted because of the repetitive functioning of the 
app, which leads her to believe that a love interest can be exchanged for another 
equivalent. This user underlines that, strikingly, she feels isolated not before but after 
meeting people through dating apps. The virtual, quantitative and iterative dimension of 
online interactions bleeds over into her offline meetings. She speaks of her consequent 
feelings of 'isolation', 'disconnection' and 'lack of trust' when it comes to her offline 
relationships that were initiated through dating apps. 
Another respondent confirmed the sense of alienation arising from casual sex on dating 
apps such as Tinder, calling the sex ‘meaningless’ and ‘degrading’. He stated: 
Ehm, I think that… if you are just using it for casual sex… and the best-case scenario is 
that you have sex with someone and then it’s meaningless and then you probably 
don’t see them again. I think that that’s the best-case scenario in a lot of situations 
for people who use it. And even that is quite degrading and alienating a lot of the 
time, especially because it doesn’t feel so much like an organic human connection 
that you’ve bumped into someone and then… You’ve kind of gone through an 
algorithm and an app. It feels… It’s almost like dehumanising on a meta-level, 
because it’s this kind of machine process for assorting humans and I think that it 
can…  
[…] And I’m trying to think about whether that’s something that’s better or worse 
compared to a real-life organic meetings. I think that… And I think that, for most 
people, it is worse because the casual, slightly kind of inhuman way in which it works 
means that, to an extent, you give up the right to feel that proud when you enter into 
it, if that makes sense. (E, male, age: 21) 
The user employs predication and nomination strategies (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) to 
construct the functioning of the app as opposed to human nature and as consequently 
'degrading and alienating’. Indeed user employs the topos of the human and the organic as 
being opposed to a ‘algorithmic’, ’machine process’ which is 'inhuman'. The user is arguing 
that the functioning of the app is fundamentally opposed to human enjoyment and 
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fulfilment. Therefore prolonged use would be ‘detrimental’ (E, male, age: 21). By suggesting 
that the machine component in dating app encounters means that, to some extent, users 
‘give up the right to feel that proud’, the E echoes Anders’ argument about how alienation 
in consumer societies not only ‘consists in labour without its fruits, but also in fruits without 
labour’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 189, my translation). 
Anders' concept of Promethean shame deals with the deleterious drive of humans to 
identify with the machine. In the section that, somewhat questionably, criticises jazz as a 
'ball [held in honour] of the machine' (Anders [1956] 2003, 84), Anders states 
It could seem, at first that, the two hostile 'forces of the es', the "original force" and 
that of the "thing", that of sex and that of the machine, have formed an alliance [...] 
to pulverise the self between them in a mechanism become orgiastic and an orgasm 
become mechanical. But with this intrepid alliance the machine has still not reached 
its ultimate goal. Its objective is that of liquidating sex itself. If it entered into contact 
with sex, it did not do this to collaborate, but to transform the violence sex contains 
into its own specific type of energy: that is, [...] transform animal energy into 
mechanical energy (Anders [1956] 2003, 84, my translation) 
Anders could not have anticipated how intimate the connection between sexuality and 
machines would become with the advent of dating apps. This passage nevertheless 
highlights that Anders was aware that sex and technology could merge, and that this 
identification could favour mechanisation. Anders highlights how it may be tempting to 
deem modern industrial technology as an enabler for sex, and to hold a Dionysian 
celebration of the quantity and speed of sex obtained through machines. However, there is 
a risk of the mechanical factor dominating over the sexual one. Sex would then lose its 
human/animal quality and be entirely structured by the rhythms of industrial production 
and consumption, yielding a senseless, dehumanised version of love. 
This dehumanising effect is apparent in the discourse of user E. Indeed, he further stated: 
'I think that it does have a bad effect on your self-esteem and sense of self-worth and I think 
it’s quite alienating. […] I think that on an individual level it… for me, it’s been for myself at 
least, it is a bit… it isn’t very good for your long-term mental health' (E, male, age: 21). Here 
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the user employs a mitigation strategy based on modal particles ('at least'; 'a bit') to nuance 
his communication of mental distress in relation to the use of dating apps. He employs the 
topos of mental health to express the idea that prolonged dating app use can have ill effects 
on individuals' psyche. 
Another respondent similarly spoke of a friend switching to using dating apps for direct 
sex because of becoming disillusioned as a result of using dating apps for too long. She 
stated: 'So that’s what I mean, when you get so jaded then everything is transactional so 
why don’t you just make it just overtly transactional then' (N, female, age: 30). The 
expression ‘overtly transactional’ refers to the practice of direct sex on dating apps. The 
respondent specified that at least these encounters meant that her friend was 'immediately 
validated' (N, female, age: 30). Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz describe ‘commitment and 
expectations that increase the resistance to terminating connection’ (2018, 2480) when 
users have already made the effort of travelling to meet someone for a hook-up. Similarly, N 
cited the fact that through such interactions: 'there is a very low risk that you are gonna be 
rejected' (N, female, age: 30). This user adopts the topos of having nothing to lose using the 
argument structure (Reisigl and Wodak, 74): 'when you get so jaded…then why don't you 
just then' (N, female, age: 30). The adverb ‘then’ emphasises that this practice is 
conditioned on a pre-existing negative state: that of being ‘jaded’. This expression belongs 
to the topos of disillusionment and apathy, suggesting that the practice the respondent is 









the next; something, someone M, male, 
age: 30 
Verbs or nouns used 
to denote direct sex: 
try him out; finish that one off; it might 
























disconnection and isolation; lack of 
trust; so jaded; alienating; degrading; 
meaningless; inhuman; detrimental 
 
O, female, 
age: 30;  N, 
female, 
age: 30; E, 
male, age: 
21 




Topos of biological 
need: 




Topos of numbers: a million times; many other people; 




age: 30;  N, 
female, 
age: 30 
Topos of repetition: that might last for a couple of days; it 
might happen again; every new swipe 
 
M, male, 
age: 30; O, 
female, 
age: 30 
Topos of mechanical: through this certain way; machine 
process for assorting humans; inhuman 
way; algorithm and an app 
 
O, female, 
age: 30;  E, 
male, age: 
21 










Table 10.5: Users’ discourse describing their relation to their use of dating apps 
Table 10.5 shows how users of dating apps employ terms related to numbers, repetition 
and mechanical action. This suggests that their activities on dating apps are consumerist, 
meaning that they are a form of activity that benefits profit rather than individuals 
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themselves. The hidden purpose of this activity is the profit of dating app companies, rather 
than the profound fulfilment of users. These terms also show how users come to think of 
their consumption activities as responses to needs, as they also often cite biological needs 
as reasons for engaging with dating apps. This illustrates how dating apps condition the 
form of need that users perceive, arguably imprinting on users their need for sex as purely 
physical and not as also mental and emotional. 
 
10.8 Users' preference for in-person sexual and romantic encounters 
The alienation arising from consumerism described by Anders and Marx is compatible 
with Eisenstein's (1972) interpretation that alienation denotes a distancing from human 
potentials that are realisable within a given historical situation. I have also shown how it is 
equivalent to a reduction of enjoyment as the pleasures of sex and romance become 
fleeting, purely physical and not also mental. Eisenstein also notes that alienation can be 
understood in terms of a denial of a 'preferred stye of life' (Eisenstein 1972, 67). Many of my 
respondents professed to having a preference for in-person encounters. However, they use 
dating apps because of limitations on their free time and space arising from wage labour 
and commodified cities, where socialising costs a lot of money. 
Asked whether she preferred in-person or dating app encounters, an interviewee stated: 
I think that everybody likes to tell that how-we-met story. And, like, chance 
encounters are more of a sort of appealing… Oh we met at the coffee shop or 
whatever. And everybody knows that on the dating app it’s not as interesting of a 
story. But I feel that […] now that I am working, it’s harder to actually meet people 
through chance encounters. So I would say, like, it’s more of a realistic way to meet 
people. (J, female, age: 29) 
This respondent uses the topos of numbers and argumentum ad populum (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 79) ‘everybody likes to tell that how-we-met story’ and ‘everybody knows’ to argue 
that it is a given that using dating apps is not as good as meeting someone through chance 
encounters. However, she then uses the topos of reality (Reisigl and Wodak, 79) (‘more 
realistic way to meet people’) to argue that the reality of employment and wage labour 
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means that meeting people through chance encounters is unrealistic. Therefore use of apps 
is necessary and justified. 
The topos of numbers ('so many'; 'filled with') and reality was also used by other 
respondent to justify use of dating apps. One user stated: 
there was definitely a point in London where I felt like: Yes, there’s so many people, 
but it almost seems too hard to meet someone, in a way. It’s like a city filled with 
lonely people. (B, male, age: 27) 
The user employed the topos of numbers in stating: ’there’s so many people’; and that 
London is a 'city filled with lonely people’. The user employs this topos to refer to the 
paradoxical situation that people often feel lonely in big cities with lots of inhabitants due to 
the pressures of advanced capitalist economies. He further employs the topos of reality and 
harshness in stating: ‘it almost seems too hard to meet someone, in a way’. He, however, 
reduces the illocutionary force of this statement (which may appear to communicate 
excessive sadness) through modal particles ('almost'; 'seems'; 'in a way'). 
Another user added a topos of efficiency (‘efficiency of chance encounters’) to the topos 
of numbers (‘slim’; ‘a million miles an hour’) and speed ('a million miles an hour') to further 
justify his use of dating apps, saying: 
the opportunity to have those chance encounters is so slim in our culture, that it’s so 
ineffective, that dating apps become this tool, which allows you to have efficiency of 
chance encounters. […] It basically allows you to squeeze… allows you to compress all 
[…] your potential meetings into such a compressed timeframe, which then fits into 
this cultural thing of us running a million miles an hour the whole time. (R, male, age: 
30) 
This user employs predication strategies based on the metaphor of ‘compress[ion]’, 
‘squeez[ing]’, and ‘fit[ting] into’ to qualify the process of using dating apps as efficient and 
fast. The topos of reality (‘the opportunity […] is so slim’; ‘ineffective’) is also used to justify 
the use of apps, despite R’s previous assertion that he prefers chance encounters. Hence R 
later added that given the time pressures associated with wage labour, 'the opportunity to 
create a meaningful relationship is so diminished that you need to rely on something that’s 
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purely transactional' (R, male, 30). Here R also uses deictics ('you'; 'our'; 'us') as a 
perspectivisation strategy to position his point of view as that of any other person in his 
position. 
Together these discursive strategies highlight how users engage with dating apps 
because of constraints in their daily life due to lack of free time and space rather than 
because of a preference for the way dating apps organise sexual and romantic encounters. 
This finding goes against Bergström's argument that the success of dating apps can be 
explained by the affordances for sexual liberation and experimentation they offer 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §27). Here it is conversely found that convenience and lack of free 
time and space is the main driver of dating app use. 
 
10.9 Conclusion 
To conclude, many of my respondents stated that app use is not so much a choice as a 
necessity, if one is to realistically find partners while working a time and energy demanding 
job. To answer RQ2.2, users of dating apps may, on the one hand, feel connected to others 
because they are presented with the possibility of meeting many different people, whom 
they otherwise would not have been able to encounter. However, they also experience 
fatigue and disenchantment when they interact with many people following the same script 
and procedure. This leads some to feel isolated and like there is no connection between 
them and other users, even after they have met in person — as interviewee O (female, age: 
30) underlined. Hence some users speak of prolonged dating app use as potentially having a 
negative impact on their mental health and self-worth. I therefore question whether dating 
apps are really sexually liberating, as some techno-euphoric accounts argue.  
For instance, Bergström maintains that critical conceptions of dating apps ‘struggle to 
conceal uneasiness aroused by the fact that they allow for a multiplication of sexual 
partners through the internet' (Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §10, my translation). However, I have 
endeavoured to show that, to the contrary, a critique of generalised dating app use need 
not reflect a critique of specific sexual preferences. Techno-euphoric understandings of 
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dating apps such as those found in Feeld’s PR often imply that sexual and romantic variety 
are automatically enhanced by digital media, even when the functioning of this media 
contains a standardising dimension. It is possible that dating app use perfectly suits some 
individuals’ sexualities, allowing them to obtain complete fulfilment. But my interviews 
suggest that this is not the case for most people. For most of my respondents, dating app 
use arises from a situation of limited alternatives. It is tied to wage labour and the 
consequent constraints placed on the free time of individuals in advanced capitalist systems. 
It cannot be defined as having ‘emancipatory effects’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §7, my 
translation) because it is a functional component of these systems. It allows a bare 
minimum of Eros to be expressed in a direct and unsophisticated way. 
To highlight this, I have outlined how Anders' theory of technology and Marx's theory of 
alienation are compatible and can be fused. Accordingly, I have elaborated a theory of how 
dating app use produces alienation in the Marxian sense of a division and inversion of 
subject and object. Just as for Marx the object is represented by the materials, instruments 
and product of labour, the object for dating app users is threefold. It is represented by the 
other users they interact with, the interface and the product of this interaction, the ensuing 
sexual and romantic relationship or communication. The very functioning of dating apps 
determines a physical separation between users, who now relate to one-another, at least in 
the first instance, through images and profiles. This separates users from their object in the 
form of other users. It also fragments their sensory experience of each other. Secondly, 
users are separated from the object understood as means of communication. They do not 
control the technological frame that strongly conditions their interactions. Finally, users are 
separated from the product of their use of these technologies. Access to dating apps is 
conditioned on users accepting privacy policies that commodify user data and 
communications. This influences interface design, which offers affordances for multiple 
short-form communications. Within this individualistic and competitive frame, 
presentations of self and interactions tend towards being standardised. The resulting 
relations between users are often short-term, iterative and merely physically fulfilling. They 
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are consequently often described as ‘transactional’ (R, male, 30; N, female, 30; E, male, 21; 
A, male, 27; Q, male, 27) and ‘disposable’ (S, female, age: 29; P, male, age: 31; J, female, 
age: 29). However, this is not to say that users cannot overcome the consumeristic 
dimension of dating apps. 
To finish, I briefly discuss how some users employed certain affordances of dating apps in 
unexpected ways that go against their general frame. Rather than engage in a ‘private 
strike’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 11) of dating apps, certain users pushed some of the existing 
affordances of these platforms to their limits so as to subvert them. They thus 
demonstrated a tendency towards ‘domesticating’ (Sørensen in Berker et al. 2005, 44) 
dating apps. For instance, certain respondents exaggerated the staged nature of profiles, 
selecting highly stylised pictures that did not reveal looks. These were intended to appeal to 
other users with similar values and interest. For instance, one respondent described 
‘reverse engineering’ what she saw as the superficial dimension of dating apps. She stated: 
I think that in an opposite way, when I put up my own photo, I try not to find a very 
pretty photo. Just because how the media is portraying these apps people are going 
after looks. People want to find somebody that is super good-looking. Because of 
that, I do the reverse engineering; I try to put very normal looking photos of myself 
even ones where you can’t fully see the face. It’s very abstracted. With no body 
exposure, you can’t see any of my body part, because I am trying to reverse engineer 
it. So that people that match with me they match with me not seeing any of those 
aspects. And I just feel really comfortable. At least it seems like it is not those guys 
who are going after these model-looking people. (O, female, age: 30) 
Employing the topos of engineering and reverse-engineering demonstrates the users’ desire 
to actively control dating app technology, rather than passively follow their affordances. 
Reverse-engineering is a nominative strategy that implies that the user is aware of the 
general orientation of the set affordances presented by dating apps. But she wishes to 
challenge and subvert these. This user demonstrates the desire to not play a ‘numbers’ 
game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) on dating apps by constructing 
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a profile that appeals to the greatest number. Instead, she wishes to attract people based 
on shared values that imply not being focussed on looks.  
This practice may also indicate a desire to save some aspects of personal discovery for in-
person meetings. Preserving mystery and uncertainty on dating apps may help replicate the 
aura of chance encounters when users meet offline. For instance, another user stated: ‘I’d 
rather post worse photos online and then people are pleasantly surprised when they see 
you’ (J, female, age: 29). This users’ reference to the topos of surprise suggests that she 
would like to preserve the unexpected dimension of chance encounters within her in-person 
meetings on dating apps. These testimonies suggests that some users would like to reduce 
the highly sexually charged atmosphere of dating apps. They seem to prefer to attempt to 
use dating apps as a general method enabling them to meet like-minded and interesting 
people. 
Next, I explore the ideology surrounding dating apps and how these companies’ PR has 
had to adapt to these user reactions. 
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11. Ideology: Dating App Use as an End in Itself 
 
11.1 Introduction 
My research question for the ideology section in the dating app case-study was RQ2.3: In 
what respects do users believe in or do not believe in the ability of dating app algorithms to 
create a “perfect match” of individuals? 
In the last chapter, I outlined a theory of alienation inspired by Anders and Marx and 
applied it to dating apps. I discussed how users' engagement with dating apps followed 
constraints in their daily lives. These meant that they did not feel it was realistic to meet 
people through chance encounters. I highlighted the fact that users' engagement with 
dating apps does not reflect their preference for virtual sociality over in-person sociality. In 
this chapter, I discuss how nevertheless use of dating apps has become normalised within 
popular culture. Over the last decade, use of online platforms to find sexual and romantic 
has gone from being somewhat stigmatised to being generally accepted and considered 
'pretty normal' (C, male, age: 23).  
I look at advertising campaigns conducted by dating app companies and analyses of 
dating apps within academia. I argue that dating app companies produce an ideology that 
encourages users to be constantly sexually available and adventurous. I further show how 
some academic discussions of dating apps are uncritical and overlook their negative, 
alienating dimension. These end up reflecting an ideology which constructs individuals' 
desire for sex, intimacy and companionship as perfectly catered to by dating app use. This 
plays into the economic interests of dating app companies, some of whom promote 
continuous use of dating apps as part of a fixed lifestyle. 
Hence, in section 11.2, I discuss dating apps' original ideology of the 'perfect match'. I 
highlight how this constructs romantic relations as being based on the notion of a 
preordained compatibility, rather than on a shared how-we-met narrative. I show that, 
while unconvinced by the idea of 'perfect matches' users tend to adopt considerations 
relating to compatibility rather than narrative when forming feelings of attraction for their 
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partners on dating apps. They thus adopt the notion of 'good matches'. In section 11.3, I 
discuss the latest marketing strategy on the part of Tinder, which consists in portraying 
Tinder use as organic, compatible with city exploration and youthful lifestyles. In section 
11.4, I discuss how dating app companies react to common sense understandings 
surrounding dating apps. In section 11.4, I describe the turn towards realism in the 
marketing strategies of dating apps. With this evolution, dating app companies tend to 
acknowledge the difficulties and harshness of dating app use while placing the responsibility 
for withstanding these difficulties on users. I discuss how this fits with a neoliberal 
conception of individual responsibility. I criticise sociological approaches that celebrate this 
privatisation. Hence, in 11.6, I question whether there exists a sex positive ideology within 
some understandings of dating apps that constructs users’ sexual desires as fit for 
commodification through these platforms. These ideologies benefit the economic interests 
of dating app companies. 
 
11.2 The perfect match ideology 
The initial ideology promoted by dating apps was tied to the idea of the ‘perfect match’ 
(Quint 2020). This expression employs both nomination and predications strategies (Wodak 
and Meyer 2016, 33). The expression ‘match’ functions as both a verb and noun. The verb 
describes the process of dating app users establishing feelings of attraction for one-another. 
It refers to the topos of an essential harmony between two elements, such as two colours. 
Hence this expression discursively constructs feelings of attraction as preordained and 
based on a fixed harmonious correspondence between two persons. The expression further 
employs the positive evaluative attribution ‘perfect’. This discursively qualifies the process 
of initiating a sexual and romantic connection as seamless and complete. The notion of 
‘perfect match’ implies that relationships are easy and ahistorical. It is opposed to the 
notion that sexual attraction and romance develops through a narrative and the overcoming 
of difficulties and obstacles. It implies that successful relationships are pre-ordained and 
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Figure 11.2.1: Two Hinge users metaphorically bumping into each other for the first time on 
the app. From Studio NYC. 2017. The Dating Apocalypse (Hinge App). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzfDGVJdpoU 
 
Figure 11.2.2: Two Hinge users immediately forming a 'meaningful match' (Hinge 2020) 
within seconds of meeting. From Studio NYC. 2017. The Dating Apocalypse (Hinge App). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzfDGVJdpoU 
Figures 11.2.1 and 11.2.2 give an insight into why the idea of the perfect match is 
deployed by dating app companies. They illustrate how dating app marketing often 
constructs use of these platforms as similar to an idealised version of in-person encounters. 
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They argue that their platforms allow users to experience the immediate attraction 
associated with the notion of love at first sight. Thus, paradoxically, the ideal employed by 
dating app marketing is the absence of dating apps. Dating app companies compete with 
one another on the basis that it is the use of their platform that most resembles in-person 
meetings. For instance, a Tinder advert features a person walking down a street while 
making eye contact with passers-by (Tinder 2018a). However, eye-contact with other users 
is not possible while using the app. The person waves her finger in front of the passers-by 
mimicking the left-swipe motion denoting a negative response on the platform interface to 
reject them. There isn't a phone in sight. This shows how dating app companies themselves 
do not depict the realities of using their interfaces. They argue that users should use their 
services because they are almost like the real thing, where an immediate level of attraction 
is established. They have attempted to translate this notion into the idea of the ‘perfect 
match’. 
The idea of the 'perfect match' is connected to the topos of a match made in heaven and 
of two people being made for one-another. This is an idea that pre-dates generalised dating 
app use but that was revived and given a modern twist by it for a certain time. For instance, 
an article on Bumble’s virtual magazine The Buzz refers to the idea of virtual dates, which 
has become increasingly popular since the 2020- coronavirus crisis. It says: ‘It’s entirely 
possible to meet your perfect match from the comfort of your couch’ (Quint 2020). This 
statement uses a predication strategy (‘from the comfort of your couch’) to qualify the 
action of finding a long-term romantic partner as easy and effortless. Perhaps this notion is 
intended to refer to the aura of spontaneous in-person meetings, which one of my 
respondents described as characterised by ‘understand[ing] immediately how you feel’ (B, 
male, age: 27). 
However, the idea that sex and romance can be obtained from the comfort of one’s 
couch also exemplifies Anders' notion of immediate gratification, which I outlined in section 
10.7. Anders speaks of the ideal of a Land of Cockaigne, where ‘“roasted squabs” “dispatch” 
themselves; that is, they fly into mouths that are already opened wide to receive them’ 
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(Anders [1956] 2003, 185, my translation). According to Anders, this situation is alienating 
because it is inimical to self-discovery and personal development. He consequently states: 
The life of the worker — the life of all of us — is doubly alienated: it not only consists 
in labour without its fruits, but also in fruits without labour (Anders [1956] 2003, 
189, my translation)  
Indeed Figures 11.2.1 and 11.2.2 depict a seemingly timeless landscape where users sit 
around playing board games and reading. There is arguably something disquieting about this 
ultra-idealised understanding of human life. 
I asked my respondents about how they related to the idea of the 'perfect match'. 
Overall, users’ experience of ‘perfect matches’ was tied to disappointment. Users generally 
appeared to adopt the idea of perfect matches while chatting online on the platforms, 
believing the person they were speaking to may be a ‘perfect match’. However, upon 
meeting the person face-to-face my respondents discovered that this was not the case. 
Hence one interviewee stated: 
Mm, I’ve had it where I’ve thought: This person might be a perfect match. And then 
we've met up and it hasn't been a perfect match. (B, male, age: 27) 
The users' employs a flat animating prosody (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) for the second 
sentence, conveying a sense of disappointment. 
Speaking about a friend another user said: 
she says she meets people and there's always no chemistry because you big them up 
in your head. Because of their profile, you think that they're gonna be a great match.  
Ehm, and she's just really jaded. (N, female, age: 30) 
This user employs deictics (‘you big them up in your head’; ‘you think their gonna be a great 
match’) as part of a perspectivisation strategy that expresses proximity with her friend's 
experience. She thus conveys the fact that it is natural to have this experience and that it is 
connected to the functioning of the app. In fact, the user states that feelings of hope arise 
‘because of their profile’. Here she employs the topos that people portray an idealised 
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version of themselves on their profiles and therefore it is natural to ‘big them up in your 
head’, or idealise them, before meeting them thinking they are a ‘great match’. 
In fact, users report more positive experiences when they have ‘moderate to low’ 
expectations based on a profile but then discover the person is different to what they had 
imagined and are pleasantly surprised as a result. Hence N states: 
So when you actually meet someone where you're expectations are like, you know, 
alright, moderate to low, and they actually turn out to be a good fit then it's 
surprising but also quite nice. (N, female, age: 30) 
Here the expression ‘good fit’ shows how the concept of ‘perfect match’, the notion of 
romance being based on fixed essential compatibility as opposed to overcoming 
incompatibilities and a how-we-met narrative, has influenced the thinking of dating app 
users. The expression ‘good fit’ participates in a nomination strategy that constructs the 
process of establishing a relationship as one based on the notion of a pre-existing, fixed and 
seamless compatibility. It also relates to the topos of functionality. 
The notion of perfect match was met with outright scepticism by some. For instance, one 
user stated: ‘I believe that the idea of perfect matches is in itself wrong’ (K, male, age: 30). 
However, the notion still influenced users’ speaking and thinking. For instance, the same 
user then added: ‘But you can get good matches’ (K, male, age: 30). Another user similarly 
refers to conversations ending after a meeting by saying that the reason that they do is that 
he thinks: 
We might not be the perfect match; it doesn’t feel like we have the… You might not 
be the best find for me. (M, male, age: 30) 
Here the expression ‘best find for me' equally shows how the notion of the ‘perfect match’ 
influences users’ vocabulary. I argue that this happens through the very functioning of the 
app. Their structure means that physically isolated users are looking, or trying to ‘find’, a 
preconceived idea of what they want. They also meet many individuals who they do not get 
along with at all in a romantic dating setting, producing a jarring experience. Hence the user 
employs nomination strategies to discursively construct his potential romantic partners as 
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‘good finds’. ‘Good fit’ and ‘good find’ both relate to a topos of functionality. They could be 
applied to the sphere of work and employment. For instance, a job application candidate 
could be considered a ‘good find’ or a ‘good fit’ for a specific role. 
The fact that users adopt ideological notions employed to market dating apps and tied to 
the set of affordances they offer illustrates Anders' notion, which I detailed in 3.6.3, that the 
functioning of modern machines does not reveal their truth but can produce partial truths. 
In this case, the emphasis within romance on pre-ordained compatibility rather than 
narratives. It also illustrates Anders' notion that the world of technology is 'ideologically 
"pre-cut"' (Anders [1956] 2003, 185, my translation), which I detailed in section 3.6.4. The 
experience of looking for a partner on dating apps is already ideological. For instance, there 
is an emphasis on ‘new specifications of individuals that put people into different sexual 
categories' (Liu 2016, 559). Choice among these options then contributes to new forms of 
‘consumerist individualism’ (Liu 2016, 562). 
 
11.3 Swipe life, Swipe city 
Another ideology that dating app companies promote is that using these platforms is fun, 
exciting and progressive. This messaging is an evolution of the notion of the perfect match. 
It de-emphasises the idea that app use seamlessly recreates the experience of love at first 
sight. It is instead connected to the idea that dating app use feels natural and organic, as it 
fits neatly within the daily routines of its users. Tinder’s online magazine ‘Swipe Life’ (Tinder 
2020b) uses a nomination strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) that implies that use of 
Tinder is ‘life’. Life is a noun which is sometimes opposed to work, as in work-life balance. It 
positively constructs the image of Tinder use as being tied to freedom and leisure. The 
expression ‘life’ also alludes to the topos of lifestyle. Swipe is a predication strategy that 
refers to the action of swiping on Tinder (the action of mutually right-swiping with one’s 
finger on the screen of a smartphone on profiles is required for users to connect). The 
expression ‘Swipe life’ qualifies Tinder use as a lifestyle that individuals choose for 
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themselves, as opposed to something users do because they are compelled to through lack 
of free time and space. 
Tinder’s latest series of promotional videos feature LGBT+ users and individuals with 
body-types that deviate from standard ideals often presented in the media. These 
individuals promote a campaign that portrays Tinder use as relatable and centres around 
the idea that Tinder is a good means to explore new cities. Indeed the persons featured go 
on many dates around cities that they are exploring and are shown around by their Tinder 
matches. Hence the campaign states: ‘Welcome to swipe city where real-ass Tinder users, 
like me, use Tinder to explore my new city’ (Tinder 2021b, 20 sec). The expression ‘real-ass 
Tinder users’ employs a predication strategy that employs colloquial appositions (‘real-ass’) 
to qualify the experience of dating app use opposed to being virtual, fake and staged. This 
follows a trend on the part of Tinder and other dating apps towards realism, which I explore 
in the next section. This sentence also uses a predication strategy with the neologism ‘swipe 
city’ that qualifies cities as being compatible with and open to Tinder use. This expression 
uses the topos that Tinder use is a great tool to get out and about and to make the most of a 
city one is exploring. Tinder thus effectively capitalises on the appeal of city exploration to 
promote its app. 
Tinder’s most high-production advert (Tinder 2015) features a woman as the protagonist 
(see Figures 11.3.1-11.3.4). Given that, as discussed in 5.5, most Tinder users are male, this 
illustrates how Tinder is trying to market the platform to women, as it cannot work 
effectively without them. The advert makes a compelling case for using Tinder while 
travelling. It makes the implicit statement that Tinder helps users make the best of their 
leisure time, transforming their travels and holidays into fun-packed and memorable time 
periods. It initially shows a woman at work in her dreary open plan office cubicle. She 
receives a text asking how her holiday went. The time stamp on the message is 8:09 am, the 
very start of what might be a drab workday. The woman reclines and looks up, beginning to 
daydream about her most recent trips abroad. The advert then cuts to flashback scenes 
where we see her travelling to London. She accordingly switches her location on the Tinder 
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app to London, allowing her to connect with local people. There, she swiftly meets a local 
man through Tinder and is shown around the city. She is taken to a football match and to 
see famous sights. Her date flirts with her in a light-hearted and respectful manner. She 
ultimately declines his final approach, politely closing the door to her apartment on him. She 
then travels to Paris. Thanks to the bonus features the advert is promoting, she is able to 
pre-emptively change her location on the Tinder app to Paris. 
 
Figure 11.3.1: Tinder makes the argument that it can efficiently allow people to meet others 
while travelling. The user can pre-emptively connect with people in Paris, her next travel 
destination, while still in London. From Tinder. 2015. Tinder Plus | Product Release | Tinder. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdef2anpd04 
This means that there is no waiting around. She is able to match with a Parisian man 
already from London. The next scene shows her meeting this man in Paris and engaging in a 






Figure 11.3.2: Tinder argues that it can ensure that users' holidays are packed full of 
enjoyable life-events. From Tinder. 2015. Tinder Plus | Product Release | Tinder. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdef2anpd04 
However, her planned trip to Europe also includes a stop in Istanbul. True to the culture 
of casual sex and romance the Tinder app developers promote, she kisses this man goodbye 
and switches her location to Istanbul. 
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Figure 11.3.3: Tinder promotes a casual vision of sex and romance, whereby users explore 
their options by flirting and dating multiple users at the same time. Accordingly, the user 
changes her location setting to Istanbul, the new city she is exploring, 
However, this advert does not give up on traditional notions of romance altogether. In 
Istanbul, she is surprise-visited by the man she met in Paris. When the advert finally cuts 
back to the initial scene of her at work daydreaming, we see her with an expression of full 
contentment. This holiday romance still feels present. In fact, we see his flowers on her 
work desk. The integration of work environment symbolism into this advert illustrates 
“Foucault’s assertion that sex is not produced ‘apart from or against power, but in the very 
space and as the means of its exercise’” (Foucault in Liu 2016, 562). This idea is also 
reflected in Anders’ notion of a ‘totalitarianism of enjoyment’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 124), 





Figure 11.3.4: Tinder's advert highlights how its user is fully satisfied with her holiday. She 
has been able to make the most of her free time. Now her labour time is bearable. From 
Tinder. 2015. Tinder Plus | Product Release | Tinder. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdef2anpd04 
Overall, Tinder makes the case that use of Tinder is a fun and efficient way of fulfilling 
users need for sociality and their desire for sex and romance. But this argument stands in a 
paradoxical relation to the fact that most dating app adverts feature little to no time 
showing users on their phones using the app. For many actual users of dating apps, the time 
spent using the phone app vs going on dates might feel disproportionate. Indeed one of my 
respondents described her use of dating apps as: ‘maddeningly time-consuming. And their 
in-built in such a way as to be addictive and endorphin releasing so you spend more time on 
them’ (D, female, age: 21). Here the user employs the topos of apps being ‘addictive and 
endorphin releasing’ to refer to the idea that many apps and social media interfaces offer 
casino-game-like affordances. Through applying techniques borrowed from gambling slot 
machines, they are designed to be habit-forming (Hobbs et al. 2017, 272). This is because 
they are based on a business model that profits from users spending as much time as 
possible as frequently as possible on their interfaces. 
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This users' description of dating app use, whereby spending time on the app takes 
precedence over experiencing sexual and romantic connections, illustrates Anders’ notion 
that the new post-puritanism, similarly to puritanism, is characterised by:  
little joyous appreciation of pleasure. In each, it is natural that sexuality is a mere 
“means in view of an end” […] What counts here is the movement, not the mooring. 
For instance, […] driving the car, not the destination. The autonomous development 
of this monstrous technical system, which never allows us to grasp ends, is therefore, 
one can say, the only “destination” of this perpetuum mobile. (Anders [1984] 2004, 
129-130) 
Here Anders’ thought fits with the cyclical nature of app use described by users. It highlights 
what present day Tinder users might feel is wrong with the idea of using Tinder for city 
exploration. Namely, this might require a considerable amount of time spent on one’s 
device, attracting and sussing out potential dates. This would actually take time away from 
city exploration. 
 
11.4 Dating app marketing reacts to user common sense surrounding dating apps 
Dating app companies cannot perfectly control the image dating apps acquire within 
society. As soon as dating app use spreads among certain populations a common sense 
surrounding them gets produced. This common sense is influenced by both official content 
promoted by dating app companies and user reactions to this content and their own 
experience of dating apps. For instance, reacting to the game-like presentation of dating 
apps, respondent D characterised them as being 'maddeningly time-consuming' (D, female, 
age: 21). A further common sense linked to dating app use that emerged with their early 
popularisation was tied to the notion that dating apps, especially Tinder, were superficial, as 
they involved swiping based on split-second judgements about photogenic beauty alone. 
Finally, there was pre-existing stigma attached to meeting people through the internet. This 
stigma, in some respects, endures. As discussed in the last chapter, many users still view 
meeting people through dating apps as less 'interesting of a story' (J, female, age: 29) than 
meeting people through chance encounters. Dating app companies cannot ignore this 
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common sense and must react to it in their promotional content if they are to effectively 
manipulate public opinion surrounding dating app use. 
In the late 2010s, Tinder launched some advertising campaigns that cynically made the 
case for dating app use despite what many people perceived as their negative 
characteristics. It provocatively actively acknowledged and celebrated their superficial 
character. One Tinder advert from 2014 depicts two like-minded people engaging in what 
seems like a promising date (PATIO Interactive 2014). Both share the same interests and 
sense of humour. At one point, speaking about the topic of tomatoes being classed as fruits, 
they jointly exclaim about tomatoes: 'just be yourself' (PATIO Interactive 2014, 18 sec) i.e. a 
vegetable. The expression 'just be yourself' is related to the topos (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 
33) that individuals should not feel ashamed for what their personality is like or what they 
look like. This topos is moreover connected to the idea that this shame often arises because 
of idealised images of humans promoted by the media.  
Then one of the persons gets up to go to the bathroom. While alone, the other party 
receives a phone notification saying that he has matched (i.e. been connected on the Tinder 
app) with the profile of what seems like a more conventionally attractive woman. This 
match asks him whether he wants to meet now. After anxiously hesitating for a moment, he 
gets up to leave the restaurant. He cannot resist the temptation of potentially sleeping with 
the woman represented by the profile. As he is about to exit, he runs into his date. They 
collide and fall, letting go of their phones. He grabs at his and accidentally picks up hers. He 
is initially confused because he sees a different profile to the one he had up on his phone. It 
is one of a muscular man also active in the area. This indicates that him and his date were 
just about to do the same thing. On realising what has happened, they both awkwardly part 
ways. The advert then turns to the Tinder logo with the provocative caption: 'the only 
connection that matters' (PATIO Interactive 2014, 56). This contradicts the initial apparent 




Figure 11.4.1: Tinder advertising slogan. From PATIO Interactive. 2014. Tinder App 
Commercial. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r6YZvle4jE 
This advert deals with the topos of Tinder use being superficial. The slogan that Tinder is 
'the only connection that matters', implies that users do not value chemistry but only 
aspects tied to the app such as physical attraction based on photos and availability for sex. It 
attempts to own up to the fact that its users are atomised individuals, as it suggests that 
they share no connection apart from use of the Tinder app. In short, Tinder developers and 
marketers sell the app as a tool that allows users to easily sleep with people they find 
attractive. This message is based on, and promotes, the idea that humans are subject to 
fixed, inevitable instinctual impulses for a standard type of person and that they cannot 
deny this. The advert sets an ambiguous relation to the potential consumers it is trying to 
woo. Far from treating them with exaggerated respect as traditional adverts do, this advert 
berates its users. It comes close to suggesting that they are hypocritical in wanting anything 
more than what Tinder has to offer. Its main message is this is what you want. This shows 
how Tinder marketers and developers are aware of negative notions potential users may 
have regarding its functioning. They therefore adopt an almost confrontational relation to 
their prospective prosumers. 
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Another Tinder advert contains a similar message (Pan up Production 2018).  However, 
produced in 2018, the advert also moves away from portraying Tinder as an instrument for 
quick sex. It argues instead that it allows users to form satisfying relationships. The advert 
ironically dramatizes a how-we-met narrative between two individuals. It shows one finding 
a notebook on his way home from work. He reads it with visible relish and uses his 
intelligence to work out, on the basis of the information it contains, that the person who 
lost it must frequent a particular park. He goes there and approaches a lady sitting on the 
bench asking her if it is hers. The advert then cuts to a scene in a restaurant of the two 
persons, now a couple, relating this seemingly impossibly romantic story of how they met to 
another couple. One of the listeners says: 'I do not believe a word of that' (Pan up 
Production 2018, 54 sec.). But the original couple insists it is true. The advert cuts to the 
Tinder logo and the slogan: ‘tell whatever story you want’ (Pan up Production 2018, 57). 
 
Figure 11.4.2: Tinder commercial. From Pan Up Productions. 2018. Tinder - Our Story. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQ83J7R85sA 
This advert also addresses its potential users with cynicism and irony. It deals with the 
topos that its use tends towards denying life-moments that many people cherish, such as 
the initial spark of unforeseen sexual attraction, or romance, that can occur with in-person 
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encounters. It argues that users say they want an interesting how-we-met narrative. But, in 
reality, they are simply satisfied with being with someone they like and are attracted to, no 
matter how they met. The advert therefore condescendingly ends with the suggestion that 
users just lie and say they didn't meet through dating apps. This shows, yet again, how 
Tinder marketers and developers have an ambiguous relation to their users. They know 
many of the latter are embarrassed to say they met their partners through Tinder. They 
consequently patronisingly suggest: if you don't like it, just lie. 
However, in its latest phase, dating app PR has had to acknowledge that the very process 
of using dating apps is not as easy and enjoyable as these middle-period adverts seem to 
suggest, despite their cynicism.  
Indeed one of my respondents discussed how the speed of dating app functioning means 
that some users feel pressure while using it to continuously self-promote themselves. One 
user stated: ‘You’re selling yourself constantly on these apps’ (B, male, age: 27). This 
statement employs a predication strategy that discursively constructs app use as similar to 
selling and promoting commodities on the market. The statement relates to the topos that 
in advanced capitalist societies individuals' personalities are also commodified, promoted 
and sold in this fashion. In opposition to the idea of the 'Swipe Life' (Tinder 2020c) lifestyle, 
it constructs dating app use as more similar to a job than a leisure activity.  
Another respondent similarly described dates feeling like job interviews, stating: 
this feels like an interview, in the sense that you have a limited timeframe to show 
them everything about you that's really great. And therefore it feels transactional; it 
doesn't feel organic. And how can you then develop like an actual like genuine 
relationship with someone…not even a relationship, but even like a connection with 
someone. (N, female, age: 30) 
This user refers to the topos of a demand for time-efficiency and self-promotion connected 
to the world of employment, stating: 'you have a limited timeframe to show them 
everything about you that's really great'. The modal particle (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) 
'really' expresses irony to denote the fake and forced character of the personalities users 
display to each other. The user further employs the topos of organic human connections 
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('genuine connection') vs the ‘transactional’ nature of dating apps. The user employs 
indirect speech acts such as questions instead of assertions as part of an intensification 
strategy that increases the illocutionary force of her expression of exasperation in relation 
to the self-defeating, transactional nature of dating apps. Another user employs an 
increasingly stressed animating prosody (Wodak and Meyer 2016, 33) on each subclause to 
express the self-defeating character of dating app use stating: ‘most people that I’ve met, 
we don’t even have anything in common, we don’t even connect’ (O, female, age: 30). This 
also represents an intensification strategy that conveys exasperation. 
Modern dating app messaging is still struggling to react to the harsh reality of dating app 
use reported by many users, while trying to put an effective marketing spin on it. Hence 
modern dating apps have moved away from the image that they provide a seamless 
experience of love (as expressed in the idea of the ‘perfect match’). Indeed Hinge, another 
dating company, prefers to speak of ‘meaningful matches’ (Hinge 2020) in its promotional 
content. Dating apps have, moreover, started to acknowledge some of the difficulties and 
pressures of their use. 
For instance, the topos of the harsh and draining nature of dating app use prompted 
Hinge to run a campaign assuring its users that it is ‘designed to be deleted’ (Hinge 2020). 
This reacts against the idea that users may become locked within a detrimental cycle of 
prolonged dating app use. This is also opposed to Tinder's advertising campaign that 
encourages users to make Tinder part of their lifestyle. Indeed Hinge and Tinder have 
diametrically opposed branding images, as Hinge portrays itself as a less superficial dating 
app because it is not based on swiping, a covert reference to Tinder (Studio NYC 2017). 
Hence Hinge’s branding effectively criticises the way Tinder works. However, Hinge and 
Tinder are owned by the same parent company, Match Group. They have identical privacy 
policies, which means that their business model is also the same. The notion that Hinge is 
‘designed to be deleted’ employs the topos of everlasting true love. Hence Hinge uses PR 
that trumpets traditional values relating to life-long monogamous love to obscure the fact 
that the company makes money from users’ data and attention, which it gains from users' 
322 
repeated use of the app. This illustrates the functioning of ideology that I discussed in 
section 2.6.2 where universal abstract concepts come to conceal real social relations. 
 
11.5 Dating app realism 
The latest wave of Tinder's promotional videos goes beyond Hinge in actively 
acknowledging the harshness of dating app use. Hence one person featured says: ‘I know 
it’s really scary to put yourself out there but honestly just go for it’ (Tinder 2020c). The 
expression 'put yourself out there' uses the metaphor of being outside ('out there') and 
showcasing one's inner self ('put yourself out') to convey the challenging and tough 
environment of dating apps. Indeed the latter exposes users and their intimate desires for 
sex and companionship to the outside world. This illustrates Anders’ observations that 
modern surveillance: 
devices have no other purpose than to cancel out distances and to render this 
cancellation real, that is, to abolish the border between “outside” and “inside”. 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 159) 
Anders further states that: 
privacy has been destroyed by means of bugs, as if we were living in glass houses 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 159) 
The image of the ‘glass house’ illustrates the feeling of this user of putting something 
intimate ‘out there’ on a public profile. Moreover, a parallel between ‘bugs’ placed in the 
intimate sphere of the home, and the storing of sensitive user data on dating apps can be 
drawn. This advert also uses the argument structure (‘I know that… but’) to convey the 
sense that using dating apps is hard but it’s worth it, or necessary. 
Indeed, another featured person states: ‘you have to put yourself out there. That’s just 
the name of the game’ (Tinder 2020c). This statement employs the expression ‘name of the 
game’ as a nomination strategy that constructs Tinder use as natural. The verbal tee up 
‘just’ participates in a mitigation strategy to reduce the illocutionary force of this argument, 
which promotes a form of resignation to dating app use as fixed and a fact of life. Tinder use 
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thus becomes synonymous with throwing oneself at life. In fact, the advert refers to the 
topos that life is a game. One featured person states ’wake up and go outside and play the 
game’ (Tinder 2020c). This constructs the absence of Tinder use as being for reserved 
people who do not get the most out of life. Framing dating apps use as tough and 
challenging is a clever marketing scheme. It is conceivable that users can then relate to the 
difficulties they encounter on dating apps as useful occasions for personal growth. Indeed 
one of the two (2 out of 18) participants that I spoke to who stated a preference for dating 
use over in-person encounters, told me that, through dating app use she felt 'empowered' 
to 'select' rather than be 'selected' (H, female, age: 29). She further stated: 'I think that you 
become a lot more, like, brutalist when you’re using dating apps' (H, female, age: 29). The 
expression 'brutalist' is a predication strategy that that discursively constructs dating app 
use as brutal and as fortifying the character of whoever uses them. 
Using an imperative tense, another person featured in the Tinder advert says: ‘do it while 
you’re young’. These messages employ the topos that there is no alternative to dating app 
use and that the latter has become the way in which people meet nowadays. The 
imperative tense participates in an intensification strategy that increases the illocutionary 
force of the company's command to people viewing the advert to use the app. Indeed some 
users speak of social pressure they feel to be on dating apps. One respondent said:  
How would I say? Yeah, it almost felt like if you were… if you were single, you kind of 
had to…not not had to have it, but that was like, seemed like a pretty normal thing 
(C, male, age: 23) 
This user employs a mitigation strategy based on hesitations ('…not not had to have it') to 
reduce the illocutionary force of his expression of social pressure to go on the app. This user 
illustrates Anders’ conception that technology forms an all-encompassing system mirroring 
socio-economic structures (section 3.3.4). 
Indeed another respondent highlighted how dating app use fitted into a social routine: 
Sometimes it's always almost like I'd have a conversation and say the most ridiculous 
things just so I could show my mates what I've said to someone, as well. 
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And then sometimes, we… when my mates get together and we're quite bored, we 
just use each other’s Tinder for half an hour. And you're allowed to say whatever you 
want. (A, male, age: 27) 
This last statement further evidences how dating app use can be harsh and misleading for 
people on the receiving end of these jokes, which are connected to lad culture. 
Tinder’s promotional content now acknowledges this harshness while putting the 
responsibility to withstand it on the user. Using the imperative tense, another of the 
company's statement says: ‘you have to keep putting yourself out there until you find that 
right person’ (Tinder 2020c). This statement refers to the topos of strength and toughness 
through the expression: ‘you have to keep putting yourself out there’. It also employs an 
imperative which encourages users to tough it out in the face of adversity encountered on 
the platform. Nomination strategy 'out there' constructs Tinder's interface as the world, and 
as something that the company does not entirely control. Hence this advertising messaging 
appeals to users’ sense of strength while also placing responsibility for withstanding 
adversity encountered on the app on users themselves. This follows neoliberal conceptions 
of individual responsibility (Fuchs 2014c, 162). 
Linguistic 
strategy 
Linguistic device Citation  
Nomination 
strategies 
Metaphors denoting a frictionless 
user experience 
swipe life; swipe city Tinder 2021a; 
Tinder 2021b 
Metaphors denoting a lack of 
responsibility 








Topoi of harshness and 
competition: 
keep putting yourself out there 




Conclusion rules denoting 
realism: 
I know… but; that’s just…how 
it is (the name of the game) 
 
Tinder 2020c 




Imperatives: you have to keep putting 
yourself out there; do it while 




Table 11.4: Realism in contemporary dating app PR 
Table 11.4 shows how dating apps companies employ linguistic devices that convey the 
harshness of the situation on dating apps as though it were something external to dating 
app companies. This participates in a general strategy of transferring the responsibility for 
security and resilience in the face of adversity on dating app users. Hence the ideology 
surrounding dating apps fits in with neoliberal ideologies that promote the idea of 
individual, as against collective, responsibility. 
 
11.6 A sex positive ideology? 
Bergström describes the main effect of dating app use as one of ‘privatisation’ 
(Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §7, my translation). This is because sexual and romantic encounters 
are now separate from broader friendship groups and networks of sociality. Bergström 
holds a non-critical view of this process. Indeed she argues that:  
economic privatisation and social privatisation, understood as a transformation of 
sociality, are two distinct processes. […] whereas the process of “dis-embedding” 
effected by the economy is often examined for its negative aspects, these [online 
dating] applications give us the chance to, at the same time, interrogate the 
emancipatory effects of this process. (Bergström 2019, ch. 6, §7, my translation)  
Bergström dichotomises between economy and society. She suggests that economic 
privatisation is detrimental. However, social privatisation promotes freedom, as users’ 
‘entourage is deprived of its matchmaking function, but also of its role as an inspector of 
nascent relationships’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 0, §19, my translation). Therefore social 
privatisation translates into ‘less external control over established relationships’ (Bergström 
2019, ch. 0, §19, my translation). For Bergström, this dynamic played ‘a central, though 
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rarely highlighted, role in the success of these websites and applications’ (Bergström 2019, 
ch. 0, §19, my translation). She further explains that now it is: 
down to each individual to define his or her own sexuality, and what constitutes his 
or her ‘right measure’ (Bergström 2019, ch. 5, §70, my translation) 
This non-critical view is jarring when considering dating app companies’ injunctions to ‘keep 
putting yourself out there’ (Tinder 2020c), using imperatives to encourage users to go on 
dating apps as much as possible. 
Bergström’s understanding assumes that individuals cannot resist peer pressure and act 
as agents within their friendship groups. She hypothesises that they instead want to react by 
fleeing group sociality in general. Moreover, Bergström does not account for the fact that 
users’ entourage can control their nascent relations on dating apps by accessing their online 
accounts. Indeed respondent A (male, age: 27) described how it was part of his usage 
practice to swap phones with friends, letting them pretend to be him on his chats. He would 
also show friends dating app profiles and ‘historical conversations’ (A, male, age: 27), 
stating: ‘you show your friends all the most attractive women that you've matched with. 
Some point out that some could be fake, but no matter’ (A, male, age: 27). This evidences 
how peer pressure and group surveillance can happen through the technology of dating 
apps, with some friends questioning the viability of the users’ connections. The present 
tense (‘you show’) highlights how this practice, which contains a competitive dimension 
linked to lad culture, is habitual and subject to group influence. Some dating app 
affordances are in line with this practice. For instance, Hinge featured an option for users to 
‘share’ (i.e. send) profiles to their friends’ phones. It further floated the idea of having 
friends recommend profiles to others (Techcrunch 2017). 
Ultimately, Bergström assumes that emancipatory self-governance is a question of 
determining a quantum of engagement with dating apps, rather than one of achieving 
greater collective control over general frames for sociality. This is a limited view of 
emancipation. Participation in music scenes, youth culture, etc., arguably allows for a 
broader scope of knowledge and control over frames of sociality in which sexual and 
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romantic connections occur than dating app use. These spaces are not specialised but multi-
functional and can also be the seat of political action and movements, including feminist 
movements for sexual freedom. In some instances, they are tied to occupied spaces which 
are directly self-governed. In contrast, all political content is explicitly banned by Tinder’s 
community guidelines and subject to deletion (Tinder 2020a). The political agency of 
atomised individuals is low. Hence it is only possible that Bergström is discussing an 
extremely limited notion of emancipation, based on individual choice among existing 
options rather than democratic control over the parameters that produce these options. 
Authors such as Bergström promote a limited sex positive viewpoint that praises the fact 
that individuals have access to more sex through dating apps, while paying little attention to 
the quality of interactions and feelings of alienation reported by users. Hence, in contrast to 
Her and Timmermans (2020) for instance, Bergström largely overlooks the potentially 
negative effects of dating app use on mental wellbeing. 
Other understandings of dating apps such as Fitzpatrick's and Birnholtz's (2018) seem to 
similarly view these platforms as neutral spaces, simply considering them as the modern 
way sexual and romantic relationships take place. Hence, despite studying the 'tensions' 
(Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz 2018, 2469) and 'negotiations' (Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz 2018, 
2469) of interactions on dating apps, these authors argue in favour of merely cosmetic 
changes to the design of their interfaces stating: 'our results offer several contributions for 
designers of LBSAs [location-based social apps], both for dating/hook-ups' (Fitzpatrick and 
Birnholtz 2018, 2483). Accordingly, they suggest creating features that:  
allow for the ephemerality of certain messages that are associated with an in-the-
moment goal or interest (such as a hook-up). This removes the problem of what we 
might consider the residue of prior goals (Fitzpatrick and Birnholtz 2018, 2484). 
Though intending to support the possibility of spontaneity on dating apps, this 
understanding plays into the culture of individualistic objectives and consumeristic sex that 
benefits dating app companies, and which I have tied to an alienating dimension (see 
section 10.7). Contrary to the work of Liu (2016), Chan (2018a, 2018b) and Wang (2018), 
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there is no discussion of the link between neoliberal ethos, alienation, lack of privacy and 
the very structure of dating apps. The authors help app developers for free through 
superficial design suggestions. They participate in promoting the convergence of different 
platforms within the virtual ecosystem (see section 10.3), as disappearing messages are a 
feature of Snapchat, a popular messaging and photo/video sharing platform. Disappearing 
text messages arguably offer affordances for compulsivity and superficiality. They may 
further promote ‘intimate intrusions’ (Gillett 2018, 212), as these would leave no traces that 
could be used as evidence. 
The limited sex positive understanding of dating apps, which could be summarised by the 
idea that dating apps liberate users from social constraints and pressures, benefits dating 
app companies. Indeed it constructs sex as a constant need that is fit to be commodified. It 
resembles the post-puritan culture in America in the 1950s, which Anders observed in his 
students. Anders argued that this culture shared more with puritanism than his students 
cared to admit, stating: 
you, similarly to your puritan forefathers, do not see love as love, but only as instinct, 
and therefore as nature. You, like your forefathers, are suspicious of cultural forms of 
love. They considered the instinct as impure natural energy. They did not believe in 
its humanisation. And they were convinced that they could only legitimate it through 
marriage. You, in the same way, see love as a natural energy, which though “pure”, 
should be freed from cultural inhibitions. You give the instinct a plus sign; they gave it 
a minus sign (Anders [1984] 2004, 97, my translation) 
Anders argued that consequently, in the post-puritan culture, sex was seen to have a ‘purely 
hygienic purpose: ascesis is unhealthy’ (Anders [1984] 2005, 129, my translation). For 
Anders, this meant that the human capacity to enrich sex was reduced. Anders further 
detailed how 'this is, de facto, the point of view from which sex is seen. Because abstention 
is not healthy, sex is necessary' (Anders [1984] 2004, 131, my tranlsation). Here Anders' 
suggestion that the idea that 'sex is necessary' is an injunction reminds one of Tinder’s 
adverts that order listeners to 'keep putting yourself out there' (Tinder 2020c) and 'do it 
while you're young' (Tinder 2020c). However, just as it is wrong to tell someone not to have 
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sex, it is also wrong to tell them to have sex. Sexuality and romance should be a sphere that 




In this chapter, I have discussed the marketing strategy of dating apps and the ideology 
that surrounds their use. To answer RQ2.3, I have shown that the ideology dating apps 
produce, to some extent, filters down into the discourse of their users. However, I have also 
shown that some ideas promoted by dating app companies, such as the idea that dating app 
use is easy and organic, clash with users’ experience. Hence there has been a turn towards 
more realistic forms of promotional content being put out by dating app companies. Dating 
app companies such as Tinder have started to acknowledge some of the difficulties and 
challenges of their use. However, they resort to advertising campaigns that challenge users 
to deal with these difficulties themselves. These adverts refer to users' strength and 
encourage their competitive spirit, enjoining them to keep putting themselves ‘out there' on 
dating platforms. They thus also encourage users to be continuously sexually available and 
adventurous, stating 'do it while you're young'. I discuss how some theorists consider this 
individualistic culture to be emancipatory and consequently evaluate whether there is a sex 
positive ideology also reflected within some analyses of dating apps. The latter benefits 
dating app companies by promoting the idea that an easier access to sex necessarily equals 
emancipation. This constructs individuals' desire for sex, intimacy and companionship as 
fixed and perfectly compatible with dominant cultures. This implies that it is consequently 
fit to be commodified through dating app use. 
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12. General Conclusion 
 
12.1 Summary 
The main research question for this thesis has been: How does Günther Anders’ critical 
theory of technology help us to analyse contemporary digital societies? I have then 
subdivided this main research question into RQ.A: How can Günther Anders’ theory of 
technology be understood as a humanist-Marxist theory of domination, alienation and 
ideology? And RQ.B: How does Gunther Anders’ theory help us analyse the way in which 
modern day examples of digital media are involved in the reproduction of domination, 
alienation and ideology? 
Chapters 2 and 3 have helped respond to research question RQ.A. In chapter 2, I looked 
at the essential categories of the human, technology, domination, alienation and ideology 
through a Marxist lens. I argued that this lens is preferable to a postmodern one. I showed 
that human essence should be understood as linked to conscious and social activity, through 
which humans shape their history and social being. This conception encompasses both 
humans' biological nature as well as their capacity for conscious reflection and abstract 
thought. It is therefore tied to, and expressed, within reality. Hence I argued against anti-
essentialist conceptions such as Foucault's. These misinterpret the concept of essence as 
being something separate and purely abstract. I also argued against Heidegger's 
understanding of technological essence as existing a priori. Instead, I showed that 
technology’s essence is tied to humans. This means that social dynamics can become 
ingrained within technology.  
I showed that domination should not be conceived as abstract domination, as the Young 
Hegelians and postmodernists do, but as the concrete projection of power over others 
through the control of weapons, resources and social structures. This means that some 
subjects subjugate others. Alienation represents a situation where this type of unfreedom 
has become generalised and is felt by everyone. Alienation means that a social relation 
separates subjects from their object. I showed how religious and political alienation can be 
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understood as based on separation. I discussed how Marx used this concept to derive the 
notion of economic alienation as one where workers no longer control the object of their 
labour, but it controls them. The relation between subject and object is consequently 
inverted. Yet this situation appears as the natural order of things. This concept of alienation 
provides the foundation of ideology. Ideology is equally characterised by an inversion 
whereby abstract universal ideas mask concrete interests and processes. Globally, 
establishing the Marxian theoretical foundations of the themes of the human, technology, 
domination, alienation and ideology show how technology is intimately connected to the 
human, but it can also form the basis of systems that perpetuate human unfreedom. 
Technological systems can become factors in the reproduction of domination, alienation 
and ideology 
In chapter 3, I showed how Anders' thought is not continuous but is subject to radical 
breaks. During his early years Anders was strongly influenced by Heidegger. But in coming to 
terms with the rise of Hitler to power and the industrial killing of the Second World War 
Anders effected a radical break away from Heidegger. His approach became increasingly 
influenced by Marx’s early works. There is also evidence of him drawing from Hegelian 
philosophy. Accordingly, he conceptualises machines as a system. He further conceives of 
technological alienation in similar terms to Marx, as a division and inversion of subject and 
object. To account for the development of modern ICTs, Anders produces an original 
conception of technologically enabled ideology. According to Anders, the very functioning of 
ICTs minimises the effects of the nuclear bomb by presenting nuclear explosions in a small-
screen format and as far-off events.  
Chapters 2 and 3 show that Anders’ theory of technology is compatible with a Marxian 
conception of the human, domination, alienation and ideology. Anders’ critical theory 
applies Marxian understanding to technology, developing threads that were already present 
in Marx’s work. Indeed, in biographical terms Anders appears to have undergone a shift 
from a Heideggerian influence to a Marxian one during and after the Second World War. 
Hence, in answer to research question RQ.A, one of my main arguments in this thesis is that 
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Anders’ theory is considerably influenced by Marx. Often this has been overshadowed by 
research into his links to phenomenology and Heidegger. Some work has also emphasised 
parallels between Anders and postmodern theory. 
Hence, in chapter 4, I distinguished Anders work from other theorists, including 
postmodern ones. I showed how his humanist-Marxist theory sets him apart from other 
critical theorists of technology, who often are closer to postmodern understandings than to 
Marxist ones. For instance, I showed that, in opposition to Jacques Ellul, Anders does not 
think of technology as separate from the economy. To the contrary, Anders shows how 
televisions and weapons are ideal commodities. In some respects, Anders' work parallels the 
culture industry approach of the Frankfurt school. However, Anders more explicitly ties the 
alienating and ideological character of ICTs to their very structure and mode of operation, or 
what would today be termed the set of affordances they offer. He focusses on the form and 
structure of ICTs rather than on the content they generally supply to individuals. 
The second general research question was RQ.B: How does Gunther Anders’ theory help 
us analyse the way in which modern day examples of digital media are involved in the 
reproduction of domination, alienation and ideology? 
Hence, in chapter 5, I elaborated my methodology for conducting the case study analysis 
on military drones and dating apps. I detailed the connection between these case studies 
and outlined some of the features of these technologies. I showed how I would use critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) to conduct research on existing material including material written 
by drone operators for the drone case study. For the dating app case study, I outlined how I 
would recruit participants for semi-structured interviews about their dating app usage. I 
explained how I would adopt a neutral approach in conducting this questionnaire by asking 
non-leading questions and following leads contained within users' responses. I subsequently 
showed how I would linguistically analyse the material by employing tools offered by CDA. I 
also derived 3 main research questions for each case-study. 
For the military drone case study, in the sphere of domination, I asked RQ1.1: What is the 
impact of the operation of military drones from a distance on operators’ psychological and 
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emotional willingness to kill humans? In the sphere of alienation, I asked RQ1.2: What is the 
impact of military drone operator’s work on their personal lives, their feelings of shame and 
guilt, and their mental health? In the sphere of ideology, I asked RQ1.3: In what respects do 
military drone operators believe or not believe in the ideology of ‘surgical strikes’? 
For the dating app case study, in the sphere of domination, I asked RQ2.1: How does the 
design and structure of dating apps influence user behaviour and how does the knowledge 
or the lack of knowledge about the circumstance that all communication and activity on 
dating apps is recorded and can be shared with companies and the police impact the 
everyday behaviour of users? In the sphere of alienation I asked: RQ2.2: How does the use 
of dating apps impact users’ feeling of connectedness and isolation, their identity, their 
feeling of happiness and sadness and their perception of beauty standards? In the sphere of 
ideology I asked RQ2.3: In what respects do users believe in or do not believe in the ability 
of dating app algorithms to create a “perfect match” of individuals? 
In chapter 6, I outlined how military drones are involved in domination. I therefore 
answered question RQ1.1: What is the impact of the operation of military drones from a 
distance on operators’ psychological and emotional willingness to kill humans? I argued that 
drones fragment the action of killing into various steps. They further make enemies appear 
as colourless and odourless blobs on a screen. Hence they, to some extent, make killing 
more detached and easier. Paradoxically, this means that drone operators can also express 
direct, unmodulated forms of aggression onto their enemies.  
In chapter 7, I outlined how military drones are involved in the production of modern-day 
alienation. I answered RQ1.2: What is the impact of military drone operator’s work on their 
personal lives, their feelings of shame and guilt, and their mental health? I showed how the 
structural affordances of drone operators allow them to adopt strategies of dissociation 
with regard to their actions. Despite this, some drone operators attempt to actively identify 
with their actions, reflecting Anders' call for producing new and enlarged emotions to 
account for the distancing effect of modern technologies.  
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In chapter 8, I looked at ideology and ask RQ1.3: In what respects do military drone 
operators believe or not believe in the ideology of ‘surgical strikes’? I showed that drone 
operators do not come to believe this ideology. Indeed they generally fear the idea that 
they have inadvertently killed children or civilians because of ‘unclear details’ (Wilkie 2015, 
9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec) (A.1) while conducting strikes. However, I detail how videos 
of drone killings circulate widely on social media and produce a spectacle-like version of 
war. Commentators glorify the ‘surgical’ (Raymond Cassiday 2020) (B.13.6) and extreme 
force with which the weapons carried by drones kill humans. Such videos tend to feed into 
racist ideologies. These tend to be black-and-white, pitting good Allied forces against evil 
terrorists.  
In chapter 7, I looked at the theme of domination in relation to dating apps and respond 
to question RQ2.1: How does the design and structure of dating apps influence user 
behaviour and how does the knowledge or the lack of knowledge about the circumstance 
that all communication and activity on dating apps is recorded and can be shared with 
companies and the police impact the everyday behaviour of users? Hence I discussed how 
dating apps reflect and to some extent re-produce lad and hook-up culture that pre-existed 
dating apps. Indeed their very structure is not neutral but offers affordances for competitive 
and individualistic understandings of sex and love. I discuss instances of sexual harassment 
reported by some of my participants. Regarding surveillance, I showed that many users 
employ the topos of security to justify dating app surveillance. However, at the same time, 
they assert that surveillance on dating apps might make them more careful about the 
information they share on these platforms. Dating app surveillance thus seems to illustrate 
Anders’ argument that technologies of surveillance establish the pre-conditions of 
totalitarianism, with users accepting a lack of privacy in the intimate sphere. 
In chapter 8, I looked at alienation on dating apps and ask RQ2.2: How does the use of 
dating apps impact users’ feeling of connectedness and isolation, their identity, their feeling 
of happiness and sadness and their perception of beauty standards? Accordingly, I analysed 
users' expressions of feelings of estrangement from their own use of dating apps. Users feel 
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isolated due to the mechanical and ‘inhuman way in which it works’ (E, male, age: 21). 
Others state that sexual and romantic encounters on dating apps feel like they could be 
reproduced ‘a million times’ (O, female, age: 30). Hence some users feel isolated and 
internally conflicted about trying to establish sexual and romantic relations on dating apps. I 
further showed how the very structure of dating apps makes sexual and romantic 
communication more fragmented, less rich and unique and more standardised. Some users 
speak of a ‘savage adherence to the mean’ (E, male, age: 21) in terms of beauty standards. 
Men, for instance, feel pressure to be ‘muscle-y and over six foot’ (E, male, age: 21). Female 
users speak of selecting their profile pictures on the basis of how many likes theses obtained 
on Instagram. This shows how dating app users become aware of a standard ideal of beauty, 
with which they sometimes feel pressure to conform. 
In chapter 9, I looked at the question of ideology on dating apps and ask RQ2.3: In what 
respects do users believe in or do not believe in the ability of dating app algorithms to 
create a “perfect match” of individuals? I showed how dating apps are involved in 
reproducing a sex positive ideology, which masks the fact that they promote sex and 
romance only to the extent that this feeds into their business model. Users of dating apps 
do not entirely believe in the notion of ‘perfect match’ as this conflicts with their experience 
of dating app use, which is generally far from smooth. However, the notion of ‘matching’ 
individuals does enter into their vocabulary. I ultimately showed how dating app PR 
encounters resistance among users and how this PR has had to adapt. This highlights some 
of the fallacies surrounding sex positive dating app discourse, including within academia. 
Anders’ theory that the simple use of technology produces ideology is both true and false. 
Users adopt a mentality connected to the affordances of dating apps, but they also remain 
critical of dating app functioning. 
 
12.2 New concepts emerging out of the case studies 
As I have argued in this thesis, Anders' critical theory of technology and his key concept 
of Promethean shame are significantly influenced by a Marxian conception of the human, 
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technology, domination, alienation and ideology. However, Anders' analysis is also inspired 
by a theory of human psychology. Indeed both Anders' parents were pioneers in the field of 
developmental psychology. Thus Anders repeatedly described Promethean shame as an 
'identity disorder' [Identifizierungs-Störung] (Anders [1956] 2003, 74, 77, 82, 83, 88, my 
translation). Anders argued that Promethean shame is a ‘relation with one-self that fails’ 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 68, my translation) further stating that ‘the person who feels shame 
finds himself at the same time both identical and non-identical with himself’ (Anders [1956] 
2003, 68, my translation). Hence, for Anders, Promethean shame is characterised not by ‘an 
equilibrated condition of a stable “mental state”, but by a mental state oscillating between 
irritation and disorientation’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 68, my translation).  It is a ‘troubled self-
identification, a “state of distress”’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 68, my translation) characterised 
by a ‘situation that one seeks to avoid’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 69, my translation). Hence 
Promethean shame relates to a person’s conscious subjectivity and identity. It refers to an 
identity crisis the person experiences in relation to his/her actions and existence. This arises 
when the latter are profoundly influenced by alienated forms of technology, giving rise to a 
discrepancy, or mismatch, between the person, the machine and their combined effects. 
Subsequently in his work Anders decided to express this idea through an analogy with a 
schizophrenic state whereby 'the individual becomes a divisum [division]' (Anders [1956] 
2003, 129, my translation). Indeed the root meaning of schizo-phrenia is 'to split' 'the mind'. 
As a result, Anders speaks of the radio and television as 'instruments of dispersion’ (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 129, my translation). He argues that these ‘devices produce artificial 
schizophrenia’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 129, my translation). He later further speaks of 'schizo-
topia' (Anders [1980] 2011, 56) when we are at home and lead a 'spatial dual existence' 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 56) through ICTs. For Anders, through distancing what is close and 
rendering close what is distant, the radio and television 'split the self into two or more 
partial beings' (Anders [1956] 2003, 131, my translation). According to my interpretation, 
Anders uses the concept of schizophrenia, as a stand-in for Marx’s concept of alienation, 
which is also characterised by a process of fragmentation. His argument parallels Marx’s 
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description of how machine labour 'distort[s] the worker into a fragment of a man' (Marx 
[1867] 1990, 799) by splitting apart physical and mental labour. Rather than being 
harmonised, human faculties are consequently scattered and fragmented. Human agency is 
lost as conscious faculties do not direct physical ones and physical experience is not 
accurately reflected in conscious thought. Hence activity and consciousness become reified. 
The subject is fragmented and becomes more objective. 
Anders shows how his concept of schizophrenia is meant to mirror Marx’s concept of 
alienation by referring to factory labour. He speaks of 
a split that we shall call a schizophrenic disorder of labor. The workers are 
“splintered”, because the relation between their affection (in this case, the innocent 
and pleasant happiness caused by the music at the workplace) and the nature of 
their affection (in this case, the production of means of annihilation, which makes 
them guilty) has ceased to exist (Anders [1980] 2011, 122) 
In this quote, Anders refers to a situation whereby weapons factory workers produce bombs 
while listening to gentle music supplied by loudspeakers. This is meant to make their work 
activity more pleasant. Workers affects are thus split off from, and at odds with, the reality 
of what they are producing. Anders thought that the concept of schizophrenia, 
characterised by a split away from reality and an inappropriate conflation of fantasy and 
reality, illustrated this situation. 
I argue that Anders’ concept of technologically induced schizophrenia should be updated. 
This is because it does not adequately express the condition of modern-day subjective 
fragmentation through digital ICTs. Schizophrenia understood as a mental disorder is 
characterised by “psychoticism” (Kernberg 2018, 23). This is a prolonged hallucinatory and 
delusional state where the difference between thoughts, ideas and reality is blurred. 
Individuals with this severe condition do not just have illogical ideas about themselves and 
the external world. They also tend to withdraw from all social interactions. This does not fit 
the fact that in the digital age individuals are said to be, on the contrary, highly connected 
through the internet. They are constantly available for remote communication. Perhaps the 
use of the term could highlight the ideological character of technology in Anders’ theory. 
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However, I argue that — if we are to adopt the modern psychological understanding of 
schizophrenia — it conveys a hallucinatory character to ideology that is too extreme and 
does not appropriately reflect Anders’ analysis. The latter conveys the sense that use of 
modern technology can be deceptive and that it can minimise serious processes. It does not 
convey the sense that modern ICTs are involved in the production of baseless fantasies and 
delusions. Admittedly today a case may be made that digital ICTs are involved in the 
promotion of conspiracy theories. But Anders' theory did not predict this and the use of the 
concept of schizophrenia remains too strong to accurately encapsulate this relatively 
marginal process. 
Moreover, Anders’ theory is not just about ideology. Reflecting Marx’s theory of 
alienation, it is about a split experience and a divided, fragmented self, leading to a 
reduction of subjective agency. Anders’ concept of Promethean shame shows how 
technology can be involved in a process where people conduct actions that they separate 
off from themselves. Consequently, they do not experience these actions in terms of their 
own emotions and moral sentiments. In sections 7.3 and 9.3, I showed how military drones 
and dating apps create affordances for operators and users to delay or even avoid 
altogether their feelings of responsibility for actions involving these technologies. Hence I 
argue that the more appropriate psychological concept to account for this alienating 
fragmentation of the subject is that of splitting. This is a primitive, image-distorting psychic 
defence whereby: 
conflicting motivations and aspects of self experience are compartmentalized or 
“split” apart. Thus, although nothing is repressed when dissociative defenses are 
employed, conflicting aspects of psychological experience are not simultaneously 
experienced in relation to the self, and in this process conflict is avoided. (Kernberg, 
Caligor and Clarkin 2007, 28) 
Building on Melanie Klein’s (Klein 1946, 102) original conception, Kernberg further states 
that: 
The main objective of the defensive constellation centering on splitting […] is to keep 
separate the aggressively determined and the libidinally determined intrapsychic 
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structures […] The price the patient pays for this defensive organization is twofold: 
the inability to integrate libidinally and aggressively invested self-representations into 
a self-concept which more truly reflects the actual self and to integrate libidinally 
invested and aggressively invested object-representations and so to understand in 
depth other people. (Kernberg [1984] 2004, 67) 
In psychoanalytic terms, the splitting defence mechanism is activated when negative or 
conflictual experiences are at risk of overwhelming positive feelings. It is an attempt to keep 
the bad and the good separate to protect the good (Lichtenberg and Slap 1973, 780). 
However, the result is a splitting off of negative feelings from one’s own self-understanding, 
values and responsibility. These affects are not integrated into the broader context of other 
affects and the principles and values that form part of the individual’s identity. Hence 
splitting is characterised by extreme, unmodulated, black-and-white affects, which lack 
nuance. I argue that military drones, dating apps and to some extent digital ICTs, more 
generally, offer affordances for individuals to conduct a form of technological splitting 
whereby they can separate off extreme affects from other emotions and their feelings of 
responsibility. Indeed, mirroring the splitting defence mechanism, these technologies 
channel aggression and love into completely separate arenas. Consequently, technological 
splitting leads to a fragmentation of the subject. The latter can no longer coherently 
integrate feelings of aggression and love, producing nuanced understandings of him/herself 
and the world. 
I highlight Kernberg’s use of the term 'compartmentalization' (Kernberg et al. 2007, 28) in 
the above quotes. Compartmentalisation is understood to be equivalent to fragmenting, as 
opposed to integrating, different aspects of subjective experience. It implies splitting off 
subjective experiences from the self. Compartmentalisation is something that characterised 
both the military drone and dating app case studies. With military drones, operators are told 
to actively 'compartmentalise' (U.S. Air Force and Space Force Recruiting 2019b) (B.2) 
between their war life and their civilian lives, which they live out at the same time. For 
instance, drone operators speak of conducting strikes during their work hours and then 
‘go[ing] home and go[ing] for a hike or hav[ing] dinner with [their] family’ (U.S. Air Force and 
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Space Force Recruiting 2019a) (B.1). With dating apps, users describe them as a 'channel' 
(M, male, age: 30) for a ‘physical need’ (M, male, age: 30), which is separate from the rest of 
their lives. Indeed, as pointed out by Bergström (2019), there are two radical breaks 
represented by dating app use compared to previous forms of sexual and romantic 
socialisation. Firstly, dating apps reflect a generalised use of a specialised service for 
recruiting sexual and romantic partners. Secondly, partners are recruited from outside the 
social environment of users. There is therefore a radical separation between users' sexuality 
and the rest of their social lives. One user described this as a ‘compartmentalis[ation]’ (Q, 
male, age: 27) (see section 9.3) of his sexual and romantic life. Together with others, who 
spoke of a 'separate moral universe' (E, male, age: 21), he highlighted the disconnect 
between his use of dating apps and his everyday life.  
Technological splitting also has implications for individual’s online self-presentation and 
experience. In section 10.3, I discussed how users select which pictures they upload on the 
basis of rigid conventions and the fact that these photos ‘had got quite a lot of likes on 
Instagram’ (D, female, age: 21). These conventions can sometimes lead users to present 
themselves online in a way that does not fit with their personality or values. Instead, this 
presentation is influenced by external socio-economic dynamics, which structure and are 
structured by the affordances of the technology. These affordances tend to reward 
behaviour that is direct and that captivates the most attention. For instance, Caldeira et al. 
report an account from one Instagram user, Ndiza, stating: 
despite not feeling comfortable sharing sexualized photographs of herself, Ndiza still 
recognized the popularity of such strategies and acknowledged that for her, ‘the 
pressure to be a naked lady of Instagram is very real.’ There is, as Megan explained, 
an uncomfortable temptation to share such sexualized content to gain popularity. 
(Caldeira, Bauwel and Ridder 2020, 1082) 
Equally the ‘numbers’ game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) 
dimension on dating apps discussed in section 9.3 creates pressure for users to approach 
others in ways that do not necessarily fit with their personality but are instead understood 
to conform to the way in which dating apps work. Hence technological splitting seems to 
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operate on dating apps within users’ ‘staged’ presentation of self (16 out of 18 respondents 
endorsed this term). This effect may also be relevant to social media more generally. 
Indeed users’ discussion of migrating photos from Instagram to dating apps highlights the 
process of mutual influence between dating apps and other social networking sites 
discussed in section 10.3 and represented in Figure 10.3.2 through the concept of the virtual 
ecosystem. This also fits with other research conceptualising social networking sites as 
places of convergence. I argue that this trend towards convergence masks a primary process 
of technological splitting in terms of users’ presentation online.  
Even though they converge into single profiles, the online presentation of individuals is 
influenced by the affordances of social media in general. For instance, Meikle and Young 
state that generally social media share the feature that they 
manifest a convergence between personal communication (to be shared one-to-one) 
and public media (to be shared with nobody in particular) (Meikle and Young in 
Fuchs 2014b, 37) 
This means that:  
Young people deploy an array of strategies to manage their online identities and 
activities in relation to imagined audiences on social media and negotiate visibility 
and various forms of monitoring (Gangneux 2021, 996) 
Trottier and Fuchs further state that: 
On social media like Facebook, we act in various roles, but all of these roles become 
mapped onto single profiles that are observed by different people who are 
associated with our different social roles. This means that social media like Facebook 
are social spaces, in which social roles tend to converge and become integrated in 
single profiles. (Trottier and Fuchs 2014, 15) 
On dating apps, for instance, users face the pressure of presenting through public profiles 
an attitude that they wish to be seductive for single individuals. This seductive aspect of 
online presentation is influenced by other platforms with affordances for accumulating 
‘likes’, such as Instagram. In turn, dating app design influences platforms with affordances 
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for networking and general sociality such as LinkedIn and Facebook. This means that a 
generalised modes of online presentation emerge. 
These favour the splitting off of online presentation as it becomes subject to the 
influence of the affordances of social media. As I showed in section 10.4, online 
presentations thus tend towards a subtle form of standardisation and conformity. For 
instance, Caldeira et al. speak of how the importance of  
following particular self-representation strategies in order to gain more likes and 
positive feedback [This] emphasizes one of the current central guiding logics of 
Instagram and of contemporary social media more broadly – the logic of quantified 
popularity (Caldeira et al. 2020, 1082) 
Hence a unified standardised code comes to appear within the presentation of individuals 
online in general. Presentations on Facebook and LinkedIn can also become influenced by 
quantified dynamics on dating apps, which emphasise an image of success based on physical 
traits such as youth and fitness. 
In some respects, this situation resembles Goffman’s argument that in presenting 
themselves in social situations individuals create a mask, a social persona, that fits with each 
situation. Hence there is a frontstage and a backstage to these social interactions. However, 
Goffman’s conception encourages us to think that the frontstage of social interactions is 
what really counts. According to some interpretations, Goffman demonstrates ‘that a self 
awaits individuals in every situation and every situation is a multi-situated activity system’ 
(Allan 1997, 6). Goffman further states that: 
In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of 
ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to—this mask is our truer self, the self 
we would like to be. In the end, our conception of our role becomes second nature 
and an integral part of our personality. (Park cited in Goffman 1959, 19-20) 
This view anticipates postmodern conceptions that there is no subject or human essence 
but only individuals’ history or accidents. 
However, most of my participants used the expression 'real life' (14 out of 18) to denote 
their offline activities. Despite the fact that many people who employ this extensively used 
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expression view their virtual lives as part of their material existence, the expression 
nevertheless implies that online activities are separate and virtual. The topos of real life 
implies that offline activities are more integrated with the person’s experience and identity. 
The irony contained in the use of the expression is revelatory. It signifies that even though 
online activities are real, they can also, to some extent, be distorted and split off. Indeed 
one of my interviewees stated that he doesn’t consider his behaviour on dating apps to 
reflect who he is ‘as a person outside of it’ (E, male, age: 21). 
Anders helps us understand how users’ presentation of self on dating apps and social 
media, more generally, can stand at odds with the reality and identity of individuals. This is 
illustrated by Anders’ play on Hegel’s notion that the truth is totality. Anders describes the 
whole formed by the totality of images transmitted through the television, stating that: 
[e]ven if every single thing were transmitted in conformity with truth, the mere fact 
that many real things are not shown would allow the totality to be transformed into 
a “prepared” world. Therefore the totality is less true than the sum of partial truths; 
in other words, modifying Hegel’s famous preposition: The whole, and only the 
whole, is mendacious. The task of those who supply us with the image of the world 
therefore consists in composing for us with many truths a mendacious whole. 
(Anders [1956] 2003, 156, my translation) 
In constructing a profile with multiple pictures that are supposed to represent the person as 
a whole, but which are actually carefully thought-out individual moments selected following 
external judgements, dating app users illustrate this argument. As one user stated: 'it’s 
ridiculous that you can reduce the quintessence of someone’s personality into a small bit of 
text and a few photos which are probably very unrepresentative' (E, male, age: 21). What 
appears as a well-rounded truth on dating apps, i.e. pictures of users with friends, going to 
concerts etc., is actually not an accurate representation. Users’ actual reality is generally 
that of wage-labour, solitude and leisure time spent behind the screen of their phones. 
Some use these applications for up to 40 minutes a day (R, male, age: 30). Hence dating 
apps promote splitting between the real and the ideal sides of a person in their presentation 
of self, leading to a mismatch, or fragmentation of these facets. 
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For both military drones and dating apps, this splitting in terms of the presentation of the 
self can bleed over into splitting in the sphere of activity and behaviour of operators and 
users. Indeed Lynn Hill states that she was 'sergeant at work' while operating drones and 
'Lynn at home' (Wilkie 2015, 4 min to 7 min 20 sec) (A.2). This fragmentation of her daily 
experience was facilitated by the fact that she waged war through a monitor screen. It 
involved the production of split off affects and behaviours which stood at odds with Lynn 
Hill’s identity. As shown in sections 7.2 and 9.3, actions and behaviour mediated by military 
drones and dating apps further respond to external parameters, be it the military chain of 
command or the ‘numbers’ game’ (L, male, age: 28; H, female, age: 26; A, male, age: 27) 
dynamic on dating apps. With military drones, operators can use the affordances of the 
technology to dehumanise enemies and sanitise killing. With dating apps, users can play the 
game of messaging, or conversely ‘filtering’ (A, male, age: 27; L, male, age: 28; K, male, age: 
30; B, male, age: 27) through, many different users at once. This leads some to reproduce 
toxic gender scripts and expectations regarding sex and beauty standards, which 
nevertheless stand at odds with their values and core beliefs.  
Indeed, in using drones, Lynn Hill discovered inclinations for violence within herself that 
she had previously thought to be impossible. Hence in her poem she states: ‘I have a 
capacity for war, I have a capacity for hate, I have a capacity for destruction, for violence, for 
lies’ (A.1) (Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec). She nevertheless struggled to 
identify with these capacities and integrate them into her sense of self. She states that she 
wanted ‘the name sergeant to separate me from the atrocities I had committed’ and that, 
without it, '[i]t was as if I had done them’ (Wilkie 2015, 4 min to 7 min 20 sec) (A.2). Here 
the subjunctive tense participates in a predication strategy that discursively qualifies the 
actions she has undertaken as not being her responsibility. She recounts the state of identity 
crisis that this created through her poems stating: 
There’s a limit to sanity, gage clocks out at two years. We ate poison like entrées at 
Blueberry Hill. I’ll have the crazy with a side of numb please. It took 63,072,000 
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seconds to go from me to someone else. (Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 11 min 15 sec) 
(A.1) 
In this poem Lynn Hill conveys the sense that her two years in the drone programme made 
her feel 'crazy' and 'numb'. The ‘me’ in the poem refers to a past, authentic self. She 
explains that the experience of drone war has made her become ‘someone else’. Similarly, 
in actively seeking out transactional, direct sexual relations, some dating app users felt 
‘regret and guilt’ (A, male, age: 27). They state: 'I don't like to think that my behaviour on 
that app was representative of who I am as a person outside of it' (E, male, age: 21). This 
highlights how technological splitting enables operators and users to channel their 
aggression or sexuality in an unmodulated, black-and-white fashion that they later dissociate 
from themselves. Each expression of affect occurs in a virtual arena. Hence it can be split off 
and not experienced in relation to the persons’ values and sense of responsibility. 
Summarising, technological splitting reflects a situation where modern ICTs are involved 
in the fragmentation of different aspects of users’ lives, leading to a conflict between their 
self-presentation, individuality and behaviour. The overall implication is the same as the one 
arising out of Anders' concept of Promethean shame: the relation between human actions 
and human emotions and sentiments is complicated and rendered problematic. However, 
there are also differences. Technological splitting means that affects are not totally absent, 
as indicated by Anders’ theory. Indeed the latter highlighted how dropping an atomic bomb 
can be done absent-mindedly, without emotions. In the above quote, Anders speaks of how 
workers can listen to music and feel mild emotions while producing weapons. Conversely, 
with technological splitting, affects are expressed in an overtly aggressive or sexual and 
hence de-sublimated form. Below, I show how technological splitting thus has ramifications 
for domination, alienation and ideology. 
In terms of domination, technological splitting favours a de-sublimated un-tempered 
expression of human drives. With military drones, operators conduct the absolute act of 
killing as though it were not their responsibility. With dating apps, users present sexualised 
photos of themselves online or send directly sexual messages because they perceive this to 
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be how dating apps work, and not a reflection of their personality. This split off expression 
of human drives means that affects are fragmented, and less susceptible to subjective 
control and modulation. For instance, Marcuse shows how Freud’s mature work 
conceptualises sexual and aggressive instincts as originating from a single quiescence 
seeking drive, which Freud calls the Nirvana principle (Marcuse [1955] 1969, 40). Because of 
their original unity, the life instincts can soak up aggressive drives if they are brought into 
contact with them. However, if technologies favour a fragmented, compartmentalised 
expression of these drives, this integrative and modulating process is inhibited. As shown in 
chapter 6, the words used to describe drone killings make use of irony and belittle the death 
of humans represented by blobs on the screen. There is scarcely any degree of empathy 
integrated within these killings. Hence technological splitting offers affordances for the 
projection of unmodulated hate. In terms dating apps, in section 9.3, I showed how dating 
apps offer affordances for direct, unmodulated individualistic expressions of sexuality that 
view obtaining sex and romance as a ‘return’ on an ‘investment’ (R, male, age: 30). This led 
to a climate of intimate intrusions. Some of my respondents also reported instances of 
sexual harassment. 
In terms of alienation, drone operators do not describe an emotionless experience of 
drone war, but one that is marked by conflicting emotions that they do not recognise as 
their own. Their subjective emotions appear to them as external objects that nevertheless 
they must identify with. Hence Brandon Bryant recalls entering a bloodthirsty headspace 
toward the end of his time operating drones. He recounts starting the day telling himself: 
“what motherfucker’s going to die today?” (Power 2013). However, this attitude was at 
odds with his identity as someone fighting for democracy and defending the US 
constitution. Similarly, dating app user M speaks of seeking direct sex with ‘who is available. 
Like, literally who is here’ (M, male, age: 30). He then experiences ‘no connection with that 
guy’ (M, male, age: 30). This suggests that he is expressing his sexual drive in a direct, de-
sublimated way. His desire for sex is split off from any emotional, subjective concern and is 
reduced to the level of a ‘physical need’ (M, male, age: 30). After a sexual encounter, he is 
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left asking: ‘What have I done? What have I just done?’ Others state about their dating app 
use that: ‘I don’t think it fits with my personality in terms of who I am and how I treat 
people in real life’ (E, male, age: 21). This illustrates how, through technological splitting, 
primary drives are expressed in an unmodulated, black-and-white manner that stands at 
odds with other aspects of the person’s individuality. Operators’ and users’ subjective 
experience is thus fragmented, reducing the share of free conscious activity within their life 
activity. This creates internal conflicts within operators and users. 
There is also a connection between technological splitting and ideology. As shown in 
chapter 8, reductive, callous and racist comments are made underneath ‘drone porn’ 
videos. The format of these videos is often black and white footage (sometimes infrared, 
with colours inverted) taken from an aerial view and showing people as figures or 
silhouettes. This creates affordances for viewers to jokingly compare the footage to a 
videogame. They can project their inner frustrations onto videos of killings and view these 
as a spectacle. This projection of affects is split off from any attempt to understand the 
complexity of the war. This favours reductive conceptualisations of the latter. Here good 
and militarily superior US forces are seen to oppose bad and militarily weak Taliban.  
In the dating app case study, in chapter 11, I highlighted how adverts cynically promoted 
dating apps by suggesting that users have standard desires to sleep with conventionally 
attractive people. Such views tie into user P's understanding that some male users are part 
of the 'alpha male group' (P, male, age: 31), implying that they are more successful with 
women for ingrained biological reasons. Indeed the topos of ‘alpha male’ implies that other 
men are ‘beta’, or physically inferior. User L also spoke of how women are 'by nature very 
discriminating' (L, male, age: 27). Both these users’ desire to be successful on dating apps 
was split off from a nuanced understanding of off-line human interactions. The very design 
of dating apps, which structures flirtation along competitive and appearance-based lines 
similar to those of a speed dating event, or a beauty pageant, seemed to encourage these 
users' reductive and fallacious theories about human attraction. Dating apps seem to cater 
perfectly to the competitive and individualistic culture of sex and romance that they 
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themselves reinforce, and which these users mistook for a fixed and natural state of affairs. 
Accordingly, the splitting of affect from complex understandings of reality favours techno-
euphoria, the unquestioning celebration of given forms of technology because these are 
seen as accomplishing a valuable social function. 
 
Figure 12.2.1: Technological splitting and digital identity diffusion reproduce domination, 
alienation and ideology 
Figure 12.2.1 shows how the process of technological splitting offers affordances for 
domination, as modern digital technologies allow for the direct expression of affects and 
drives. In the case of military drones, this yields a strong affordance for violence. In the case 
of dating apps, this yields a tendency toward individualistic and competitive sexual and 
romantic behaviour. Some theorists further highlight how a tendency toward sexual 
harassment is present in the very sexual scripts enacted on dating apps. Such 
technologically based domination can form the basis for alienation as split off actions and 
affects are not integrated with regard to the self. The notion of technological splitting builds 
on Anders’ theory of how technology conditions human activity and complicates the 
relation between humans, their actions and their sentiments. Operators of military drones 
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and users of dating apps express extreme affects that are at odds with their sense of self. 
Figure 12.2.1 shows how technological splitting can form the basis for the production of 
modern-day ideology. The impersonal projection of de-sublimated affects favours the 
construction of reductive, black-and-white narratives. These construct the Taliban as the evil 
enemy without accounting for the historical-social-political and economic reasons for their 
existence. Conversely, these construct dating apps as perfectly catering to a standardised 
human need for casual sex and romance. Given the feelings of alienation discussed by my 
respondents, this celebration of dating apps constitutes a form of techno-euphoria. 
 
12.3 Is Anders a technological determinist? 
In 2020, the video of the murder of George Floyd sparked international outrage and 
helped re-ignite the Black Lives Matter movement against systemic racism and police 
brutality in Western democracies and elsewhere. The video of the killing was taken on 
mobile phones by bystanders. It circulated rapidly on social media and protests were quickly 
organised using the same platforms. Given that modern forms of technology were a factor 
in creating such a crucial movement, one could question the overall negative and pessimistic 
view of technology found within Anders’ theory. One may further question why such a 
theory should be updated and reformulated in this thesis. I answer this question by first 
looking at Anders’ own experience of an analogous circumstance. 
In 1979, in the preface to the fifth edition of Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (Anders 
[1956] 1961), Anders re-examined ‘the totally negative judgement that I made in regards to 
the mass media’ (Anders [1979] 2002, 12-13, my translation). Since the publication of the 
first volume of Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (Anders [1956] 1961), television was used in 
ways that Anders could not have predicted in the 60s. Namely, journalistic reports showing 
the suffering of the civilian population in the Vietnam war were disseminated to American 
homes thanks to the television. However, instead of going back on his main techno-
pessimistic argument Anders stated: 
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my theses – the television makes man passive and teaches him to systematically 
mistake appearance for essence; the world comes to mirror the images because 
historical events always model themselves on the basis of the needs of the television 
– are even truer today than they were then. […] the theses, despite everything, still 
need to be completed and sometimes strengthened: even if it has appeared that 
since then televised images deliver to our homes, in some situations, a reality that, 
without them, would remain unknown to us. The direct perception of reality is 
certainly preferable to the perception of images, but the latter are still better than 
nothing. The images of the war in Vietnam which were broadcast daily in American 
households helped “open” the tired and vacant eyes of thousands of citizens, 
triggering a protest movement that played a significant part in putting an end to the 
genocide that was being committed at that time. (Anders [1979] 2002, 12-13, my 
translation) 
Hence Anders was able to maintain a critical view of technology while not denying the fact 
that technologies that are produced by advanced industrial societies can also be used for 
good ends. One of Anders’ primary arguments is that what 
shapes and deforms us, are not just the objects that the “means” mediate, but the 
means and contraptions themselves. These are not merely objects of multiple 
possible uses, but have their own determinate structure and function. (Anders [1956] 
2003, 98 my translation) 
In other words, Anders conceived technology as potentially offering affordances for good 
ends. However, he conceived the general frame of technology as predominantly negatively 
influencing human existence. Hence, contrary to the impression one could receive by 
reading some of Anders’ most provocative statements, such as that technology has become 
‘the subject of history’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 1), Anders’ argument about technology is not 
absolutist. Below I trace the evolution of Anders’ thought on technology to argue that 
Anders presents an overall techno-pessimist theory of technology. However, his theory is 
not techno-determinist, as it conceptualises the essence of technology as being forged 
within, and influenced by, capitalist societies. Moreover, it accepts that existing 
technologies can be used for good ends. 
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In Table 12.3 I summarise how Anders’ view of technology progressed throughout his life. 
I show how Anders’ conception of technology is one where society and technology mutually 
influence one-another. Moreover, with time, Anders became increasingly prepared to 
recognise the positive impacts modern forms of technology could have. He did this while 
maintaining a critical view of the direction in which technology should be steered. 
Year 1948 1956 1964 
Publication On the Pseudo-Concreteness 
of Heidegger's Philosophy 
The Obsolescence of 
Man, Volume I: on the 
Soul in the Epoch of the 
Second Industrial 
Revolution 
We, Sons of Eichmann: 
An open letter to Klaus 
Eichmann 
Quotation Operating a modern machine 
does not reveal it at all; its 
"alienation" is obviously 
reckoned within present-day 
society and in its division of 
labor (Anders [Stern] 1948, 
344); 
The province of Heidegger's 
concreteness begins behind 
hunger and ends before 
economy and machine 
(Anders [Stern] 1948, 347) 
It is not the single 
commodity which is 
thirsty, but the universe 
of commodities in their 
totality; because what I 
have called the ‘the 
thirst of objects’ is 
nothing other than the 
interdependence of 
production, that is the 
fact that all products 
have interdependent 
relations and refer to 
one-another. (Anders 
[1956] 2003, 168-169, 
my translation) 
In short, their self-
expansion is limitless; 
the machines’ thirst for 
accumulation is 
insatiable. (Anders 
[1964] 2015, 17) 
all the machines would 
be dependent on one 
another, and vice 
versa, and each and 
every one of them 
would have to help 
their peers to operate 
as best as possible. 
(Anders [1964] 2015, 
17) 
Interpretation Break with Heidegger. There 
are no machines in 
Heidegger’s philosophy, only 
tools. How does this account 
for the modern experience of 
factory work? Heidegger does 
not see a link between 
technology and the economy. 
He does not see the 
alienation arising from 
machine work. 
Reference to Marx 
([1867] 1990, 154-177). 
Technologies are ideal 
realisations of the 
commodity-form. The 
commodity-form has 
conquered the entire 
world and technologies 
are furnishing it with its 
most perfect realisation. 
Technologies now do 
what commodities 
have done previously; 
they expand and 
conquer the world. The 
world of commodities 





Society > Technology 
(negative) 
Society > Technology 
(negative) 
Technology > Society 
(negative) 




Year 1977 1969 
Publication The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: On 
the Destruction of Life in the Epoch of 
the Third Industrial Revolution 
 
The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: On 
the Destruction of Life in the Epoch of 
the Third Industrial Revolution 
 
Quotation It would be senseless to expect that the 
non-freedoms (described above) will 
disappear with the end of capitalism 
(which may very well come to an end 
someday), because they are the 
consequences of technology to a much 
greater extent than they are the 
consequences of property relations. 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 73); 
 
the consequences of technology will not 
be transformed with the transformation 
of property relations (Anders [1980] 
2011, 61, italics in original) 
The attitude towards technology in the 
underdeveloped countries has to be 
completely differentiated from the 
attitude that must be adopted in the 
countries with advanced technology. 
The absence of technology in the 
underdeveloped countries is an 
incomparably greater danger than its 
existence. In these countries, an anti-
technological attitude, which is valid 
among us, must sound like madness. 
(Anders [1980] 2011, 85) 
Interpretation Specifies that, because a dominating, 
alienating and ideological dimension 
has been inscribed into modern 
technologies, it is no longer enough to 
transform the economic system. For 
instance, surveillance technologies will 
not cease to be problematic if private 
property relations are abolished. Argues 
that this is not opposed to a Marxist 
view. 
Specifies that he is not against 
developing nations adopting existing 
industrial technologies. His argument is 
about what technologies are produced 
and established in advanced capitalist 




Technology > Society (negative) Technology > society (positive) 
Table 12.3 The evolution of Anders’ thought on the relation between society and technology 
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Year 1979 1992 
Publication The Obsolescence of Man, Volume I: on 
the Soul in the Epoch of the Second 
Industrial Revolution 
The Obsolescence of the Proletariat 
Quotation The direct perception of reality is 
certainly preferable to the perception 
of images, but the latter are still better 
that engineer and with him the 99 per 
cent of his colleagues – lives and works 
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than nothing. The images of the war in 
Vietnam which were broadcast daily in 
American households helped “open” 
the tired and vacant eyes of thousands 
of citizens 
(Anders [1979] 2002, 12-13, my 
translation) 
 
as blindly as the unqualified industrial 
worker, who without knowing for what 
purpose […] presses a lever up and 
down a thousand times a day (Anders 
[1992] 2013, 147, my translation) 
 
Interpretation Technologies played a role in spreading 
information about the horrors of the 
Vietnam war. However, this does not 
take away from the fact that the 
general frame through which this 
information is conveyed is problematic. 
Merges an explicitly Marxist view of 
class struggle with a concern for the 
dominating, alienating and ideological 
character of modern technologies. Says 
that, given our relationship of non-





Technology > Society (positive) Technology > Society (negative) 
Table 12.3 The evolution of Anders’ thought on the relation between society and technology 
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Table 12.3 shows how Anders did not believe that technology shapes society and not the 
other way around. For instance, in The Obsolescence of Man, vol. I, Part II: ‘The World as 
Phantom and Matrix’, Anders speaks about consumerism and how technologies such as the 
radio and the television represent ideal realisations of the logic of commodities. Specifically, 
see sections: 5 ‘occurrences come to us, we do not go to them’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 106-
109, my translation); 8 ‘Familiarisation and its commodity character’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 
116-118, my translation); 21 ‘the creation of needs. […] commodities are thirsty, and so are 
we with them’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 162-169, my translation); and 22 ‘The first axiom of 
economic ontology, the single exemplar is not’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 173-177, my 
translation). Here Anders speaks of how ICTs mirror the logic of commodities and the 
economy. Anders’ 1964 book, We, Sons of Eichmann (Anders [1964] 2015) no longer 
referrers to a ‘universe of commodities’ (Anders [1980] 2010, 110) thirsting after one-
another and expanding to conquer the world. Now it is machines who take on this role (see 
Anders [1964] 2015, 16-19). This indicates that Anders thought that, in some respects, 
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modern forms of technology had taken over the role that commodities previously held in 
structuring the interaction of individuals. 
Anders’ latest writing Die Antiquiertheit des Proletariats [The Obsolescence of the 
Proletariat] (Anders 1992a) makes most explicit how Anders conceptualises that technology 
has taken on the role that was previously attributed to commodities, private property 
relations and the economy, making individuals lose control over their production. Here 
Anders argues that modern wellbeing should be assessed according to the standard of 
freedom (Anders [1992] 2013, 147) granted by modern machines. He argues that this is low 
because individuals are powerless to shape their own technology. Increasingly there is a 
dimension within Anders’ thought that argues that: ‘the consequences of technology will 
not be transformed with the transformation of property relations’ (Anders [1980] 2011, 61). 
Anders’ conception can be characterised as techno-pessimist. It primarily views modern 
forms of technology as an obstacle for human emancipation and a foundation for 
totalitarian systems. However, Anders is not techno-determinist, because he saw how the 
essence of the technology that he criticised derived from consumer capitalist societies. 
Moreover, he did not argue for a wholesale rejection of technology. To the contrary, Anders 
criticised Heidegger for adopting a ‘machine-smashing attitude’ (Anders [Stern] 1948, 344). 
Anders believed that technological structures are totalising in the same way that social and 
economic systems are. Consequently, his conception is not one that invites individuals to 
embark on a ‘private strike’ (Anders [1956] 2003, 11) and individually reject technology. It 
invites individuals to engage in collective action to address the unfreedom that technical 
systems are a factor in reproducing. His theory encourages us to think about the conception, 
design and application of modern forms of technology. It shows us, with unprecedented 
detail, how the latter is not neutral, but reproduces modern forms of domination, alienation 
and ideology. I argue that Anders’ work further understands these categories through a 
Marxist lens which views alienation as arising from a division and inversion of subject and 
object. In this, Anders’ thought can be fundamentally distinguished from that of Heidegger, 
who argued for a return to artisanal forms of technology. 
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Below I graphically represent how Günther Anders’ philosophy is, to a significant degree, 
techno-pessimistic without being techno-deterministic. I do this using the ‘dialectic of 
technology/media & society’ elaborated by Fuchs (Fuchs 2011, 114-115). The latter offers a 











Figure 12.3.1: Evaluating the degree of Anders’ techno-determinism. Photograph courtesy of 
Gerhard Oberschlick 
 
Figure 12.3.1 shows how most of Anders’ work (e.g. Anders [1956] 2003 [OMI], [1980] 
2011 [OMII], [1964] 2015 [Eichmann]) focussed on the influence of technology on society. 
However, some portions of this work (e.g. Anders [1956] 2003, [1980] 2011) also show how 
this technology was, to begin with, forged within consumer capitalist societies. Hence it 
reproduces the domination, alienation and ideology of these societies, potentially carrying it 
forward into post-capitalist societies. This means that Anders’ theory is not techno-
determinist, as it conceives technology and society as mutually influencing one-another. 
This can also be seen by looking at the last row in Table 12.3, which charts how some of 
Anders’ statements accept that technology can positively influence society. However, in 
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focussing on the primarily negative effect of technology on society Anders’ theory can be 
characterised as techno-pessimistic. 
In figure 12.3.2 below, I show how Anders’ techno-pessimism was not absolute. With 
time, Anders became increasingly prepared to accept that capitalist forms of technology 
could positively influence society. However, he never turned back on his criticism of the 
general frame of modern forms of technology. I graphically represent the focal point of 
Anders’ mental work through lines. During Anders' middle years he narrowly focussed on 
the negative effects of technology on society. The dotted line shows the cursory interest 
Anders had for the negative effect of society on technology. The figure also shows that as 
Anders aged and reached the end of his life, the focus of his attention broadened to account 
for the positive effect existing technologies could have on society. He also became prepared 
to accept that society could have a positive effect on technology, through promoting 
photojournalism, for instance. 
 
 
Figure 12.3.2: Anders techno-pessimism and techno-optimism. Photographs courtesy of 
Gerhard Oberschlick 
 
What lessons does Anders’ work offer for contemporary conceptions of technology? 
Anders’ insistence on how the frame of modern technology can have a negative impact on 
society encourages us to question technology more deeply than most theories. The aim 
should be to change the current essence of technology. This was forged within the capitalist 
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economy and is based on maximum output and maximum input, for Anders (see section 
3.3.4). In the digital era, military drones and dating apps are examples of this essence. They 
promise efficiency but they also promote continued, almost unending use. They thus 
illustrate Anders’ argument that the means have become the ends (Anders [1956] 2003, 
236). This mirrors the inversion of subject and object described by Marxist theory, which 
renders human activity standardised and objective, rather than creative and subjective. 
Some Marxist theorists wish to name the type of social and conscious activity that is to 
replace wage labour in communist societies ‘productive leisure’ (Kurz [1991] 2011). This 
implies that it is something different to labour. Similarly, Anders’ critique of technology does 
not concern mere cosmetic changes to software and hardware design, or even its 
repurposing. It encourages us to radically re-think the modern technological project, to 
produce articles of necessity which aim at enriching human experience and emotions and 
not simply at maximising output, while also drawing a maximum of input. Perhaps such 
forms of technology should also bare a different name. 
Future studies could investigate to what extent some existing technologies point towards 
this new essence. For instance, in what respects do green technologies differ from the 
essence of maximum yield at maximum input outlined by Anders? In what other respects 
are they compatible with this essence and potentially factors in reproducing domination, 
alienation and ideology? 
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Appendix A: Sampling Source Material for the Military Drone Case Study 
First, I explain how I have divided the material that I sampled into civil society and official 
discourses. Then I present this material in Table A. 
Looking at material which is already available on the internet runs the risk of producing a 
biased sample. This could arise if there is a ‘distortion in the representativeness’ (Bryman 
2012, 187) of the discourses that I am analysing, meaning that the voice of certain groups is 
excluded from the research. In my case, I run the risk of mainly including discourses 
produced by ex-operators who are critical of the drone programme.  
To counter this tendency, I design my study by looking at both critical and non-critical 
accounts. Hence, I divide tokens of discourse into two categories: tokens that belong to the 
sphere of civil society and tokens that are produced by governments or military institutions. 
The main basis for the discourse tokens pertaining to civil society are interviews, video 
testimonials and written material produced by ex-military drone pilots. The main basis for 
government and military tokens is official recruitment videos, open days for the press 
featuring interviews with active drone operators, official statements and video releases by 
the RAF and U.S. Air Force. 
I use videos of Apache helicopters as stand ins for drone videos. I rely on the similarity of 
the video feed, which in both cases is used to aim weapons. Apache helicopters and drones 
share in common the fact that they both fire Hellfire missiles, though Apache helicopters 
also fire a chain gun, which drones do not have. I use Apache helicopter footage to 
overcome the limitations of footage of military drone attacks on YouTube. For instance, 
audio is always absent from these videos. Moreover, this footage is typically heavily edited 
and censored. In contrast, videos of Apache helicopters mostly have audio, which allows me 
to analyse commands to kill used by pilots and gunners. The footage is less edited. One 
difference in the footage is that it is more detailed than that of drones, as, for instance, it is 
taken from closer proximity. However, this means that any evidence of the desensitising 
effect of this black and white or infrared footage taken from an aerial view, logically also 
applies to the video feed of drones, which typically is grainier and less clear. 
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Below is a Table that lists the source material I will use for the military drone case study. 
This material is composed of written and spoken tokens that I will analyse using critical 
discourse analysis (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). 
I number items in the civil society column A.1, A.2, etc. I number items in the official 
discourse column B.1, B.2, etc. The A column contains 6 poems; 4 podcasts; 1 magazine 
print interview; 6 newspaper video and print interviews; 1 YouTube documentary which 
focuses heavily on an interview with Brandon Bryant; 2 journalistic reports in the form of a 
documentary and a book; 3 blogs, among which 1 film review; two articles written by drone 
operators (one is a film review); and one film. The B column contains 3 recruitment videos; 
1 investigative report; 4 leaked documents; 1 training manual; 1 video report from a press 
open day at an RAF base in Lincolnshire from which military drones are commanded; 2 
weapons’ brochures; 4 videos with audio of Apache helicopter attacks on YouTube; 16 
comments on these videos; 3 videos of drone attacks without audio and 1 partially censored 
transcript from a drone attack that killed civilians published in the Los Angeles Times. 
The civil society column (A) contains material that is more expressive and unconstrained. 
The poems give an insight into the inner thoughts and subjective perspective of drone 
operators. Similarly, the podcast interviews and long interviews on other media highlight 
the subjective experience of drone operators and the narratives they construct about their 
own lives. The blog posts are equally an insight into the subjective take on the world of 
drone operators. The articles give an insight into the political opinions of drone operators. 
The poems and interviews are the most information rich, which explains why they form the 
majority of sources in this column. However, I also value the articles, blogs and film reviews 
operators have written themselves. I therefore have included 3 blogs and 2 articles. I have 
opposed to the civil society column the official discourse column. The material in this 
column is more constrained and follows official protocols. This material gives me an insight 
into the official image and ideology produced in relation to military drones, which I find, for 
instance, in weapons brochures. This is especially true of the recruitment videos, where 
drone operators promote the drone programme. However, I also include official discourses 
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such as those found on official internal documents describing operations and in the 
commands drone and Apache helicopter operators use to strike. This official discourse gives 
me an insight into the attitude military agents adopt while killing, and how they construct, 
qualify, and position themselves with regard to these processes. 
A. Civil society B. Official 
 
Person featured: Lynn Hill, ex-sensor operator and 
image analyst 
 
Material: Poetry written and performed by Lynn 
Hill. It is primarily contained in an audio-visual 
recording of the show called ‘Holding it down: The 
Veterans’ Dreams project,’ which was performed at 
The Metropolitan Museum of Art in 2015 
(McGregor 2015). (Duration: 1 hr, 28 min, 6 sec) 
 
These poems were also recited by Lynn Hill on 
various podcasts (1 for the BBC (Wilkie 2015), 1 for 
North Carolina Public Radio (Cole 2013) and 2 for 
the National Endowment for the Arts (Reed 2013; 
Reed 2014)). The BBC one can be easily accessed 
on the BBC Sounds app. There are links to the other 
two in the bibliography. 
 
Below I transcribe the poems from: Wilkie, Andrew. 
2015. “Lynn Hill - 21st Century War Poet.” BBC 
World Service, November 29, 2015, sec. The 




• (A.1) Capacity (Wilkie 2015, 9 min 25 sec to 
11 min 15 sec) (119 words) 
Synopsis: Lynn Hill describes how she discovered 
that she was able to carry out violent acts using 
drones. She thereby realised that she had a 
capacity for both love and aggression. 
 
• (A.2) Name (291 words) (Wilkie 2015, 4 min 
to 7 min 20 sec) 
Synopsis: Lynn Hill describes how the killings she 
was carrying out through drones started to affect 
her consciousness when she switched to a new 
team that did not use official military titles but first 
 
Person featured: Various active drone 
operators 
 
Material: US Air force, Recruitment video 
for ‘Remotely piloted Aircraft (RPA)’ 
 
• (B.1) U.S. Air Force and Space Force 
Recruiting. 2019a. “Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Sensor 
Operator—Training Pipeline,” 
March 15, 2019, sec. YouTube 
video, 2 min 6 sec; 
• (B.2) ———. 2019b. “Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Sensor 
Operator—What  Are Some 
Challenges?” U.S. Air Force and 
Space Force Recruiting, March 15, 
2019, sec. YouTube video, 114 sec; 
• (B.3) ———. 2019c. “Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Sensor 
Operator—What Makes This 
Career Unique?” March 15, 2019, 














names. These acts were now associated with her 
name and so she could no longer separate them 
from herself. 
 
• (A.3) Dreams in Colour (145 words) (Wilkie 
2015, 1 min 27 sec to 3 min) 
Synopsis: Lynn Hill describes how, during her daily 
life in the US, her mind was full of vivid images of 
the war in Afghanistan and Iraq despite her only 
having experienced it remotely through the black 
and white image feed of the drones she was 
piloting. 
 
• (A.4) Untitled. Potential title: My Marine 
(255 words) (Wilkie 2015, 17 min 30 sec to 
19 min 45 sec) 
Synopsis: Lynn Hill describes how she was 
emotionally invested in a Marine soldier that was 
fighting in the war in Iraq. On one occasion, she 
gained detailed information about a mission he was 
on because she was piloting a drone in the same 
area. 
 
• (A.5) Untitled. Potential title: That’s a bad 
Question (280 words) (Wilkie 2015, 13 min 
to 15 min 20 sec) 
Synopsis: Lynn Hill recalls a college student asking 
her flippantly whether she has ever killed anyone. 
She comes up with the idea that all US citizens 
share a part of responsibility for the actions she has 
committed, because the war was determined 
through a democratic process. 
 
• (A.6) Untitled. Potential title: Brother (112 
words) (25 min 23 sec to 26 min 25 sec) 
Synopsis: waiting at the veteran’s affairs office Lynn 
speaks to a war veteran who lost his legs in 
combat. She feels guilty because her scars from the 
war are only mental and not physical. 
 
Person featured: Lynn Hill 
 
Material: four interviews on four separate podcasts 
featuring her poetry. 
 
• (A.7) Wilkie, Andrew. 2015. “Lynn Hill - 21st 
Material: Leaked confidential US army 
documents published as part of (B.4) 
Scahill, Jeremy, Josh Begley, Cora Currier, 
Ryan Devereaux, and Peter Maass. 2015. 
“The Drone Papers.” The Intercept, 
October 15, 2015. 
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Century War Poet.” BBC World Service, 
November 29, 2015, sec. The Documentary 
Podcast, 27 min 2 sec; 
• (A.8) Cole, Sean. 2013. “Ex-Drone Operator 
Captures Experiences in Poetry.” North 
Carolina Public Radio, 2013, sec. The Story, 
podcast 42 min 15 sec; 
• (A.9) Reed, Jo. 2013. “Lynn Hill Discusses 
Her Participation in ‘Holding It Down.’” 
National Endowment for the Arts, April 11, 
2013, sec. Stories, podcast 26 min 44 sec; 
• (A.10) Reed, Jo. 2014. “Remembering War 
through Art.” National Endowment for the 
Arts, May 22, 2014, sec. Jacob Lawrence’s 
War Series, podcast 28 min 29 sec. 
 
Description: 
In these interviews, Lynn Hill elaborates on some of 
the themes of her poems and describes her life 














• (B.5) U.S. Military. 2013a. 
“Geolocation Watchlist.” 
• (B.6) U.S. Military. 2013b. 
“Operation Haymaker”; 
• (B.7) ISR Task Force, Requirements 
and Analysis Division. 2013a. “ISR 
Support to Small Footprint CT 
Operations – Somalia / Yemen”; 
• (B.8) ISR Task Force, Requirements 
and Analysis Division. 2013b. “ISR 
Support to Small Footprint CT 
Operations – Somalia / Yemen: 
Executive Summary.” 
 
Description: These are leaked official US 
documents detailing target lists, operation 
information and general analyses and 
assessments by the US Air Force about 
their operations. They detail referential 
strategies, layers of supervision and 



















Person featured: Brandon Bryant 
 
Material: interview with Brandon Bryant in GQ 
magazine 
 
• (A.11) Power, Matthew. 2013. “Confessions 
Material: Training manual explaining rules 
of engagement to marine cadets 
 
• (B.9) United States Marine Corps. 
2017. Law Of War/ Introduction To 
Rules Of Engagement B130936 
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of an American Drone Operator.” GQ, 
October 23, 2013. 
 
Description: in depth look at Brandon Bryant’s 
experience of killing using drones, which he reveals 





Student Handout. Camp Barrett, 
Virginia: The Basic School, Marine 
Corps Training Command 
 
Description: this training manual highlights 
the criteria that US military personnel use 
to decide whether they can kill someone. 
The same principles apply for air attacks. 
Persons featured: various ex-military drone 
operators who have become whistle blowers 
denouncing the US Drone programme. These 
include (Cian Westmoreland, Michael Haas, 
Brandon Bryant, Stephen Lewis) 
 
• (A.12) Pilkington, Ed. 2015. “Life as a Drone 
Operator: ‘Ever Step on Ants and Never 
Give It Another Thought?’” The Guardian, 
November 19, 2015, sec. World news 
 
Description: various statements made by the drone 





Persons featured: active drone operators 
and their superiors 
 
Material: RAF press open day, Channel 4 
News report 
 
• (B.10) Mason, Paul. 2013. “Inside 
the ‘cockpit’ of a British Drone.” 
Channel 4 News, December 18, 
2013, sec. YouTube video, 5 min 19 
sec. 
 
Description: This is a news report 
presented by Paul Mason. This was based 
on the Ministry of Defence organising an 
open day for the press at RAF Waddington, 
Lincolnshire, the base from which RAF 
drones are piloted. This report features 
interviews with an active drone pilot and 





Persons featured: RAF drone operator 
 
• (A.13) Rayment, Sean. 2020. “RAF Drone 
Pilot Kills Terrorists from 3,000 Miles Away 
‘like Stepping on Ants.’” Mirror, May 30, 
2020, sec. UK News 
 
Material: various statements made about the UK’s 
drone programme. Discussion of the psychological 
impact on operators 
 
Source: 
Persons featured: Weapons companies 
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and 
Northrop Grumman 
 
Material: Brochure describing weapons for 
sales purposes. B.11 describes drone 
models. B.13 describes the ammunition 
used by the chain gun on Apache 
helicopters 
 
• (B.11) General Atomic Aeronautical 




Profile II: Multi-Role—Single 
solution. Www.Ga-Asi.Com 1–8. 
• (B.12) Northrop Grumman. 2018. 
“LW30 M789 HEDP: 30 x 113mm 
High Explosive Dual Purpose.” 
Northropgrumman.Com. 
 
Description: These brochures contain 
precision and capability discourses used by 
weapons’ companies to advertise drones. 
Persons featured: various ex-military drone 
operators who have become whistle blowers 
denouncing the US Drone programme. These 
include (Cian Westmoreland, Michael Haas, 
Brandon Bryant, Stephen Lewis) 
 
Material: 
         Press videos featuring interviews with ex-military 
drone operators. The Guardian video is an edited 
extract from the documentary by Hessen Schei, 




• (A.14) Hessen Schei, Tonje. 2015. “Drone 
Wars: The Gamers Recruited to Kill.” The 
Guardian, February 2, 2015, sec. YouTube 
video, 9 min 32 sec; 
• (A.15) Heller, Jake. 2015. “Former Drone 
Pilots Denounce 'Morally Outrageous’ 
Program.” NBC News, December 7, 2015, 
sec. YouTube video, 6 min 55 sec 
• (A.16) Goodman, Amy, and Juan Gonzalez. 
2013. “A Drone Warrior’s Torment: Ex-Air 
Force Pilot Brandon Bryant on His Trauma 
From Remote Killing.” Democracy Now!, 
October 25, 2013, sec. YouTube video 16 









Material: videos showing an apache 
helicopter attack plus comments on 
YouTube 
 
• (B.13) AH64Apacheaction. 2013. 
“Apache Helicopter Kills 20 
Taliban.” YouTube, February 27, 
2013, sec. video, 10 min 35 sec. 
[video since removed ca. 2020] 
 
o (B.13.1) diddle the poodle 
(2020) ‘Nothing better than 
Taliban compost to fertilize 
the local wildlife.’ [658 
likes] 
o (B.13.2) eijmert (ca. 2020) 
‘Free firtelized fields’  
o (B.13.3) Exotic Proxi (ca. 
2019) ‘When you notice 
this is not call of duty 
modern warfare’ 
o (B.13.4) DoOnalD TrUmmP 
(ca. 2019) ‘xxX-
TLIBAN_ALLAHUAKBAR-Xxx 
left the game’ 
o (B.13.5) Jean-Marie 
Asclépios #DBL_G1 #FDPH 
(2019) ‘I like the way the 
operator try not to kill 
animals’ [3.4K likes] 
o (B.13.6) Raymond Cassiday 
(2020) ‘Of most Apache fire 
teams , this one has been 
the most surgical ... [three 
heart emojis]’ 
o (B.13.7) Kyle Komarek 
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(2020) ‘"He's uh, no longer 
with us." Classic bad-assery 
from US owners of the 
night sky...’ 
 
• (B.14) SmokeyPG. 2012. “18+ 
*Warning Graphic* 2 Apache 
Helicopters Engage over 20 Taliban 
Fighters *NEW*.” YouTube, July 19, 
2012, sec. video, 15 min 18 sec. 
[Longer version of B.10 hosted by a 
different account; still not removed 
as of 20 October 2020] 
o (B.14.1) hctiB alliK (ca. 
2017) ‘I watch this video 
whenever I’m mad’ 
o (B.14.2) Lori Girl (ca. 2017) 
‘Not graphic. Quite 
satisfying actually.’ 
o (B.14.3) ltsj3v (ca. 2017) ‘I 
would never buy this game 




2016) ‘I watch this 
everytime [sic] there is a 
new terror attack’ 
 
• (B.15) Bone Tactical. 2015. “Apache 
Helicopter Blows Up Insurgent 
With IED in Backpack.” YouTube, 
July 2, 2015, sec. video, 1 min 54 
sec 
o (B.15.1) 616e6f6e (ca. 
2020) ‘Dude sounds like a 
dentist’ 
o (B.15.2) Bingre (ca. 2019) 
‘No animals were hurt in 
the making of this 
production’ 
o (B.15.3) Charles P. (ca. 
2019) ‘The dogs survived! 
hooray!’ 
o (B.15.4) IV IV (ca. 2018) ‘I'm 
glad the animals made it to 
safety !’ 
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o (B.15.5) Max ibrahim (ca. 
2018) ‘Will this run on a 
4gb ram pc??’  
o T FP (2020) ‘I love seeing 
the parts fly...just shows 
how destructive the 
weaponry is.’ 
 
• (B.16) Alex Broadbent. 2017. 
“(GRAPHIC WARNING) Apache 
Helicopter Takes Out Iraqi 
Insurgents.” YouTube, July 12, 
2017, sec. video 3 min 38 sec. 
o (B.16.1) daniel hannon (ca. 
2019) ‘I didn't find this 
video to be distressing at 
all’ 
o (B.16.2) lands8115 (ca. 
2019) ‘I am not distressed 
at all except I should have 
added more butter to my 
popcorn’ 
 
• (B.17) dvidshub. 2008. “UAV Kills 6 
Heavily Armed Criminals.” YouTube, 
April 11, 2008, sec. video 78 sec. 
• (B.18) Ministry of Defence. 2015a. 
“RAF Reaper Strike on ISIL Vehicle 
in Iraq July 6 2015,” July 9, 2015, 
sec. YouTube video, 1 min 17 sec. 
• (B.19) Ministry of Defence. 2015b. 
“RAF Reaper Neutralises Taliban 
Bomb Factory,” November 25, 
2015, sec. YouTube video, 1 min 20 
sec. 
 
Description: These videos contain extreme 
violence, but it is viewed through infrared 
images, which invert black and white. 
Because they aim to inspire awe and 
satisfy the violent fantasies of viewers, 
these videos can be classified as ‘war 
porn,’ or ‘drone porn’ in the case of B.17-
B.19. For instance, B13 gained over 
4,006,571 views and 28,000 likes, against 
only 2,400 dislikes, before it was removed 
by YouTube for containing graphic 
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violence. 
The Apache videos (B.13, B.14, B.15, B16) 
contain the audio of commands used to 
kill. Comments below all the videos 
commonly make light of the killings, 
glorifying them. The comments are un-
official discourse, but the content of the 
video is sometimes directly released by 

























Person featured: Brandon Bryant 
 
Material: Brandon Bryant interviewed in a YouTube 
documentary 
 
• (A.17) Engman. 2018. “Warrior in a Garden: 
Drone Operator Whistleblower,” April 14, 




This is a low budget YouTube documentary which 
mostly consists in a long interview with ex-drone 
Person featured: Predator drone crew 
 
Material: Article featuring an edited 
transcript of an occasion where a drone 
was involved in targeting civilians. The 
transcript was obtained by the LA Times 
through a freedom of information request. 
 
• (B.20) Cloud, David. 2011. “Combat 
by Camera: Anatomy of an Afghan 
War Tragedy.” Los Angeles Times, 
April 10, 2011. 
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operator and whistle-blower Brandon Bryant. 
Brandon explains his life journey since leaving the 
military, and how he came to take personal 






The transcript gives an insight into drone 
operatives’ level of accuracy in identifying 
combatants. The transcript shows 
operatives desire to use their weapons, 
regardless of the limited evidence that the 
people they are targeting are combatants. 
Material: extract from a documentary for Vice by 
independent journalist Ben Anderson covering the 
war in in Afghanistan 
 
• (A.18) Anderson, Ben. 2013. “This Is What 
Winning Looks Like (Part 1/3).” Vice, May 
15, 2013, sec. YouTube video, 29 min 1 sec  
 
Description: journalist Ben Anderson embedded 
with U.S troops in Afghanistan over a period of 
many months. This documentary features a candid 
interview with a U.S. general who expresses 





Persons featured: The British Army, 2007 Queen’s 
Company, The Grenadier Guards; US Marine Corps, 
2009 2nd Battalion 8th Marines, 2010 1st Battalion 
6th Marines, 2011 3rd Battalion 5th Marines 
 
Material: book which chronicles Ben Anderson’s 
time as an independent journalist embedded with 
US and UK troops. The conversations it contains are 
transcribed from tapes. 
 
• (A.19) Anderson, Ben. 2011. No Worse 
Enemy: The Inside Story of the Chaotic 
Struggle for Afghanistan. Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications. 
 
Description: Ben Anderson’s reporting is valuable 
because he is one of the few reporters who went 
out with Allied troops during active battles. 
Because he took the same risks as troops, many of 
them opened up to him. His reporting contrasts 
sharply with official narratives and information 
obtained from press releases. 
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Person featured: Cian Westmoreland, ex- drone 
communication systems engineer 
 
Material: 
Westmoreland blog post on Project Red Hand: 
 
• (A.20) Westmoreland, Cian. 2014a. “The 
Nomad.” Project Red Hand (blog). 
November 3, 2014. (9,117 words); 
• (A.21) Westmoreland, Cian. 2014b. “The 
Day I Stopped Being Afraid.” November 12, 
2014. (3,280 words); 
 
Description: 
These are posts on the website Project Red Hand 
which was set up by Brandon Bryant and others to 
speak out against the US drone programme. Cian 
Westmoreland reflects on the WikiLeaks video 
‘Collateral Murder’ showing US troops firing on 
journalists from an Apache helicopter. He further 
recounts his struggle with mental health issues 









Authors: Heather Linebaugh 
 
Material: Article for newspaper written by ex-drone 
operator.  
 
• (A.22) Linebaugh, Heather. 2013. “I Worked 
on the US Drone Program. The Public 
Should Know What Really Goes on” The 
Guardian, December 29, 2013, sec. Opinion. 
(1100 words); 
 
Articles discusses the issue of the image resolution 
of drones. Linebaugh discusses the difficulty of 
telling whether individuals are carrying weapons 







Person featured: Lynn Hill 
 
Material: Film review posted on Lynn Hill’s blog: 
The Predator and the Poet 
 
• (A.23) Torres, Lynn. 2016. “Eye in the Sky 
Movie: Did They Get It Right?” Predator and 
the Poet (blog). April 8, 2016. (602 words) 
 
Description: 
Lynn Hill reviews the film Eye in the Sky (2015) 
paying particular attention to the question of who 
is responsible given the chain of command leading 







Author: Cian Westmoreland 
 
Material: Film review in a newspaper article of Eye 
in the Sky (2015) 
 
• (A.24) Westmoreland, Cian. 2016. 
“Whistleblower’s Review of ‘Eye in the 
Sky.’” HuffPost, April 20, 2016. (1,410 word)  
 
Description: Westmoreland reviews the film Eye in 
the Sky (2015), stating that the film exaggerates the 








Film about drone warfare 
 
• (A.25) Hood, Gavin. 2015. Eye in the Sky. 
Raindog Films. 1 hr 43 min 
 
Description: 
This film centres on the moral dilemma of killing 
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through drones. The film shows drone operatives 
using statistics on the likelihood that a strike will kill 
civilians to determine whether they will shoot or 
not. On the whole, the film deals with the question 
of whether the cost of a human life can be 
calculated. It portrays drone technology to be more 
advanced than what it actually is by, for instance, 
suggesting that it can produce extraordinarily clear 
visual feeds. 
 
Both Lynn Hill and Cian Westmoreland have 
reviewed this film discussing whether it is accurate. 
Table A: Military drone tokens 
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This questionnaire is composed of three parts. The first is about your general experience 
of dating apps. The second looks a bit more in detail at usage practices. The third will be 
about your conversations on the platform. In addition, I will ask some very general 
questions at the beginning for context. 
Please remember that you are free to decline to answer any question and you can stop 
the interview at any time. You don’t have to give any reason for doing this. Finally, I just 
want to reiterate that I will transcribe the recording as soon as possible. The transcript will 
be anonymous. The only identifying information it will have is your age, gender and sexual 
orientation. After the interview has been transcribed, I will permanently delete the 
recording. I will notify you when this process is complete. 
There is no right or wrong answer! 
 
 
1. General questions 
(1.1) Can you say a little about when you started using Tinder or another dating app? 
(1.2) And what was your motivation for using this app? 
(1.3) Did you use other dating apps? If so, which ones? 
(1.4) What do you think are the commonalities and differences between the platforms 
you used? 
(1.5) Before you started using dating apps, did you meet people through chance 





2. PART I: General experience of dating apps 
(2.1) In general, do you think it is rather easy or rather difficult to find someone on Tinder 
who matches what you are looking for? In what respects?  
(2.2) Is it rather time-consuming or not so time-consuming to find an interesting “match” 
on Tinder? 
(2.3) Do you have a specific type of person that you are looking for on dating apps or that 
you are generally attracted to? 
(2.4) Have you ever met someone on [chosen dating app] where you felt that the person 
perfectly matched what you were looking for on [chosen dating app]? If yes, can you give an 
example and talk about it? 
(2.5) Have you heard of other users having similar experiences of “perfect matches” on 
[chosen dating app]? 
(2.6) Have you ever met someone on [chosen dating app] and felt that the person did not 
at all match what you were looking for on [chosen dating app]? If yes, can you give an 
example and talk about it? 
(2.7) If yes, have you heard of other users having similar experiences of imperfect 
matches on [chosen dating app]? 
(2.8) Do you think that the algorithms used on [chosen dating app] are effective at 
matching individuals? If yes, why and if no, why not? 
 
 
3. PART II: Your experience as a user 
(3.1) A: Your experience interacting with other users 
(3.1.1) Can you maybe give an example of how you met someone via [chosen dating app] 
whom you liked? How did your first contact come about? And how did the first meeting 
come about? Can you describe how your feelings to this user developed? 
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(3.1.2) Did very positive feelings develop online or after a personal meeting offline? At 
what point did you know that you liked this person? 
(3.1.3) Have you heard of cases where [chosen dating app] users invested a lot of time 
into communicating or meeting with a user, but then suddenly the contact ended. This is 
sometimes known as ‘ghosting’. If yes, can you say more about this example? How do you 
think this user felt? 
(3.1.4) And what about you, have you ever had experiences on [chosen dating app] that 
created negative feelings such as disappointment or isolation? If yes, can you talk more 
about it and give a concrete example? 
(3.1.5) The media often say that [chosen dating app] is primarily a platform for quick sex 
and one-night stands. Do you think this is rather true or false? Why? Do you think that’s a 
good or a bad thing? 
(3.1.6) How would you characterise your behaviour on dating apps? 
(3.1.7) Are you happy with this behaviour do you see it as fitting with your personality? 
 
(3.2) B: How you set up your profile 
(3.2.1) Can you talk about the images and profile information that you use on [chosen 
dating app] and that other users can see when viewing your profile? How do you select 
these images? How do you decide what information you put on your profile?  
(3.2.2) Do you think that users’ images are rather authentic or rather staged? Can you 
give examples? 
(3.2.3) One can sometimes hear that the way the bodies and lives of women and men are 
presented in the media is unrealistic. It is said that they are often presented as beautiful, 
happy, and perfect and that real life and real people are different. Do you think [chosen 
dating app] has rather positive or rather negative impacts on the standards of beauty? In 
what respects? Can you give concrete examples? 
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(3.2.4) Have you ever felt that [chosen dating app] is a place where people can take 
ownership of the way their body is and put forward an image that is different to the ideal 
standard of beauty which is presented in the media? 
(3.2.5) Have you ever been confronted with unrealistic expectations with regard to 
standards of beauty on dating apps? Has this ever made you feel negative about yourself? 
 
4. PART III: Conversations on dating apps 
(4.01) Many commercial Internet platforms and apps collect a lot of personal data about 
users. Have you ever been made aware of data collection practices on social media 
platforms such as Facebook? What do you think are the impacts of platforms such as 
Facebook on privacy? 
(4.02) Dating apps such as [chosen dating app] deal with quite personal information 
having to do with sexuality and intimacy. Do you think [chosen dating app] should store 
personal conversations that users have on the platform or not? If yes, why and if no, why 
not? 
(4.03) And what about images and videos that one user sends to another user. Should 
[chosen dating app] store such images and videos? 
(4.04) Have you ever talked about matters that you deem very personal, such as family, 
physical or mental health issues on [chosen dating app]? If yes, can you say more about it 
and give a concrete example? 
(4.05) Have you ever sent sensitive images or videos via the platform? If yes, can you say 
more about it and give a concrete example? 
(4.06) Have you ever talked in a sexually suggestive manner on [chosen dating app] or 
discussed sexual preferences and orientation? If yes, can you say more about it and give a 
concrete example? 
(4.07) Have you ever talked about drug use on [chosen dating app]? If yes, can you say 
more about it and give a concrete example? 
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(4.08) Did you ever have concerns about the data usage and storage practices of [chosen 
dating app]? If so, in what respects? If no, in what respects do you think users can trust 
[chosen dating app] to behave responsibly with data? 
(4.09) [chosen dating app]’s privacy policy says that the company stores personal data, 
including the content of your chats and sensitive data having to do with sexual orientation, 
intimate images or videos, etc. that you send. What do you think about these data collection 
and storage practices? 
(4.10) Did you know that [chosen dating app] stores lots of data about you for a long 
time? Has this in any way impacted your behaviour on the platform? Are there things you 
have deliberately not talked about on the platform that you would talk about in a face-to-
face conversation? If so, can you say more about it? (Is the reverse true?) 
(4.11) How do you feel about [chosen dating app] analysing your conversations and 
uploaded data for targeted ads? 
(4.12) [chosen dating app] shares information about a users’ profile, uploads, and 
communication with the police if there is a request to do so. What do you think about this 
practice? 
(4.13) Do you think that [chosen dating app]’s data storage and user practices could have 
negative impacts for you? If so, in what respects? If no, why not? 
 
 
5. FINAL REMARKS 
We’ve reached the end of this interview. Thank you so much for participating. This is 
sincerely appreciated. 
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Appendix C: Copyright permission 
 
 
In figures 12.3.1 and 12.3.2, I have used two pictures of Günther Anders. The copyright 
holder of the latter is Gerhard Oberschlick, who has kindly granted permission for me to use 
these pictures in this thesis.  
He can be contacted at gerhard.oberschlick@gmx.net 
